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The History of Rome

VOLUME 4

PART 2

THEODOR MOMMSEN



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THE
HISTORY OF ROME

BY
THEODOR MOMMSEN.

TRANSLATED,
WITH THE AUTHOR'S SANCTION AND ADDITIONS,

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CHAPTER VIII.

THE JOINT RULE OF POMPEIUS AND CÆSAR.

AMONG the democratic chiefs, who from the time of the consul- Pompeius
late of Cæsar were recognised officially, so to speak, as the joint and Cæsar
rulers of the commonwealth, as the governing "triumvirs," in juxtapo-
Pompeius in public opinion occupied decidedly the first place. sition.
It was he who was called by the Optimates the "private
dictator;" it was before him that Cicero prostrated himself
in vain; against him were directed the sharpest sarcasms in
the placards of Bibulus, and the most envenomed arrows of
the conversation in the saloons of the opposition. This was
only to be expected. According to the facts before the
public Pompeius was indisputably the first general of his
time; Cæsar was a dexterous party leader and party orator,
of undeniable talents, but as notoriously of unwarlike, and
indeed of effeminate, temperament. Such opinions had been
long current; it could not be expected of the rabble in high
quarters, that they should trouble themselves about the real
state of things and abandon platitudes once established,
because of some obscure feats of heroism on the Tagus.
Cæsar evidently played in the league the mere part of the
adjutant, who executed for his chief the work which Flavius,
Afranius, and other less capable instruments had attempted
and not performed. It seemed as if even his governorship
could not alter this state of things. Afranius had only
recently occupied a very similar position, without thereby
acquiring any special importance; several provinces at once
had been of late years repeatedly placed under one governor,
and often far more than four legions had been united in one
hand; as matters were again quiet beyond the Alps and

prince Ariovistus was recognised by the Romans as a friend and neighbour, there was no prospect of conducting a war of any moment there. It was natural to compare the position which Pompeius had obtained by the Gabinio-Manilian law with that which Cæsar had obtained by the Vatinian; but the comparison did not turn out to Cæsar's advantage. Pompeius ruled over nearly the whole Roman empire; Cæsar over two provinces. Pompeius had the soldiers and the treasures of the state almost absolutely at his disposal; Cæsar had only the sums assigned to him and an army of 24,000 men. It was left to Pompeius himself to fix the point of time for his retirement; Cæsar's command was secured to him for a long period no doubt, but yet only for a limited term. Pompeius, in fine, had been intrusted with the most important undertakings by sea and land; Cæsar was sent to the north, to watch over the capital from upper Italy and to take care that Pompeius should rule it undisturbed.

Pompeius
and the
capital.

Anarchy.

But when Pompeius was appointed by the coalition to be ruler of the capital, he undertook a task far exceeding his powers. Pompeius understood nothing further of ruling than might be summed up in the word of command. The waves of agitation in the capital were swelled at once by past and by future revolutions; the problem of ruling this city—which in many respects might be compared to the Paris of the nineteenth century—without an armed force was infinitely difficult, and for that stiff and stately pattern-soldier altogether insoluble. Very soon matters reached such a pitch, that friends and foes, both equally inconvenient to him, could for his part do what they pleased; after Cæsar's departure from Rome the coalition still ruled doubtless the destinies of the world, but not the streets of the capital. The senate too, to whom there still belonged a sort of nominal government, allowed things in the capital to follow their natural course; partly because the section of this body controlled by the coalition lacked the instructions of the regents, partly because the angry opposition kept aloof out of indifference or pessimism, but chiefly because the whole aristocratic corporation began to feel at any rate, if not to comprehend, its utter impotence. For the moment therefore there was nowhere at Rome any power of resistance in any sort of government, nowhere a real authority. Men were living in an interregnum between the ruin of the

aristocratic, and the rise of the military, rule; and, if the Roman commonwealth has presented all the different political functions and organisations more purely and normally than any other in ancient or modern times, it has also exhibited political disorganisation — anarchy — with an unenviable clearness. It is a strange coincidence that in the same years, in which Cæsar was creating beyond the Alps a work to last for ever, there was enacted in Rome one of the most extravagant political farces that was ever produced upon the stage of the world's history. The new regent of the commonwealth did not rule, but shut himself up in his house and sulked in silence. The former half-deposed government likewise did not rule, but sighed, sometimes in private amidst the confidential circles of the villas, sometimes in chorus in the senate house. The portion of the burgesses which had still at heart freedom and order was disgusted with the reign of confusion, but utterly without leaders and helpless it maintained a passive attitude, and not merely avoided all political activity, but kept aloof, as far as possible, from the political Sodom itself. On the other hand the rabble of every sort never had better days, never found a merrier arena. The number of little great men was legion. Demagogism became quite a trade, which accordingly did not lack its professional insignia — the threadbare mantle, the shaggy beard, the long streaming hair, the deep bass voice; and not seldom it was a trade with golden soil. For the standing declamations the tried gargles of the theatrical staff were an article in much request;* Greeks and Jews, freedmen and slaves, were the most regular attenders and the loudest criers in the public assemblies; frequently, even when it came to a vote, only a minority of those voting consisted of burgesses constitutionally entitled to do so. "Next time," it is said in a letter of this period, "we may expect our lackeys to outvote the emancipation-tax." The real powers of the day were the compact and armed bands, the battalions of anarchy raised by adventurers of rank out of gladiatorial slaves and blackguards. Their possessors had from the outset been mostly numbered among the popular party; but since the departure of Cæsar, who alone understood how to impress the democracy, and alone knew how to manage it, all discipline had departed from

The anar-
chists.

* This is the meaning of *cantorum convitio contiones celebrare* (Cic. *pro. Sest.* 55, 118).

them and every partisan adopted his politics at his own hand. Even now, no doubt, these men fought with most pleasure under the banner of freedom; but, strictly speaking, they were neither of democratic nor of anti-democratic views, but inscribed on the in itself indispensable banner, as it happened, now the name of the people, anon that of the senate or that of a party chief; Clodius for instance fought or professed to fight in succession for the ruling democracy, for the senate, and for Crassus. The leaders of these bands kept to their colours only so far as they inexorably persecuted their personal enemies—as in the case of Clodius against Cicero and Milo against Clodius—while their partisan position served them merely as a handle in these personal feuds. We might as well seek to set a charivari to music as to write the history of this political witches' revel; nor is it of any moment to enumerate all the deeds of murder, besiegings of houses, acts of incendiarism and other scenes of violence within a great capital, and to reckon up how often the scale was traversed from hissing and shouting to spitting on and trampling down opponents, and thence to throwing stones and drawing swords.

Clodius.

- The principal performer in this theatre of political rascality was that Publius Clodius, of whose services, as already mentioned (P. 207), the regents availed themselves against Cato and Cicero. Left to himself, this influential, talented, energetic and—in his trade—really exemplary partisan, pursued during his tribunate of the people (696) an ultra-democratic policy, gave the citizens corn gratis, restricted the right of the censors to stigmatise immoral burgesses, prohibited the magistrates from obstructing the course of the comitial machinery by religious formalities, set aside the limits which had shortly before (690), for the purpose of checking the system of bands, been imposed on the right of association of the lower classes, and re-established the “street-clubs” (*collegia compitalicia*) at that time abolished, which were nothing else than a formal organization—subdivided according to the streets, and with an almost military arrangement—of the whole free or slave proletariat of the capital. If in addition the further law, which Clodius had likewise already projected and purposed to introduce when prætor in 702, should give to freedmen and to slaves living in *de facto* possession of freedom the same political rights with the freeborn, the author of

52.

all these brave improvements of the constitution might declare his work complete, and as a second Numa of freedom and equality might invite the sweet rabble of the capital to see him celebrate high mass in honour of the arrival of the democratic millennium in the temple of Liberty which he had erected on the site of one of his burnings at the Palatine. Of course these exertions in behalf of freedom did not exclude a traffic in decrees of the burghesses; like Cæsar himself, Cæsar's ape kept governorships and other posts great and small on sale for the benefit of his fellow-citizens, and sold the sovereign rights of the state for the benefit of subject kings and cities.

At all these things Pompeius looked on without stirring. If he did not perceive how seriously he thus compromised himself, his opponent perceived it. Clodius had the hardi-
Quarrel of Pompeius with Clodius.
hood to engage in a dispute with the regent of Rome on a question of little moment, as to the sending back of a captive Armenian prince; and the variance soon became a formal feud, in which the utter helplessness of Pompeius was displayed. The head of the state knew not how to encounter the partisan otherwise than with his own weapons, only wielded with far less dexterity. If he had been tricked by Clodius respecting the Armenian prince, he offended him in turn by releasing Cicero, who was pre-eminently obnoxious to Clodius, from the exile into which Clodius had sent him; and he attained his object so thoroughly, that he converted his opponent into an implacable foe. If Clodius made the streets insecure with his bands, the victorious general likewise set slaves and pugilists to work; in the frays which ensued the general naturally was worsted by the demagogue and defeated in the street, and Gaius Cato was kept almost constantly under siege in his garden by Clodius and his comrades. It is not the least remarkable feature in this remarkable spectacle, that the regent and the rogue amidst their quarrel vied in courting the favour of the fallen government; Pompeius, partly to please the senate, permitted Cicero's recall, Clodius on the other hand declared the Julian laws null and void, and called on Marcus Bibulus publicly to testify to their having been unconstitutionally passed.

Naturally no positive result could issue from this imbroglio of dark passions; its most distinctive character was just its utterly ludicrous want of object. Even a man of Cæsar's genius had to learn by experience that democratic

agitation was completely worn out, and that even the way to the throne lay no longer through demagogism. It was nothing more than a historical makeshift, if now, in the interregnum between republic and monarchy, some whimsical fellow dressed himself out with the prophet's mantle and staff which Cæsar had long laid aside, and the great ideals of Gaius Gracchus came once more upon the stage distorted into a parody; the so-called party from which this democratic agitation proceeded was so little such in reality, that afterwards it had no part at all allotted to it in the decisive struggle. It cannot even be asserted that by means of this anarchical state of things the desire after a strong government based on military power had been vividly kindled in the minds of those who were indifferent to politics. Even apart from the fact that such neutral burgesses were chiefly to be sought outside of Rome, and thus were not directly affected by the rioting in the capital, those minds which could be at all influenced by such motives had been already by their former experience, and especially by the Catilinarian conspiracy, thoroughly converted to the principle of authority; but those that were really alarmed were affected far more emphatically by a dread of the gigantic crises inseparable from an overthrow of the constitution, than by dread of the mere continuance of the — at bottom withal very superficial — anarchy in the capital. The only result of it which historically deserves notice was the painful position in which Pompeius was placed by the attacks of the Clodians, and which had a material share in determining his further steps.

Pompeius
in relation
to the Gal-
lic victories
of Cæsar.

Little as Pompeius liked and understood taking the initiative, he was yet on this occasion compelled by the change of his position towards both Clodius and Cæsar to depart from his previous inaction. The irksome and disgraceful situation to which Clodius had reduced him, could not but at length arouse even his sluggish nature to hatred and anger. But far more important was the change which took place in his relation to Cæsar. While, of the two confederate regents, Pompeius had utterly failed in the functions which he had undertaken, Cæsar had the skill to turn his official position to an account which left all calculations and all fears far behind. Without much inquiry as to permission, Cæsar had doubled his army by levies in his southern province inhabited in great measure

by Roman burgesses; had with this army crossed the Alps instead of keeping watch over Rome from Northern Italy; had crushed in the bud a new Cimbrian invasion, and within two years (696, 697) had carried the Roman arms to the Rhine and the Channel. In presence of such facts even the aristocratic tactics of ignoring and disparaging were baffled. He who had often been scoffed at as effeminate was now the idol of the army, the celebrated victory-crowned hero, whose fresh laurels outshone the faded laurels of Pompeius, and to whom even the senate as early as 697 accorded the demonstrations of honour usual after successful campaigns in richer measure than had ever fallen to the share of Pompeius. Pompeius stood towards his former adjutant precisely as after the Gabinio-Manilian laws the latter had stood towards him. Cæsar was now the hero of the day and the master of the most powerful Roman army; Pompeius was an ex-general who had once been famous. It is true that no collision had yet occurred between father-in-law and son-in-law, and their relation was externally undisturbed; but every political alliance is inwardly broken up, when the relative proportions of the power of the parties are materially altered. While the quarrel with Clodius was merely annoying, the change in the position of Cæsar involved a very serious danger for Pompeius; just as Cæsar and his confederates had formerly sought a military support against him, he found himself now compelled to seek a military support against Cæsar, and laying aside his haughty privacy to come forward as a candidate for some extraordinary magistracy, which would enable him to hold his place by the side of the governor of the two Gauls with equal and, if possible, with superior power. His tactics, like his position, were exactly those of Cæsar during the Mithradatic war. To balance the military power of a superior but still remote adversary by the obtaining of a similar command, Pompeius required in the first instance the official machinery of government. A year and a half ago this had been absolutely at his disposal. The regents then ruled the state both by the comitia, which absolutely obeyed them as the masters of the street, and by the senate, which was energetically overawed by Cæsar; as representative of the coalition in Rome and as its acknowledged head, Pompeius would have doubtless obtained from the senate and from the burgesses any decree which he wished, even if

58, 57.

57.

it were against Cæsar's interest. But by the awkward quarrel with Clodius, Pompeius had lost the command of the streets, and could not expect to carry a proposal in his favour in the popular assembly. Things were not quite so unfavourable for him in the senate; but even there it was doubtful whether Pompeius after that long and fatal inaction still held the reins of the majority firmly enough in hand to procure such a decree as he required.

The republican opposition among the public.
60.

The position of the senate also, or rather of the nobility generally, had meanwhile undergone a change. From the very fact of its complete abasement it drew fresh energy. In the coalition of 694 various things had been revealed, which were by no means ripe for the light. The banishment of Cato and Cicero—which public opinion, however much the regents kept themselves in the background and even professed to lament it, referred with unerring tact to its real authors—and the marriage-relationship formed between Cæsar and Pompeius suggested to men's minds with disagreeable clearness monarchical decrees of banishment and family alliances. The larger public too, which stood more aloof from political events, observed the foundations of the future monarchy coming more and more distinctly into view. From the moment when the public perceived that Cæsar's object was not a modification of the republican constitution, but that the question at stake was the existence or non-existence of the republic, many of the best men, who had hitherto reckoned themselves of the popular party and honoured in Cæsar its head, must infallibly have passed over to the opposite side. It was no longer in the saloons and the country houses of the governing nobility alone that men talked of the "three dynasts," of the "three-headed monster." The dense crowds of people listened to Cæsar's consular orations without a sound of acclamation or approval; not a hand stirred to applaud when the democratic consul entered the theatre. But they hissed when one of the tools of the regent showed himself in public, and even staid men applauded when an actor uttered an anti-monarchic sentence or an allusion against Pompeius. Nay, when Cicero was to be banished, a great number of burgesses—it is said twenty thousand—mostly of the middle classes, put on mourning after the example of the senate. "Nothing is now more popular," it is said in a letter of this period, "than hatred of the popular party." The regents dropped hints, that

through such opposition the equites might easily lose their new special places in the theatre, and the commons their bread-corn; people were therefore somewhat more guarded perhaps in the expression of their displeasure, but the feeling remained the same. The lever of material interests was applied with better success. Cæsar's gold flowed in streams. Men of seeming riches whose finances were in disorder, influential ladies who were in pecuniary embarrassment, insolvent young nobles, merchants and bankers in difficulties, either went in person to Gaul with the view of drawing from the fountain head, or applied to Cæsar's agents in the capital; and rarely was any man outwardly respectable—Cæsar avoided dealings with vagabonds who were utterly lost—rejected in either quarter. To this fell to be added the enormous buildings which Cæsar caused to be executed on his account in the capital—and by which a countless number of men of all ranks from the consular down to the common porter found opportunity of profiting—as well as the immense sums expended for public amusements. Pompeius did the same on a more limited scale; to him the capital was indebted for the first theatre of stone, and he celebrated its dedication with a magnificence never seen before. Of course such distributions reconciled a number of men who were inclined towards opposition, more especially in the capital, to the new order of things up to a certain extent; but the marrow of the opposition was not to be reached by this system of corruption. Every day more and more clearly showed how deeply the existing constitution had struck root among the people, and how little, in particular, the circles more aloof from direct party agitation, especially the country towns, were inclined towards monarchy or even ready to submit to it.

If Rome had had a representative constitution, the discontent of the burgesses would have found its natural expression in the elections, and have increased by so expressing itself; under the existing circumstances nothing was left for those true to the constitution but to place themselves under the senate, which, degraded as it was, still appeared the representative and champion of the legitimate republic. Thus it happened that the senate, now when it had been overthrown, suddenly found at its disposal an army far more considerable and far more earnestly faithful, than when in its power and splendour it overthrew the Gracchi

Attempts of
the regents
to check it.

Increasing
importance
of the
senate.

and under the protection of Sulla's sword restored the state. The aristocracy felt this; it began to bestir itself afresh. Just at this time Marcus Cicero, after having bound himself to join the obsequious party in the senate and not only to offer no opposition, but to work with all his might for the regents, had obtained from them permission to return. Although Pompeius in this matter only made an incidental concession to the oligarchy, and intended first of all to play a trick on Clodius, and secondly to acquire in the fluent consular a tool rendered pliant by sufficient blows, the opportunity afforded by Cicero's return was embraced for republican demonstrations, just as his banishment had been a demonstration against the senate. With all possible solemnity, protected moreover against the Clodians by the band of Titus Annius Milo, the two consuls, following out a resolution of the senate, submitted a proposal to the burgesses to permit the return of the consular Cicero, and the senate called on all burgesses true to the constitution not to be absent from the vote. An unusual number of worthy men, especially from the country towns, actually assembled in Rome on the day of voting (4 Aug. 697). The journey of the consular from Brundisium to the capital gave occasion to a series of similar, not less brilliant, manifestations of public feeling. The new alliance between the senate and the burgesses faithful to the constitution was on this occasion as it were publicly proclaimed, and a sort of review of the latter was held, the singularly favourable result of which contributed not a little to revive the sunken courage of the aristocracy. The helplessness of Pompeius in presence of these daring demonstrations as well as the undignified and almost ridiculous position into which he had fallen with reference to Clodius, deprived him and the coalition of their credit; and the section of the senate which adhered to the regents, demoralised by the singular inaptitude of Pompeius and helplessly left to itself, could not prevent the republican-aristocratic party from regaining completely the ascendancy in the corporation. The game of this party really at that time—697—was still by no means desperate for a courageous and dexterous player. It had now—what it had not possessed for a century past—a firm support in the people; if it trusted the people and itself, it might attain its object in the shortest and most honourable way. Why not attack the regents openly and avowedly? Why should not a

resolute and eminent man at the head of the senate cancel the extraordinary powers as unconstitutional, and summon all the republicans of Italy to arms against the tyrants and their following? It was possible perhaps in this way once more to restore the rule of the senate. Certainly the republicans would thus play a bold game; but perhaps in this case, as often, the most courageous resolution might have been at the same time the most prudent. Only, it is true, the indolent aristocracy of this period was scarcely capable of so simple and bold a resolution. There was however another way perhaps more sure, at any rate better adapted to the character and nature of these constitutionalists; they might labour to set the two regents at variance and through this variance to attain ultimately to the helm themselves. The relations between the two men ruling the state had become altered and relaxed, now that Cæsar had acquired a standing of preponderant power by the side of Pompeius and had compelled the latter to canvass for a new position of command; it was probable that, if he obtained it, there would arise in one way or other a rupture and struggle between them. If Pompeius remained unsupported in this, his defeat was scarcely doubtful, and the constitutional party would in that event find themselves after the close of the conflict under the rule of one master instead of two. But if the nobility employed against Cæsar the same means by which the latter had won his previous victories, and entered into alliance with the weaker competitor, victory would probably, with a general like Pompeius, and with an army such as that of the constitutionalists, fall to the coalition; and to settle matters with Pompeius after the victory could not—judging from the proofs of political incapacity which he had already given—appear a specially difficult task.

Things had taken such a turn as naturally to suggest an understanding between Pompeius and the republican party. Whether such an approximation was to take place, and what shape the mutual relations of the two regents and of the aristocracy, which had become utterly enigmatical, were next to assume, fell necessarily to be decided, when in the autumn of 697 Pompeius came to the senate with the proposal to intrust him with extraordinary official power. He based his proposal once more on that by which he had eleven years before laid the foundations of his power, the price of bread in the capital, which had just then—as pre-

Attempts of Pompeius to obtain a command through the senate.

57.

Administration of the supplies of corn.

viously to the Gabinian law—reached an oppressive height. Whether it had been forced up by special machinations, such as Clodius imputed sometimes to Pompeius, sometimes to Cicero, and these in their turn charged on Clodius, cannot be determined; the continuance of piracy, the emptiness of the public chest, and the negligent and disorderly supervision of the supplies of corn by the government were already quite sufficient of themselves, even without political forestalling, to produce scarcities of bread in a great city dependent almost solely on transmarine supplies. The plan of Pompeius was to get the senate to commit to him the superintendence of the matters relating to corn throughout the whole Roman empire, and, with a view to this ultimate object, to intrust him on the one hand with the unlimited disposal of the Roman state-treasure, and on the other hand with an army and fleet, as well as a command which not only stretched over the whole Roman empire, but was superior in each province to that of the governor—in short he designed to institute an improved edition of the Gabinian law, to which the conduct of the Egyptian war just then pending (P. 153) would therefore quite as naturally have been annexed as the conduct of the Mithradatic war to the *razzia* against the pirates. However much the opposition to the new dynasts had gained ground in recent years, the majority of the senate was still, when this matter came to be discussed in Sept. 697, under the constraint of the terror excited by Cæsar. It obsequiously accepted the project in principle, and that on the proposition of Marcus Cicero, who was expected to give, and gave, in this case the first proof of the pliability learned by him in exile. But in the settlement of the details very material portions were abated from the original plan, which the tribune of the people Gaius Messius submitted. Pompeius obtained neither free control over the treasury, nor legions and ships of his own, nor even an authority superior to that of the governors; but they contented themselves with granting to him, for the purpose of his organising due supplies for the capital, considerable sums, fifteen adjutants, and in all affairs relating to the supply of grain full proconsular power throughout the Roman dominions for the next five years, and with having this decree confirmed by the burgesses. There were many different reasons which led to this alteration, almost equivalent to a rejection, of the original plan: a regard to

Cæsar, with reference to whom the most timid could not but have the greatest scruples in investing his colleague not merely with equal but with superior authority in Gaul itself; the concealed opposition of Pompeius' hereditary enemy and reluctant ally Crassus, to whom Pompeius himself attributed or professed to attribute primarily the failure of his plan; the antipathy of the republican opposition in the senate to any decree which really or nominally enlarged the authority of the regents; lastly and mainly, the incapacity of Pompeius himself, who even after having been compelled to act could not prevail on himself to acknowledge his own action, but chose always to bring forward his real design as it were in incognito by means of his friends, while he himself in his well-known modesty declared his willingness to be content even with less. No wonder that they took him at his word, and gave him the less. Pompeius was nevertheless glad to have found at any rate a serious employment, and above all a fitting pretext for leaving the capital. He succeeded, moreover, in providing it with ampler and cheaper supplies, although not without the provinces severely feeling the reflex effect. But he had missed his real object; the proconsular title, which he had a right to bear in all the provinces, remained an empty name, so long as he had not troops of his own at his disposal. Accordingly he soon afterwards got a second proposition made to the senate, that it should confer on him the charge of conducting back the expelled king of Egypt, if necessary by force of arms, to that country. But the more that his urgent need of the senate became evident, the senators received his wishes with a less pliant and less respectful spirit. It was immediately discovered in the Sibylline oracles that it was impious to send a Roman army to Egypt; whereupon the pious senate almost unanimously resolved to abstain from armed intervention. Pompeius was already so humbled, that he would have accepted the mission even without an army; but in his incorrigible dissimulation he left this also to be declared merely by his friends, and spoke and voted for the despatch of another senator. Of course the senate rejected a proposal which wantonly risked a life so precious to his country; and the ultimate issue of the endless discussions was the resolution not to interfere in Egypt at all (Jan. 698).

Egyptian
expedition.

56.

These repeated repulses which Pompeius met with in the
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X

- Attempt at an aristocratic restoration. senate and, what was worse, had to acquiesce in without retaliation, were naturally regarded—come from what side they would—by the public at large as so many victories of the republicans and defeats of the regents generally; the tide of republican opposition was accordingly always on the increase. Already the elections for 698 had gone but partially according to the mind of the dynasts; Cæsar's candidates for the prætorship, Publius Vatinius and Gaius Alfius, had failed, while two decided adherents of the fallen government, Gnæus Lentulus Marcellinus and Gnæus Domitius Calvinus, had been elected, the former as consul, the latter as prætor.
56. But for 699 there even appeared as candidate for the consulship Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, whose election it was difficult to prevent owing to his influence in the capital and his colossal wealth, and who, it was sufficiently well known, would not be content with a concealed opposition. The comitia thus rebelled; and the senate chimed in. It solemnly deliberated over an opinion, which Etruscan soothsayers of acknowledged wisdom had furnished respecting certain signs and wonders at its special request. The celestial revelation announced that through the dissension of the upper classes the whole power over the army and treasure threatened to pass to one ruler and the state to incur loss of freedom—it seemed that the gods pointed primarily at the proposal of Gaius Messius. The republicans soon descended from heaven to earth. The law as to the domain of Capua and the other laws issued by Cæsar as consul had been constantly described by them as null and void, and an opinion had been expressed in the senate as early as
- Attack on Cæsar's laws. 57. Dec. 697 that it was necessary to cancel them for their informalities. On the 6th April 698 the consul Cicero proposed in a full senate to put the consideration of the Campanian land distribution in the order of the day for the 15th May. It was the formal declaration of war; and it was the more significant, that it came from the mouth of one of those men who only show their colours when they think that they can do so with safety. Evidently the aristocracy held that the moment had come for beginning the struggle not with Pompeius against Cæsar, but against the *tyrannis* generally. What would further follow might easily be seen. Domitius made no secret that he intended as consul to propose to the burgesses the immediate recall of Cæsar from Gaul. An aristocratic restoration was at work; and with the
- 56.

attack on the colony of Capua the nobility threw down the gauntlet to the regents.

Cæsar, although receiving from day to day detailed accounts of the events in the capital and, whenever military considerations allowed, watching their progress from as near a point of his southern province as possible, had not hitherto, visibly at least, interfered in them. But now war had been declared against him as well as his colleague, in fact against him especially; he was compelled to act, and he acted quickly. He happened to be in the very neighbourhood; the aristocracy had not even found it advisable to delay the rupture, till he should have again crossed the Alps. In the beginning of April 698 Crassus left the capital, to concert the necessary measures with his more powerful colleague; he found Cæsar in Ravenna. Thence both proceeded to Luca, and there they were joined by Pompeius, who had departed from Rome soon after Crassus (11 April), ostensibly for the purpose of procuring supplies of grain from Sardinia and Africa. The most noted adherents of the regents, such as Metellus Nepos the proconsul of Hither Spain, Appius Claudius the proprætor of Sardinia, and many others, followed them; a hundred and twenty lictors, and upwards of two hundred senators were counted at this conference, where already the new monarchical senate was represented in contradistinction to the republican. In every respect the decisive voice lay with Cæsar. He used it to re-establish and consolidate the existing joint rule on a new basis of more equal distribution of power. The governorships of most importance in a military point of view, next to that of the two Gauls, were assigned to his two colleagues—that of the two Spains to Pompeius, that of Syria to Crassus; and these offices were to be secured to them by decree of the people for five years (700–704), and to be suitably provided for in a military and financial point of view. On the other hand Cæsar stipulated for the prolongation of his command, which expired with the year 700, to the close of 705, as well as for the prerogative of increasing his legions to ten and of charging the pay for the troops arbitrarily levied by him on the state-chest. Pompeius and Crassus were moreover promised a second consulship for the next year (699) before they departed for their governorships, while Cæsar kept it open to himself to administer the supreme magistracy a second time after the termination of his governorship in 706, when the

Conference
of the re-
gents at
Luca.

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54-50.

54, 49.

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ten years' interval legally requisite between two consulships should have in his case elapsed. The military support, which Pompeius and Crassus required for regulating the affairs of the capital all the more that the legions of Cæsar originally destined for this purpose could not now be withdrawn from Transalpine Gaul, was to be found in new legions, which they were to raise for the Spanish and Syrian armies and were not to despatch from Italy to their several destinations until it should seem to themselves to be convenient. The main questions were thus settled; subordinate matters, such as the settlement of the tactics to be followed against the opposition in the capital, the regulation of the candidatures for the ensuing years, and the like, did not long detain them. The great master of mediation composed the personal differences which stood in the way of an agreement with his wonted ease, and compelled the most refractory elements to act in concert. An understanding befitting colleagues was restored, externally at least, between Pompeius and Crassus. Even Publius Clodius was induced to keep himself and his pack quiet, and to give no further annoyance to Pompeius—not the least marvellous feat of the mighty magician.

Designs of
Cæsar in
this ar-
rangement.

That this whole settlement of the pending questions proceeded, not from a compromise among independent and rival regents meeting on equal terms, but solely from the good will of Cæsar, is evident from the circumstances. Pompeius appeared at Luca in the painful position of a powerless refugee, who comes to ask aid from his opponent. Whether Cæsar chose to dismiss him and to declare the coalition dissolved, or to receive him and to let the league continue just as it stood—Pompeius was in either view politically annihilated. If he did not in this case break with Cæsar, he became the powerless client of his confederate. If again he did break with Cæsar and, which was not very probable, effected even now a coalition with the aristocracy, this alliance between opponents, concluded under pressure of necessity and at the last moment, was so little formidable that it was hardly for the sake of averting it that Cæsar agreed to those concessions. A serious rivalry on the part of Crassus with Cæsar was utterly impossible. It is difficult to say what motives induced Cæsar to surrender without necessity his superior position, and now voluntarily to concede—what he had refused to his rival even on the con-

clusion of the league of 694, and what the latter had since, with the evident design of being armed against Cæsar, vainly striven in different ways to attain without, nay against, Cæsar's will—the second consulate and military power. Certainly it was not Pompeius alone that was placed at the head of an army, but also his old enemy and Cæsar's ally throughout many years, Crassus; and undoubtedly Crassus obtained his respectable military position merely as a counterpoise to the new power of Pompeius. Nevertheless Cæsar was a great loser, when his rival exchanged his former powerlessness for an important command. It is possible that Cæsar did not yet feel himself sufficiently master of his soldiers to lead them with confidence to warfare against the formal authorities of the land, and was therefore anxious not to be forced to civil war now by being recalled from Gaul; but whether civil war should arise or not depended at the moment far more on the aristocracy of the capital than on Pompeius, and this would have been at most a reason for Cæsar not breaking openly with Pompeius, so that the opposition might not be emboldened by the rupture, but not a reason for conceding to him what he did concede. Purely personal motives may have contributed to the result; it may be that Cæsar recollected how he had once stood in a position of similar powerlessness in presence of Pompeius, and had been saved from destruction only by his—pusillanimous, it is true, rather than magnanimous—retirement; it is probable that Cæsar hesitated to break the heart of his beloved daughter who was sincerely attached to her husband—in his soul there was room for much besides the statesman. But the decisive reason was doubtless the consideration of Gaul. Cæsar—differing from his biographers—regarded the subjugation of Gaul not as an incidental enterprise useful to him for the gaining of the crown, but as one on which depended the external security and the internal reorganisation, in a word the future, of his country. That he might be enabled to complete this conquest undisturbed and might not be obliged to take in hand just at once the extrication of Italian affairs, he unhesitatingly gave up his superiority over his rivals and granted to Pompeius sufficient power to settle matters with the senate and its adherents. This was a grave political blunder, if Cæsar had no other object than to become as quickly as possible king of Rome; but the ambition of that rare man was not

- confined to the vulgar aim of a crown. He had the boldness to prosecute side by side, and to complete, two labours equally vast—the settlement of the internal affairs of Italy, and the acquisition and securing of a new and fresh soil for Italian civilisation. These tasks of course interfered with each other; his Gallic conquests hindered much more than helped him on his way to the throne. It yielded him bitter fruit, that he postponed the Italian revolution to 706 instead of settling it in 698. But as a statesman as well as a general Cæsar was a peculiarly daring player, who, confiding in himself and despising his opponents, gave them always great and sometimes extravagant odds.

The aristocracy submits.

- It was now therefore the turn of the aristocracy to make good their high gage, and to wage war as boldly as they had boldly declared it. But there is no more pitiable spectacle than when cowardly men have the misfortune to take a bold resolution. They had simply exercised no foresight at all. It seemed to have occurred to nobody that Cæsar would possibly stand on his defence, or that even now Pompeius and Crassus might combine with him afresh and more closely than ever. This seems incredible; but it becomes intelligible, when we glance at the persons who then led the constitutionalist opposition in the senate. Cato was still absent;* the most influential man in the senate at this time was Marcus Bibulus, the hero of passive resistance, the most obstinate and most stupid of all consulars. They had taken up arms only to lay them down, so soon as the adversary merely put his hand to the sheath; the bare news of the conferences of Luca sufficed to suppress all thought of a serious opposition and to bring the mass of the timid, that is the immense majority of the senate, back to their duty as subjects, which in an unhappy hour they had abandoned. There was no further talk of the appointed discussion to try the validity of the Julian laws; the legions raised by Cæsar at his own hand were charged by decree of

- * Cato was not yet in Rome when Cicero spoke on 11th March 698 in favour of Sestius (*Pro Sest.* 28, 60) and when the discussion took place in the senate in consequence of the resolutions of Luca respecting Cæsar's legions (*Plut. Cæs.* 21); it is not till the discussions at the beginning of 699 that we find him once more busy, and, as he travelled in winter (*Plut. Cato Min.* 38), he must have returned to Rome in the end of 698. He cannot therefore, as has been mistakenly inferred from Asconius (p. 35, 53), have defended Milo in Feb. 698.

the senate on the public chest; the attempts on occasion of regulating the next consular provinces to take away both Gauls or one of them by decree from Cæsar were rejected by the majority (end of May 698). Thus the corporation did public penance. Secretly the lords, one after another, thoroughly frightened at their own temerity, came to make their peace and vow unconditional obedience—none more quickly than Marcus Cicero, who repented too late of his perfidy, and with reference to the most recent period of his life applied to himself epithets which were altogether more appropriate than flattering.* Of course the regents agreed to be pacified; they refused nobody pardon, for there was nobody who was worth the trouble of making him an exception. That we may see how suddenly the tone in aristocratic circles changed after the resolutions of Luca became known, it is worth while to compare the pamphlets given forth by Cicero shortly before with the palinode which he issued publicly to evince his repentance and his good intentions.†

The regents could thus regulate Italian affairs at their pleasure and more thoroughly than before. Italy and the capital obtained practically a garrison although not assembled in arms, and one of the regents as commandant. Of the troops levied for Syria and Spain by Crassus and Pompeius, those destined for the East no doubt took their departure; but Pompeius caused the two Spanish provinces to be administered by his lieutenants with the garrison hitherto stationed there, while he dismissed the officers and soldiers of the legions which were newly raised—nominally for despatch to Spain—on furlough, and remained himself with them in Italy.

Doubtless the tacit opposition of public opinion increased, the more clearly and generally men perceived that the regents were working to put an end to the old constitution and with as much gentleness as possible to accommodate the

Settlement
of the new
monarch-
ical rule.

* *Me asinum germanum fruisse* (*Ad. Att.* iv. 5, 3).

† This palinode is the still extant oration on the Provinces to be assigned to the consuls of 699. It was delivered in the end of May 698. The pieces contrasting with it are the orations for Sestius and against Vatinius and that upon the opinion of the Etruscan soothsayers, dating from the months of March and April, in which the aristocratic regime is glorified to the best of his ability and Cæsar in particular is treated in a very cavalier tone. It was but reasonable that Cicero should, as he himself confesses (*Ad. Att.* iv. 5, 1), be ashamed to transmit even to intimate friends that attestation of his resumed allegiance.

existing condition of the government and administration to the forms of the monarchy; but they submitted, because they were obliged to submit. First of all, all the more important affairs, and particularly all that related to military matters and external relations, were disposed of without consulting the senate, sometimes by decree of the people, sometimes by the mere good pleasure of the rulers. The arrangements agreed on at Luca respecting the military command of Gaul were submitted directly to the burgesses by Crassus and Pompeius, those relating to Spain and Syria by the tribune of the people Gaius Trebonius, and in other instances the more important governorships were frequently filled up by decree of the people. That the regents did not need the consent of the authorities to increase their troops at pleasure, Cæsar had already sufficiently shown: as little did they hesitate mutually to borrow troops; Cæsar for instance received such collegiate support from Pompeius for the Gallic, and Crassus from Cæsar for the Parthian, war. The Transpadanes, who possessed according to the existing constitution only Latin rights, were treated by Cæsar during his administration practically as full burgesses of Rome.* While formerly the organisation of newly-acquired terri-

* This is not stated by our authorities. But the view that Cæsar levied no soldiers at all from the Latin communities, that is to say from by far the greater part of his province, is in itself utterly incredible, and is directly refuted by the fact that the opposition party slightly designates the force levied by Cæsar as "for the most part natives of the Transpadane colonies" (*Cæs. B. C.* iii. 87); for here the Latin colonies of Strabo (*Ascon. in Pison.* p. 3; Sueton. *Cæs.* 8) are evidently meant. Yet there is no trace of Latin cohorts in Cæsar's Gallic army; on the contrary according to his express statements all the recruits levied by him in Cisalpine Gaul were added to the legions or distributed into legions. It is possible that Cæsar combined with the levy the bestowal of the franchise; but more probably he adhered in this matter to the stand-point of his party, which instead of seeking to procure for the Transpadanes the Roman franchise rather regarded it as already legally belonging to them (*P.* 158). Only thus could the report spread; that Cæsar had introduced of his own authority the Roman municipal constitution among the Transpadane communities (*Cic. Ad. Att.* v. 3, 2; *Ad. Fam.* viii. 1, 2). This hypothesis too explains why Hirtius designates the Transpadane towns as "colonies of Roman burgesses" (*B. G.* viii. 24), and why Cæsar treated the colony of Comum founded by him as a burgess-colony (Sueton. *Cæs.* 28; Strabo, v. 1 p. 213; Plutarch, *Cæs.* 29) while the moderate party of the aristocracy conceded to it only the same rights as to the other Transpadane colonies, viz. Latin rights, and the ultras even declared the civic rights conferred on the settlers as altogether null, and consequently did not concede to the Comenses the privileges attached to the holding of a Latin municipal magistracy (*Cic. Ad. Att.* v. 11, 2; Appian *B. C.* ii. 26).

tories had been managed by a senatorial commission, Cæsar organised his extensive Gallic conquests altogether according to his own judgment, and founded, for instance, without having received any further powers burgess-colonies, particularly Novum-Comum (Como) with five thousand colonists. Piso conducted the Thracian, Gabinius the Egyptian, Crassus the Parthian war, without consulting the senate, and even without reporting, as was usual, to that body; in like manner triumphs and other marks of honour were accorded and carried out, without the senate being asked about them. Obviously this did not arise from a mere neglect of forms, which would be the less intelligible, seeing that in the great majority of cases no opposition from the senate was to be expected. On the contrary, it was a well-calculated design to dislodge the senate from the domain of military arrangements and higher politics, and to restrict its administrative action to financial questions and internal affairs; and the opponents of the regents plainly saw this and protested, so far as they could, against this conduct of theirs by means of senatorial decrees and criminal actions. While the regents thus in the main set aside the senate, they still made some use of the less dangerous popular assemblies — care was taken that in these the lords of the street should put no further difficulty in the way of the lords of the state; in many cases however they dispensed with this empty shadow, and employed without disguise autocratic forms.

The humbled senate had to submit to its position whether it would or not. The leader of the compliant majority continued to be Marcus Cicero. He was useful on account of his lawyer's talent of finding reasons, or at any rate words, for everything; and there was a genuine Cæsarian irony in employing the man, by means of whom mainly the aristocracy had conducted their demonstrations against the regents, as the mouthpiece of servility. Accordingly they pardoned him for his brief desire to kick against the pricks, not however without having previously assured themselves of his submissiveness in every way. His brother had been obliged to take the position of an officer in the Gallic army to answer in some measure as a hostage for him; Pompeius had compelled Cicero himself to accept a lieutenant-generalship under him, which furnished a handle for politely banishing him at any moment. Clodius had certainly been instructed to leave him meanwhile at peace, but Cæsar as little threw off

The senate under the monarchy. Cicero and the majority.

Clodius on account of Cicero as he threw off Cicero on account of Clodius ; and the great saviour of his country and the no less great hero of liberty entered into an antechamber rivalry in the headquarters of Samarobriva, for the befitting illustration of which there lacked, unfortunately, a Roman Aristophanes. But not only was the same rod kept in suspense over Cicero's head, which had once already descended on him so severely ; golden fetters were also laid upon him. Amidst the serious embarrassment of his finances the loans of Cæsar free of interest, and the joint overseership of those buildings which occasioned the circulation of enormous sums in the capital, were in a high degree welcome to him ; and many an immortal oration for the senate was nipped in the bud by the thought that the agent of Cæsar might present a bill to him after the close of the sitting. Consequently he vowed "in future to ask no more after right and honour, but to strive for the favour of the regents," and "to be as flexible as an ear-lap." They used him accordingly as—what he was good for—an advocate ; in which capacity it was on various occasions his lot to be obliged to defend his very bitterest foes at a higher bidding, and that especially in the senate, where he almost regularly served as the organ of the dynasts and submitted the proposals "to which others probably consented, but not he himself ;" indeed, as recognised leader of the majority of the compliant, he obtained even a certain political importance. They dealt with the other members of the governing corporation accessible to fear, flattery, or gold in the same way as they had dealt with Cicero, and succeeded in keeping it on the whole in subordination.

Cato and
the mino-
rity.

56. Certainly there remained a section of their opponents, who at least kept to their colours and were neither to be terrified nor to be won. The regents had become convinced that exceptional measures, such as those against Cato and Cicero, did their cause more harm than good, and that it was a lesser evil to tolerate an unpleasant republican opposition than to convert their opponents into martyrs for the republic. Therefore they allowed Cato to return (end of 698) and thenceforward in the senate and in the Forum, often at the peril of his life, to offer a continued opposition to the regents, which was doubtless deserving of honour, but unhappily was at the same time ridiculous. They allowed him on occasion of the proposals of Trebonius to push matters once more to a hand-to-hand conflict in the Forum, and to sub-

mit to the senate a proposal that the proconsul Cæsar should be given over to the Usipetes and Tencteri on account of his perfidious conduct towards those barbarians (P. 255). They were patient when Marcus Favonius, Cato's Sancho, after the senate had adopted the resolution to charge the legions of Cæsar on the state-chest, sprang to the door of the senate-house and proclaimed to the streets the danger of the country; when the same person in his scurrilous fashion called the white bandage, which Pompeius wore round his weak leg, a misplaced diadem; when the consular Lentulus Marcellinus, on being applauded, called out to the assembly to make diligent use of this privilege of expressing their opinion while they were still allowed to do so; when the tribune of the people Gaius Ateius Capito consigned Crassus on his departure for Syria, with all the formalities of the theology of the day, publicly to the evil spirits. These were, on the whole, vain demonstrations of an irritated minority; yet the little party from which they issued was so far of importance, that it on the one hand fostered and gave the watchword to the republican opposition fermenting in secret, and on the other hand sometimes dragged the majority of the senate, which withal cherished at bottom quite the same sentiments with reference to the regents, into isolated decrees directed against them. For even the majority felt the need of giving vent, at least sometimes and in subordinate matters, to their suppressed indignation, and especially—after the manner of those who are servile with reluctance—of exhibiting their resentment towards the great foes in rage against the small. Wherever it was possible, a gentle blow was administered to the instruments of the regents; thus Gabinius was refused the thanksgiving-festival that he asked (698); thus Piso was recalled from his province; thus mourning was put on by the senate, when the tribune of the people Gaius Cato hindered the elections for 699 as long as the consul Marcellinus belonging to the constitutional party was in office. Even Cicero, however humbly he always bowed before the regents, issued an equally envenomed and insipid pamphlet against Cæsar's father-in-law. But both these feeble signs of opposition by the majority of the senate and the ineffectual resistance of the minority show only the more clearly, that the government had now passed from the senate to the regents as it formerly passed from the burgesses to the senate; and that

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the senate was already not much more than a monarchical council of state employed also to absorb the anti-monarchical elements. "No man," the adherents of the fallen government complained, "is of the slightest account except the three; the regents are all-powerful, and they take care that no one shall remain in doubt about it; the whole state is virtually transformed and obeys the dictators; our generation will not live to see a change of things." They were living in fact no longer under the republic, but under monarchy.

Continued
opposition
at the elec-
tions,

But if the guidance of the state was at the absolute disposal of the regents, there remained still a political domain separated in some measure from the government proper, which it was more easy to defend and more difficult to conquer; that of the ordinary elections of magistrates, and of the jury-courts. That the latter, although not coming directly under politics, are greatly influenced everywhere, and were so above all in Rome, by the spirit that rules state-affairs, is of itself clear. The elections of magistrates certainly belonged by right to the government proper of the state; but, as at this period the state was administered substantially by extraordinary magistrates or by men wholly without title, and even the supreme ordinary magistrates, if they belonged to the anti-monarchical party, could not in any tangible way influence the state-machinery, the ordinary magistrates sank more and more into mere puppets—as, in fact, even those of them who were most disposed to opposition described themselves frankly and with entire justice as powerless ciphers—and their elections therefore sank into mere demonstrations. Thus, after the opposition had already been wholly dislodged from the proper field of battle, hostilities might nevertheless be continued in that of elections and processes. The regents spared no pains to remain victors also in this field. As to the elections, they had already at Luca settled between themselves the lists of candidates for the next years, and they left no means untried to carry the candidates agreed upon there. They expended their gold primarily for the purpose of influencing the elections. A great number of soldiers were dismissed annually on furlough from the armies of Cæsar and Pompeius to take part in the voting at Rome. Cæsar was wont himself to guide, and watch over, the election movements from as near a point as possible of Upper Italy. Yet the object was but

very imperfectly attained. For 699 no doubt Pompeius and Crassus were elected consuls, agreeably to the convention of Luca, and Lucius Domitius, the only candidate of the opposition who persevered, was set aside; but this had been effected only by open violence, on which occasion Cato was wounded and other extremely scandalous incidents occurred. In the next consular elections for 700, in spite of all the exertions of the regents, Domitius was actually elected, and Cato likewise now prevailed in the candidature for the prætorship, in which to the scandal of the whole burgesses Cæsar's client Vatinius had during the previous year beaten him off the field. At the elections for 701 the opposition succeeded in so indisputably convicting the candidates of the regents along with others of the most shameful electioneering intrigues that the regents, on whom the scandal recoiled, could not do otherwise than abandon them. These repeated and severe defeats of the dynasts on the battle-field of the elections may be traceable in part to the unmanageableness of the rusty machinery, to the incalculable accidents of the polling, to the opposition at heart of the middle classes, to the various private considerations that interfere in such cases and often strangely clash with those of party; but the main cause lies elsewhere. The elections were at this time essentially in the power of the different clubs into which the aristocracy had grouped themselves; the system of bribery was organised by them on the most extensive scale and with the utmost method. The same aristocracy therefore, which was represented in the senate, ruled the elections; but while in the senate it yielded with a grudge, it worked and voted here—in secret and secure from all reckoning—absolutely against the regents. That the influence of the nobility in this field was by no means broken by the strict penal law against the electioneering intrigues of the clubs, which Crassus when consul in 699 caused to be confirmed by the burgesses, is self-evident, and is shown by the elections of the succeeding years.

The jury-courts occasioned equally great difficulty to the regents. As they were then composed, while the senatorial nobility was here also influential, the decisive voice lay chiefly with the middle class. The fixing of a high-rated census for jurymen by a law proposed by Pompeius is a remarkable proof that the opposition to the regents had its chief seat in the middle class properly so called, and that

and in the courts.

the great capitalists showed themselves here, as everywhere, more compliant than the latter. Nevertheless the republican party was not yet deprived of all hold in the courts, and it was never weary of directing political impeachments, not indeed against the regents themselves, but against their prominent instruments. This warfare of prosecutions was waged the more keenly, that according to usage the duty of accusation belonged to the senatorial youth, and, as may readily be conceived, there was more of republican passion, fresh talent, and bold delight in attack to be found among these youths than among the older members of their order. Certainly the courts were not free; if the regents were in earnest, the courts ventured as little as the senate to refuse obedience. None of their antagonists were prosecuted by the opposition with such hatred—so furious that it almost passed into a proverb—as Vatinius, by far the most audacious and unscrupulous of the closer adherents of Cæsar; but his master gave the command, and he was acquitted in all the processes raised against him. But impeachments by men who knew how to wield the sword of dialectics and the lash of sarcasm as did Gaius Licinius Calvus and Gaius Asinius Pollio, did not miss their mark even when they failed; nor were isolated successes wanting. They were mostly, no doubt, obtained over subordinate individuals, but even one of the highest and most hated adherents of the dynasts, the consular Gabinius, was overthrown in this way. Certainly in his case the implacable hatred of the aristocracy, which as little forgave him for the law regarding the conducting of the war with the pirates as for his disparaging treatment of the senate during his Syrian governorship, was combined with the rage of the great capitalists, against whom he had when governor of Syria ventured to defend the interests of the provincials, and even with the resentment of Crassus, with whom he had stood on ceremony in handing over to him the province. His only protection against all these foes was Pompeius, and the latter had every reason to defend his ablest, boldest, and most faithful adjutant at any price; but here, as everywhere, he knew not how to use his power and to defend his clients, as Cæsar defended his; in the end of 700 the jurymen found Gabinius guilty of extortions and sent him into banishment.

54.

On the whole, therefore, in the sphere of the popular elections and of the jury courts it was the regents that fared

worst. The elements which ruled in these were less tangible, and therefore more difficult to be terrified or corrupted than the direct organs of government and administration. The holders of power encountered here, especially in the popular elections, the tough energy of a close oligarchy—grouped in coteries—which is by no means finally disposed of when its rule is overthrown, and which is the more difficult to vanquish the more covert its action. They encountered here too, especially in the jury-courts, the repugnance of the middle classes towards the new monarchical rule, which with all the perplexities springing out of it they were as little able to remove. They suffered in both quarters a series of defeats. The election-victories of the opposition had, it is true, merely the value of demonstrations, since the regents possessed and employed the means of practically annulling any magistrate whom they disliked; but the criminal trials in which the opposition carried condemnations deprived them, in a way keenly felt, of useful auxiliaries. As things stood, the regents could neither set aside nor adequately control the popular elections and the jury-courts, and the opposition, however much it felt itself straitened even here, maintained to a certain extent the field of battle.

It proved, however, yet a more difficult task to encounter the opposition in a field, to which they turned with the greater zeal the more they were precluded from direct political action. This was literature. Even the judicial opposition was at the same time a literary one, and indeed pre-eminently so, for the orations were regularly published and served as political pamphlets. The arrows of poetry hit their mark still more rapidly and sharply. The lively youth of the high aristocracy, and still more energetically perhaps the cultivated middle class in the Italian country towns, waged the war of pamphlets and epigrams with zeal and success. There fought side by side on this field the noble senator's son Gaius Licinius Calvus (672-706) who was as much feared in the character of an orator and pamphleteer as of a versatile poet, and the municipals of Cremona and Verona Marcus Furius Bibaculus (652-691) and Quintus Valerius Catullus (667-c. 700) whose elegant and pungent epigrams flew swiftly like arrows through Italy and were sure to hit their mark. An oppositional tone prevails throughout the literature of these years. It is full of indignant sarcasm against the "great Cæsar," "the

Literature
of the oppo-
sition.

82-18.

102-63.

87-54

unique general," against the affectionate father-in-law and son-in-law, who ruin the whole globe in order to give their dissolute favourites opportunity to parade the spoils of the long-haired Celts through the streets of Rome, to furnish royal banquets with the booty of the furthest isles of the west, and as rivals showering gold to supplant honest youths at home in the favour of their mistresses. There is in the poems of Catullus* and the other fragments of the literature of this period something of that fervour of personal and political hatred, of that republican agony overflowing in riotous humour or in stern despair, which are more prominently and powerfully apparent in Aristophanes and Demosthenes. The most sagacious of the three rulers at least saw well that it was as impossible to despise this opposition as to suppress it by word of command. So far as he could, Cæsar tried rather personally to gain over the more eminent authors. Cicero himself had to thank his literary reputation in good part for the respectful treatment which he especially experienced from Cæsar; but the governor of Gaul did not disdain to conclude a special peace even with Catullus through the intervention of his father who had become personally known to him in Verona; and the young poet, who had just heaped upon the powerful general the bitterest and most personal sarcasms, was treated by him with the most flattering distinction. In fact Cæsar had genius enough to follow his literary opponents on their own domain and to publish—as an indirect defence against manifold attacks—a detailed report on the Gallic wars, which set forth before the public, with happily assumed naïveté, the necessity and constitutional propriety of his military operations. But it is freedom alone that is absolutely and exclusively poetical and creative; it and it alone is able even in its most wretched caricature, even with its latest breath, to

* The collection handed down to us is full of references to the events of 699 and 700 and was doubtless published in the latter year; the most recent event, which it mentions, is the prosecution of Vatinius (Aug. 700). The statement of Hieronymus that Catullus died in 697–698 requires therefore to be altered only by a few years. From the circumstance that Vatinius “swears falsely by his consulship,” it has been erroneously inferred that the collection did not appear till after the consulate of Vatinius (707); it only follows from it that Vatinius, when the collection appeared, might already reckon on becoming consul in a definite year, for which he had every reason as early as 700; for his name certainly stood on the list of candidates agreed on at Luca (Cicero *Ad. Att.* iv. 8 b. 2).

55, 54.

54.

57–56.

47.

54.

inspire fresh enthusiasm. All the sound elements of literature were and remained anti-monarchical; and, if Cæsar himself could venture on this domain without proving a failure, the reason was merely that even now he still cherished at heart the magnificent dream of a free commonwealth, although he was unable to transfer it either to his adversaries or to his adherents. Practical politics were not more absolutely controlled by the regents than literature by the republicans.*

It became necessary to take serious steps against this im-
 potent, but still troublesome and audacious opposition. The
 condemnation of Gabinius, apparently, turned the scale (end
 of 700). The regents agreed to introduce a dictatorship,
 though only a temporary one, and by means of this to
 carry new coercive measures especially respecting the elec-
 tions and the jury courts. Pompeius, as the regent on whom
 primarily devolved the government of Rome and Italy, was
 charged with the execution of this resolve; which accordingly
 bore the impress of the awkwardness in resolution and action
 that characterized him, and of his singular incapacity of

New ex-
 ceptional
 measures
 resolved on.
 54.

* The well-known poem of Catullus numbered xxix. was written in 699 or 700 after Cæsar's Britannic expedition and before the death of Julia: 55.
 54.

*Quis hoc potest videre, quis potest pati,
 Nisi impudicus et vorax et aleo,
 Mamurram habere quod Comata Gallia
 Habebat ante et ultima Britannia? etc.*

Mamurra of Formiæ, Cæsar's favourite and for a time during the Gallic wars an officer in his army, had, probably a short time before the composition of this poem, returned to the capital and was in all likelihood then occupied with the building of his much-talked-of marble palace furnished with lavish magnificence on the Caelian hill. The Pontic booty mentioned in the poem is that of Mytilene, of which Cæsar had a share as one of the officers serving in 675 in the army of the governor of Bithynia and Pontus (iii. 346); the Iberian spoil is that which was acquired in the governorship of Further Spain (P. 196). 79.

More innocent than this virulent invective, which was bitterly felt by Cæsar (Suet. *Cæs.* 73), is another nearly contemporary poem of the same author (xi.) to which we may here refer, because with its pathetic introduction to an anything but pathetic commission it very cleverly quizzes the staff of the new regents—the Gabiniuses, Antoniuses, and such like, suddenly advanced from the lowest haunts to head-quarters. Let it be remembered that it was written at a time when Cæsar was fighting on the Rhine and on the Thames, and when the expeditions of Crassus to Parthia and of Gabinius to Egypt were in preparation. The poet, as if he too expected one of the vacant posts from one of the regents, gives to two of his clients their last instructions before departure:

Furi et Aureli, comites Catulli, etc.

- speaking out frankly, even where he would and could command. Already at the close of 700 the demand for a dictatorship was brought forward in the senate in the form of hints, and that not by Pompeius himself. There served as its ostensible ground the continuance of the system of clubs and bands in the capital, which by acts of bribery and violence certainly exercised the most pernicious influence on the elections as well as on the jury-courts and perpetuated a state of disturbance; we must allow that this rendered it easy for the regents to justify their exceptional measures. But, as may well be conceived, even the servile majority shrank from granting what the future dictator himself seemed to shrink from openly asking. When the unparalleled agitation regarding the elections for the consulship of 701 led to the most scandalous scenes, so that the elections were postponed a full year beyond the fixed time and only took place after a seven months' interregnum in July 701, Pompeius found in this state of things the desired occasion for indicating still more distinctly to the senate that the dictatorship was the only means of cutting, if not of loosing the knot; but the decisive word of command was not even yet spoken. Perhaps it would have still remained for long unuttered, had not the most audacious partizan of the republican opposition Titus Annius Milo stepped into the field at the consular elections for 702 as a candidate in opposition to the candidates of the regents, Quintus Metellus Scipio and Publius Plautius Hypsæus, both men closely connected with Pompeius personally and thoroughly devoted to him. Milo, endowed with physical courage, with a certain talent for intrigue and for contracting debt, and above all with an ample amount of native assurance which had been carefully cultivated, had made himself a name among the political adventurers of the time, and was the most famous man in his trade next to Clodius, and naturally therefore through rivalry at the most deadly feud with the latter. As the Achilles of the streets had been acquired by the regents and with their permission was again playing the ultra-democrat, the Hector of the streets became as a matter of course an aristocrat; and the republican opposition, which now would have concluded an alliance with Catilina in person, had he presented himself to them, readily acknowledged Milo as their legitimate champion in all riots. In fact the few successes, which they carried off in this field of battle,

Milo.

were the work of Milo and of his well-trained band of gladiators. So Cato and his friends in return supported the candidature of Milo for the consulship; even Cicero could not avoid recommending one who had been his enemy's enemy and his own protector during many years; and as Milo himself spared neither money nor violence to carry his election, it seemed secure. For the regents it would have been not only a new and keenly felt defeat, but also an imminent danger; for it was to be foreseen that the bold partisan would not allow himself as consul to be reduced to insignificance so easily as Domitius and other men of the respectable opposition. It happened that Achilles and Hector accidentally encountered each other not far from the capital on the Appian Way, and a fray arose between their respective bands, in which Clodius himself received a sword-cut on the shoulder and was compelled to take refuge in a neighbouring house. This had occurred without orders from Milo; but, as the matter had gone so far and as the storm had now to be encountered at any rate, the whole crime seemed to Milo more desirable and even less dangerous than the half; he ordered his men to drag Clodius forth from his lurking place and to put him to death (13 Jan. 702). The street leaders of the regents' party—the tribunes of the people Titus Munatius Plancus, Quintus Pompeius Rufus, and Gaius Sallustius Crispus—saw in this occurrence a fitting opportunity to thwart in the interest of their masters the candidature of Milo and carry the dictatorship of Pompeius. The dregs of the populace, especially the freedmen and slaves, had lost in Clodius their patron and future deliverer (P. 296); the necessary excitement was thus easily aroused. After the bloody corpse had been exposed for show at the orators' platform in the Forum and the speeches appropriate to the occasion had been made, the riot broke forth. The seat of the perfidious aristocracy was destined as a funeral pile for the great liberator; the mob carried the body to the senate-house, and set the building on fire. Thereafter the multitude proceeded to the front of Milo's house and kept it under siege, till his band drove off the assailants by a discharge of arrows. They passed on to the house of Pompeius and of his consular candidates, of whom the former was saluted as dictator and the latter as consuls, and thence to the house of the interrex Marcus Lepidus, on whom devolved the conducting of the consular elections.

Killing of
Clodius.

52.

Anarchy in
Rome.

When the latter, as in duty bound, refused to make arrangements for the elections immediately, as the clamorous multitude demanded, he was kept during five days under siege in his dwelling house.

Dictator-
ship of
Pompeius.

But the instigators of these scandalous scenes had over-acted their part. Certainly their lord and master was resolved to employ this favourable episode in order not merely to set aside Milo, but also to seize the dictatorship; he wished, however, to receive it not from a mob of bludgeon-men, but from the senate. Pompeius brought up troops to put down the anarchy which prevailed in the capital, and which had in reality become intolerable to everybody; at the same time he now enjoined what he had hitherto requested, and the senate complied. It was merely an empty subterfuge, that on the proposal of Cato and Bibulus the proconsul Pompeius, retaining his former offices, was nominated as "consul without colleague" instead of dictator (on the 25th of the intercalary month* 702)—a subterfuge, which admitted an appellation labouring under a double incongruity† for the mere purpose of avoiding one which expressed the simple fact, and which vividly reminds us of the sagacious resolution of the waning patriciate to concede to the plebeians not the consulship, but only the consular power (i. 297.)

52.

Changes in
the arrange-
ment of
magistracies
and the jury
system.

Thus in legal possession of full power, Pompeius set to work and proceeded with energy against the republican party which was powerful in the clubs and jury-courts. The existing enactments as to elections were repeated and enforced by a special law; and by another against electioneering intrigues, which obtained retrospective force for all offences of this sort committed since 684, the penalties hitherto imposed were augmented. Still more important was the enactment, that the governorships, which were by far the more important and especially by far the more lucrative half of official life, should be conferred on the consuls and prætors not immediately on their retirement from the consulate or prætorship, but only after the expiry of other five years; an arrangement which of course could only come into effect after four years, and therefore made the filling up

70.

* In this year the January with 29 and the February with 23 days were followed by the intercalary month with 28, and then by March.

† *Consul* signifies "colleague" (i. 257), and a consul, who is at the same time proconsul, is at once an actual consul and a consul's substitute.

of the governorships for the next few years substantially dependent on decrees of senate which were to be issued for the regulation of this interval, and thus practically on the person or section ruling the senate at the moment. The jury-commissions were left in existence, but limits were put to the right of counter-plea, and—what was perhaps still more important—the liberty of speech in the courts was done away; for both the number of the advocates and the time of speaking apportioned to each were restricted by fixing a maximum, and the bad habit which had prevailed of adducing, in addition to the witnesses as to facts, witnesses to character or *laudatores*, as they were called, in favour of the accused was prohibited. The obsequious senate further decreed on the suggestion of Pompeius that the country had been placed in peril by the quarrel on the Appian Way; accordingly a special commission was appointed by an exceptional law for all crimes connected with it, the members of which were directly nominated by Pompeius. An attempt was also made to give once more a serious importance to the office of the censors, and by that agency to purge the deeply disordered burgess-body of its worst elements.

All these measures were adopted under the pressure of the sword. In consequence of the declaration of the senate that the country was in danger, Pompeius called the men capable of service throughout Italy to arms and made them swear allegiance for all contingencies; an adequate and trustworthy corps was temporarily stationed at the Capitol; at every stirring of opposition Pompeius threatened armed intervention, and during the proceedings at the trial respecting the murder of Clodius stationed, contrary to all precedent, a guard over the place of trial itself.

The scheme for the revival of the censorship failed, because among the servile majority of the senate no one possessed sufficient moral courage and authority even to become a candidate for such an office. On the other hand Milo was condemned by the jurymen (8 April 702) and Cato's candidature for the consulship of 703 was frustrated. The opposition of speeches and pamphlets received through the new judicial ordinances a blow from which it never recovered; the dreaded forensic eloquence was thereby driven from the field of politics, and thenceforth felt the restraints of monarchy. Opposition of course had not disappeared either from the minds of the great majority of the nation or even wholly

Humiliation
of the re-
publicans.

52.

51.

from public life—to effect that end the popular elections, the jury-courts, and literature must have been not merely restricted, but annihilated. Indeed, in these very transactions themselves, Pompeius by his unskilfulness and perversity helped the republicans to gain even under his dictatorship several triumphs which he severely felt. The special measures, which the rulers took to strengthen their power, were of course officially characterised as enactments made in the interest of public tranquillity and order, and every burgess, who did not desire anarchy, was described as substantially concurring in them. But Pompeius pushed this transparent fiction so far, that instead of putting safe instruments into the special commission for the investigation of the late tumult he chose the most respectable men of all parties, including even Cato, and applied his influence over the court essentially to maintain order, and to render it impossible for his adherents as well as for his opponents to indulge in the scenes of disturbance customary in the trials of this period. This neutrality of the regent was discernible in the judgments of the special court. The jurymen did not venture to acquit Milo himself; but most of the subordinate persons accused belonging to the party of the republican opposition were acquitted, while condemnation inexorably befel those who in the late riot had taken part for Clodius, or in other words for the regents, including not a few of Cæsar's and of Pompeius' own most intimate friends—even Hypsæus his candidate for the consulship, and the tribunes of the people Plancus and Rufus, who had directed the *emeute* in his interest. That Pompeius did not prevent their condemnation for the sake of appearing impartial, was one specimen of his folly; and a second was, that he withal in matters quite indifferent violated his own laws to favour his friends—appearing for example as a witness to character in the trial of Plancus, and in fact protecting from condemnation several accused persons specially connected with him, such as Metellus Scipio. As usual, he wished here also to accomplish opposite things; in attempting to satisfy the duties at once of the impartial regent and of the party chief, he fulfilled neither the one nor the other, and was regarded by public opinion with justice as a despotic regent, and by his adherents with equal justice as a leader who either could not or would not protect his followers.

But, although the republicans were still stirring and were even refreshed by an isolated success here and there chiefly through the blundering of Pompeius, the object which the regents had proposed to themselves in that dictatorship was on the whole attained, the reins were drawn tighter, the republican party was humbled, and the new monarchy was strengthened. The public began to reconcile themselves to it. When Pompeius not long after recovered from a serious illness, his restoration was celebrated throughout Italy with the befitting demonstrations of joy which are usual on such occasions in monarchies. The regents showed themselves satisfied; as early as the 1st of August 702 Pompeius resigned his dictatorship, and shared the consulship with his client Metellus Scipio.

CHAPTER IX.

DEATH OF CRASSUS. RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS.

Crassus
goes to
Syria.

MARCUS CRASSUS had for years been reckoned among the heads of the "three-headed monster," without any proper title to be so included. He served as a makeweight to trim the balance between the real regents Pompeius and Cæsar, or, to speak more accurately, he threw his weight into the scale of Cæsar against Pompeius. The part of a supernumerary colleague is not a very honourable one; but Crassus was never hindered by any keen sense of honour from pursuing his own advantage. He was a merchant and was open to negotiation. What was offered to him was not much; but, as more was not to be got, he accepted it, and sought to forget the ambition that fretted him, and his chagrin at occupying a position so near to power and yet so powerless, amidst his always accumulating piles of gold. But the conference at Luca changed the state of matters also for him; with the view of still retaining the preponderance as compared with Pompeius after concessions so extensive, Cæsar gave to his old confederate Crassus an opportunity of attaining in Syria through the Parthian war the same position to which Cæsar had attained by the Celtic war in Gaul. It was difficult to say whether these new prospects proved more attractive to the ardent thirst for gold which had now become at the age of sixty a second nature and grew only the more intense with every newly won million, or to the ambition which had been long repressed with difficulty in the old man's breast and now glowed in it with restless fire. He arrived in Syria as early as the beginning of 700; he had not even waited for the expiry of his consulship to

depart. Full of impatient ardour he seemed desirous to redeem every minute with the view of making up for what he had lost, of gaining the treasures of the East in addition to those of the West, of achieving the power and glory of a general as rapidly as Cæsar and with as little trouble as Pompeius.

He found the Parthian war already commenced. The faithless conduct of Pompeius towards the Parthians has been already mentioned (P. 140); he had not respected the stipulated frontier of the Euphrates and had wrested several provinces from the Parthian empire for the benefit of Armenia, which was now a client state of Rome. King Phraates had submitted to this treatment; but after he had been murdered by his two sons Mithradates and Orodes, the new king Mithradates immediately declared war on the king of Armenia, Artavasdes, son of the recently deceased Tigranes (about 698).^{*} This was at the same time a declaration of war against Rome; as soon therefore as the revolt of the Jews was suppressed, Gabinius, the able and spirited governor of Syria, led the legions over the Euphrates. Meanwhile, however, a revolution had occurred in the Parthian empire; the grandees of the kingdom, with the young bold and talented grand vizier at their head, had overthrown king Mithradates and placed his brother Orodes on the throne. Mithradates therefore made common cause with the Romans and resorted to the camp of Gabinius. Everything promised the best results to the enterprise of the Roman governor, when he unexpectedly received orders to restore the king of Egypt by force of arms to Alexandria (P. 153). He was obliged to obey; but, in the expectation of soon coming back, he induced the dethroned Parthian prince who solicited aid from him to commence the war in the meanwhile at his own hand. Mithradates did so; and Seleucia and Babylon declared for him; but the vizier captured Seleucia by assault, having been in person the first to mount the battlements, and in Babylon Mithradates himself was forced by famine to surrender, whereupon he was by his brother's orders put to death. His death was a palpable loss to the Romans; but it by no means put an end to the agitation in the Parthian empire, and the Arme-

Expedition
against the
Parthians
resolved on.

56.

^{*} Tigranes was still living in February 698 (Cic. *pro Sest.* 27, 59); on the other hand Artavasdes was already reigning before 700 (Justin, xlii. 2, 4; Plut. *Crass.* 49). 56. 54.

nian war continued. Gabinius after ending the Egyptian campaign was just on the eve of turning to account the still favourable opportunity and resuming the interrupted Parthian war, when Crassus arrived in Syria and along with the command took up also the plans of his predecessor. Full of high-flown hopes he estimated the difficulties of the march as slight, and the power of resistance in the armies of the enemy as yet slighter; he not only spoke confidently of the subjugation of the Parthians, but was already in imagination the conqueror of the kingdoms of Bactria and India.

Plan of the
campaign.

The new Alexander, however, was in no haste. Before he carried into effect these great plans, he found leisure for very tedious and very lucrative subordinate transactions. The temples of Derceto at Hierapolis Bambyce and of Jehovah at Jerusalem, and other rich shrines of the Syrian province, were by order of Crassus despoiled of their treasures; and contingents or, still better, sums of money instead were levied from all the subjects. The military operations of the first summer were limited to an extensive reconnaissance in Mesopotamia; the Euphrates was crossed, the Parthian satrap was defeated at Ichnæ (on the Belik to the north of Rakkah), and the neighbouring towns, including the considerable one of Nicephorium (Rakkah), were occupied, after which the Romans having left garrisons behind in them returned to Syria. They had hitherto been in doubt whether it was more advisable to march to Parthia by the circuitous route of Armenia or by the direct route through the Mesopotamian desert. The first route, leading through mountainous regions under the control of trustworthy allies, commended itself by its greater safety; king Artavasdes came in person to the Roman head-quarters to advocate this plan of the campaign. But that reconnaissance decided in favour of the march through Mesopotamia. The numerous and flourishing Greek and half-Greek towns in the regions along the Euphrates and Tigris, above all the great city of Seleucia, were altogether averse to the Parthian rule; all the Greek townships with which the Romans came into contact had now, like the citizens of Carrhæ at an earlier time (P. 136), practically shown how ready they were to shake off the intolerable foreign yoke and to receive the Romans as deliverers, almost as countrymen. The Arab prince Abgarus, who commanded the desert of Edessa and Carrhæ and thereby the usual

route from the Euphrates to the Tigris, had arrived in the camp of the Romans to assure them in person of his devotedness. The Parthians had appeared to be wholly unprepared. Accordingly (701) the Euphrates was crossed (near Biradjik). To reach the Tigris from this point they had the choice of two routes; either the army might move downward along the Euphrates to the latitude of Seleucia where the Euphrates and Tigris are only a few miles distant from each other; or they might immediately after crossing take the shortest line to the Tigris right across the great Mesopotamian desert. The former route led directly to the Parthian capital Ctesiphon, which lay opposite Seleucia on the other bank of the Tigris; several weighty voices were raised in favour of this route in the Roman council of war; in particular the quæstor Gaius Cassius pointed to the difficulties of the march in the desert, and to the suspicious reports arriving from the Roman garrisons on the left bank of the Euphrates as to the Parthian warlike preparations. But in opposition to this the Arab prince Abgarus announced that the Parthians were employed in evacuating their western provinces. They had already packed up their treasures and put themselves in motion to flee to the Hyrcanians and Scythians; only through a forced march by the shortest route was it at all possible still to reach them; but by such a march the Romans would probably succeed in overtaking and cutting up at least the rear guard of the great army under Sillaces and the vizier, and obtaining enormous spoil. These reports of the friendly Bedouins decided the direction of the march; the Roman army, consisting of seven legions, 4000 cavalry, and 4000 slingers and archers, turned off from the Euphrates and away into the inhospitable plains of northern Mesopotamia. Far and wide no enemy appeared; only hunger and thirst, and the endless sandy desert, seemed to keep watch at the gates of the East. At length, after many days of toilsome marching, not far from the first river which the Roman army had to cross, the Balissus (Belik), the first horsemen of the enemy were descried. Abgarus with his Arabs was sent out to reconnoitre; the Parthian squadrons retired up to and over the river and vanished in the distance, pursued by Abgarus and his followers. With impatience the Romans waited for his return and for more exact information. The general hoped here at length to come upon the constantly retreating foe; his young and brave son Publius, who had fought with

The Eu-
phrates
crossed.
53.

The march
in the De-
sert.

the greatest distinction in Gaul under Cæsar (P. 238, 254) and had been sent by the latter at the head of a Celtic squadron of horse to take part in the Parthian war, was inflamed with a vehement desire for the fight. When no tidings came, they resolved to advance at a venture; the signal for starting was given, the Balissus was crossed, the army after a brief insufficient rest at noon was led on without delay at a rapid pace. Then suddenly the kettledrums of the Parthians sounded all around; on every side their silken gold-embroidered banners were seen waving, and their iron helmets and coats of mail glittering in the blaze of the hot noonday sun; and by the side of the vizier stood prince Abgarus with his Bedouins.

Roman and
Parthian
systems of
warfare.

The Romans saw too late the net in which they had allowed themselves to be ensnared. With sure glance the vizier had thoroughly seen both the danger and the means of meeting it. Nothing could be accomplished against Roman infantry of the line with Oriental infantry; so he had got rid of this arm, and by sending a mass which was useless in the main field of battle under the personal leadership of king Orodes to Armenia, he had prevented king Artavasdes from allowing the promised 10,000 heavy cavalry to join the army of Crassus, who now painfully felt the want of them. On the other hand the vizier met the Roman tactics, unsurpassed of their kind, with a system entirely different. His army consisted exclusively of cavalry; the line was formed of the heavy horsemen armed with long thrusting-lances, and protected, man and horse, by a coat of mail of metallic plates or a leathern doublet and by similar greaves; the mass of the troops consisted of mounted archers. As compared with these, the Romans were thoroughly inferior in the corresponding arms both as to number and excellence. Their infantry of the line, excellent as they were in close combat, whether at a short distance with the heavy javelin or in hand-to-hand combat with the sword, could not compel an army consisting wholly of cavalry to come to an engagement with them; and they found, even when they did come to a hand-to-hand conflict, an equal if not superior adversary in the iron-clad hosts of lancers. As compared with an army like this Parthian one, the Roman army was at a disadvantage strategically, because the cavalry commanded the communications; and at a disadvantage tactically, because every weapon of close combat must succumb to that which is wielded from a

distance, unless the struggle becomes an individual one man against man. The concentrated position, on which the whole Roman method of war was based, increased the danger in presence of such an attack; the closer the ranks of the Roman column, the more irresistible certainly was its onset, but the less also could the missiles fail to hit their mark. Under ordinary circumstances, where towns have to be defended and difficulties of the ground have to be considered, such a system of tactics operating with mere cavalry against infantry could never be completely carried out; but in the Mesopotamian desert, where the army almost like a ship on the high seas neither encountered an obstacle nor met with a basis for strategic dispositions during many days' march, this mode of warfare was irresistible for the very reason that circumstances allowed it to be developed there in all its purity and therefore in all its power. There everything combined to put the foreign infantry at a disadvantage against the native cavalry. Where the heavily-laden Roman foot-soldier dragged himself toilsomely through the sand or the steppe, and perished from hunger or still more from thirst amid the pathless route marked only by water-springs that were far apart and difficult to find, the Parthian horseman, accustomed from childhood to sit on his fleet steed or camel, nay almost to spend his life in the saddle, easily traversed the desert whose hardships he had long learned how to lighten and in case of need to bear. There no rain fell to mitigate the intolerable heat, and to slacken the bow-strings and leathern thongs of the enemy's archers and slingers; there amidst the deep sand at many places ordinary ditches and ramparts could hardly be formed for the camp. Imagination can hardly conceive a situation in which all the military advantages were more on the one side, and all the disadvantages more thoroughly on the other.

To the question, under what circumstances this new style of tactics, the first national system that on its own proper ground showed itself superior to the Roman, arose among the Parthians, we can only reply by conjectures. The lancers and mounted archers were of great antiquity in the East, and already formed the flower of the armies of Cyrus and Darius; but hitherto these arms had been employed only as secondary, and essentially to cover the thoroughly useless Oriental infantry. The Parthian armies also by no means differed in this respect from the other Oriental ones; armies are

mentioned, five-sixths of which consisted of infantry. In the campaign of Crassus, on the other hand, the cavalry for the first time came forward independently, and this arm obtained quite a new application and quite a different value. The irresistible superiority of the Roman infantry in close combat seems to have led the adversaries of Rome in very different parts of the world independently of each other—at the same time and with similar success—to meet it with cavalry and distant weapons. What was completely successful with Cassivellaunus in Britain (P. 259) and partially successful with Vercingetorix in Gaul (P. 269)—what was to a certain degree attempted even by Mithradates Eupator (P. 68)—the vizier of Orodes carried out only on a larger scale and more completely. And in doing so he had special advantages; for he found in the heavy cavalry the means of forming a line; the bow which was national in the East and was handled with masterly skill in the Persian provinces gave him an effective weapon for distant combat; and lastly the peculiarities of the country and the people enabled him freely to realize his brilliant idea. Here, where the Roman weapons of close combat and the Roman system of concentration yielded for the first time before the weapons of more distant warfare and the system of deploying, that military revolution was initiated which only reached its completion with the introduction of firearms.

Battle near
Carrhæ.

Under such circumstances the first battle between the Romans and Parthians was fought amidst the sandy desert thirty miles to the south of Carrhæ (Harran) where there was a Roman garrison, and at a somewhat less distance to the north of Ichnæ. The Roman archers were sent forward, but retired immediately before the enormous numerical superiority and the far greater elasticity and range of the Parthian bows. The legions, which, in spite of the advice of the more sagacious officers that they should be deployed as much as possible against the enemy, had been drawn up in a dense square of twelve cohorts on each side, were soon out-flanked and overwhelmed with the formidable arrows, which under such circumstances hit their man even without special aim, and against which the soldiers had no means of retaliation. The hope that the enemy might expend his missiles vanished with a glance at the endless range of camels laden with arrows. The Parthians were still extending their line. That the out-flanking might not end in surrounding,

Publius Crassus advanced to the attack with a select corps of cavalry, archers, and infantry of the line. The enemy in fact abandoned the attempt to close the circle, and retreated, hotly pursued by the impetuous leader of the Romans. But, when the corps of Publius had totally lost sight of the main army, the heavy cavalry made a stand against it, and the Parthian host hastening up from all sides closed in like a net round it. Publius, who saw his troops falling thickly and vainly around him under the arrows of the mounted archers, threw himself in desperation with his Celtic cavalry unprotected by any coats of mail on the iron-clad lancers of the enemy; but the fearless valour of his Celts, who seized the lances with their hands or sprang from their horses to stab the enemy, performed its marvels in vain. The remains of the corps, including their leader wounded in the sword-arm, were driven to a slight eminence, where they only served for an easier mark to the enemy's archers. Mesopotamian Greeks, who were accurately acquainted with the country, adjured Crassus to ride off with them and make an attempt to escape; but he refused to separate his fate from that of the brave men whom his too daring courage had led to death, and he caused himself to be stabbed by the hand of his shield-bearer. Following his example, most of the still surviving officers put themselves to death. Of the whole division, about 6000 strong, not more than some 500 were taken prisoners; no one was able to escape. Meanwhile the attack on the main army had slackened, and the Romans were but too glad to rest. When at length the absence of any tidings from the corps sent out startled them out of the deceitful calm, and they drew near to the scene of the battle for the purpose of learning its fate, the head of the son was displayed on a pole before his father's eyes; and the terrible onslaught began once more against the main army with the same fury and the same hopeless uniformity. They could neither break the ranks of the lancers nor reach the archers; night alone put an end to the slaughter. Had the Parthians bivouacked on the battle-field, hardly a man of the Roman army would have escaped. But not trained to fight otherwise than on horseback, and therefore afraid of a surprise, they were wont never to encamp close to the enemy; jeeringly they shouted to the Romans that they would give the general a night to bewail his son, and galloped off to return next morning and despatch the game that lay bleeding on the ground.

Retreat to
Carrhæ.

Departure
from
Carrhæ.

Surprise of
Sinnaca.

Of course the Romans did not wait for the morning. The lieutenant-generals Cassius and Octavius—Crassus himself had completely lost his judgment—ordered the men still capable of marching to set out immediately and with the utmost silence (leaving behind the whole—said to amount to 4000—of the wounded and stragglers), with the view of seeking protection within the walls of Carrhæ. It happened that the Parthians, when they returned on the following day, applied themselves first of all to seek out and massacre the scattered Romans left behind, and that the garrison and inhabitants of Carrhæ, early informed of the disaster by fugitives, had marched forth in all haste to meet the beaten army; the remnant was thus saved from what seemed inevitable destruction. The Parthian cavalry could not think of undertaking the siege of Carrhæ. But the Romans soon voluntarily departed, whether compelled by want of provisions, or in consequence of the desponding precipitation of their commander-in-chief, whom the soldiers had vainly attempted to remove from the command and to replace by Cassius. They moved in the direction of the Armenian mountains; marching by night and resting by day Octavius with a band of 5000 men reached the fortress of Sinnaca, which was only a day's march distant from the heights that would give shelter, and liberated even at the peril of his own life the commander-in-chief, whom a guide had led astray and given up to the enemy. Then the vizier rode in front of the Roman camp to offer, in the name of his king, peace and friendship to the Romans, and to propose a personal conference between the two generals. The Roman army, demoralized as it was, adjured and indeed compelled its leader to accept the offer. The vizier received the consular and his staff with the usual honours, and offered anew to conclude a compact of friendship; only, with just bitterness recalling the fate of the agreements concluded with Lucullus and Pompeius respecting the Euphrates boundary (P. 140), he demanded that it should be immediately reduced to writing. A richly adorned horse was produced; it was a present from the king to the Roman commander-in-chief: the servants of the vizier crowded round Crassus, zealous to mount him on the steed. It seemed to the Roman officers as if there was a design to seize the person of the commander-in-chief; Octavius, unarmed as he was, pulled the sword of one of the Parthians from its sheath and stabbed the groom.

In the tumult which thereupon arose, the Roman officers were all put to death; the grey-haired commander-in-chief also, like his grand-uncle (iii. 56), was unwilling to serve as a living trophy to the enemy, and sought and found death. The multitude left behind in the camp without a leader were partly taken prisoners, partly dispersed. What the day of Carrhæ had begun, the day of Sinnaca completed (June 9, 701); the two took their place side by side with the days of the Allia, of Cannæ, and of Arausio. The army of the Euphrates was no more. Only the squadron of Gaius Cassius, which had been broken off from the main army on the retreat from Carrhæ, and some other scattered bands and isolated fugitives succeeded in escaping from the Parthians and Bedouins and separately finding their way back to Syria. Of above 40,000 Roman legionaries, who had crossed the Euphrates, not a fourth part returned; the half had perished; nearly 10,000 Roman prisoners were settled by the victors in the extreme east of their kingdom—in the oasis of Merv—as bondsmen compelled after the Parthian fashion to render military service. For the first time since the eagles had headed the legions, they had become in the same year trophies of victory in the hands of foreign nations, almost contemporaneously of a German tribe in the West (P. 262) and of the Parthians in the East. As to the impression, which the defeat of the Romans produced in the East, unfortunately no adequate information has reached us; but it must have been deep and lasting. King Orodes was just celebrating the marriage of his son Pacorus with the sister of his new ally, Artavasdes the king of Armenia, when the announcement of the victory of his vizier arrived, and along with it, according to Oriental usage, the cut-off head of Crassus. The tables were already removed; one of the wandering companies of actors from Asia Minor, numbers of which at that time existed and carried Hellenic poetry and the Hellenic drama far into the East, was just performing before the assembled court the Bacchæ of Euripides. The actor playing the part of Agave, who in her Dionysiac frenzy has torn in pieces her son and returns from Cithæron carrying his head on the thyrsus, exchanged this for the bloody head of Crassus, and to the infinite delight of his audience of half Hellenised barbarians began afresh the well-known song:

53.

φέρομεν ἐξ ὄρεος
 ἔλικά νεότομον ἐπὶ μέλαθρα
 μακαρίαν θήραν.

It was, since the times of the Achæmenidæ, the first serious victory which the Orientals had achieved over the West; and there was a deep significance in the fact, that by way of celebrating this victory the fairest product of the western world—Greek tragedy—parodied itself through its degenerate representatives in that hideous burlesque. The civic spirit of Rome and the genius of Hellas began simultaneously to accommodate themselves to the chains of Sultanism.

Conse-
 quences
 of the
 defeat.

The disaster, terrible in itself, seemed also as though it was to be dreadful in its consequences, and to shake the foundations of the Roman power in the East. It was among the least of its results, that the Parthians now had absolute sway beyond the Euphrates; that Armenia, after having fallen away from the Roman alliance even before the disaster of Crassus, was reduced by it into entire dependence on Parthia; that the faithful citizens of Carrhæ were bitterly punished for their adherence to the Occidentals by the new master appointed over them by the Parthians, one of the treacherous guides of the Romans, named Andromachus. The Parthians now prepared in earnest to cross the Euphrates in their turn, and, in union with the Armenians and Arabs, to dislodge the Romans from Syria. The Jews and various other Occidentals awaited emancipation from the Roman rule there, no less impatiently than the Hellenes beyond the Euphrates awaited relief from the Parthian; in Rome civil war was at the door; an attack at this particular place and time was a grave peril. But fortunately for Rome the leaders on each side had changed. Sultan Orodes was too much indebted to the heroic prince, who had first placed the crown on his head and then cleared the land from the enemy, not to get rid of him as soon as possible by the executioner. His place as commander-in-chief of the invading army destined for Syria was filled by a prince, the king's son Pacorus, with whom on account of his youth and inexperience the prince Osaces had to be associated as military adviser. On the other side the *interim* command in Syria in room of Crassus was taken up by the prudent and resolute quæstor Gaius Cassius. The Parthians were, just like Crassus formerly, in no haste to attack, but during the years 701 and 702 sent only weak flying bands, who were

Repulse of
 the Par-
 thians.

easily repulsed, across the Euphrates; so that Cassius obtained time to reorganize the army in some measure, and with the help of the faithful adherent of the Romans, Herodes Antipater, to reduce to obedience the Jews, whom their resentment at the spoliation of the temple perpetrated by Crassus had already driven to arms. The Roman government had thus full time to send fresh troops for the defence of the threatened frontier; but this was left undone amidst the convulsions of the incipient revolution, and, when at length in 703 the great Parthian invading army appeared on the Euphrates, Cassius had still nothing to oppose to it but the two weak legions formed from the remains of the army of Crassus. Of course with these he could neither prevent the crossing nor defend the province. Syria was overrun by the Parthians, and all Western Asia trembled. But the Parthians did not understand the besieging of towns. They not only retreated from Antioch, into which Cassius had thrown himself with his troops, without having accomplished their object, but they were on their retreat along the Orontes allured into an ambush by Cassius' cavalry and there severely handled by the Roman infantry; prince Osaces was himself among the slain. Friend and foe thus perceived that the Parthian army under an ordinary general and on ordinary ground was not capable of much more than any other Oriental army. However, the attack was not abandoned. Pacorus lay encamped during the winter of 703-4 in Cyrrhestica on this side of the Euphrates; and the new governor of Syria, Marcus Bibulus, as wretched a general as he was an incapable statesman, knew no better course of action than to shut himself up in his fortresses. It was generally expected that the war would break out in 704 with renewed fury. But instead of turning his arms against the Romans Pacorus turned against his own father, and accordingly even entered into an understanding with the Roman governor. Thus the stain was not wiped from the shield of Roman honour, nor was the reputation of Rome restored in the East; but the Parthian invasion of Western Asia was over, and the Euphrates boundary was, for the time being at least, retained.

In Rome meanwhile the periodical volcano of revolution was whirling upward its clouds of stupefying smoke. The Romans began to have no longer a soldier or a denarius to be employed against the public foe—no longer a thought for

Impression produced in Rome by the defeat of Carrhæ.

the destinies of the nations. It is one of the most dreadful signs of the times, that the huge national disaster of Carrhæ and Sinnaca gave the politicians of that time far less to think and speak of than that wretched tumult on the Appian road, in which, a couple of months after Crassus, Clodius the partisan-leader perished; but it is easily conceivable and almost excusable. The breach between the two regents, long felt as inevitable and often announced as near, was now assuming such a shape that it could not be stopped. Like the boat of the ancient Greek mariners' tale, the vessel of the Roman community now found itself as it were between two rocks swimming towards each other; expecting every moment the crash of collision, those whom it was bearing tortured by nameless anguish into the eddying surge that rose higher and higher, were benumbed; and, while every slightest movement there attracted a thousand eyes, not one ventured to give a glance to the right or the left.

The [56.
good under-
standing
between
the regents
relaxed.

After Cæsar had, at the conference of Luca in April 698, agreed to considerable concessions as regarded Pompeius, and the regents had thus placed themselves substantially on a level, their relation was not without the outward conditions of durability, so far as a division of the monarchical power—in itself indivisible—could be lasting at all. It was a different question whether the regents, at least for the present, were determined to keep together and mutually to acknowledge without reserve their title to rank as equals. That this was the case with Cæsar, in so far as he had acquired the interval necessary for the conquest of Gaul at the price of equalisation with Pompeius, has been already set forth. But Pompeius was hardly ever, even provisionally, in earnest with the collegiate scheme. His was one of those petty and mean natures, towards which it is dangerous to practice magnanimity; to his paltry spirit it appeared certainly a dictate of prudence to supplant at the first opportunity his reluctantly acknowledged rival, and his mean soul thirsted after a possibility of retaliating on Cæsar for the humiliation which he had suffered through Cæsar's indulgence. But while it is probable that Pompeius in accordance with his heavy and sluggish nature never properly consented to let Cæsar hold a position of equality by his side, yet the design of breaking up the alliance doubtless came only by degrees to be distinctly entertained by him. At any rate the public, which usually saw better through the views and intentions of

Pompeius than he did himself, could not be mistaken in thinking that at least with the death of the beautiful Julia—who died in the bloom of womanhood in the autumn of 700 and was soon followed by her only child to the tomb—the personal relation between her father and her husband was broken up. Cæsar attempted to re-establish the ties of affinity which fate had severed; he asked for himself the hand of the only daughter of Pompeius, and offered Octavia, his sister's grand-daughter, who was now his nearest relative, in marriage to his fellow-regent; but Pompeius left his daughter to her existing husband Faustus Sulla the son of the regent, and he himself married the daughter of Quintus Metellus Scipio. The personal breach had unmistakably begun, and it was Pompeius who drew back his hand. It was expected that a political breach would at once follow; but in this people were mistaken; in public affairs a collegiate understanding continued for a time to subsist. The reason was, that Cæsar did not wish publicly to dissolve the relation before the subjugation of Gaul was accomplished, and Pompeius did not wish to dissolve it before the governing authorities and Italy should be wholly reduced under his power by his investiture with the dictatorship. It is singular, but yet readily admits of explanation, that the regents under these circumstances supported each other; Pompeius after the disaster of Aduatua in the winter of 700 handed over one of his Italian legions that were dismissed on furlough by way of loan to Cæsar; on the other hand Cæsar granted his consent and his moral support to Pompeius in the repressive measures which the latter took against the stubborn republican opposition. It was only after Pompeius had in this way procured for himself at the beginning of 702 the undivided consulship and an influence in the capital thoroughly outweighing that of Cæsar, and after all the men capable of arms in Italy had tendered their military oath to himself personally and in his name, that he formed the resolution to break as soon as possible formally with Cæsar; and the design became distinctly enough apparent. That the judicial prosecution which took place after the tumult on the Appian Way lighted with unsparing severity precisely on the old democratic partizans of Cæsar (P. 326), might perhaps pass as a mere awkwardness. That the new law against electioneering intrigues, which had retrospective effect as far as 684, included also the dubious proceedings at Cæsar's

54.

54.

Dictator-
52.] ship of
Pompeius.

Covert
attacks by
Pompeius
on Cæsar.

70.

- candidature for the consulship (P. 324), might likewise be nothing more, although not a few Cæsarians thought that they perceived in it a definite design. But people could no longer shut their eyes, however willing they might be to do so, when Pompeius did not select for his colleague in the consulship his former father-in-law Cæsar, as was fitting in the circumstances of the case and was in many quarters demanded, but associated with himself a puppet wholly dependent on him in his new father-in-law Scipio (P. 326); and still less, when Pompeius at the same time got the governorship of the two Spains continued to him for five years more, that is to 709, and a considerable fixed sum appropriated from the state-chest for the payment of his troops, not only without stipulating for a like prolongation of command and a like grant of money to Cæsar, but even while labouring ulteriorly to effect the recall of Cæsar before the term formerly agreed on through the new regulations which were issued at the same time regarding the holding of the governorships. These encroachments were unmistakably calculated to undermine Cæsar's position and eventually to overthrow him. The moment could not be more favourable. Cæsar had conceded so much to Pompeius at Luca, only because Crassus and his Syrian army would necessarily, in the event of any rupture with Pompeius, be thrown into Cæsar's scale; for upon Crassus—who since the times of Sulla had been at the deepest enmity with Pompeius and almost as long politically and personally allied with Cæsar, and who from his peculiar character at all events, if he could not himself be king of Rome, would have been content to be the new king's banker—Cæsar could always reckon, and could have no apprehension at all of seeing Crassus enter into an alliance with his enemies. The catastrophe of June 701, by which army and general in Syria perished, was therefore a terribly severe blow for Cæsar. A few months later the national insurrection burst forth more violently than ever in Gaul, just when it had seemed completely subdued, and for the first time Cæsar there encountered an equal opponent in the Arvernian king Vercingetorix. Once more fate had been working for Pompeius; Crassus was dead, all Gaul was in revolt, Pompeius was practically dictator of Rome and master of the senate. What might have happened, if he had now, instead of remotely intriguing against Cæsar, summarily compelled the burgesses or the senate to recall Cæsar at once from
- 45.
- 53.

Gaul! But Pompeius never understood how to take advantage of fortune. He heralded the breach clearly enough; already in 702 his acts left no doubt about it, and in the spring of 703 he openly expressed his purpose of breaking with Cæsar; but he did not break with him, and allowed the months to slip away unemployed. 52.
51.

But however Pompeius might delay, the crisis was incessantly urged on by the mere force of circumstances. The impending war was not eventually a struggle between republic and monarchy—for that had been virtually decided years before—but a struggle between Pompeius and Cæsar for the possession of the crown of Rome. But neither of the pretenders found his account in uttering the plain truth; he would have thereby driven all that very respectable portion of the burgesses, which desired the continuance of the republic and believed in its possibility, directly into the camp of his opponent. The old battle-cries raised by Gracchus and Drusus, Cinna and Sulla, used up and meaningless as they were, remained still good enough for watchwords in the struggle of the two generals contending for sole power; and, though for the moment both Pompeius and Cæsar ranked themselves officially with the so-called popular party, it could not be for a moment doubtful that Cæsar would inscribe on his banner the people and democratic progress, Pompeius the aristocracy and the legitimate constitution. Cæsar had no choice. He was from the outset and very earnestly a democrat; the monarchy as he understood it differed more in name than in reality from the Gracchan government of the people; and he was too magnanimous and too profound a statesman to conceal his colours and to fight under any other escutcheon than his own. The immediate advantage no doubt, which this battle-cry brought to him, was trifling; it was confined mainly to the circumstance, that he was thereby relieved from the inconvenience of directly naming the kingdom and alarming the mass of the lukewarm and his own adherents by that detested word. The democratic banner hardly yielded further positive gain, since the ideals of Gracchus had been rendered infamous and ridiculous by Clodius; for where was there now—laying aside perhaps the Transpadanes—any class of any sort of importance, which would have been induced by the battle-cries of the democracy to take part in the struggle?

This state of things would have decided the part of

The old party names and the pretenders.

The democracy and Cæsar.

The aristocracy and Pompeius.

Pompeius in the impending struggle, even if apart from this it had not been self-evident that he could only enter into it as the general of the legitimate republic. Nature had destined him, if ever any one, to be a member of an aristocracy; and nothing but very accidental and very selfish motives had carried him over as a deserter from the aristocratic to the democratic camp. That he should now revert to his Sullan traditions, was not merely natural, but in every respect of essential advantage. Effete as was the democratic cry, the conservative cry could not but have the more potent effect, if it proceeded from the right man. Perhaps the majority, at any rate the flower of the burgesses, belonged to the constitutional party; and as respected its numerical and moral strength might well be called to interfere powerfully, perhaps decisively, in the impending struggle of the pretenders. It wanted nothing but a leader. Marcus Cato, its present head, did the duty, as he understood it, of its leader amidst daily peril to his life and perhaps without hope of success; his fidelity to duty deserves respect, but to be the last at a forlorn post is commendable in the soldier, not in the general. He had not the skill either to organise or to bring into action at the proper time the powerful reserve, which had sprung up as it were spontaneously in Italy for the party of the overthrown government; and he had for good reasons never made any pretension to the military leadership, on which everything ultimately depended. If instead of this man, who knew not how to act either as party chief or as general, a man of the political and military mark of Pompeius should raise the banner of the existing constitution, the municipals of Italy would necessarily flock towards it in crowds, that under it they might help to fight, if not indeed for the kingship of Pompeius, at any rate against the kingship of Cæsar. To this was added another consideration at least as important. It was characteristic of Pompeius, even when he had formed a resolve, not to be able to find his way to its execution. While he knew perhaps how to conduct war but certainly not how to declare it, the Catonian party, although assuredly unable to conduct it, was very able and above all very ready to furnish reasons for war against the monarchy which was in course of being established. According to the intention of Pompeius, while he kept himself aloof and in his peculiar way now talked as though he would immediately depart for his Spanish pro-

vinces, now made preparations as though he would set out to take the command on the Euphrates, the legitimate governing board, namely the senate, were to break with Cæsar, to declare war against him, and to intrust the conduct of it to Pompeius, who then, yielding to the general desire, was to come forward as the protector of the constitution against demagogico-monarchical plots, as an upright man and champion of the existing order of things against the profligates and anarchists, as the duly installed general of the senate against the Emperor of the street, and so once more to save his country. Thus Pompeius gained by the alliance with the conservatives both a second army in addition to his personal adherents, and a suitable war-manifesto—advantages which certainly were purchased at the high price of coalescing with those who were in principle opposed to him. Of the countless evils involved in this coalition, there was developed in the mean time only one—but that already a very grave one—that Pompeius surrendered the power of commencing hostilities against Cæsar when and how he pleased, and in this decisive point made himself dependent on all the accidents and caprices of an aristocratic corporation.

Thus the republican opposition, after having been for years obliged to rest content with the part of a mere spectator and having hardly ventured to whisper, was now brought back once more to the political stage by the impending rupture between the regents. It consisted primarily of the circle which rallied round Cato—those republicans who were resolved to venture on the struggle for the republic and against the monarchy under all circumstances, and the sooner the better. The pitiful issue of the attempt made in 698 (P. 310) had taught them that they by themselves alone were not in a position either to conduct war or even to call it forth; it was known to every one that even in the senate, while the whole corporation with a few isolated exceptions was averse to monarchy, the majority would still only restore the oligarchic government if it might be restored without danger—in which case, to be sure, it might have a good while to wait. In presence of the regents on the one hand, and on the other hand of this indolent majority, which desired peace above all things and at any price, and was averse to any decided action and most of all to a decided rupture with one or other of the regents, the only possible course for the Catonian party to obtain a

The re-
publicans.

restoration of the old rule lay in a coalition with the less dangerous of the rulers. If Pompeius acknowledged the oligarchic constitution and offered to fight for it against Cæsar, the republican opposition might and must recognise him as its general, and in alliance with him compel the timid majority to a declaration of war. That Pompeius was not quite in earnest with his fidelity to the constitution, could indeed escape nobody; but, undecided as he was in everything, he had by no means arrived like Cæsar at a clear and firm conviction that it must be the first business of the new monarch to sweep off thoroughly and conclusively the oligarchic lumber. At any rate the war would train a really republican army and really republican generals; and, after the victory over Cæsar, they might proceed with more favourable prospects to set aside not merely one of the monarchs, but the monarchy itself, which was in the course of formation. Desperate as was the cause of the oligarchy, the offer of Pompeius to become its ally was the most favourable arrangement possible for it.

Their
league with
Pompeius.

- The conclusion of the alliance between Pompeius and the Catonian party was effected with comparative rapidity. Already during the dictatorship of Pompeius a remarkable approximation had taken place between them. The whole behaviour of Pompeius in the Milonian crisis, his abrupt repulse of the mob that offered him the dictatorship, his distinct declaration that he would accept this office only from the senate, his unrelenting severity against disturbers of the peace of every sort and especially against the ultra-democrats, the surprising complaisance with which he treated Cato and those who shared his views, appeared as much calculated to gain the men of order as they were offensive to the democratic Cæsar. On the other hand Cato and his followers, instead of combating with their wonted sternness the proposal to confer the dictatorship on Pompeius, had made it with immaterial alterations of form their own; Pompeius had received the undivided consulship immediately from the hands of Bibulus and Cato. While the Catonian party and Pompeius had thus at least a tacit understanding as early as the beginning of 702, the alliance might be held as formally concluded, when at the consular elections for 703 there was elected not Cato himself indeed, but—along with an insignificant man belonging to the majority of the senate—one of the most decided adherents of Cato, Marcus
- 52.
- 51.

Claudius Marcellus. Marcellus was no furious zealot and still less a genius, but a steadfast and strict aristocrat, just the right man to declare war if war was to be begun with Cæsar. As the case stood, this election, so surprising after the repressive measures adopted immediately before against the republican opposition, can hardly have occurred otherwise than with the consent, or at least under the tacit permission, of the regent of Rome for the time being. Slowly and awkwardly, as was his wont, but surely and steadily Pompeius moved onward to the rupture.

It was not the intention of Cæsar on the other hand to fall out at this moment with Pompeius. He could not indeed desire seriously and permanently to share the ruling power with any colleague, least of all with one of so secondary a sort as was Pompeius; and beyond doubt he had long resolved after terminating the conquest of Gaul to take the sole power for himself and in case of need to extort it by force of arms. But a man like Cæsar, in whom the officer was thoroughly subordinate to the statesman, could not fail to perceive that the regulation of the political organism by force of arms does in its consequences deeply and often permanently disorganize it; and therefore he could not but seek to solve the difficulty, if at all possible, by peaceful means or at least without open civil war. But even if civil war was not to be avoided, he could not desire to be driven to it at a time, when in Gaul the rising of Vercingetorix imperilled afresh all that had been obtained and occupied him without interruption from the winter of 701-702 to the winter of 703, and when Pompeius and the constitutional party opposed to him on principle were dominant in Italy. Accordingly he sought to preserve the relation with Pompeius and thereby the peace unbroken, and to attain, if at all possible, by peaceful means to the consulship for 706 already promised to him at Luca. If he should then after a conclusive settlement of Celtic affairs be placed in a regular manner at the head of the state, he, who was still more decidedly superior to Pompeius as a statesman than as a general, might well reckon on out-manceuvring the latter in the senate-house and in the Forum without special difficulty. Perhaps it was possible to find out for his awkward, vacillating, and arrogant rival some sort of honourable and uninfluential position, in which the latter might be content to sink into a nullity; the repeated attempts of Cæsar

Passive resistance of Cæsar.

53-52.
51.

48

to keep himself related by marriage to Pompeius, may have been designed to pave the way for such a solution and bring about a final settlement of the old quarrel through the succession of offspring inheriting the blood of both competitors. The republican opposition would then remain without a leader and therefore probably quiet, and peace would be preserved. If this should not be successful and if there should be, as was certainly possible, a necessity for ultimately resorting to the decision of arms, Cæsar would then as consul in Rome dispose of the compliant majority of the senate; and he could impede or perhaps frustrate the coalition of the Pompeians and the republicans, and conduct the war far more suitably and more advantageously, than if he now as proconsul of Gaul gave orders to march against the senate and its general. Certainly the success of this plan depended on Pompeius being good-natured enough to let Cæsar still

48.

obtain the consulship for 706 promised to him at Luca; but even if it failed, it would be always of advantage for Cæsar to have given practical and repeated evidence of the most yielding disposition. On the one hand time would thus be gained for attaining his object meanwhile in Gaul; on the other hand his opponents would be left with the odium of initiating the rupture and consequently the civil war—which was of the utmost moment for Cæsar with reference to the majority of the senate and the party of material interests, and more especially with reference to his own soldiers.

On these views he acted. He armed certainly; the number of his legions was raised through new levies in the winter of 702-703 to eleven, including that borrowed from Pompeius. But at the same time he expressly and openly approved of Pompeius' conduct during the dictatorship and the restoration of order in the capital which he had effected, rejected the warnings of officious friends as calumnies, reckoned every day by which he succeeded in postponing the catastrophe a gain, overlooked whatever could be overlooked and bore whatever could be borne—immoveably adhering only to the one decisive demand that, when his governorship of Gaul came to an end with 705, the second consulship, admissible by republican state-law and promised to him according to agreement by his colleague, should be granted to him for the year 706.

52-51.

49.

48.

Prepara-
tion for

This very demand became the battle-field of the diplomatic war which now began. If Cæsar were compelled either to

resign his office of governor before the last day of December 705 or to postpone the assumption of the magistracy in the capital beyond the 1st January 706, so that he should remain for a time between the governorship and the consulate without office, and consequently liable to criminal impeachment—which according to Roman law was only allowable against one who was not in office—the public had good reason to prophesy for him in this case the fate of Milo, because Cato had for long been ready to impeach him and Pompeius was a more than doubtful protector. Now, to attain that object, Cæsar's opponents had a very simple means. According to the existing ordinance as to elections every candidate for the consulship was obliged to announce himself personally to the presiding magistrate, and to cause his name to be inscribed on the official list of candidates before the election, that is half a year before entering on office. It had probably been regarded in the conferences at Luca as a matter of course that Cæsar would be released from this obligation, which was purely formal and was very often dispensed with; but the decree to that effect had not yet been issued, and, as Pompeius was now in possession of the decreative machinery, Cæsar depended in this respect on the good will of his rival. Pompeius incomprehensibly abandoned of his own accord this completely secure position; with his consent and during his dictatorship (702) the personal appearance of Cæsar was dispensed with by a tribunician law. When however soon afterwards the new election-ordinance (P. 324) was issued, the obligation of candidates personally to enroll themselves was repeated in general terms, and no exception was inserted in favour of those released from it by earlier resolutions of the people; according to strict form the privilege granted in favour of Cæsar was cancelled by the later general law. Cæsar complained, and the clause was subsequently appended but not confirmed by special decree of the people, so that this enactment inserted by mere interpolation in the already promulgated law could only be looked on *de jure* as a nullity. Where Pompeius therefore might have simply kept by the law, he had preferred first to make a spontaneous concession, then to recall it, and lastly to palliate this recall in a manner most illegal.

While in this way the shortening of Cæsar's governorship was only aimed at indirectly, the regulations as to the governorships issued at the same time sought the same

attacks on
Cæsar.
49. 48.

Attempt
to keep
Cæsar out
of the
consulship.

52.

Attempt
to shorten
Cæsar's

governor-
ship.

- object directly. The ten years for which the governorship had been secured to Cæsar, latterly through the law proposed by Pompeius himself in concert with Crassus, ran according to the usual mode of reckoning from 1 March 695 to the last day of February 705. As however, according to the earlier practice, the proconsul or proprætor had the right of entering on his provincial magistracy immediately after the termination of his first year of office, the successor of Cæsar was to be nominated not from the urban magistrates of 704 but from those of 705, and could not therefore enter before 1st Jan. 706. So far Cæsar had still during the last ten months of the year 705 a right to the command, not on the ground of the Pompeio-Licinian law, but on the ground of the old rule that a command with a set term still continued after the expiry of the term up to the arrival of the successor. But now, since the new regulation of 702 called to the governorships not the consuls and prætors going out but those who had gone out five years ago or more, and thus prescribed an interval between the civil magistracy and the command instead of the previous immediate sequence, there was no longer any difficulty in straightway filling up from another quarter every legally vacant governorship. The pitiful dissimulation and procrastinating artifice of Pompeius are after a remarkable manner mixed up, in these arrangements, with the wily formalism and the constitutional erudition of the republican party. Years before these weapons of state-law could be employed, they had them duly prepared, and put themselves in a condition on the one hand to compel Cæsar to the resignation of his command from the day when the term secured to him by Pompeius' own law expired, that is from the 1st March 705, by sending successors to him, and on the other hand to be able to treat as null and void the votes tendered for him at the elections for 706. Cæsar, not in a position to hinder these moves, kept silence and left things to their own course.

Debates as
to Cæsar's
recall.

- Gradually therefore the slow course of constitutional procedure developed itself. According to custom the senate had to deliberate on the governorships of the year 705, so far as they went to former consuls, at the beginning of 703, so far as they went to former prætors, at the beginning of 704; that earlier deliberation gave the first occasion to discuss the nomination of new governors for the two Gauls in the senate, and thereby the first occasion for open collision

between the constitutional party pushed forward by Pompeius and the senatorial supporters of Cæsar. The consul Marcus Marcellus introduced a proposal to give the two provinces hitherto administered by the proconsul Gaius Cæsar from the 1st March 705 to the two consulars who were to be provided with governorships for that year. The long-repressed indignation burst forth in a torrent through the sluice once opened; everything that the Catonians were meditating against Cæsar was brought forward in these discussions. For them it was a settled point, that the right granted by exceptional law to the proconsul Cæsar of announcing his candidature for the consulship in absence had been again cancelled by a subsequent decree of the people, and that the reservation inserted in the latter was invalid. The senate should in their opinion cause the same magistrate, now that the subjugation of Gaul was ended, to discharge immediately the soldiers who had served out their time. The bestowal of burgess-rights and establishment of colonies by Cæsar in Upper Italy were described by them as unconstitutional and null; in further illustration of which Marcellus ordained that a respected senator of the Cæsarian colony of Comum, who, even if that place had not burgess but only Latin rights, was entitled to lay claim to Roman citizenship (P. 312), should receive the punishment of scourging which was admissible only in the case of non-burgesses.

The supporters of Cæsar at this time—among whom Gaius Vibius Pansa, who was the son of a man proscribed by Sulla but yet had entered on a political career, formerly an officer in Cæsar's army and in this year tribune of the people, was the most notable—affirmed in the senate that both the state of things in Gaul and equity demanded not only that Cæsar should not be recalled before the time, but that he should be allowed to retain the command along with the consulship; and they pointed beyond doubt to the facts, that a few years previously Pompeius had just in the same way combined the Spanish governorships with the consulate, that even at the present time, besides the important office of superintending the supply of food to the capital, he held the supreme command in Italy in addition to the Spanish, and that in fact the whole men capable of arms had been sworn in by him and had not yet been released from their oath.

The process began to take shape, but its course was not on that account more rapid. The majority of the senate,

seeing the breach approaching, allowed no sitting capable of issuing a decree to take place for months; and other months in their turn were lost through the solemn procrastination of Pompeius. At length the latter broke the silence and ranged himself, in a reserved and vacillating fashion as usual but yet plainly enough, on the side of the constitutional party against his former ally. He summarily and abruptly rejected the demand of the Cæsarians that their master should be allowed to conjoin the consulship and the proconsulship; this demand, he added with blunt coarseness, seemed to him no better than if a son should offer to flog his father. He approved in principle the proposal of Marcellus, in so far as he too declared that he would not allow Cæsar directly to attach the consulship to the proconsulship. He hinted, however, although without making any binding declaration on the point, that they would perhaps grant to

48. Cæsar admission to the elections for 706 without requiring his personal announcement, as well as the continuance of his

48. governorship at the utmost to the 13th Nov. 705. But in the mean time the incorrigible procrastinator consented to the postponement of the nomination of successors to the last day

50. of Feb. 704, which was asked by the representatives of Cæsar, probably on the ground of a clause of the Pompeio-Licinian law forbidding any discussion in the senate as to the nomination of successors before the beginning of Cæsar's last year of office.

To this effect accordingly the senate decreed (29 Sept. 703). The filling up of the Gallic governorships was placed

51. in the order of the day for the 1st March 704; but even now

50. it was attempted to break up the army of Cæsar—just as had formerly been done by decree of the people with the army of Lucullus (P. 72, 102)—by inducing his veterans to apply to the senate for their discharge. Cæsar's supporters effected indeed, as far as they constitutionally could, the cancelling of these decrees by their tribunician veto; but Pompeius very distinctly declared that the magistrates were bound unconditionally to obey the senate, and that intercessions and similar antiquated formalities should produce no change. The oligarchical party, whose organ Pompeius now made himself, betrayed not obscurely the design, in the event of a victory, of revising the constitution in their sense and removing everything which had even the semblance of popular freedom; as indeed, doubtless for this reason, it omitted to

avail itself of the comitia at all in its attacks directed against Cæsar. The coalition between Pompeius and the constitutional party was thus formally declared; sentence too was already evidently passed on Cæsar, and the term of its promulgation was simply postponed. The elections for the following year proved thoroughly adverse to him.

During these party manœuvres of his antagonists preparatory to war, Cæsar had succeeded in getting rid of the Gallic insurrection and restoring the state of peace in the whole subject territory. As early as the summer of 703, under the convenient pretext of defending the frontier (P. 289) but evidently in token of the fact that the legions in Gaul were now beginning to be no longer needed there, he moved one of them to North Italy. He could not avoid perceiving now at any rate, if not earlier, that he would not be spared the necessity of drawing the sword against his fellow-citizens; nevertheless, as it was highly desirable to leave the legions still for a time in the barely pacified Gaul, he sought even yet to procrastinate, and, well acquainted with the extreme love of peace in the majority of the senate, did not abandon the hope of still restraining them from the declaration of war in spite of the pressure exercised over them by Pompeius. He did not even hesitate to make great sacrifices, if only he might avoid for the present open variance with the supreme governing board. When the senate (in the spring of 704) at the suggestion of Pompeius requested both him and Cæsar to furnish each a legion for the impending Parthian war (P. 338), and when agreeably to this resolution Pompeius demanded back from Cæsar the legion lent to him some years before, so as to send it to Syria, Cæsar complied with the double demand, because neither the opportuneness of this decree of the senate nor the justice of the demand of Pompeius could in themselves be disputed, and the keeping within the bounds of the law and of formal loyalty was of more consequence to Cæsar than a few thousand soldiers. The two legions came without delay and placed themselves at the disposal of the government, but instead of sending them to the Euphrates, the latter kept them at Capua in readiness for Pompeius; and the public had once more the opportunity of comparing the manifest endeavours of Cæsar to avoid a rupture with the perfidious preparations for war of his opponents.

For the discussions with the senate Cæsar had succeeded in Curie.

purchasing not only one of the consuls of the year, Lucius Æmilius Paullus, but above all the tribune of the people Gaius Curio, probably the most eminent among the many brilliant profligates of this epoch;* unsurpassed in refined elegance, in fluent and clever oratory, in dexterity of intrigue, and in that energy, which in the case of vigorous but vicious characters bestirs itself only the more powerfully amid the pauses of idleness; but also unsurpassed in his dissolute life, in his talent for borrowing—his debts were estimated at 60,000,000 sesterces (£575,000)—and in his moral and political want of principle. He had previously offered himself to be bought by Cæsar and had been rejected; the talent, which he thenceforward displayed in his attacks on Cæsar, induced the latter subsequently to buy him up—the price was high, but the commodity was worth the money. Curio had in the first months of his tribunate of the people played the independent republican, and had as such thundered both against Cæsar and against Pompeius. He availed himself with rare skill of the apparently impartial standing which this gave him, when in March 704 the proposal as to the filling up of the Gallic governorships for the next year came up afresh for discussion in the senate; he completely approved the decree, but asked that it should be at the same time extended to Pompeius and his extraordinary commands. His arguments—that a constitutional state of things could only be brought about by the removal of all exceptional positions, that Pompeius as merely entrusted by the senate with the proconsulship could still less than Cæsar refuse obedience to it, that the mere removal of one of the two generals would only increase the danger to the constitution—carried complete conviction to superficial politicians and to the public at large; and the declaration of Curio, that he intended to prevent any one-sided proceedings against Cæsar by the veto constitutionally belonging to him, met with much approval in and out of the senate. Cæsar declared his consent at once to Curio's proposal and offered to resign his governorship and command at any moment on the summons of the senate, provided Pompeius would do the same; he might safely do so, for Pompeius without his Italo-Spanish command was no longer to be feared. Pompeius again for that very reason could not but refuse; his reply—that Cæsar must first

50.
Debates as
to the recall
of Cæsar
and Pom-
peius.

* *Homo ingeniosissime nequam* (Vellei, ii, 48).

resign, and that he meant speedily to follow the example thus set—was the less satisfactory, that he did not even specify a definite term for his retirement. Again the decision was delayed for months; Pompeius and the Catonians, perceiving the dubious humour of the majority of the senate, did not venture to bring Curio's proposal to a vote. Cæsar employed the summer in establishing the state of peace in the regions which he had conquered, in holding a great review of his troops on the Scheldt, and in making a triumphal march through the province of North Italy which was entirely devoted to him; autumn found him in Ravenna, the southern frontier-town of his province. The vote which could no longer be delayed on Curio's proposal at length took place, and exhibited the defeat of the party of Pompeius and Cato in all its extent. By 370 votes against 20 the senate resolved that the proconsuls of Spain and Gaul should both be called upon to resign their offices; and with boundless joy the good burgesses of Rome heard the glad news of the saving achievement of Curio. Pompeius was thus recalled by the senate no less than Cæsar, and while Cæsar was ready to comply with the command, Pompeius positively refused obedience. The presiding consul Gaius Marcellus, cousin of Marcus Marcellus and like the latter belonging to the Catonian party, addressed a severe lecture to the servile majority; and it was, no doubt, vexatious to be thus beaten in their own camp and beaten by means of a phalanx of poltroons. But where was victory to come from under a leader, who, instead of shortly and distinctly dictating his orders to the senators, resorted in his old days a second time to the instructions of a professor of rhetoric, that with eloquence polished up afresh he might encounter the vigorous and brilliant talents of Curio?

Cæsar and Pompeius both recalled.

The coalition, defeated in the senate, was in the most painful position. The Catonian section had undertaken to push matters to a rupture and to carry the senate along with them, and now saw their vessel stranded after a most vexatious manner on the sandbanks of the indolent majority. Their leaders had to listen in their conferences to the bitterest reproaches from Pompeius; he pointed out emphatically and with entire justice the dangers of the seeming peace; and, though it depended on himself alone to cut the knot by rapid action, his allies knew very well that they could never expect this from him, and that it was for them, as they had

Declaration of war.

promised, to bring matters to a crisis. After the champions of the constitution and of senatorial government had already declared the constitutional rights of the burgesses and of the tribunes of the people to be meaningless formalities (P. 352), they now found themselves driven by necessity to treat the constitutional decisions of the senate itself in a similar manner and, as the legitimate government would not let itself be saved with its own consent, to save it against its will. This was neither new nor accidental; Sulla (iii. 350) and Lucullus (P. 61) had been obliged to carry every energetic resolution conceived by them in the true interest of the government with a high hand irrespective of it, just as Cato and his friends now proposed to do; the machinery of the constitution was in fact utterly effete, and the senate was now—as the comitia had been for centuries—nothing but a worn out wheel slipping constantly out of its track.

50. It was rumoured (Oct. 704) that Cæsar had moved four legions from Transalpine into Cisalpine Gaul and stationed them at Placentia. This transference of troops was of itself within the prerogative of the governor; Curio moreover palpably showed in the senate the utter groundlessness of the rumour; and they by a majority rejected the proposal of the consul Gaius Marcellus to give Pompeius on the strength of it orders to march against Cæsar. Yet the said consul, 49. in concert with the two consuls elected for 705 who likewise belonged to the Catonian party, proceeded to Pompeius, and these three men by virtue of their own plenitude of power requested the general to put himself at the head of the two legions stationed at Capua, and to call the Italian militia to arms at his discretion. A more informal authorization for the commencement of a civil war can hardly be conceived; but people had no longer time to attend to such secondary matters; Pompeius accepted it. The military preparations, the levies began; in order personally to forward them, Pompeius left the capital in December 704.

50.
The ultimatum of
Cæsar.

Cæsar had fully attained the object of devolving the initiative of civil war on his opponents. He had, while himself keeping on legal ground, compelled Pompeius to declare war, and to declare it not as representative of the legitimate authority, but as general of an openly revolutionary minority of the senate which overawed the majority. This

result was not to be reckoned of slight importance, although the instinct of the masses could not and did not deceive itself for a moment as to the fact that the war concerned other things than questions of formal law. Now, when war was declared, it was Cæsar's interest to strike a blow as soon as possible. The preparations of his opponents were just beginning, and even the capital was not occupied. In ten or twelve days an army three times as strong as the troops of Cæsar that were in Upper Italy could be collected at Rome; but still it was not impossible to surprise the city undefended, or even perhaps by a rapid winter campaign to seize all Italy, and to shut off the best resources of his opponents before they could make them available. The sagacious and energetic Curio, who after resigning his tribunate (10 Dec. 704) had immediately gone to Cæsar at Ravenna, vividly represented the state of things to his master; and it hardly needed such a representation to convince Cæsar that longer delay now could only be injurious. But, as he with the view of not giving his antagonists occasion to complain had hitherto brought no troops to Ravenna itself, he could for the present do nothing but despatch orders to his whole force to set out with all haste; and he had to wait till at least the one legion stationed nearest reached Ravenna. Meanwhile he sent an ultimatum to Rome, which, if useful for nothing else, by its extreme submissiveness still further compromised his opponents in public opinion, and perhaps even, as he seemed himself to hesitate, induced them to prosecute more remissly their preparations against him. In this ultimatum Cæsar dropped all the counter-demands which he formerly made on Pompeius, and offered on his own part both to resign the governorship of Transalpine Gaul, and to dismiss eight of the ten legions belonging to him, at the term fixed by the senate; he declared himself content, if the senate would leave him either the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria with one, or that of Cisalpine Gaul alone with two, legions, not, forsooth, up to his investiture with the consulship, but till after the close of the consular elections for 706. He thus consented to those proposals of accommodation, with which at the beginning of the discussions the senatorial party and even Pompeius himself had declared that they would be satisfied, and showed himself ready to remain in a private position from his election to the consulate down to his

50.

48.

Last debate
in the
senate.

49.

entering on office. Whether Cæsar was in earnest with these astonishing concessions and had confidence that he should be able to carry through his game against Pompeius even after granting so much, or whether he reckoned that those on the other side had already gone too far to find in these proposals of compromise more than a proof that Cæsar regarded his cause itself as lost, can no longer be with certainty determined. The probability is, that Cæsar committed the fault of playing a too bold game, far rather than the worse fault of promising something which he was not minded to perform; and that, if strangely enough his proposals had been accepted, he would have made good his word. Curio undertook once more to represent his master in the lion's den. In three days he made the journey from Ravenna to Rome. When the new consuls Lucius Lentulus and Gaius Marcellus the younger* assembled the senate for the first time on 1 Jan. 705, he delivered in a full meeting the letter addressed by the general to the senate. The tribunes of the people, Marcus Antonius well-known in the chronicle of scandal of the city as the intimate friend of Curio and his accomplice in all his follies, but at the same time known from the Egyptian and Gallic campaigns as a brilliant cavalry officer, and Quintus Cassius, Pompeius' former quæstor,—the two, who were now in Curio's stead managing Cæsar's cause in Rome—insisted on the immediate reading of the despatch. The grave and clear words in which Cæsar set forth the imminence of civil war, the general wish for peace, the arrogance of Pompeius, and his own yielding disposition, with all the irresistible force of truth; the proposals for a compromise, of a moderation which doubtless surprised his own partisans; the distinct declaration that this was the last time that he should offer his hand for peace—made the deepest impression. In spite of the dread inspired by the numerous soldiers of Pompeius who flocked into the capital, the sentiment of the majority was not doubtful; the consuls could not venture to let it find expression. Respecting the proposal renewed by Cæsar that both generals might be enjoined to resign their commands simultaneously, respecting all the projects of accommodation suggested by his letter, and respecting the proposal made by Marcus Cœlius Rufus

50.

49.

51.

* To be distinguished from the consul having the same name of 704; the latter was a cousin, the consul of 705 a brother, of the Marcus Marcellus who was consul in 703.

and Marcus Calpurnius that Pompeius should be urged immediately to depart for Spain, the consuls refused—as they in the capacity of presiding officers were entitled to do—to let a vote take place. Even the proposal of one of their most decided partisans who was simply not so blind to the military position of affairs as his party, Marcus Marcellus—to defer the determination till the Italian levy *en masse* could be under arms and could protect the senate—was not allowed to be brought to a vote. Pompeius caused it to be declared through his usual organ, Quintus Scipio, that he was resolved to take up the cause of the senate now or never, and that he would let it drop if they longer delayed. The consul Lentulus said in plain terms that even the decree of the senate was no longer of consequence, and that, if it should persevere in its servility, he would act of himself and with his powerful friends take the further steps necessary. Thus overawed, the majority decreed what was commanded—that Cæsar should at a definite and not distant day give up Transalpine Gaul to Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, and Cisalpine Gaul to Marcus Servilius Novianus, and should dismiss his army, failing which he should be esteemed a traitor. When the tribunes of Cæsar's party made use of their right of veto against this resolution, not only were they, as they at least asserted, threatened in the senate-house itself by Pompeian soldiers with their swords, and forced, in order to save their lives, to flee in slaves' clothing from the capital; but the now sufficiently overawed senate treated their formally quite constitutional interference as an attempt at revolution, declared the country in danger, and in the usual forms called the whole burgesses to take up arms, and all magistrates faithful to the constitution to place themselves at the head of the armed (7 Jan. 705).

Now it was enough. When Cæsar was informed by the tribunes who had fled to his camp entreating protection as to the reception which his proposals had met with in the capital, he called together the soldiers of the thirteenth legion, which had meanwhile arrived from its cantonments near Tergeste (Trieste) at Ravenna, and unfolded before them the state of things. It was not merely the man of genius versed in the knowledge and skilled in the control of men's hearts, whose brilliant eloquence shone forth and glowed in this agitating crisis of his own and the world's

49.

Cæsar
marches
into Italy.

destiny; nor merely the generous commander-in-chief and the victorious general, addressing soldiers, who had been called by himself to arms and for eight years had followed his banners with daily increasing enthusiasm. There spoke, above all, the energetic and consistent statesman, who had now for nine and twenty years defended the cause of freedom in good and evil times; who had braved for it the daggers of assassins and the executioners of the aristocracy, the swords of the Germans and the waves of the unknown ocean, without ever yielding or wavering; who had torn to pieces the Sullan constitution, had overthrown the rule of the senate, and had furnished the defenceless and unarmed democracy with protection and with arms by means of the struggle beyond the Alps. And he spoke, not to the Clodian public whose republican enthusiasm had been long burnt down to ashes and dross, but to the young men from the towns and villages of Northern Italy, who still felt freshly and purely the mighty influence of the thought of civic freedom; who were still capable of fighting and of dying for ideals; who had themselves received for their country in a revolutionary way from Cæsar the burgess-rights which the government refused to them; whom Cæsar's fall would leave once more at the mercy of the *fascēs*, and who already possessed practical proofs (P. 351) of the inexorable use which the oligarchy proposed to make of these against the Transpadanes. Such were the listeners before whom the great orator set forth the facts—the thanks for the conquest of Gaul which the nobility were preparing for the general and his army; the contemptuous setting aside of the comitia; the overawing of the senate; the sacred duty of protecting with armed hand the tribunate of the people wrested five hundred years ago by their fathers arms in hand from the nobility, and of keeping the ancient oath which these had taken for themselves as for their children's children that they would man by man stand firm even to death for the tribunes of the people (i. 295). And then, when he—the leader and general of the popular party—summoned the soldiers of the people, now that conciliatory means had been exhausted and concession had reached its utmost limits, to follow him in the last, the inevitable, the decisive struggle against the equally hated and despised, equally perfidious and incapable, and in fact ludicrously incorrigible aristocracy—there was

not an officer or a soldier who could hold back. The order was given for departure; at the head of his vanguard Cæsar crossed the narrow brook, which separated his province from Italy, and which the constitution forbade the proconsul of Gaul to pass. When after nine years' absence he trod once more the soil of his native land, he trod at the same time the path of revolution. "The die was cast."

CHAPTER X.

BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS.

The re-
sources on
either side.

Cæsar's
absolute
power
within his
own party.

ARMS were thus to decide which of the two men who had hitherto jointly ruled Rome was now to be its sole ruler. Let us see what were the comparative resources at the disposal of Cæsar and Pompeius for the impending struggle.

Cæsar's power rested primarily on the wholly unlimited authority which he enjoyed within his own party. If the ideas of democracy and of monarchy met together in it, this was not the result of a coalition which had been accidentally entered into and might be accidentally dissolved; on the contrary it was involved in the very essence of a democracy without a representative constitution, that democracy and monarchy should find in Cæsar at once their highest and ultimate expression. In political as in military matters throughout the first and the final decision lay with Cæsar. However high the honour in which he held any serviceable instrument, it remained an instrument still; Cæsar stood in his own party without confederates, surrounded only by military-political adjutants, who as a rule had risen from the army and as soldiers were trained never to ask the reason and purpose of anything, but unconditionally to obey. On this account especially, at the decisive moment when the civil war began, of all the officers and soldiers of Cæsar one alone refused him obedience; and the circumstance that that one was precisely the foremost of them all, simply confirms this view of the relation of Cæsar to his adherents. Titus Labienus had shared with Cæsar all the troubles of the dark times of Catilina (P. 159) as well as all the lustre of the Gallic career of victory, had regularly

Labienus.

held independent command, and frequently led half the army; as he was the oldest, ablest, and most faithful of Cæsar's adjutants, he was beyond question also highest in position and highest in honour. As late as in 704 Cæsar had entrusted to him the supreme command in Cisalpine Gaul, in order partly to put this confidential post into safe hands, partly to forward the views of Labienus in his canvass for the consulship. But from this very position Labienus entered into communication with the opposite party, resorted at the beginning of hostilities in 705 to the head-quarters of Pompeius instead of those of Cæsar, and fought through the whole civil strife with unparalleled bitterness against his old friend and master in war. We are not sufficiently informed either as to the character of Labienus or as to the special circumstances of his changing sides; but in the main his case certainly presents nothing but a further proof of the fact, that a military chief can reckon far more surely on his captains than on his marshals. To all appearance Labienus was one of those persons who combine with military efficiency utter incapacity as statesmen, and who in consequence, if they unhappily choose or are compelled to take part in politics, are exposed to those strange paroxysms of giddiness, of which the history of Napoleon's marshals supplies so many tragi-comic examples. He may probably have thought himself entitled to rank alongside of Cæsar as a second chief of the democracy; and the rejection of this claim of his may have sent him over to the camp of his opponents. His case rendered for the first time apparent the whole gravity of the evil, that Cæsar's treatment of his officers as adjutants without independence admitted of the rise of no men fitted to undertake a separate command in his camp, while at the same time he stood urgently in need of such men amidst the diffusion—which might easily be foreseen—of the civil war through all the provinces of the wide empire. But this disadvantage was far outweighed by that unity in the supreme leadership, which was the primary condition of all success, and a condition only to be preserved at such a cost.

This unity of leadership acquired its full power through the efficiency of its instruments. Here the army comes, first of all, into view. It still numbered nine legions of infantry or at the most 50,000 men, all of whom however had faced the enemy and two-thirds had served in all the

campaigns against the Celts. The cavalry consisted of German and Noric mercenaries, whose usefulness and trustworthiness had been proved in the war against Vercingetorix. The eight years' warfare, full of varied vicissitudes, against the Celtic nation—which was brave, although in a military point of view greatly inferior to the Italian—had given Cæsar the opportunity of organizing his army as he alone knew how to organize it. The whole efficiency of the soldier presupposes due physical vigour ; in Cæsar's levies more regard was had to the strength and activity of the recruits than to their means or their morals. But the serviceableness of an army, like that of any other machine, depends above all on the ease and quickness of its movements ; the soldiers of Cæsar attained a perfection rarely reached and probably never surpassed in their readiness for immediate departure at any time, and in the rapidity of their marching. Courage, of course, was valued above everything ; Cæsar practised with unrivalled mastery the art of stimulating martial emulation and the *esprit de corps*, so that the pre-eminence accorded to particular soldiers and divisions appeared even to those who were postponed as the necessary hierarchy of valour. He weaned his men from fear by not unfrequently—where it could be done without serious danger—keeping his soldiers in ignorance of an approaching conflict, and allowing them to encounter the enemy unexpectedly. But obedience was on a parity with valour. The soldier was required to do what he was bidden, without asking the reason or the object ; many an aimless fatigue was imposed on him solely as a training in the difficult art of blind obedience. The discipline was strict, but not harassing ; it was exercised with unrelenting vigour when the soldier was in presence of the enemy ; at other times, especially after victory, the reins were relaxed, and if an otherwise efficient soldier was then pleased to indulge in perfumery or to deck himself with elegant arms and the like, or even if he allowed himself to be guilty of outrages or irregularities of a very questionable kind, provided only his military duties were not immediately affected thereby, the foolery and the crime were allowed to pass, and the general lent a deaf ear to the complaints of the provincials on such points. Mutiny on the other hand was never pardoned, either in the instigators, or even in the guilty corps itself. But the true soldier ought to be not merely efficient, brave, and obedient, he ought to be all this willingly and spontane-

ously ; and it is the privilege of gifted natures alone to induce the animated machine which they govern to a joyful service by means of example and of hope, and especially by the consciousness of being turned to befitting use. As the officer, who would demand valour from his troops, must himself have looked danger in the face with them, Cæsar had even when general found opportunity of drawing his sword and had then used it like the best ; in activity, moreover, and fatigue he was constantly far more exacting from himself than from his soldiers. Cæsar took care that victory, which primarily no doubt brings gain to the general, should be associated also with personal hopes in the minds of the soldiers. We have already mentioned that he knew how to render his soldiers enthusiastic for the cause of the democracy, so far as the prosaic times still admitted of enthusiasm, and that the political equalisation of the Transpadane country — the native land of most of his soldiers—with Italy proper was proposed as one of the objects of the struggle (P. 159). Of course material recompenses were at the same time not wanting—as well special rewards for distinguished feats of arms as general rewards for every efficient soldier ; the officers had their portions, the soldiers received presents, and the most lavish gifts were placed in prospect for the triumph. But above all things Cæsar as a true commander understood how to awaken in every single component element, large or small, of the mighty machine the consciousness of a befitting application. The ordinary man is destined for service, and he has no objection to be an instrument, if he feels that a master guides him. Everywhere and at all times the eagle eye of the general rested on the whole army, rewarding and punishing with impartial justice, and directing the action of each towards the course conducive to the good of all ; so that there was no experimenting or trifling with the sweat and blood of the humblest, but for that very reason, where it was necessary, unconditional devotion even to death was required. Without allowing each individual to see into the whole springs of action, Cæsar yet allowed each to catch such glimpses of the political and military connection of things, as to secure that he should be recognized—and it may be idealised—by the soldiers as a statesman and a general. He treated his soldiers throughout not as his equals, but as men who were entitled to demand and were able to endure the truth, and who had to put faith in the

promises and the assurances of their general, without thinking of deception or listening to rumours; as comrades through long years in warfare and victory, among whom there was hardly any one that he did not know by name, and that in the course of so many campaigns had not formed more or less of a personal relation to the general; as good companions, with whom he talked and dealt confidentially and with the cheerful elasticity peculiar to him; as clients, to requite whose services, and to avenge whose wrongs and death, constituted in his view a sacred duty. Perhaps there never was an army which was more perfectly what an army ought to be—a machine able for its work and willing for its work, in the hand of a master who transfers to it his own elasticity. Cæsar's soldiers were, and felt themselves, a match for a tenfold superior force; in connection with which it should not be overlooked, that under the Roman tactics—calculated altogether for hand to hand conflict and especially for combat with the sword—the practised Roman soldier was superior to the novice in a far higher degree than is now the case under the circumstances of modern times.* But still more than by the superiority of valour the adversaries of Cæsar felt themselves humbled by the unchangeable and affecting fidelity with which his soldiers clung to their general. It is perhaps without a parallel in history, that when the general summoned his soldiers to follow him into the civil war, with the single exception already mentioned of Labienus, no Roman officer and no Roman soldier deserted him. The hopes of his opponents as to an extensive desertion were thwarted as ignominiously, as the former attempts to break up his army like that of Lucullus (P. 352). Labienus himself appeared in the camp of Pompeius with a band doubtless of Celtic and German cavalry, but without a single legionary. Indeed the soldiers, as if they would show

* A centurion of Cæsar's tenth legion, taken prisoner, declared to the commander-in-chief of the enemy that he was ready with ten of his men to make head against the best cohort of the enemy (500 men; *Bell. Afric.* 45). "In the ancient mode of fighting," to quote the opinion of Napoleon, "a battle consisted simply of duels; what was only correct in the mouth of that centurion, would be mere boasting in the mouth of the modern soldier." Vivid proofs of the soldierly spirit that pervaded Cæsar's army are furnished by the Reports—appended to his Memoirs—respecting the African and the second Spanish wars, of which the former appears to have had as its author an officer of the second rank, while the latter is in every respect a subaltern camp-journal.

that the war was quite as much their matter as that of their general, settled among themselves that they would give credit for the pay, which Cæsar had promised to double for them at the outbreak of the civil war, to their commander up to its termination, and would meanwhile support their poorer comrades from the general means; besides, every subaltern officer equipped and paid a trooper out of his own purse.

While Cæsar thus had the one thing which was needful—Field of Cæsar's power. unlimited political and military authority and a trustworthy army ready for the fight—his power extended, comparatively speaking, over only a very limited space. It was based essentially on the province of Upper Italy. Upper Italy. This region was not merely the most populous of all the districts of Italy, but also devoted to the cause of the democracy as its own. The feeling which prevailed there is shown by the conduct of a division of recruits from Opitergium (Oderzo in the delegation of Treviso), which not long after the outbreak of the war in the Illyrian waters, surrounded on a wretched raft by the war-vessels of the enemy, allowed themselves to be shot at during the whole day down to sunset without surrendering, and, such of them as had escaped the missiles, put themselves to death with their own hands during the following night. It is easy to conceive what might be expected of such a population. As they had already granted Cæsar the means of more than doubling his original army, so after the outbreak of the civil war recruits presented themselves in great numbers for the ample levies that were immediately instituted. Italy. In Italy proper, on the other hand, the influence of Cæsar was not even remotely to be compared to that of his opponents. Although he had the skill by dexterous manœuvres to put the Catonian party in the wrong, and had sufficiently commended the rectitude of his cause to all who wished for a pretext with a good conscience either to remain neutral, like the majority of the senate, or to embrace his side, like his soldiers and the Transpadanes, the mass of the burgesses naturally did not allow themselves to be misled by these things and, when the commandant of Gaul put his legions in motion against Rome, they beheld—despite all explanations as to formal law—in Cato and Pompeius the defenders of the legitimate republic, in Cæsar the democratic usurper. People in general more-over expected from the nephew of Marius, the son-in-law of Cinna, the ally of Catilina, a repetition of the Marian and

Cinnan horrors, a realisation of the saturnalia of anarchy projected by Catilina; and though Cæsar certainly gained allies through this expectation—so that the political refugees immediately put themselves in a body at his disposal, the ruined men saw in him their deliverer, and the lowest ranks of the rabble in the capital and country towns were thrown into a ferment on the news of his advance,—these belonged to the class of friends who are more dangerous than foes.

Provinces.

In the provinces and the dependent states Cæsar had even less influence than in Italy. Transalpine Gaul indeed as far as the Rhine and the Channel obeyed him, and the colonists of Narbo as well as the Roman burgesses elsewhere settled in Gaul were devoted to him; but even in the Narbonese province the constitutional party had numerous adherents, and the newly conquered provinces were far more a burden than a benefit to Cæsar in the impending civil war; in fact, for good reasons he made no use of the Celtic infantry at all in that war, and but sparing use of the cavalry. In the other provinces and the neighbouring half or wholly independent states Cæsar had indeed attempted to procure for himself support, had lavished rich presents on the princes, caused great buildings to be executed in various towns, and granted to them in case of need financial and military assistance; but on the whole, of course, not much had been gained by this means, and the relations with the German and Celtic princes in the regions of the Rhine and the Danube,—particularly the connection with the Noric king Voctio, so important for the recruiting of cavalry,—were probably the only relations of this sort, which were of any moment for him.

The
coalition.

While Cæsar thus entered the struggle only as commandant of Gaul, without other essential resources than efficient adjutants, a faithful army, and a devoted province, Pompeius began it as the *de facto* chief of the Roman commonwealth, and in full possession of all the resources that stood at the disposal of the legitimate government of the great Roman empire. But, while his position was in a political and military point of view far more considerable, it was also on the other hand far less definite and firm. The unity of leadership, which resulted of itself and by necessity from Cæsar's position, was inconsistent with the nature of a coalition; and although Pompeius, too much of a soldier to be deceived as to its being indispensable, attempted to force it on the coalition and got himself nominated by the senate as sole and

absolute generalissimo by land and sea, yet the senate itself could not be set aside nor hindered from a preponderating influence on the political, and an occasional and therefore doubly injurious interference with the military, superintendence. The recollection of the twenty years' war waged on both sides with envenomed weapons between Pompeius and the constitutional party; the feeling which vividly prevailed on both sides, and which they with difficulty concealed, that the first consequence of the victory when achieved would be a rupture between the victors; the contempt which they entertained for each other and with only too good grounds in either case; the inconvenient number of respectable and influential men in the ranks of the aristocracy and the intellectual and moral inferiority of almost all who took part in the matter—altogether produced among the opponents of Cæsar a reluctant and refractory co-operation, which formed a very sad contrast to the harmonious and compact action on the other side.

While all the disadvantages incident to the coalition of powers naturally hostile were thus felt in an unusual measure by Cæsar's antagonists, this coalition was certainly still a very considerable power. It had exclusive command of the sea; all ports, all ships of war, all the materials for equipping a fleet were at its disposal. The two Spains—as it were the home of the power of Pompeius just as the two Gauls were the home of that of Cæsar—were faithful adherents to their master and in the hands of able and trustworthy administrators. In the other provinces also, of course with the exception of the two Gauls, the posts of the governors and commanders had during recent years been filled up with safe men under the influence of Pompeius and the minority of the senate. The client-states throughout and with great decision took part against Cæsar and in favour of Pompeius. The most important princes and cities had been brought into the closest personal relations with Pompeius during the different sections of his manifold activity. In the war against the Marians, for instance, he had been the companion in arms of the kings of Numidia and Mauretania and had re-established the kingdom of the former (iii. 344); in the Mithradatic war, in addition to a number of other minor principalities temporal and spiritual, he had re-established the kingdoms of Bosphorus, Armenia, and Cappadocia, and created that of Deiotarus (P. 138, 142, 143); it was primarily at his in-

Field of
power of
the coalition.

Juba of
Numidia.

Italy
against
Cæsar.

stigation that the Egyptian war was undertaken, and it was by his adjutant that the rule of the Lagidæ had been fortified afresh (P. 154). Even the city of Massilia in Cæsar's own province, while indebted to the latter doubtless for various favours, was indebted to Pompeius at the time of the Sertorian war for a very considerable extension of territory (P. 215); and, besides, the ruling oligarchy there stood in natural alliance—strengthened by various mutual relations—with the oligarchy in Rome. But these personal motives and relations as well as the glory pertaining to the victor in three continents, which in these more remote parts of the empire far outshone that of the conqueror of Gaul, did perhaps less harm to Cæsar in those quarters, than the views and designs—which had not remained unknown to them—of the heir of Gaius Gracchus as to the necessity of uniting the dependent states and the usefulness of provincial colonizations. No one of the dependent dynasts found himself more imminently threatened by this peril than Juba king of Numidia. Not only had he years before, in the lifetime of his father Hiempsal, fallen into a vehement personal quarrel with Cæsar, but recently the same Curio, who now occupied almost the first place among Cæsar's adjutants, had proposed to the Roman burgesses the annexation of the Numidian kingdom. Lastly, if matters should go so far as to lead the independent neighbouring states to interfere in the Roman civil war, the only state of real power, that of the Parthians, was practically already allied with the aristocratic party by the connection entered into between Pacorus and Bibulus (P. 339), while Cæsar was far too much a Roman to league himself for party interests with the conquerors of his friend Crassus.

As to Italy the great majority of the burgesses was, as has been already mentioned, averse to Cæsar—especially, of course, the whole aristocracy with their very considerable following, but also in a not much less degree the great capitalists, who could not hope in the event of a thorough reform of the commonwealth to preserve their partisan jury-courts and their monopoly of extortion. Of equally anti-democratic sentiments were the small capitalists, the landholders and generally all classes that had anything to lose; but in these ranks of life the cares of the next rent-term and of sowing and reaping outweighed, as a rule, every other consideration.

The army at the disposal of Pompeius consisted chiefly of the Pom-
the Spanish troops, seven legions inured to war and in every ^{peian army.}
respect reliable; to which fell to be added the divisions of
troops—weak indeed, and very much scattered—which were
to be found in Syria, Asia, Macedonia, Africa, Sicily, and
elsewhere. In Italy there were under arms at the outset
only the two legions recently given off by Cæsar, whose
effective strength did not amount to more than 7,000 men,
and whose trustworthiness was more than doubtful, because—
levied in Cisalpine Gaul and old comrades in arms of Cæsar—
they were in a high degree displeased at the unbecoming
intrigue by which they had been made to change camps (P.
353), and recalled with longing their general who had mag-
nanimously paid to them beforehand at their departure the
presents which were promised to every soldier for the triumph.
But, apart from the circumstance that the Spanish troops
might arrive in Italy with the spring either by the land route
through Gaul or by sea, the men of the three legions still
remaining from the levies of 699 (P. 311), as well as the
Italian levy sworn to allegiance in 702 (P. 325) could be
recalled from their furlough. Including these, the number of
troops standing at the disposal of Pompeius on the whole,
without reckoning the seven legions in Spain and those
scattered in other provinces, amounted in Italy alone to ten
legions* or about 60,000 men, so that it was no exaggeration
at all, when Pompeius asserted that he had only to stamp with
his foot to cover the ground with armed men. It is true that
it required some interval—though but short—to render these
soldiers available; but the arrangements for this purpose as
well as for the carrying out of the new levies ordered by the
senate in consequence of the outbreak of the civil war were
already everywhere in progress. Immediately after the
decisive decree of the senate (7 Jan. 705), in the very
depth of winter the most eminent men of the aristocracy set
out to the different districts, to hasten the calling up of
recruits and the preparation of arms. The want of cavalry
was much felt, as for this arm they had been accustomed to
rely wholly on the provinces and especially on the Celtic
contingents; to make at least a beginning, three hundred
gladiators belonging to Cæsar were taken from the training

55.

52

49

* This number was specified by Pompeius himself (Cæsar, *B. C.* i, 6), and
it agrees with the fact, that he lost in Italy about 60 cohorts or 30,000 men,
and took 25,000 over to Greece (Cæsar, *B. C.* iii, 10.)

schools of Capua and mounted—a step which however met with so general disapproval, that Pompeius again broke up this troop and levied in room of it 300 horsemen from the mounted slave-herdmen of Apulia.

The state-treasury was at a low ebb as usual; they busied themselves in supplementing the inadequate amount of cash out of the local treasuries and even from the temple-treasures of the *municipia*.

Cæsar takes
the [49.
offensive.

Under these circumstances the war opened at the beginning of January 705. Of troops capable of marching Cæsar had not more than a legion—5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry—at Ravenna, which was by the highway some 240 miles distant from Rome; Pompeius had two weak legions—7,000 infantry and a small squadron of cavalry—under the orders of Appius Claudius at Luceria, from which, likewise by the highway, the distance was just about as great to the capital. The other troops of Cæsar, leaving out of account the raw divisions of recruits still in course of formation, were stationed, one half on the Saone and Loire, the other half in Belgium, while Pompeius' Italian reserves were already arriving from all sides at their rendezvous; long before even the first of the Transalpine divisions of Cæsar could arrive in Italy, a far superior army could not but be ready to receive it there. It seemed folly, with a band of the strength of that of Catilina and for the moment without any effective reserve, to assume the aggressive against a superior and hourly increasing army under an able general; but it was a folly in the spirit of Hannibal. If the beginning of the struggle were postponed till spring, the Spanish troops of Pompeius would assume the offensive in Transalpine, and his Italian troops in Cisalpine, Gaul, and Pompeius, a match for Cæsar in tactics and superior to him in experience, was a formidable antagonist in such a campaign running its regular course. Now perhaps, accustomed as he was to operate slowly and surely with superior masses, he might be disconcerted by a wholly improvised attack; and that which could not greatly discompose Cæsar's thirteenth legion after the severe trial of the Gallic surprise and the January campaign in the land of the Bellovaci (P. 281),—the suddenness of the war and the toil of a winter-campaign—could not but disorganise the Pompeian corps consisting of old soldiers of Cæsar or of ill-trained recruits, and still only in the course of formation.

Accordingly Cæsar advanced into Italy.* Two highways ^{Cæsar's advance.} led at that time from the Romagna to the south; the Æmilio-Cassian which led from Bononia over the Apennines to Arretium and Rome, and the Popillio-Flaminian, which led from Ravenna along the coast of the Adriatic to Fanum and was there divided, one branch running westward through the Furlo pass to Rome, another southward to Ancona and thence onward to Apulia. On the former Marcus Antonius advanced as far as Arretium, on the second Cæsar himself pushed forward. Resistance was nowhere encountered; the recruiting officers of quality had no military skill, their bands of recruits were no soldiers, the inhabitants of the country towns were only anxious not to be involved in a siege. When Curio with 1,500 men approached Iguvium, where a couple of thousand Umbrian recruits had assembled under the prætor Quintus Minucius Thermus, general and soldiers took to flight at the bare tidings of his approach; and similar results on a small scale everywhere ensued. Cæsar had to choose whether he would march against Rome, from which his cavalry at Arretium were already only about 130 miles distant, or against the legions encamped at Luceria. He chose the latter plan. The consternation of the opposite party was boundless. Pompeius received the news of Cæsar's ^{Rome evacuated.} advance at Rome; he seemed at first disposed to defend the capital, but, when the news arrived of Cæsar's entrance into the Picenian territory and of his first successes there, he abandoned Rome and ordered its evacuation. A panic, augmented by the false report that Cæsar's cavalry had appeared before the gates, came over the world of quality. The senators, who had been informed that every one who should remain behind in the capital would be treated as an accomplice of the rebel Cæsar, flocked in crowds out at the gates. The consuls themselves had so totally lost their senses, that they did not even secure the treasure; when Pompeius called upon them to fetch it, for which there was sufficient time, they returned the reply that they would deem it safer, if he should first occupy Picenum. All was perplexity; consequently a great council of war was held in

* The decree of the senate was passed on the 7th January; on the 18th it had been already for several days known in Rome that Cæsar had crossed the boundary (Cic. *ad. Att.* vii. 10; ix. 10, 4); the messenger needed at the very least three days from Rome to Ravenna. According to this the setting out of Cæsar falls about the 12th January, which according to the current reduction corresponds to the Julian 24 Nov. 704.

Teanum Sidicinum (23 Jan.), at which Pompeius, Labienus, and both consuls were present. First of all proposals of accommodation from Cæsar were again submitted; even now he declared himself ready at once to dismiss his army, to hand over his provinces to the successors nominated, and to become a candidate in the regular way for the consulship, provided that Pompeius would depart for Spain and Italy were disarmed. The answer was, that if Cæsar would immediately return to his province, they would bind themselves to procure the disarming of Italy and the departure of Pompeius by a decree of the senate to be passed in due form in the capital; perhaps this reply was intended not as a bare artifice to deceive, but as an acceptance of the proposal of compromise; it was, however, in reality the opposite. The personal conference with Pompeius desired by Cæsar the former declined, and could not but decline, that he might not by the semblance of a new coalition with Cæsar provoke still more the distrust already felt by the constitutional party. Concerning the management of the war it was agreed in Teanum, that Pompeius should take the command of the troops stationed at Luceria, on which notwithstanding their untrustworthiness all hope depended; that he should advance with these into his own and Labienus' native country, Picenum; that he should personally call the general levy there to arms, as he had done some thirty-five years ago (iii. 332), and should attempt at the head of the faithful Picentine cohorts and the veterans formerly under Cæsar to set a limit to the advance of the enemy. Everything depended on whether Picenum would hold out until Pompeius came up to its defence. Already Cæsar with his reunited army had penetrated into it along the coast road by way of Ancona. Here too the preparations were in full course; in the very northernmost Picenian town Auximum a considerable band of recruits was collected under Publius Attius Varus; but at the entreaty of the municipality Varus evacuated the town even before Cæsar appeared, and a handful of Cæsar's soldiers which overtook the troop not far from Auximum totally dispersed it after a brief conflict—the first in this war. In like manner soon afterwards Gaius Lucilius Hirrus with 3,000 men evacuated Camerinum, and Publius Lentulus Spinther with 5,000 Asculum. The men, thoroughly devoted to Pompeius, willingly for the most part left their houses and farms, and followed their leaders over

Conflicts in
Picenum.

the frontier ; but the district itself was already lost, when the officer sent by Pompeius for the temporary conduct of the defence, Lucius Vibullius Rufus—no genteel senator, but a soldier experienced in war—arrived there ; he had to content himself with taking the six or seven thousand recruits who were saved away from the incapable recruiting officers, and conducting them for the time to the nearest rendezvous. This was Corfinium, the place of meeting for the levies in the Albensian, Marsian and Pæignian territories ; the body of recruits here assembled, of nearly 15,000 men, was the contingent of the most warlike and trustworthy regions of Italy, and the flower of the army in course of formation for the constitutional party. When Vibullius arrived here, Cæsar was still several days' march behind ; there was nothing to prevent him from immediately starting agreeably to Pompeius' instructions and conducting the saved Picentine recruits along with those assembled at Corfinium to join the main army in Apulia. But the commandant in Corfinium was the designated successor to Cæsar in the governorship of Transalpine Gaul, Lucius Domitius, one of the most narrow-minded and stubborn of the Roman aristocracy ; and he not only refused to comply with the orders of Pompeius, but also prevented Vibullius from departing at least with the men from Picenum for Apulia. So firmly was he persuaded that Pompeius only delayed from obstinacy and must necessarily come up to his relief, that he scarcely made any serious preparations for a siege and did not even gather into Corfinium the bands of recruits placed in the surrounding towns. Pompeius however did not appear, and for good reasons ; for, while he might perhaps apply his two untrustworthy legions as a support to the Picentine general levy, he could not with them alone offer battle to Cæsar. Instead of him after a few days Cæsar came (14 Feb.). His troops had been joined in Picenum by the twelfth, and before Corfinium by the eighth, legion from beyond the Alps, and, besides these, three new legions had been formed partly from the Pompeian men that were taken prisoners or presented themselves voluntarily, partly from the recruits that were at once levied everywhere ; so that Cæsar before Corfinium was already at the head of an army of 40,000 men, half of whom had seen service. So long as Domitius hoped for Pompeius' arrival, he caused the town to be defended ; when Pompeius' letters had at length undeceived

him, he resolved, not forsooth to persevere at the forlorn post—by which he would have rendered the greatest service to his party—nor even to capitulate, but, while the common soldiers were informed that relief was close at hand, to make his own escape along with his noble officers during the next night. But he had not the judgment to carry into effect even this pretty scheme. The confusion of his behaviour betrayed him. A part of the men began to mutiny; the Marsian recruits, who held such an infamy on the part of their general to be impossible, wished to fight against the mutineers; but they too were obliged reluctantly to believe the truth of the accusation, whereupon the whole garrison arrested their staff and handed it, themselves, and the town over to Cæsar (20 Feb.). The corps in Alba, 3,000 strong, and 1,500 recruits assembled in Tarracina thereupon laid down their arms, as soon as Cæsar's patrols of cavalry appeared; a third division in Sulmo of 3,500 men had been previously compelled to surrender.

and
captured.

Pompeius
goes to
Brundi-
sium.

Embarka-
tion for
Greece.

Pompeius had given up Italy as lost, so soon as Cæsar had occupied Picenum; only he wished to delay his embarkation as long as possible, with the view of saving such of his force as could still be saved. Accordingly he had slowly put himself in motion for the nearest sea-port Brundisium. Thither came the two legions of Luceria and such recruits as Pompeius had been able hastily to collect in the deserted Apulia, as well as the troops raised by the consuls and other commissioners in Campania and conducted in all haste to Brundisium; thither too resorted a number of political fugitives, including the most distinguished of the senators accompanied by their families. The embarkation began; but the vessels at hand did not suffice to transport all at once the whole multitude, which still amounted to 25,000 persons. No course remained but to divide the army. The larger half went first (4 March); with the smaller division of some 10,000 men Pompeius awaited at Brundisium the return of the fleet; for, however desirable the possession of Brundisium might be for a contingent attempt to recover Italy, they did not venture to hold the place permanently against Cæsar. Meanwhile Cæsar arrived before Brundisium; the siege began. Cæsar attempted first of all to close the mouth of the harbour by moles and floating bridges, with a view to exclude the returning fleet; but Pompeius caused the trading vessels lying in the harbour

to be armed, and managed to prevent the complete closing of the harbour until the fleet appeared and the troops—whom Pompeius with great dexterity, in spite of the vigilance of the besiegers and the hostile feeling of the inhabitants, withdrew from the town to the last man unharmed—were carried off beyond Cæsar's reach to Greece (17 March). The further pursuit, like the siege itself, failed for want of a fleet.

In a campaign of two months, without a single serious engagement, Cæsar had so broken up an army of ten legions, that less than the half of it had with great difficulty escaped in a confused flight across the sea, and the whole Italian peninsula, including the capital with the state-treasure and all the stores accumulated there, had fallen into the power of the victor. Not without reason did the beaten party bewail the terrible rapidity, sagacity, and energy of the "monster."

But it may be questioned whether Cæsar gained or lost more by the conquest of Italy. In a military respect, no doubt, very considerable resources were now not merely withdrawn from his opponents, but rendered available for himself; even in the spring of 705 his army embraced, in consequence of the levies *en masse* instituted everywhere, a considerable number of legions of recruits in addition to the nine old ones. But on the other hand it now became necessary not merely to leave behind a considerable garrison in Italy, but also to take measures against the closing of the transmarine traffic contemplated by his opponents who commanded the sea, and against the famine with which the capital was consequently threatened; whereby Cæsar's already sufficiently complicated military task was complicated further still. Financially it was certainly of importance, that Cæsar had the good fortune to obtain possession of the stock of money in the capital; but the principal sources of income and particularly the revenues from the East were in the hands of the enemy, and, in consequence of the greatly increased demands for the army and the new obligation to provide for the starving population of the capital, the considerable sums which were found quickly melted away. Cæsar soon found himself compelled to appeal to private credit, and, as it seemed that he could not possibly gain any long respite by this means, extensive confiscations were generally anticipated as the only remaining expedient.

Military and financial results of the seizure of Italy. [49.

Its political
results,
Fear of
anarchy

More serious difficulties still were created by the political relations amidst which Cæsar found himself placed on the conquest of Italy. The apprehension of an anarchical revolution was universal among the propertied classes. Friends and foes saw in Cæsar a second Catilina; Pompeius believed or affected to believe that Cæsar had been driven to civil war merely by the impossibility of paying his debts. This was certainly absurd; but in fact Cæsar's antecedents were anything but reassuring, and still less reassuring was the aspect of the retinue that now surrounded him. Individuals of the most broken reputation, notorious personages like Quintus Hortensius, Gaius Curio, Marcus Antonius,—the latter the stepson of the Catilinarian Lentulus who was executed by the orders of Cicero—were the most prominent actors in it; the highest posts of trust were bestowed on men who had long ceased even to reckon up their debts; people saw men that held office under Cæsar not merely keeping dancing-girls—which was done by others also—but appearing publicly in company with them. Was there any wonder, that even grave and politically impartial men expected amnesty for all exiled criminals, cancelling of creditors' claims, comprehensive mandates of confiscation, proscription, and murder, nay, even a plundering of Rome by the Gallic soldiery?

dispelled by
Cæsar.

But in this respect the "monster" deceived the expectations of his foes as well as of his friends. As soon even as Cæsar occupied the first Italian town, Ariminum, he prohibited all common soldiers from appearing armed within the walls; the country towns were protected from injury throughout and without distinction, whether they had given him a friendly or hostile reception. When the mutinous garrison surrendered Corfinium late in the evening, he in the face of every military consideration postponed the occupation of the town till the following morning, solely that he might not abandon the burgesses to the nocturnal invasion of his exasperated soldiers. Of the prisoners the common soldiers, as presumably indifferent to politics, were incorporated with his own army, while the officers were not merely spared, but also freely dismissed without distinction of person and without the exaction of any promises whatever; and whatever they claimed as private property was frankly given up to them, without even investigating with any strictness the warrant for their claims. Lucius Domitius himself was thus treated, and even Labienus had the money and baggage

which he had left behind sent after him to the enemy's camp. In the most painful financial embarrassment the immense estates of his opponents whether present or absent were not assailed ; indeed Cæsar preferred to borrow from friends, rather than that he should stir up the holders of property against him even by exacting the formally admissible, but practically antiquated, land tax (iii. 395). The victor regarded only the half, and that not the more difficult half, of his task as solved with the victory ; he saw the security for its duration, according to his own expression, only in the unconditional pardon of the vanquished, and had accordingly during the whole march from Ravenna to Brundisium incessantly renewed his efforts to bring about a personal conference with Pompeius and a tolerable accommodation. But, if the aristocracy had previously refused to listen to reconciliation, the unexpected and withal so disgraceful emigration had raised their wrath to madness, and the wild vengeance breathed by the beaten contrasted strangely with the placability of the victor. The communications regularly coming from the camp of the emigrants to their friends left behind in Italy were full of projects for confiscations and proscriptions, of plans for purifying the senate and the state, compared with which the restoration of Sulla was child's play, and which even the moderate men of their own party heard with horror. The frantic passion of impotence, the wise moderation of power, produced their effect. The whole mass, in whose eyes material interests were superior to political, threw itself into Cæsar's arms. The country towns idolised "the uprightness, the moderation, the prudence" of the victor ; and even opponents conceded that these testimonies of respect were meant in earnest. The great capitalists, farmers of the taxes, and jurymen, showed no special desire, after the severe shipwreck which had befallen the constitutional party in Italy, to entrust themselves further to the same pilots ; capital returned to the light, and "the rich lords resorted again to their daily task of writing their rent-rolls." Even the great majority of the senate, at least numerically speaking—for certainly but few of the nobler and more influential members of the senate were included in it—had notwithstanding the orders of Pompeius and of the consuls remained behind in Italy, and a portion of them even in the capital itself ; and they acquiesced in Cæsar's rule. Cæsar's moderation, well calculated even in its

Threats of
the emi-
grants.

The mass of
quiet people
gained for
Cæsar.

Indigna-
tion of the
anarchist
party
against

Cæsar.
The repub-
lican party
in Italy.

very semblance of excess, attained its object; the trembling anxiety of the propertied classes as to the impending anarchy was in some measure allayed. This was doubtless an incalculable gain for the future; the prevention of anarchy, and of the scarcely less dangerous alarm of anarchy, was the indispensable preliminary to the future reorganisation of the commonwealth. But at the moment this moderation was more dangerous for Cæsar than the renewal of the Cinnan and Catilinarian fury would have been; it did not convert enemies into friends, and it converted friends into enemies. Cæsar's Catilinarian adherents were indignant that murder and pillage remained in abeyance; these audacious and desperate personages, some of whom were men of talent, might be expected to prove cross and untractable. The republicans of all shades, on the other hand, were neither converted nor propitiated by the leniency of the conqueror. According to the creed of the Catonian party duty towards what they called their fatherland absolved them from every other consideration; even one who owed freedom and life to Cæsar remained entitled and in duty bound to take up arms or at least to engage in plots against him. The less decided sections of the constitutional party were no doubt ready to accept peace and protection from the new monarch; nevertheless they ceased not to curse the monarchy and the monarch at heart. The more clearly the change of the constitution became manifest, the more distinctly the great majority of the burgesses—both in the capital with its keener susceptibility of political excitement, and among the more energetic population of the country and country towns—awoke to a consciousness of their republican sentiments; so far the friends of the constitution in Rome reported with truth to their brethren of kindred views in exile, that at home all classes and all persons were friendly to Pompeius. The discontented temper of all these circles was further increased by the moral pressure, which the more decided and more notable men who shared such views exercised from their very position as emigrants over the multitude of the humbler and more lukewarm. The conscience of the honourable man smote him in regard to his remaining in Italy; the half-aristocrat fancied that he was ranked among the plebeians, if he did not go into exile with the Domitii and the Metelli, and even if he took his seat in the Cæsarian senate of nobodies. The victor's special clemency gave to this silent opposition

increased political importance; seeing that Cæsar abstained from terrorism, it seemed as if his secret opponents could display their disinclination to his rule without much danger.

Very soon he experienced remarkable treatment in this respect at the hands of the senate. Cæsar had begun the struggle to liberate the overawed senate from its oppressors. This was done; consequently he wished to obtain from the senate approval of what had been done, and full powers for the continuance of the war. For this purpose, when Cæsar appeared before the capital (end of March) the tribunes of his party convoked for him the senate (1 April). The meeting was tolerably numerous, but the more notable of the very senators that remained in Italy were absent, including even the former leader of the servile majority Marcus Cicero and Cæsar's own father-in-law Lucius Piso; and, what was worse, those who did appear were not inclined to enter into Cæsar's proposals. When Cæsar spoke of full power to continue the war, one of the only two consuls present, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, a very timid man who desired nothing but a quiet death in his bed, was of opinion that Cæsar would deserve well of his country if he should abandon the thought of carrying the war to Greece and Spain. When Cæsar thereupon requested the senate at least to be the medium of transmitting his peace proposals to Pompeius, they were not indeed opposed to that course in itself, but the threats of the emigrants against the neutrals had so terrified the latter, that no one was found to undertake the message of peace. Through the disinclination of the aristocracy to help the erection of the monarch's throne, and through the same inertness of the dignified corporation, by means of which Cæsar had shortly before frustrated the legal nomination of Pompeius as generalissimo in the civil war, he too was now thwarted when making a like request. Other impediments, moreover, occurred. Cæsar desired, with the view of regulating in some sort of way his position, to be named dictator; but his wish was not complied with, because such a magistrate could only be constitutionally appointed by one of the consuls, and the attempt of Cæsar to buy the consul Lentulus—of which owing to the disordered condition of his finances there was a good prospect—nevertheless proved a failure. The tribune of the people Lucius Metellus, moreover, lodged a protest against all the steps of the pro-consul, and made signs as though he would protect with his

Passive resistance of the senate to Cæsar.

person the public chest, when Cæsar's men came to empty it. Cæsar could not avoid in this case ordering that the inviolable person should be pushed aside as gently as possible; otherwise, he kept by his purpose of abstaining from all violent steps. He declared to the senate, just as the constitutional party had done shortly before, that he had certainly desired to regulate things in a legal way and with the help of the supreme authority; but, since this help was refused, he could dispense with it. Without further concerning himself about the senate and the formalities of state law, he handed over the temporary administration of the capital to the prætor Marcus Æmilius Lepidus as city-prefect, and made the requisite arrangements for the administration of the provinces that obeyed him and the continuance of the war. Even amidst the din of the gigantic struggle, and with all the alluring sound of Cæsar's lavish promises, it still made a deep impression on the multitude of the capital, when they saw in their free Rome the monarch for the first time exercising a monarch's prerogative and breaking open the doors of the treasury by his soldiers. But the times had gone by, when the impressions and feelings of the multitude determined the course of events; it was with the legions that the decision lay, and a few painful feelings more or less were in fact of no further moment.

Provisional
arrange-
ment of the
affairs of
the capital.

The pro-
vinces.

The Pom-
peians in
Spain.

Cæsar hastened to resume the war. He owed his successes hitherto to the offensive, and he intended still to maintain it. The position of his antagonist was singular. After the original plan of carrying on the campaign simultaneously in the two Gauls by offensive operations from the bases of Italy and Spain had been frustrated by Cæsar's aggressive, Pompeius had intended to go to Spain. There he had a very strong position. The army amounted to seven legions; a large number of Pompeius' veterans served in it, and several years of conflicts in the Lusitanian mountains had hardened soldiers and officers. Among its captains Marcus Varro indeed was simply a celebrated scholar and a faithful partisan; but Lucius Afranius had fought with distinction in the East and in the Alps, and Marcus Petreius, the conqueror of Catilina, was an officer as dauntless as he was able. While in the Further province Cæsar had still diverse adherents from the time of his governorship there (P. 212), the more important province of the Ebro was attached by all the ties of veneration and gratitude to the celebrated general,

who twenty years before had held the command in it during the Sertorian war, and after the termination of that war had organised it anew. Pompeius could evidently after the Italian disaster do nothing better than proceed to Spain with the saved remnant of his army, and then at the head of his whole force advance to meet Cæsar. But unfortunately he had, in the hope of being able still to save the troops that were in Corfinium, tarried in Apulia so long that he was compelled to choose the nearer Brundisium as his place of embarkation instead of the Campanian ports. Why, master as he was of the sea and Sicily, he did not subsequently revert to his original plan, cannot be determined; probably the aristocracy after their short-sighted and distrustful fashion showed no desire to trust themselves to the Spanish troops and the Spanish population. At any rate Pompeius remained in the East, and Cæsar had the option of directing his first attack either against the army which was being organised in Greece under Pompeius' own command, or against that which was ready for battle under his lieutenants in Spain. He had decided in favour of the latter course, and, as soon as the Italian campaign ended, had taken measures to collect on the lower Rhone nine of his best legions, as also 6,000 cavalry—partly men individually picked out by Cæsar in the Celtic cantons, partly German mercenaries—and a number of Iberian and Ligurian archers.

But at this point his opponents also had been active. ^{Massilia} Lucius Domitius, who was nominated by the senate in ^{against} Cæsar's stead as governor of Transalpine Gaul, had ^{Cæsar.} proceeded from Corfinium—as soon as Cæsar had released him—along with his attendants and with Pompeius' confidant Lucius Vibullius Rufus to Massilia, and actually induced that city to declare for Pompeius and even to refuse a passage to Cæsar's troops. Of the Spanish troops the two least trustworthy legions were left behind under the command of Varro in the Further province; while the five best, reinforced by 40,000 Spanish infantry—partly Celtiberian infantry of the line, partly Lusitanian and other light troops—and by 5,000 Spanish cavalry, under Afranius and Petreius had, in accordance with the orders of Pompeius transmitted by Vibullius, set out to close the Pyrenees against the enemy.

Meanwhile Cæsar himself arrived in Gaul and, as the ^{Cæsar occu-} commencement of the siege of Massilia still detained him in ^{pies the} person, he immediately despatched the greater part of his ^{Pyrenees.}

Position at
Ilerda.

troops assembled on the Rhone—six legions and the cavalry—along the great road leading by way of Narbo (Narbonne) to Rhode (Rosas) with the view of anticipating the enemy at the Pyrenees. The movement was successful; when Afranius and Petreius arrived at the passes, they found them already occupied by the Cæsarians and the line of the Pyrenees lost. They then took up a position at Ilerda (Lerida) between the Pyrenees and the Ebro. This town lies twenty miles to the north of the Ebro on the right bank of one of its tributaries, the Sicoris (Segre) which was crossed by only a single solid bridge immediately at Ilerda. To the south of Ilerda the mountains which adjoin the left bank of the Ebro approach pretty close to the town; to the northward there stretches on both sides of the Sicoris a level country which is commanded by the hill on which the town is built. For an army, which had to submit to a siege, it was an excellent position; but the defence of Spain, after the occupation of the line of the Pyrenees had been neglected, could only be undertaken in earnest behind the Ebro, and, as no secure communication was established between Ilerda and the Ebro, and no bridge existed over the latter stream, the retreat from the temporary to the true defensive position was not sufficiently secured. The Cæsarians established themselves above Ilerda in the delta, which the river Sicoris forms with the Cinga (Cinca) which unites with it below Ilerda; but the attack only began in earnest after Cæsar had arrived in the camp (23 June). Under the walls of the town the struggle was maintained with equal exasperation and equal valour on both sides, and with frequent alternations of success; but the Cæsarians did not attain their object—which was, to establish themselves between the Pompeian camp and the town and thereby to possess themselves of the stone bridge—and they consequently remained dependent for their communication with Gaul solely on two bridges which they had hastily constructed over the Sicoris, and, as the river at Ilerda itself was too considerable to be bridged over, about eighteen or twenty miles further up. When the floods came on with the melting of the snow, these temporary bridges were swept away; and, as they had no vessels for the passage of the highly swollen rivers and under such circumstances the restoration of the bridges could not for the present be thought of, the Cæsarian army was confined to the narrow

Cæsar cut
off.

space between the Cinca and the Sicoris, while the left bank of the Sicoris and with it the road, by which the army communicated with Gaul and Italy, were exposed almost undefended to the Pompeians, who passed the river partly by the town-bridge, partly by swimming after the Lusitanian fashion on skins. It was the season shortly before harvest; the old produce was almost used up, the new was not yet gathered, and the narrow stripe of land between the two streams was soon exhausted. In the camp actual famine prevailed—the *modius* of wheat cost 50 *denarii* (£1 16s.)—and dangerous diseases broke out; whereas on the left bank there were accumulated provisions and varied supplies, as well as troops of all sorts—reinforcements from Gaul of cavalry and archers, officers and soldiers from furlough, foraging parties returning—in all a mass of 6000 men, whom the Pompeians attacked with superior force and drove with great loss to the mountains, while the Cæsarians on the right bank were obliged to remain passive spectators of the unequal conflict. The communications of the army were in the hands of the Pompeians; in Italy the accounts from Spain suddenly ceased, and the suspicious rumours, which began to circulate there, were not so very remote from the truth. Had the Pompeians followed up their advantage with some energy, they could not have failed either to reduce under their power or at least to drive back towards Gaul the mass scarcely capable of resistance which was crowded together on the left bank of the Sicoris, and to occupy this bank so completely that not a man could cross the river without their knowledge. But both points were neglected; those bands were doubtless forced off with loss but neither destroyed nor completely beaten back, and the prevention of the crossing of the river was left substantially to the river itself. Thereupon Cæsar formed his plan. He ordered portable boats of a light wooden frame and osier work lined with leather, after the model of those used in the Channel among the Britons and subsequently by the Saxons, to be prepared in the camp and transported in waggons to the point where the bridges had stood. On these frail barks the other bank was reached and, as it was found unoccupied, the bridge was re-established without much difficulty; the communications were thereupon quickly restored, and the eagerly expected supplies were conveyed to the camp. Cæsar's happy idea thus rescued the army from

Cæsar re-establishes the communications.

Retreat
of the
Pompeians
from Ilerda.

Cæsar
follows.

the immense peril in which it was placed. Then the cavalry of Cæsar which in efficiency far surpassed that of the enemy began at once to scour the country on the left bank of the Sicoris; the most considerable Spanish communities between the Pyrenees and the Ebro—Osca, Tarraco, Dertosa, and others—nay, even several to the south of the Ebro, passed over to Cæsar's side. The supplies of the Pompeians were now rendered scarce through the foraging parties of Cæsar and the defection of the neighbouring communities; they resolved at length to retire behind the line of the Ebro, and set themselves in all haste to form a bridge of boats over the Ebro below the mouth of the Sicoris. Cæsar sought to cut off the retreat of his opponents over the Ebro and to detain them in Ilerda; but so long as the enemy remained in possession of the bridge at Ilerda and he had control of neither ford nor bridge there, he could not distribute his army over both banks of the river and could not invest Ilerda. His soldiers therefore worked day and night to lower the depth of the river by means of canals drawing off the water, so that the infantry could wade through it. But the preparations of the Pompeians to pass the Ebro were sooner finished than the arrangements of the Cæsarians to invest Ilerda; when the former after finishing the bridge of boats began their march towards the Ebro along the left bank of the Sicoris, the canals of the Cæsarians seemed to the general not yet far enough advanced to make the ford available for the infantry; he ordered only his cavalry to pass the stream and, by clinging to the rear of the enemy, at least to detain and harass them. But when Cæsar's legions saw in the grey morning the enemy's columns which had been retiring since midnight, they discerned with the sure instinct of experienced veterans the strategic importance of this retreat, which would compel them to follow their antagonists into distant and impracticable regions filled by hostile troops; at their own request the general ventured to lead the infantry also into the river, and although the water reached up to the shoulders of the men, it was crossed without accident. It was high time. If the narrow plain, which separated the town of Ilerda from the mountains enclosing the Ebro were once traversed and the army of the Pompeians entered the mountains, their retreat to the Ebro could no longer be prevented. Already they had, notwithstanding the constant attacks of

the enemy's cavalry which greatly delayed their march, approached within five miles of the mountains, when they, having been on the march since midnight and unspeakably exhausted, abandoned their original plan of traversing the whole plain on the same day, and pitched their camp. Here Cæsar's infantry overtook them and encamped opposite to them in the evening and during the night, as the nocturnal march which the Pompeians had at first contemplated was abandoned from fear of the night-attacks of the cavalry. On the following day also both armies remained immoveable, occupied only in reconnoitring the country. Early in the morning of the third day Cæsar's infantry set out, that by a movement through the pathless mountains alongside of the road they might turn the position of the enemy and bar their route to the Ebro. The object of the strange march, which seemed at first to turn back towards the camp before Ilerda, was not at once perceived by the Pompeian officers. When they discerned it, they sacrificed camp and baggage and advanced by a forced march along the highway, to gain the crest of the ridge before the Cæsarians. But it was already too late; when they came up, the compact masses of the enemy were already posted on the highway itself. A desperate attempt of the Pompeians to discover other routes to the Ebro over the steep mountains was frustrated by the Roman cavalry, which surrounded and cut to pieces the Lusitanian troops sent forth for that purpose. Had a battle taken place between the Pompeian army—which had the enemy's cavalry in its rear and their infantry in front, and was utterly demoralised—and the Cæsarians, the issue was scarcely doubtful, and the opportunity for fighting several times presented itself; but Cæsar made no use of it, and restrained, not without difficulty, the impatient eagerness for combat in his soldiers sure of victory. The Pompeian army was at any rate strategically lost; Cæsar avoided weakening his army and still further envenoming the bitter feud by useless bloodshed. On the very day after he had succeeded in cutting off the Pompeians from the Ebro, the soldiers of the two armies had begun to fraternise and to negotiate respecting surrender; indeed the terms asked by the Pompeians, especially as to the sparing of their officers, had been already conceded by Cæsar, when Petreius with his escort consisting of slaves and Spaniards came upon the negotiators and caused the

The route to the Ebro closed.

Cæsarians, on whom he could lay hands, to be put to death. Cæsar nevertheless sent the Pompeians who had come to his camp back unharmed, and persevered in seeking a peaceful solution. Ilerda, where the Pompeians had still a garrison and considerable magazines, became now the point which they sought to reach; but with the hostile army in front and the Sicoris between them and the fortress, they marched without coming nearer to their object. Their cavalry became gradually so afraid that the infantry had to take them into the centre and legions had to be set as the rearguard; the procuring of water and forage became more and more difficult; they had already to kill the beasts of burden, because they could no longer feed them. At length the wandering army found itself formally inclosed, with the Sicoris in its rear and the enemy's force in front, which drew rampart and trench around it. It attempted to cross the river, but Cæsar's German horsemen and light infantry anticipated it in the occupation of the opposite bank. No bravery and no fidelity could longer avert the inevitable capitulation (2 Aug. 705). Cæsar granted to officers and soldiers their life and liberty, and the possession of the property which they still retained as well as the restoration of what had been already taken from them, the full value of which he undertook personally to make good to his soldiers; and not only so, but while he had compulsorily enrolled in his army the recruits captured in Italy, he honoured these old legions of Pompeius by the promise that no one should be compelled to enter the army against his will. He required only that each should give up his arms and repair to his home. Accordingly the soldiers who were natives of Spain, about a third of the army, were disbanded at once, while the Italian soldiers were discharged at the borders of Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul.

Capitulation of the Pompeians.
49.

Further Spain submits.

Hither Spain on the breaking up of this army fell of itself into the power of the victor. In Further Spain, where Marcus Varro held the chief command for Pompeius, it seemed to him, when he learned the disaster of Ilerda, most advisable that he should throw himself into the insular town of Gades and should carry thither for safety the considerable sums which he had collected by confiscating the treasures of the temples and the property of prominent Cæsarians, the not inconsiderable fleet which he had raised, and the two legions intrusted to him. But on the mere rumour of Cæsar's

arrival the most notable towns of the province which had been for long attached to Cæsar declared for the latter and drove away the Pompeian garrisons or induced them to a similar revolt; such was the case with Corduba, Carmo, and Gades itself. One of the legions also set out of its own accord for Hispalis, and passed over along with this town to Cæsar's side. When at length even Italica closed its gates against Varro, the latter resolved to capitulate.

About the same time Massilia also submitted. With rare energy the Massiliots had not merely sustained a siege, but had also kept the sea against Cæsar; it was their native element, and they might hope to obtain vigorous support on it from Pompeius, who in fact had the exclusive command of it. But Cæsar's lieutenant, the able Decimus Brutus, the same who had achieved the first naval victory in the Atlantic over the Veneti (P. 252), managed rapidly to equip a fleet; and in spite of the brave resistance of the enemy's crews—consisting partly of Albiœcian mercenaries of the Massiliots, partly of slave-herdsmen of Domitius—he vanquished by means of his brave marines selected from the legions the stronger Massiliot fleet, and sank or captured the greater part of their ships. When a small Pompeian squadron under Lucius Nasidius arrived from the East by way of Sicily and Sardinia in the port of Massilia, the Massiliots renewed their naval armament and sailed forth along with the ships of Nasidius against Brutus. The engagement which took place off Tauroeis (La Ciotat to the east of Marseilles) might probably have had a different result, if the vessels of Nasidius had fought with the same desperate courage which the Massiliots displayed on that day; but the flight of the Nasidians decided the victory in favour of Brutus, and the remains of the Pompeian fleet fled to Spain. The besieged were completely driven from the sea. On the landward side, where Gaius Trebonius conducted the siege, the most resolute resistance was still continued; but in spite of the frequent sallies of the Albiœcian mercenaries and the skilful expenditure of the immense stores of projectiles accumulated in the city, the works of the besiegers were at length advanced up to the walls and one of the towers fell. The Massiliots declared that they would give up the defence, but desired to conclude the capitulation with Cæsar himself, and entreated the Roman commander to suspend the siege operations till Cæsar's arrival. Trebonius had express orders from Cæsar

Siege of
Massilia.

Massilia
capitulates.

to spare the town as far as possible; he granted the armistice desired. But when the Massiliots made use of it for an artful sally, in which they completely burnt the one half of the almost unguarded Roman works, the struggle of the siege began anew and with increased exasperation. The vigorous commander of the Romans repaired with surprising rapidity the destroyed towers and the mound; the Massiliots were now once more completely enclosed. When Cæsar on his return from the conquest of Spain arrived before their city, he found it reduced to extremities partly by the enemy's attacks, partly by famine and pestilence, and ready for the second time—on this occasion in right earnest—to surrender on any terms. Domitius alone, remembering the indulgence of the victor which he had shamefully misused, embarked in a boat and stole through the Roman fleet, to seek a third battle-field for his implacable resentment. Cæsar's soldiers had sworn to put to the sword the whole male population of the perfidious city, and vehemently demanded from the general the signal for plunder. But Cæsar, mindful here also of his great task of establishing Helleno-Italic civilisation in the West, was not to be coerced into furnishing a sequel to the destruction of Corinth. Massilia—the most remote from the mother-country of all those cities, once so numerous, free, and powerful, that belonged to the old Ionic mariner-nation, and almost the last in which the Hellenic seafaring life had preserved itself fresh and pure, as in fact it was the last Greek city that fought at sea—Massilia had to surrender its magazines of arms and naval stores to the victor, and lost a portion of its territory and of its privileges; but it retained its freedom and its nationality and continued, though with diminished proportions in a material point of view, to be intellectually the centre of Hellenic culture in that distant Celtic country which at this very time was attaining a new historical significance.

Expeditions
of Cæsar
to the corn-
provinces.

While thus in the western provinces the war after various critical vicissitudes was thoroughly decided at length in favour of Cæsar, Spain and Massilia were subdued, and the chief army of the enemy was captured to the last man, the decision of arms had also taken place on the second arena of warfare, on which Cæsar had found it necessary immediately after the conquest of Italy to assume the offensive.

We have already mentioned that the Pompeians intended to reduce Italy to starvation. They had the means of

doing so in their hands. They had thorough command of the sea and laboured with great zeal everywhere—in Gades, Utica, *Messana*, above all in the East—to increase their fleet. They held moreover all the provinces, from which the capital drew its means of subsistence: Sardinia and Corsica through Marcus Cotta, Sicily through Marcus Cato, Africa through the self-nominated commander-in-chief Titus Attius Varus and their ally Juba king of Numidia. It was indispensably needful for Cæsar to thwart these plans of the enemy and to wrest from them the corn-provinces. Quintus ^{Sardinia} Valerius was sent with a legion to Sardinia and compelled ^{occupied.} the Pompeian governor to evacuate the island. The more important enterprise of taking Sicily and Africa from the enemy was intrusted to the young Gaius Curio with the assistance of the able Gaius Caninius Rebilus who had experience in war. Sicily was occupied by him without a blow; Cato, without a proper army and not a man of the sword, ^{Sicily} evacuated the island, after having in his straightforward ^{occupied.} manner previously warned the Siceliots not to compromise themselves uselessly by an ineffectual resistance. Curio left behind half of his troops to protect this island so important for the capital, and embarked with the other half—two legions and 500 horse—for Africa. Here he might expect to encounter more serious resistance; besides the considerable and in its own fashion efficient army of Juba, the governor Varus had formed two legions of Romans settled in Africa and also fitted out a small squadron of ten sail. With the aid of his superior fleet, however, Curio effected without difficulty a landing between Hadrumentum, where the one ^{Landing of} legion of the enemy lay along with their ships of war, and ^{Curio in} Utica, in front of which town lay the second legion under ^{Africa.} Varus himself. Curio turned against the latter, and pitched his camp not far from Utica, just where a century and a half before the elder Scipio had taken up his first winter-encampment in Africa (ii. 183). Cæsar, compelled to keep together his best troops for the Spanish war, had been obliged to make up the Sicilo-African army for the most part out of the legions taken over from the enemy, more especially the war-prisoners of Corfinium; the officers of the Pompeian army in Africa, some of whom had served in the very legions that were conquered at Corfinium, now left no means untried to bring back their old soldiers who were fighting against them to their first allegiance. But Cæsar had not erred in the

Curio
conquers
at Utica.

choice of his lieutenant. Curio knew as well how to direct the movements of the army and of the fleet, as how to acquire personal influence over the soldiers; the supplies were abundant, the conflicts without exception successful. When Varus, presuming that the troops of Curio only wanted opportunity to pass over to his side, resolved to give battle chiefly for the sake of affording them this opportunity, the result did not justify his expectations. Animated by the fiery appeal of their youthful leader, the cavalry of Curio put to flight the horsemen of the enemy, and in presence of the two armies cut down also the light infantry which had accompanied the horsemen; and emboldened by this success and by Curio's personal example, his legions advanced through the difficult ravine separating the two lines to the attack, for which the Pompeians however did not wait, but disgracefully fled back to their camp and evacuated even this in the ensuing night. The victory was so complete that Curio at once took steps to besiege Utica. When news arrived, however, that king Juba was advancing with all his forces to its relief, Curio resolved, just as Scipio had done on the arrival of Syphax, to raise the siege and to return to Scipio's former camp till reinforcements should arrive from Sicily. Soon afterwards came a second report, that king Juba had been induced by the attacks of neighbouring chiefs to turn back with his main force and was sending to the aid of the besieged merely a moderate corps under Saburra. Curio, who from his lively temperament had only with great reluctance made up his mind to rest, now set out again at once to fight with Saburra before he could enter into communication with the garrison of Utica. His cavalry, which had gone forward in the evening, actually succeeded in surprising the corps of Saburra on the Bagradas during the night and inflicting much damage upon it; and on the news of this victory Curio hastened the march of the infantry, in order by their means to complete the defeat. Soon they perceived on the last slopes of the heights that sank towards the Bagradas the corps of Saburra, which was skirmishing with the Roman horsemen; the legions coming up helped to drive it completely down into the plain. But here the combat changed its aspect. Saburra was not, as they supposed, destitute of support; on the contrary he was not much more than five miles distant from the Numidian main force. Already the flower of the Numidian infantry and 2,000 Gallic and Spanish horsemen had

Curio
defeated
by Juba
on the
Bagradas.

arrived on the field of battle to support Saburra, and the king in person with the bulk of the army and sixteen elephants was approaching. After the nocturnal march and the hot conflict there were at the moment not more than 200 of the Roman cavalry together, and these as well as the infantry, extremely exhausted by fatigue and fighting, were all surrounded, in the wide plain into which they had allowed themselves to be allured, by the continually increasing hosts of the enemy. Vainly Curio endeavoured to engage in close combat; the Libyan horsemen retreated, as they were wont, so soon as a Roman division advanced, only to pursue it when it turned. In vain he attempted to regain the heights; they were occupied and foreclosed by the enemy's horse. All was lost. The infantry was cut down to the last man. Of the cavalry a few succeeded in cutting their way through; Curio too might have probably saved himself, but he could not bear to appear without the army intrusted to him in presence of his master, and died sword in hand. Even the force which was collected in the camp before Utica, and that which guarded the fleet—which might so easily have escaped to Sicily—surrendered under the impression made by the fearfully rapid catastrophe on the following day to Varus (Aug. or Sept. 705).

Death of
Curio.

49.

So ended the expedition arranged by Cæsar to Sicily and Africa. It attained its object so far, since by the occupation of Sicily in connection with that of Sardinia the most urgent wants of the capital were relieved; the miscarriage of the conquest of Africa—from which the victorious party drew no further substantial gain—and the loss of two untrustworthy legions might be got over. But the early death of Curio was an irreparable loss for Cæsar, and indeed for Rome. Not without reason had Cæsar intrusted the most important independent command to this young man, although he had no military experience and was notorious for his dissolute life; there was a spark of Cæsar's own spirit in the fiery youth. He resembled Cæsar, inasmuch as he had drained the cup of pleasure to the dregs; inasmuch as he did not become a statesman because he was an officer, but his political action placed the sword in his hands; inasmuch as his eloquence was not that of rounded periods, but the eloquence of deeply felt thought; inasmuch as his mode of warfare was based on rapid action with slight means; inasmuch as his character was marked by levity and often by frivolity, by pleasant frankness and thorough life in the moment. If, as his general

says of him, youthful fire and high courage carried him into incautious acts, and if he too proudly accepted death that he might not submit to be pardoned for a pardonable fault, traits of similar imprudence and similar pride are not wanting in Cæsar's history also. We may regret that this exuberant nature was not permitted to work off its follies and to preserve itself for the following generation so miserably poor in talents, and so rapidly falling a prey to the dreadful rule of mediocrities.

Pom- [49.
peius' plan
of the cam-
paign for
705.

How far these events of the war in 705 interfered with Pompeius' general plan for the campaign, and particularly what part in that plan was assigned after the loss of Italy to the important military corps in the West, can only be determined by conjecture. That Pompeius had the intention of coming by way of Africa and Mauretania to the aid of his army fighting in Spain, was simply a romantic, and beyond doubt altogether groundless, rumour circulating in the camp of Ilerda. It is much more likely that he still kept by his earlier plan of attacking Cæsar from both sides in Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul (P. 372) even after the loss of Italy, and meditated a combined attack at once from Spain and Macedonia. It may be presumed that the Spanish army was meant to remain on the defensive at the Pyrenees till the Macedonian army in the course of organization was likewise ready to march; whereupon both would then have started simultaneously and effected a junction according to circumstances either on the Rhone or on the Po, while the fleet, it may be conjectured, would have attempted at the same time to recover Italy proper. On this supposition apparently Cæsar had first prepared himself to meet an attack on Italy. One of the ablest of his officers, the tribune of the people Marcus Antonius, commanded there with proprætorian powers. The south-eastern ports—Sipus, Brundisium, Tarentum—where an attempt at landing was first to be expected, had received a garrison of three legions. Besides this Quintus Hortensius, the degenerate son of the well-known orator, collected a fleet in the Tyrrhene Sea, and Publius Dolabella a second fleet in the Adriatic, which were to be employed partly to support the defence, partly to transport the intended expedition to Greece. In the event of Pompeius attempting to penetrate by land into Italy, Marcus Licinius Crassus, the eldest son of the old colleague of Cæsar, was to conduct the defence of Cisalpine Gaul, Gaius the younger brother of Marcus Antonius that of Illyricum.

But the expected attack was long in coming. It was not till the height of summer that the conflict began in Illyria. There Cæsar's lieutenant Gaius Antonius with his two legions lay in the island of Curicta (Veglia in the gulf of Quarnero), and Cæsar's admiral Publius Dolabella with forty ships lay in the narrow arm of the sea between this island and the mainland. The admirals of Pompeius in the Adriatic, Marcus Octavius with the Greek, Lucius Scribonius Libo with the Illyrian division of the fleet, attacked the squadron of Dolabella, destroyed all his ships, and cut off Antonius on his island. To rescue him, a corps under Basilus and Salustius came from Italy and the squadron of Hortensius from the Tyrrhene Sea; but neither the former nor the latter were able to effect anything in presence of the far superior fleet of the enemy. The legions of Antonius had to be abandoned to their fate. Provisions came to an end, the troops became troublesome and mutinous; with the exception of a few divisions, which succeeded in reaching the mainland on rafts, the corps, still numbering fifteen cohorts, laid down their arms and were conveyed in the vessels of Libo to Macedonia to be there incorporated with the Pompeian army, while Octavius was left to complete the subjugation of the Illyrian coast now denuded of troops. The Dalmatæ, who from the period of Cæsar's governorship had been at feud with him (P. 290), the important insular town of Issa (Lissa), and other places, embraced the party of Pompeius; but the adherents of Cæsar maintained themselves in Salonæ (Spalato) and Lissus (Alessio), and in the former town not merely sustained with courage a siege, but, when they were reduced to extremities, made a sally with such effect, that Octavius raised the siege and sailed off to Dyrrhachium to pass the winter.

This success achieved in Illyricum by the Pompeian fleet, although of itself not inconsiderable, had yet but little influence on the issue of the campaign as a whole; and it appears miserably small, when we consider that the performances of the land and naval forces under Pompeius' command during the whole eventful year 705 were confined to this single feat of arms, and that from the East, where the general, the senate, the second great army, the principal fleet, the immense military and still more extensive financial resources of the antagonists of Cæsar were united, no intervention at all took place at the point where it was needed in that all-

Cæsar's
fleet and
army in
Illyricum
destroyed.

Result
of the
campaign
as a whole.

decisive struggle in the West. The scattered condition of the forces in the eastern half of the empire, the method of the general never to operate except with superior masses, his awkward and tedious movements, and the discord of the coalition may perhaps explain in some measure, though not excuse, the inactivity of the land-force; but that the fleet, which commanded the Mediterranean without a rival, should have thus done nothing to affect the course of affairs—nothing for Spain, next to nothing for the faithful Massiliots, nothing to defend Sardinia, Sicily, Africa, or, if not to re-occupy Italy, at any rate to obstruct its supplies—this makes demands on our ideas of the confusion and perversity prevailing in the Pompeian camp, which we can only with difficulty meet.

The aggregate result of this campaign was corresponding. Cæsar's double aggressive movement, against Spain and against Sicily and Africa, was successful in the former case completely, in the latter at least partially; while Pompeius' plan of starving Italy was thwarted in the main by the taking away of Sicily, and his general plan of campaign was frustrated completely by the destruction of the Spanish army; and in Italy only a very small portion of Cæsar's defensive arrangements had come to be applied. Notwithstanding the painfully felt losses in Africa and Illyria, Cæsar came forth from this first year of the war in the most decided and most decisive manner victorious.

Organiza-
tions in
Macedonia.

The emi-
grants.

If, however, nothing material was done from the East to obstruct Cæsar in the subjugation of the West, efforts at least were made towards securing political and military consolidation there during the respite so ignominiously obtained. The great rendezvous of the opponents of Cæsar was Macedonia. Thither Pompeius himself and the mass of the emigrants from Brundisium resorted; thither came the other refugees from the West: Marcus Cato from Sicily, Lucius Domitius from Massilia, but more especially a number of the best officers and soldiers of the broken-up army of Spain, with its generals Afranius and Varro at their head. In Italy emigration gradually became among the aristocrats a question not of honour merely but almost of fashion, and it obtained a fresh impulse through the unfavourable accounts which arrived regarding Cæsar's position before Ilerda; not a few of the more lukewarm partisans and the political trimmers went over by degrees, and even Marcus Cicero at

last persuaded himself that he did not adequately discharge his duty as a citizen by writing a dissertation on concord. The senate of emigrants at Thessalonica, where the official Rome pitched its *interim* abode, numbered nearly 200 members, including many venerable old men and almost all the consulars. But they were veritably emigrants. This Roman Coblentz presented a pitiful spectacle of the high pretensions and paltry performances of the grandees of Rome, their unseasonable reminiscences and still more unseasonable recriminations, their political perversities and financial embarrassments. It was a matter of comparatively slight moment that, while the old structure was falling to pieces, they were with the most painstaking solemnity watching over every old ornamental scroll and every speck of rust in the constitution; after all it was simply ridiculous, when the noble lords had scruples of conscience as to calling their deliberative assembly beyond the sacred soil of the city the senate, and cautiously gave it the title of the "three hundred;"* or when they instituted tedious investigations in state law as to whether and how a curiate law could be legitimately enacted elsewhere than at the Capitol. A far worse trait was the indifference of the lukewarm and the narrowminded stubbornness of the ultras. The former could neither be induced to act nor to keep silence. If they were asked to exert themselves in some definite way for the common good, with the inconsistency characteristic of weak people they regarded any such suggestion as a malicious attempt to compromise them still further, and either did not do what they were ordered at all or did it with half heart. At the same time of course, with their affectation of knowing better when it was too late and their over-wise impracticabilities, they proved a perpetual clog to those who were acting; their daily work consisted in criticising, ridiculing, and bemoaning every occurrence great and small, and in unnerving and discouraging the multitude by their own sluggishness and hopelessness. While these displayed the utter

The lukewarm.

The ultras

* As according to formal law the "legal deliberative assembly" undoubtedly, just like the "legal court," could only take place in the city itself or within the precincts, the senate of Thessalonica called itself the "three hundred" (*Bell. Afric.* 88, 90; *Appian* ii. 95), not because it consisted of 300 members, but because this was the ancient normal number of senators (i. 73). It is very likely that this assembly recruited its ranks by *equites* of distinction; but, when Plutarch makes the three hundred Italian wholesale dealers (*Cato Min.* 59, 61), he has misunderstood his authority (*Bell. Afr.* 90).

prostration of weakness, the ultras on the other hand exhibited in full display its exaggerated action. With them there was no attempt to conceal that the preliminary to any negotiation for peace was the bringing over of Cæsar's head; every one of the attempts towards peace, which Cæsar repeatedly made even now, was tossed aside without being examined, or employed only to cover insidious attempts on the lives of the commissioners of their opponent. That the declared partisans of Cæsar had jointly and severally forfeited life and property, was a matter of course; but it fared little better with those more or less neutral. Lucius Domitius, the hero of Corfinium, gravely proposed in the council of war that those senators who had fought in the army of Pompeius should come to a vote on all who had either remained neutral or had emigrated but not entered the army, and should according to their own pleasure individually acquit them or punish them by fine or even by the forfeiture of life and property. Another of these ultras formally lodged with Pompeius a charge of corruption and treason against Lucius Afranius for his defective defence of Spain. Among these deep-dyed republicans their political theory assumed almost the character of a confession of religious faith; they accordingly hated their own more lukewarm partisans and Pompeius with his personal adherents, if possible, still more than their open opponents, and that with all the dull obstinacy of hatred which is wont to characterise orthodox theologians; and they were mainly to blame for the numberless and bitter separate quarrels which distracted the emigrant army and emigrant senate. But they did not confine themselves to words. Marcus Bibulus, Titus Labienus, and others of this clique carried out their theory in practice, and caused such officers or soldiers of Cæsar's army as fell into their hands to be executed *en masse*; which, as may well be conceived, did not tend to make Cæsar's troops fight with less energy. If the counter-revolution in favour of the friends of the constitution, for which all the elements were in existence (P. 380), did not break out in Italy during Cæsar's absence, the reason, according to the assurance of discerning opponents of Cæsar, lay chiefly in the general dread of the unbridled fury of the republican ultras after the restoration should have taken place. The better men in the Pompeian camp were in despair at this frantic behaviour. Pompeius, himself a brave soldier, spared the prisoners as far as he might

and could; but he was too pusillanimous and in too awkward a position to prevent or even to punish all atrocities of this sort, as it became the commander-in-chief to do. Marcus Cato, the only man who at least carried moral consistency into the struggle, attempted with more energy to check such proceedings; he induced the emigrant senate to prohibit by a special decree the pillage of subject towns and the putting to death of a burgess otherwise than in battle. The able Marcus Marcellus had similar views. No one, indeed, knew better than Cato and Marcellus that the extreme party would carry out their valiant acts, if necessary, in defiance of all decrees of the senate. But if even now, when they had still to regard considerations of prudence, the rage of the ultras could not be tamed, people might prepare themselves after the victory for a reign of terror from which Marius and Sulla themselves would have turned away with horror; and we can understand why Cato, according to his own confession, was more afraid of the victory than of the defeat of his own party.

The management of the military preparations in the Macedonian camp was in the hands of Pompeius the commander-in-chief. His position, always troublesome and galling, had become still worse through the unfortunate events of 705. In the eyes of his partisans he was mainly to blame for this result. This judgment was in various respects not just. A considerable part of the misfortunes endured was to be laid to the account of the perversity and insubordination of the lieutenant-generals, especially of the consul Lentulus and Lucius Domitius; from the moment when Pompeius took the head of the army, he had led it with skill and courage, and had saved at least very considerable forces from the shipwreck; that he was not a match for Cæsar's altogether superior genius, which was now recognised by all, could not be fairly made matter of reproach to him. But the result alone decided men's judgment. Trusting to the general Pompeius, the constitutional party had broken with Cæsar; the injurious consequences of this breach recoiled upon the general Pompeius; and, though owing to the notorious military incapacity of all the other chiefs no attempt was made to change the supreme command, yet confidence at any rate in the commander-in-chief was paralysed. To these painful consequences of the defeats endured were added the injurious influences of the emigra-

[†]The preparations for war.

tion. Among the refugees who arrived there were certainly a number of efficient soldiers and able officers, especially those belonging to the former Spanish army; but the number of those who came to serve and fight was small, while that of the generals of quality who called themselves proconsuls and imperators with as good title as Pompeius, and of the noble lords who took part in active military service more or less reluctantly, was alarmingly great. By means of these the mode of life in the capital was introduced into the camp, not at all to the advantage of the army; the tents of such lords were graceful bowers, the ground elegantly covered with fresh turf, the walls clothed with ivy; silver plate stood on the table, and the wine-cup often circulated there even in broad daylight. Those fashionable warriors formed a singular contrast with Cæsar's daredevils, who ate coarse bread from which the former recoiled, and who, when that failed, devoured even roots and swore that they would rather chew the bark of trees than desist from the enemy. While, moreover, the action of Pompeius was hampered by the necessity of having regard to the authority of a corporation personally averse to him, this embarrassment was singularly increased when the senate of emigrants took up its abode almost in his very head-quarters and all the venom of the emigrants came to find vent in these senatorial sittings. Lastly there was nowhere any man of mark, who could have thrown his own weight into the scale against all these preposterous doings. Pompeius himself was far too secondary in point of intellect for that purpose, and far too hesitating, awkward, and reserved. Marcus Cato would have had at least the requisite moral authority, and would not have lacked the good will to support Pompeius with it; but Pompeius, instead of calling him to his assistance, out of distrustful jealousy kept him in the background, and preferred for instance to commit the highly important chief command of the fleet to the utterly incapable Marcus Bibulus rather than to Cato.

The legions
of Pompeius.

While Pompeius thus treated the political aspect of his position with his characteristic perversity, and did his best to make what was already bad in itself still worse, he devoted himself on the other hand with commendable zeal to his duty of giving military organisation to the considerable but scattered forces of his party. The flower of his force was composed of the troops brought with him from Italy, out of

which with the supplementary aid of the Illyrian prisoners of war and the Romans domiciled in Greece five legions in all were formed. Three others came from the East—the two Syrian legions formed from the remains of the army of Crassus, and one made up out of the two weak legions hitherto stationed in Cilicia. Nothing stood in the way of the withdrawal of these corps of occupation: because on the one hand the Pompeians had an understanding with the Parthians, and might even have had an alliance with them if Pompeius had not indignantly refused to pay them the price which they demanded for it—the cession of the Syrian province added by himself to the empire; and on the other hand Cæsar's plan of despatching two legions to Syria, and inducing the Jews once more to take arms by means of the prince Aristobulus kept a prisoner in Rome, was thwarted partly by other causes, partly by the death of Aristobulus. New legions were moreover raised—one from the veteran soldiers settled in Crete and Macedonia, two from the Romans of Asia Minor. To all these fell to be added 2000 volunteers, who were derived from the remnant of the Spanish select corps and other similar sources; and, lastly, the contingents of the subjects. Pompeius like Cæsar had disdained to make requisitions of infantry from them; only the Epirot, Ætolian, and Thracian militia were called out to guard the coast, and moreover 3000 archers from Greece and Asia Minor and 1200 slingers were taken up as light troops. The cavalry again—with the exception of a noble guard, ^{His cavalry.} more respectable than militarily important, formed from the young aristocracy of Rome, and of the Apulian slave-herdsmen whom Pompeius had mounted (P. 372)—consisted exclusively of the contingents of the subjects and clients of Rome. The flower of it consisted of the Celts, partly from the garrison of Alexandria (P. 154), partly the contingents of king Deiotarus who in spite of his great age had appeared in person at the head of his troops, and of the other Galatian dynasts. With them were associated the excellent Thracian horsemen, who were partly brought up by their princes Sadala and Rhaskyporis, partly enlisted by Pompeius in the Macedonian province; the Cappadocian cavalry; the mounted archers sent by Antiochus king of Commagene; the contingents of the Armenians from the west side of the Euphrates under Taxiles, and from the other side under Megabates, and the Numidian

bands sent by king Juba—the whole body amounted to 7000 horsemen.

Fleet.

Lastly, the fleet of Pompeius was very considerable. It was formed partly of the Roman transports brought from Brundisium or subsequently built, partly of the war vessels of the king of Egypt, of the Colchian princes, of the Cilician dynast Tarcondimotus, of the cities of Tyre, Rhodes, Athens, Corcyra, and generally of all the Asiatic and Greek maritime states; and it numbered nearly 500 sail, of which the Roman vessels formed a fifth. Immense magazines of corn and military stores were accumulated in Dyrrhachium. The war-chest was well filled, for the Pompeians were in possession of the principal sources of the public revenue and turned to their own account the moneyed resources of the client-princes, of the senators of distinction, of the farmers of the taxes, and generally of the whole Roman and non-Roman population within their reach. Every appliance that the reputation of the legitimate government and the much-renowned protectorship of Pompeius over kings and peoples could move in Africa; Egypt, Macedonia, Greece, Western Asia and Syria, had been put in motion for the protection of the Roman republic; the report which circulated in Italy that Pompeius was arming the Getæ, Colchians, and Armenians against Rome, and the designation of “king of kings” given to Pompeius in the camp, could hardly be called exaggerations. On the whole he had command over an army of 7000 cavalry and eleven legions, of which, it is true, but five at the most could be described as accustomed to war, and over a fleet of 500 sail. The temper of the soldiers, for whose provisioning and pay Pompeius manifested adequate care, and to whom in the event of victory the most abundant rewards were promised, was throughout good, in several—and these precisely the most efficient—divisions excellent; but a great part of the army consisted of newly-raised troops, the formation and training of which, however zealously it was prosecuted, necessarily required time. The force altogether was imposing, but at the same time of a somewhat motley character.

Junction
of the
Pompeians
[49-48.
on the coast
of Epirus.

According to the design of the commander-in-chief the army and fleet were to be in the main completely united by the winter of 705-706 along the coast and in the waters of Epirus. The admiral Bibulus had already arrived with 110 ships at his new head-quarters, Corcyra. On the other hand

the land-army, the head-quarters of which had been during the summer at Berrhœa on the Haliaemon, had not yet come up; the mass of it was moving slowly along the great highway from Thessalonica towards the west coast to the future head-quarters Dyrrhachium; the two legions, which Metellus Scipio was bringing up from Syria, remained at Pergamus in Asia for winter quarters and were expected in Europe only towards spring. They were taking time in fact for their movements. For the moment the ports of Epirus were guarded, over and above the fleet, merely by their own civic defences and the levies of the adjoining districts.

It thus remained possible for Cæsar, notwithstanding the ^{Cæsar} intervention of the Spanish war, to assume the offensive ^{against} also in Macedonia; and he at least was not slow to act. He ^{Pompeius.} had long ago ordered the collection of vessels of war and transports in Brundisium, and after the capitulation of the Spanish army and the fall of Massilia had directed the greater portion of the select troops employed there to proceed to that destination. The unparalleled exertions no doubt, which were thus required by Cæsar from his soldiers, thinned the ranks more than their conflicts had done, and the mutiny of one of the four oldest legions, the ninth, on its march through Placentia was a dangerous indication of the temper prevailing in the army; but Cæsar's presence of mind and personal authority mastered it, and from this quarter nothing impeded the embarkation. But the want of ships, from which the pursuit of Pompeius had failed in March 705, threatened also to frustrate this expedition. 49. The war-vessels, which Cæsar had given orders to build in the Gallic, Sicilian, and Italian ports, were not yet ready or at any rate not on the spot; his squadron in the Adriatic had been in the previous year destroyed at Curicta (P. 395); he found at Brundisium not more than twelve ships of war and scarcely transports enough to convey over at once the third part of his army—of twelve legions and 10,000 cavalry—destined for Greece. The considerable fleet of the enemy exclusively commanded the Adriatic and especially all the harbours of the mainland and islands on its eastern coast. Under such circumstances the question presents itself, why Cæsar did not instead of the maritime route choose the land route through Illyria, which relieved him from all the perils threatened by the fleet and besides was shorter for his troops, who mostly came from Gaul, than the route by Brundisium.

48.
Cæsar lands
in Epirus.

First
successes.

It is true that the Illyrian country was rugged and poor beyond description; but it was traversed by other armies not long afterwards, and this obstacle can hardly have appeared insurmountable to the conqueror of Gaul. Perhaps he apprehended that during the troublesome march through Illyria Pompeius might convey his whole force over the Adriatic, whereby their parts would at once have been changed and Cæsar must have taken up his position in Macedonia, while Pompeius lay in Italy; although such a rapid change was scarcely to be expected from his slow-moving antagonist. Perhaps Cæsar had decided for the maritime route on the supposition that his fleet would meanwhile be brought into a condition to command respect, and, when after his return from Spain he became aware of the true state of things in the Adriatic, it might be too late to change the plan of campaign. Perhaps—and, in accordance with Cæsar's quick temperament always urging him to decision, we may even say in all probability—he found himself irresistibly tempted by the circumstance that the Epirote coast was still at the moment unoccupied but would certainly be covered in a few days by the enemy, to thwart once more by a bold stroke the whole plan of his antagonist. However this may be, on the 4th Jan. 706* Cæsar set sail with six legions greatly thinned by toil and sickness and 600 horsemen from Brundisium for the coast of Epirus. It was a counterpart to the foolhardy Britannic expedition; but at least the first throw was fortunate. The coast was reached in the middle of the Acroceraunian (Chimara) cliffs, at the little frequented roadstead of Paleassa (Paljassa). The transports were seen both from the harbour of Oricum (creek of Avlona) where a Pompeian squadron of eighteen sail was lying, and from the head-quarters of the hostile fleet at Coreyra; but in the one quarter they deemed themselves too weak, in the other they were not ready to sail, so that the first freight was landed without hindrance. While the vessels at once returned to bring over the second, Cæsar on that same evening ascended the Acroceraunian mountains. His first successes were as great as the surprise of his enemies. The Epirote militia nowhere resisted; the important seaport towns of Oricum and Apollonia along with a number of smaller places were taken, and Dyrrhachium, selected by the Pompeians as their chief arsenal and filled

* According to the rectified calendar somewhere about the 5th Nov. 705.

with stores of all sorts, but only feebly garrisoned, was in the utmost danger.

But the further course of the campaign did not correspond to this brilliant beginning. Bibulus subsequently made up in some measure for the negligence, of which he had been guilty, by redoubling his exertions. He not only captured nearly thirty of the transports returning home, and caused them with every living thing on board to be burnt, but he also established along the whole district of coast occupied by Cæsar, from the island Sason (Saseno) as far as the ports of Corcyra, a most careful watch, however troublesome it was rendered by the inclement season of the year and the necessity of bringing everything necessary for the guard-ships, even wood and water, from Corcyra; in fact his successor Libo—for he himself soon succumbed to the unwonted fatigues—even blockaded for a time the port of Brundisium, till the want of water again dislodged him from the little island in front of it on which he had established himself. It was not possible for Cæsar's officers to convey the second portion of the army over to their general. As little did he himself succeed in the capture of Dyrrhachium. Pompeius learned through one of Cæsar's peace-envoys as to his preparations for the voyage to the Epirote coast, and, thereupon accelerating his march, threw himself just at the right time into that important arsenal. Cæsar's situation was critical. Although he extended his range in Epirus as far as with his slight strength was at all possible, the subsistence of his army remained difficult and precarious, while the enemy, in possession of the magazines of Dyrrhachium and masters of the sea, had abundance of everything. With his army probably little above 20,000 strong he could not offer battle to that of Pompeius at least twice as numerous, but had to deem himself fortunate that Pompeius went methodically to work and, instead of immediately forcing a battle, took up his winter quarters between Dyrrhachium and Apollonia on the right bank of the Apsus, facing Cæsar on the left, in order that after the arrival of the legions from Pergamus in the spring he might annihilate the enemy with an irresistibly superior force. Thus months passed. If the arrival of the better season, which brought to the enemy a strong additional force and the free use of his fleet, found Cæsar still in the same position, he was to all appearance lost, with his weak band wedged in among the rocks of Epirus between the immense fleet

Cæsar cut
off from
Italy.

and the three times superior land army of the enemy ; and already the winter was drawing to a close. His sole hope still depended on the transport fleet ; any attempt to steal or fight its way through the blockade was more than audacious ; but after the first voluntary foolhardiness this second venture was enjoined by necessity. How desperate his situation appeared to Cæsar himself, is shown by his resolution—when the fleet still came not—to sail alone in a fisherman's boat through the Adriatic to Brundisium in order to fetch it ; which, in reality, was only abandoned because no mariner was found to undertake the daring voyage.

Antonius
proceeds to
Epirus.

But his appearance in person was not needed to induce the faithful officer who commanded in Italy, Marcus Antonius, to make this last effort for the saving of his master. Once more the transport fleet, with four legions and 800 cavalry on board, sailed from the harbour of Brundisium, and fortunately a strong south wind carried it past Libo's galleys. But the same wind, which thus saved the fleet, rendered it impossible for it to land as it was directed on the coast of Apollonia, and compelled it to sail past the camps of Cæsar and Pompeius and to steer to the north of Dyrrhachium towards Lissus, which town fortunately still adhered to Cæsar (P. 395). When it sailed past the harbour of Dyrrhachium, the Rhodian galleys started in pursuit, and hardly had Antonius' ships entered the port of Lissus when the enemy's squadron appeared before it. But just at this moment the wind suddenly veered, and drove the pursuing galleys back into the open sea and partly on the rocky coast. Through the most marvellous good fortune the landing of the second freight had also been successful.

Junction
of Cæsar's
army.

Antonius and Cæsar were no doubt still some four days' march from each other, separated by Dyrrhachium and the whole army of the enemy ; but Antonius happily effected the perilous march round about Dyrrhachium through the passes of the Graba Balkan, and was received by Cæsar, who had gone to meet him, on the right bank of the Apsus. Pompeius, after having vainly attempted to prevent the junction of the two armies of the enemy and to force the corps of Antonius to fight by itself, took up a new position at Asparagium on the river Genusus (Uschkomobin), which flows parallel to the Apsus between the latter and the town of Dyrrhachium, and here remained once more immovable. Cæsar felt himself now strong enough to give battle ; but

Pompeius declined it. On the other hand he succeeded in deceiving Pompeius and throwing himself unawares with his better marching troops, just as at Ilerda, between the enemy's camp and the fortress of Dyrrhachium on which it rested as a basis. The chain of the Graba Balkan, which stretching in a direction from east to west ends on the Adriatic in the narrow tongue of land at Dyrrhachium, sends off—fourteen miles to the east of Dyrrhachium—in a south-westerly direction a lateral branch which likewise turns in a crescentic form towards the sea, and the main chain and lateral branch of the mountains enclose between themselves a small plain extending round a cliff on the seashore. Here Pompeius now took up his camp, and, although Cæsar's army kept the land route to Dyrrhachium closed against him, he yet with the aid of his fleet remained constantly in communication with the town and was amply and easily provided from it with everything needful; while among the Cæsarians, notwithstanding strong detachments to the country lying behind, and notwithstanding all the exertions of the general to bring about an organised system of conveyance and thereby a regular supply, there was more than scarcity, and flesh, barley, nay even roots had very frequently to take the place of the wheat to which they were accustomed.

As his phlegmatic opponent persevered in his inaction, Cæsar undertook to occupy the circle of heights which enclosed the plain on the shore held by Pompeius, with the view of being able at least to arrest the movements of the superior cavalry of the enemy and to operate with more freedom against Dyrrhachium, and if possible to compel his opponent either to battle or to embarkation. Nearly the half of Cæsar's troops was detached to the interior; it seemed almost Quixotic to propose with the rest virtually to besiege an army perhaps twice as strong, concentrated in position, and resting on the sea and the fleet. Yet Cæsar's veterans by infinite exertions invested the Pompeian camp with a chain of posts sixteen miles long, and afterwards added, just as before Alesia, to this inner line a second outer one, to protect themselves against attacks from Dyrrhachium and against attempts to turn their position which could so easily be executed with the aid of the fleet. Pompeius attacked more than once portions of these entrenchments with a view to break if possible the enemy's line, but he did not attempt

Cæsar
invests
Pompeius'
camp.

to prevent the investment by a battle; he preferred to construct in his turn a number of entrenchments around his camp, and to connect them with one another by lines. Both sides exerted themselves to push forward their trenches as far as possible, and the earthworks advanced but slowly amidst constant conflicts. At the same time skirmishing went on on the opposite side of Cæsar's camp with the garrison of Dyrrhachium; Cæsar hoped to get the fortress into his power by means of an understanding with some within it, but was prevented by the enemy's fleet. There was incessant fighting at very different points—on one of the hottest days at six places simultaneously—and, as a rule, the tried valour of the Cæsarians had the advantage in these skirmishes; once, for instance, a single cohort maintained itself in its entrenchments against four legions for several hours, till support came up. No prominent success was attained on either side; yet the effects of the investment came by degrees to be oppressively felt by the Pompeians. The stopping of the rivulets flowing from the heights into the plain compelled them to be content with scanty and bad well-water. Still more severely felt was the want of fodder for the beasts of burden and the horses, which the fleet was unable adequately to remedy; numbers of them died, and it was of but little avail that the horses were conveyed by the fleet to Dyrrhachium, because there also they did not find sufficient fodder. Pompeius could not much longer delay to free himself from his disagreeable position by a blow struck against the enemy. He was informed by Celtic deserters that the enemy had neglected to secure the beach between his two chains of entrenchments 600 feet distant from each other by a cross-wall, and on this he formed his plan. While he caused the inner line of Cæsar's entrenchments to be attacked by the legions from the camp, and the outer line by the light troops placed in vessels and landed beyond the enemy's entrenchments, a third division landed in the space left between the two lines and attacked in the rear their already sufficiently occupied defenders. The entrenchment next to the sea was taken, and the garrison fled in wild confusion; with difficulty the commander of the next trench Marcus Antonius succeeded in maintaining it and in setting a limit for the moment to the advance of the Pompeians; but, apart from the considerable loss, the outermost entrenchment along the sea remained in the hands of the Pompeians and the line

Cæsar's
lines
broken.

was broken. Cæsar the more eagerly seized the opportunity, which soon after presented itself, of attacking a Pompeian legion, which had incautiously become isolated, with the bulk of his infantry. But the attacked made valiant resistance, and, as the ground on which the fight took place had been several times employed for the encampment of larger and lesser divisions and was intersected in various directions by mounds and ditches, Cæsar's right wing along with the cavalry missed entirely its way; instead of supporting the left in attacking the Pompeian legion, it got into a narrow trench that led from one of the old camps towards the river. Thus Pompeius, who came up in all haste with five legions to the aid of his troops, found the two wings of the enemy separated, and one of them in an utterly forlorn position. When the Cæsarians saw him advance, a panic seized them; the whole plunged into disorderly flight; and, if the matter ended with the loss of 1000 of the best soldiers and Cæsar's army did not sustain a complete defeat, this was owing simply to the circumstance that Pompeius also could not freely deploy his force on the broken ground, and to the fact that, fearing a stratagem, he at first held back his troops.

But, even as it was, these days were fraught with mischief. Not only had Cæsar endured the most serious losses and forfeited at a blow his entrenchments, the result of four months of gigantic labour; he was by the recent engagements thrown back again exactly to the point from which he had set out. From the sea he was more completely driven than ever, since Pompeius' elder son Gnæus had by a bold attack partly burnt, partly carried off, Cæsar's few ships of war lying in the port of Oricum, and had soon afterwards also set fire to the transport fleet that was left behind in Lissus; all possibility of bringing up fresh reinforcements to Cæsar by sea from Brundisium was thus lost. The numerous Pompeian cavalry, now released from their confinement, poured themselves over the adjacent country and threatened to render the provisioning of Cæsar's army, which had always been difficult, utterly impossible. Cæsar's daring enterprise of carrying on offensive operations without ships against an enemy in command of the sea and resting on his fleet had totally failed. On what had hitherto been the theatre of war he found himself in presence of an impregnable defensive position, and unable to strike a serious blow either against Dyrrhachium or against the hostile army; on the other hand it

Cæsar
once more
defeated.

Conse-
quences of
Cæsar's
defeats.

depended now solely on Pompeius whether he should proceed to attack under the most favourable circumstances an antagonist already in grave danger as to the means of subsistence. The war had arrived at a crisis. Hitherto Pompeius had, to all appearance, played the game of war without special plan, and only adjusted his defence according to the exigencies of each attack; and this was not to be censured, for the protraction of the war gave him opportunity of making his recruits capable of fighting, of bringing up his reserves, and of bringing more fully into play the superiority of his fleet in the Adriatic. The defeats of Dyrrhachium had not, it is true, that effect which Pompeius not without reason expected from them; the eminent soldierly energy of Cæsar's veterans did not allow matters to come to an immediate and total breaking up of the army by hunger and mutiny; but Cæsar was entirely beaten not merely in tactics but also in strategy, and it seemed as if he could neither maintain himself in his present position nor judiciously change it.

War prospects of Pompeius.

Scipio and Calvinus.

Pompeius had conquered; it was for him to assume the aggressive; and he was resolved to do so. Three different ways of rendering his victory fruitful presented themselves to him. The first and simplest was not to desist from assailing the vanquished army, and, if it departed, to pursue it. Secondly Pompeius might leave Cæsar himself and his best troops in Greece, and might cross in person, as he had long been making preparations for doing, with the main army to Italy, where the feeling was decidedly anti-monarchical and the forces of Cæsar, after the despatch of the best troops and their brave and trustworthy commandant to the Greek army, would not be of very much moment. Lastly the victor might turn inland, effect a junction with the legions of Metellus Scipio, and attempt to capture the troops of Cæsar stationed in the interior. The latter forsooth had, immediately after the arrival of the second cargo from Italy, despatched strong detachments to Aetolia and Thessaly to procure means of subsistence for his army, and had ordered a corps of two legions under Gnæus Domitius Calvinus to advance on the Egnatian highway towards Macedonia, with the view of intercepting and if possible defeating in detail the corps of Scipio advancing on the same road from Thessalonica. Calvinus and Scipio had already approached within a few miles of each other, when Scipio suddenly turned southward and, rapidly crossing the

Haliacmon (Jadsche Karasu) and leaving his baggage there under Marcus Favonius, penetrated into Thessaly, in order to attack with superior force Cæsar's legion of recruits employed in the reduction of the country under Lucius Cassius Longinus. But Longinus retired over the mountains towards Ambracia on the detachment under Gnæus Calvisius Sabinus sent by Cæsar to Ætolia, and Scipio could only cause him to be pursued by his Thracian cavalry, for Calvinus threatened his reserve left behind under Favonius on the Haliacmon with the same fate which he had himself destined for Longinus. So Calvinus and Scipio met again on the Haliacmon, and encamped there for a considerable time opposite to each other.

Pompeius might choose among these plans ; no choice was left to Cæsar. After that unfortunate engagement he entered on his retreat to Apollonia. Pompeius followed. The march from Dyrrhachium to Apollonia along a difficult road crossed by several rivers was no easy task for a defeated army pursued by the enemy ; but the dexterous guidance of their general and the indestructible marching energy of the soldiers compelled Pompeius after four days' pursuit to suspend it as useless. He had now to decide between the Italian expedition and the march into the interior. However advisable and attractive the former might seem, and though various voices were raised in its favour, he preferred not to abandon the corps of Scipio, the more especially as he hoped by this march to get the corps of Calvinus into his hands. Calvinus lay at the moment on the Egnatian road at Heraclea Lyncestis, between Pompeius and Scipio, and, after Cæsar had retreated to Apollonia, further distant from the latter than from the great army of Pompeius ; without knowledge, moreover, of the events at Dyrrhachium and of his hazardous position, since after the successes achieved at Dyrrhachium the whole country inclined to Pompeius and the messengers of Cæsar were everywhere seized. It was not till the enemy's main force had approached within a few miles of him that Calvinus learned from the accounts of the enemy's advanced posts themselves the state of things. A quick departure in a southerly direction towards Thessaly withdrew him at the last moment from imminent destruction ; Pompeius had to content himself with having liberated Scipio from his position of peril. Cæsar had meanwhile arrived unmolested at Apollonia. Immediately after the disaster of

Cæsar's
retreat from
Dyrrha-
chium to
Thessaly.

Dyrrhachium he had resolved if possible to transfer the struggle from the coast away into the interior, with the view of getting beyond the reach of the enemy's fleet—the ultimate cause of the failure of his previous exertions. The march to Apollonia had only been intended to place his wounded in safety and to pay his soldiers there, where his depôts were stationed; as soon as this was done, he set out for Thessaly, leaving behind garrisons in Apollonia, Oricum, and Lissus. The corps of Calvinus had also put itself in motion towards Thessaly; and Cæsar could effect a junction with the reinforcements coming up from Italy, this time by the land route through Illyria—two legions under Quintus Cornificius—still more easily in Thessaly than in Epirus. Ascending by difficult paths in the valley of the Aous and crossing the mountain-chain which separates Epirus from Thessaly, he arrived at the Peneius; Calvinus was likewise directed thither, and the junction of the two armies was thus accomplished by the shortest route and that which was least exposed to the enemy. It took place at Æginium not far from the source of the Peneius. The first Thessalian town before which the now united army appeared, Gomphi, closed its gates against it; it was quickly stormed and given up to pillage, and the other towns of Thessaly terrified by this example submitted, so soon as Cæsar's legions merely appeared before the walls. Amidst these marches and conflicts, and with the help of the supplies—albeit not too ample—which the region on the Peneius afforded, the traces and recollections of the calamitous days which they had passed through gradually vanished.

The victories of Dyrrhachium had thus borne not much immediate fruit for the victors. Pompeius with his unwieldy army and his numerous cavalry had not been able to follow his versatile enemy into the mountains; Cæsar like Calvinus had escaped from pursuit, and the two stood united and in full security in Thessaly. Perhaps it would have been the best course if Pompeius had now without delay embarked with his main force for Italy, where success was scarcely doubtful. But in the mean time only a division of the fleet departed for Sicily and Italy. In the camp of the coalition the contest with Cæsar was looked on as so completely decided by the battles of Dyrrhachium that it only remained to reap the fruits of victory, in other words, to follow out and capture the defeated army. Their former

over-cautious reserve was succeeded by an arrogance still less justified by circumstances; they gave no heed to the facts, that they had, strictly speaking, failed in the pursuit, that they had to hold themselves in readiness to encounter a completely refreshed and reorganised army in Thessaly, and that there was no small risk in moving away from the sea, renouncing the support of the fleet, and following their antagonist to the battle-field chosen by himself. They were simply resolved at any price to fight with Cæsar, and therefore to get at him as soon as possible and by the most convenient way. Cato took up the command in Dyrrhachium, where a garrison was left behind of eighteen cohorts, and in Corcyra, where 300 ships of war were left; Pompeius and Scipio proceeded—the former, apparently, following the Egnatian way as far as Pella and then striking into the great road to the south, the latter from the Haliacmon through the passes of Olympus—to the lower Peneius and met at Larissa.

Cæsar lay to the south of Larissa in the plain—which extends between the hill-country of Cynoscephalæ and the chain of Othrys and is intersected by a tributary of the Peneius, the Enipeus—on the left bank of the latter stream near the town of Pharsalus; Pompeius pitched his camp opposite to him on the right bank of the Enipeus along the slope of the heights of Cynoscephalæ.* The entire army

Battle at
Pharsalus.

* The exact determination of the field of battle is difficult. Appian (ii. 75) expressly places it between (New) Pharsalus (now Fersala) and the Enipeus. Of the two streams, which alone are of any importance in the question, and are undoubtedly the Apidanus and Enipeus of the ancients—the Sofadhitiko and the Fersaliti—the former has its sources in the mountains of Thaumaci (Dhomoko) and the Lolopian heights, the latter in mount Othrys, and the Fersaliti alone flows past Pharsalus; now as the Enipeus according to Strabo (ix. p. 432) springs from mount Othrys and flows past Pharsalus, the Fersaliti has been most justly pronounced by Leake (*Northern Greece*, iv. 320) to be the Enipeus, and the hypothesis followed by Göler that the Fersaliti is the Apidanus, is untenable. With this all the other statements of the ancients as to the two rivers agree. Only we must doubtless assume with Leake, that the river of Vlokho formed by the union of the Fersaliti and the Sofadhitiko and going to the Peneius was called by the ancients Apidanus as well as the Sofadhitiko; which, however, is the more natural, as while the Sofadhitiko probably has, the Fersaliti has not, constantly water (Leake iv. 321). Old Pharsalus, from which the battle takes its name, must therefore have been situated between Fersala and the Fersaliti. Accordingly the battle was fought on the left bank of the Fersaliti, and in such a way that the Pompeians, standing with their faces towards Pharsalus, leaned their right wing on the river (Cæsar, *B. C.* iii. 83; Frontinus, *Strat.* ii. 3, 22). The camp of the Pompeians,

of Pompeius was assembled; Cæsar on the other hand still expected the corps of nearly two legions formerly detached to Ætolia and Thessaly, now stationed under Quintus Fufius Calenus in Greece, and the two legions of Cornificius which were sent after him by the land route from Italy and had already arrived in Illyria. The army of Pompeius, numbering eleven legions or 47,000 men and 7000 horse, was more than double that of Cæsar in infantry, and seven times as numerous in cavalry; fatigue and conflicts had so decimated Cæsar's troops, that his eight legions did not number more than 22,000 men under arms, consequently not nearly the half of their normal amount. The victorious army of Pompeius provided with a countless cavalry and good magazines had provisions in abundance, while the troops of Cæsar had difficulty in keeping themselves alive and only hoped for better supplies from the corn-harvest not far distant. The Pompeian soldiers, who had learned in the last campaign to know war and trust their leader, were in the best of humour. All military reasons on the side of Pompeius favoured the

however, cannot have stood here, but only on the slope of the heights of Cynoscephalæ, on the right bank of the Enipeus, partly because they barred the route of Cæsar to Scotussa, partly because their line of retreat evidently went over the mountains above the camp towards Larissa; if they had, according to Leake's hypothesis (iv. 482), encamped to the east of Pharsalus on the left bank of the Enipeus, they could never have got to the northward through this stream, which at this very point has a deeply cut bed (Leake iv. 469), and Pompeius must have fled to Lamia instead of Larissa. Probably therefore the Pompeians pitched their camp on the right bank of the Fersaliti, and passed the river both in order to fight and in order, after the battle, to regain their camp, whence they then moved up the slopes of Crannon and Scotussa, which culminate above the latter place in the heights of Cynoscephalæ. This was not impossible. The Enipeus is a small slow-flowing rivulet, which Leake found two feet deep in November, and which in the hot season often lies quite dry (Leake i. 448, and iv. 472; comp. Lucan, vi. 373), and the battle was fought in the height of summer. Further the armies before the battle lay three miles and a half from each other (Appian. *B.C.* ii. 65), so that the Pompeians could make all preparations and also properly secure the communication with their camp by bridges. Had the battle terminated in a complete rout, no doubt the retreat to and over the river could not have been executed, and doubtless for this reason Pompeius only reluctantly agreed to fight here. The left wing of the Pompeians which was the most remote from the base of retreat felt this; but the retreat at least of their centre and their right wing was not accomplished in such haste as to be impracticable under the given conditions. Cæsar and his copyists are silent as to the crossing of the river, because this would place in too clear a light the eagerness for battle of the Pompeians apparent otherwise from the whole narrative, and they are also silent as to the conditions of retreat favourable for these.

view, that the decisive battle should not be long delayed, seeing that they now confronted Cæsar in Thessaly; and the emigrant impatience of the many noble officers and others accompanying the army doubtless had more weight than even such reasons in the council of war. Since the events of Dyrrhachium these lords regarded the triumph of their party as an ascertained fact; already there was eager strife as to the filling up of Cæsar's supreme pontificate, and instructions were sent to Rome to hire houses at the Forum for the next elections. When Pompeius hesitated as to his crossing of the rivulet which separated the two armies, and which Cæsar with his much weaker army did not venture to pass, this excited great indignation; Pompeius, it was alleged, delayed the battle only in order to rule somewhat longer over so many consulars and prætorians and to perpetuate his part of Agamemnon. Pompeius yielded; and Cæsar, who under the impression that matters would not come to a battle, had just projected a mode of turning the enemy's army and for that purpose was on the point of setting out towards Scotussa, likewise arrayed his legions for battle, when he saw the Pompeians preparing to offer it to him on his bank. Thus the battle of Pharsalus was fought on the 9th August 706, almost on the same field where a hundred and fifty years before the Romans had laid the foundation of their dominion in the East (ii. 301). Pompeius rested his right wing on the Enipeus; Cæsar opposite to him rested his left on the broken ground stretching in front of the Enipeus; the two other wings were stationed out in the plain, covered in each case by the cavalry and the light troops. The intention of Pompeius was to keep his infantry on the defensive, but with his cavalry to scatter the weak band of horsemen which, mixed after the German fashion with light infantry, confronted him, and then to take Cæsar's right wing in rear. His infantry courageously sustained the first charge of that of the enemy, and the engagement there came to a stand. Labienus likewise dispersed the enemy's cavalry after a brave but short resistance, and deployed his force to the left with the view of turning the infantry. But Cæsar, foreseeing the defeat of his cavalry, had stationed behind it on the threatened flank of his right wing some 2000 of his best legionaries. As the enemy's horsemen, driving those of Cæsar before them, galloped along and around the line, they

suddenly came upon this select corps advancing intrepidly against them and, rapidly thrown into confusion by the unexpected and unusual infantry attack,* they galloped at full speed from the field of battle. The victorious legionaries cut to pieces the enemy's archers now unprotected, then rushed at the left wing of the enemy, and began now on their part to turn it. At the same time Cæsar's third division hitherto reserved advanced along the whole line to the attack. The unexpected defeat of the best arm of the Pompeian army, as it raised the courage of their opponents, broke that of the army and above all that of the general. When Pompeius, who from the outset did not trust his infantry, saw the horsemen gallop off, he rode back at once from the field of battle to the camp, without even awaiting the issue of the general attack ordered by Cæsar. His legions began to waver and soon to retire over the brook into the camp, which was not accomplished without severe loss. The day was thus lost and many an able soldier had fallen, but the army was still substantially intact, and the situation of Pompeius was far less perilous than that of Cæsar after the defeat of Dyrrhachium. But while Cæsar in the vicissitudes of his destiny had learned that fortune loves to withdraw herself at certain moments even from her favourites in order to be once more won back through their perseverance, Pompeius knew fortune hitherto only as the constant goddess, and despaired of himself and of her when she withdrew from him; and, while in Cæsar's great nature despair only developed still mightier energies, the feebler soul of Pompeius under similar pressure sank into the infinite abyss of despondency. As once in the war with Sertorius he had been

* With this is connected the well-known direction of Cæsar to his soldiers to strike at the faces of the enemy's horsemen. The infantry—which here in an altogether irregular way acted on the offensive against cavalry, who were not to be reached with the sabres—were not to throw their *pila*, but to use them as hand-spears against the cavalry and, in order to defend themselves better against these, to thrust at their faces (Plutarch, *Pomp.* 69, 71; *Cæs.* 45; Appian. ii. 76, 78; Flor. ii. 13; Oros. vi. 15; erroneously Frontinus, iv. 7, 32). The anecdotal turn given to this instruction, that the Pompeian horsemen were to be brought to run away by the fear of receiving scars in their faces, and that they actually galloped off “holding their hands before their eyes” (Plutarch), collapses of itself; for it has point only on the supposition that the Pompeian cavalry had consisted principally of the young nobility of Rome, the “graceful dancers;” and this was not the case (P. 401). At the most it may be, that the wit of the camp gave to that simple and judicious military order this very irrational but certainly comic turn.

on the point of abandoning the office entrusted to him in presence of his superior opponent and of departing (P. 32), so now, when he saw the legions retire over the stream, he threw from him the fatal general's scarf, and rode off by the nearest route to the sea, to find means of embarking there. His army discouraged and leaderless—for Scipio, although recognised by Pompeius as colleague in supreme command, was yet general-in-chief only in name—hoped to find protection behind the camp-walls; but Cæsar allowed it no rest; the obstinate resistance of the Roman and Thracian guard of the camp was speedily overcome, and the mass was compelled to withdraw in disorder to the heights of Crannon and Scotussa, at the foot of which the camp was pitched. It attempted by moving forward along these hills to regain Larissa; but the troops of Cæsar, heeding neither booty nor fatigue and advancing by better paths in the plain, intercepted the route of the fugitives; in fact, when late in the evening the Pompeians suspended their march, their pursuers were able even to draw an entrenched line which precluded the fugitives from access to the only rivulet to be found in the neighbourhood. So ended the day of Pharsalus. The enemy's army was not only defeated, but annihilated; 15,000 of the enemy lay dead or wounded on the field of battle, while the Cæsarians missed only 200 men; the body which remained together, amounting still to nearly 20,000 men, laid down their arms on the morning after the battle; only isolated troops, including, it is true, the officers of most note, sought a refuge in the mountains; of the eleven eagles of the enemy nine were handed over to Cæsar. Cæsar, who on the very day of the battle had reminded the soldiers that they should not forget the fellow-citizen in the foe, did not treat the captives as Bibulus and Labienus had done; nevertheless he too found it necessary now to exercise some severity. The common soldiers were incorporated in the army, fines or confiscations of property were inflicted on the men of better rank; the senators and equites of note who were taken, with few exceptions, suffered death. The time for clemency was past; the longer the civil war lasted, the more remorseless and implacable it became.

Some time elapsed, before the consequences of the 9th of August 706 could be fully discerned. What admitted of least doubt, was the passing over to the side of Cæsar of all those who had attached themselves to the party vanquished

Flight of
Pompeius.

48.

The political effects of the battle of Pharsalus.

The East submits.

The aristocracy after the battle of Pharsalus.

at Pharsalus merely as being the more powerful; the defeat was so thoroughly decisive, that the victor was joined by all who were not willing or were not obliged to fight for a lost cause. All the kings, peoples, and cities, which had hitherto been the clients of Pompeius, now recalled their naval and military contingents and declined to receive the refugees of the beaten party; such as Egypt, Cyrene, the communities of Syria, Phœnicia, Cilicia and Asia Minor, Rhodes, Athens, and generally the whole of the East. In fact Pharnaces king of the Bosphorus pushed his officiousness so far, that on the news of the Pharsalian battle he took possession not only of the town of Phanagoria which several years before had been declared free by Pompeius, and of the dominions of the Colchian princes confirmed by him, but even of the kingdom of Little Armenia which Pompeius had conferred on king Deiotarus. Almost the sole exceptions to this general submission were the little town of Megara which allowed itself to be besieged and stormed by the Cæsarians, and Juba king of Numidia, who had for long expected, and after the victory over Curio expected only with all the greater certainty, that his kingdom would be annexed by Cæsar, and was thus obliged, for better or for worse, to abide by the defeated party.

In the same way as the client communities submitted to the victor of Pharsalus, the tail of the constitutional party,—all who had joined it with half a heart or had even, like Marcus Cicero and his fellows, merely danced around the aristocracy like the witches around the Brocken,—approached to make their peace with the new monarch, a peace accordingly which his contemptuous indulgence readily and courteously granted to the petitioners. But the flower of the defeated party made no compromise. All was over with the aristocracy; but the aristocrats could never become converted to monarchy. The highest revelations of humanity are perishable; the religion once true may become a lie,* the polity once fraught with blessing may become a curse; but even the gospel that is past still finds confessors,

* [I may here state once for all that in this and other passages, where Dr. Mommsen appears incidentally to express views of religion or philosophy with which I cannot be supposed to agree, I have not thought it right—as is, I believe, sometimes done in similar cases—to omit or modify any portion of what he has written. The reader must judge for himself as to the truth or value of such assertions as those given in the text.—*Tr.*]

and if such a faith cannot remove mountains like faith in the living truth, it yet remains true to itself down to its very end, and does not depart from the realm of the living till it has dragged its last priests and its last partisans along with it, and a new generation, freed from those shadows of the past and the perishing, rules over a world that has renewed its youth. So it was in Rome. Into whatever abyss of degeneracy the aristocratic rule had now sunk, it had once been a great political system; the sacred fire, by which Italy had been conquered and Hannibal had been vanquished, continued to glow—although somewhat dim and dull—in the Roman nobility so long as that nobility existed, and rendered a cordial understanding between the men of the old régime and the new monarch impossible. A large portion of the constitutional party submitted at least outwardly, and recognised the monarchy so far as to accept pardon from Cæsar and to retire as much as possible into private life; which, however, ordinarily was not done without the mental reservation of thereby preserving themselves for a future change of things. This course was chiefly followed by the partisans of lesser note; but the able Marcus Marcellus, the same who had brought about the rupture with Cæsar (P. 347), was to be found among these judicious persons and voluntarily banished himself to Lesbos. In the majority, however, of the genuine aristocracy passion was more powerful than cool reflection; along with which, no doubt, self-deceptions as to success being still possible and apprehensions of the inevitable vengeance of the victor variously co-operated. No one probably Cato. formed a judgment as to the situation of affairs with so painful a clearness, and so free from fear or hope on his own account, as Marcus Cato. Completely convinced that after the days of Ilorda and Pharsalus the monarchy was inevitable, and morally firm enough to confess to himself this bitter truth and to act upon it, he hesitated for a moment whether the constitutional party ought at all to continue a war, which would necessarily require sacrifices for a lost cause on the part of many who did not know why they offered them. But when he resolved to fight against the monarchy not for victory, but for a speedier and more honourable fall, he yet sought as far as possible to draw no one into this war, who chose to survive the fall of the republic and to be reconciled to monarchy. He conceived that, so long as the republic had been merely threatened, it was a right and a duty to

compel the lukewarm and bad citizen to take part in the struggle ; but that now it was senseless and cruel to compel the individual to share the ruin of the lost republic. Not only did he himself discharge every one who desired to return to Italy ; but when the wildest of the wild partisans, Gnæus Pompeius the younger, insisted on the execution of these people and of Cicero in particular, it was Cato alone who by his moral authority prevented it.

Pompeius.

Pompeius also had no desire for peace. Had he been a man who deserved to hold the position which he filled, we might suppose him to have perceived that he who aspires to a crown cannot return to the beaten track of ordinary existence, and that there is accordingly no place left on earth for one who has failed. But Pompeius was hardly too noble-minded to ask a favour, which the victor would have been perhaps magnanimous enough not to refuse to him ; on the contrary, he was probably too mean to do so. Whether it was that he could not make up his mind to trust himself to Cæsar, or that in his usual vague and undecided way, after the first immediate impression of the disaster of Pharsalus had vanished, he began again to cherish hope, Pompeius was resolved to continue the struggle against Cæsar and to seek for himself yet another battle-field after that of Pharsalus.

Military
effects of
the battle.

The leaders
scattered.

Thus, however much Cæsar had striven by prudence and moderation to appease the fury of his opponents and to lessen their number, the struggle nevertheless went on without alteration. But the leading men had almost all taken part in the fight at Pharsalus ; and, although they all escaped with the exception of Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus who was killed in the flight, they were yet scattered in all directions, so that they were unable to concert a common plan for the continuance of the campaign. Most of them found their way, partly through the desolate mountains of Macedonia and Illyria, partly by the aid of the fleet, to Corcyra, where Marcus Cato commanded the reserve left behind. Here a sort of council of war took place under the presidency of Cato, at which Metellus Scipio, Titus Labienus, Lucius Afranius, Gnæus Pompeius the younger and others were present ; but the absence of the commander-in-chief and the painful uncertainty as to his fate, as well as the internal dissensions of the party prevented the adoption of any common resolution, and ultimately each took the course which seemed to him the most suitable for himself or for the

common cause. It was in fact in a high degree difficult to say, among the many straws to which they might possibly cling, which was the one that would keep longest above water. Macedonia and Greece were lost by the battle of Pharsalus. Macedonia and Greece. It is true that Cato, who had immediately on the news of the defeat evacuated Dyrrhachium, still held Corcyra, and Rutilius Lupus the Peloponnesus, during a time for the constitutional party. For a moment it seemed also as if the Pompeians would make a stand at Patræ in the Peloponnesus; but the accounts of the advance of Calenus sufficed to frighten them from that quarter. As little was there any Italy. attempt to maintain Corcyra. On the Italian and Sicilian coasts the Pompeian squadrons despatched thither after the victories of Dyrrhachium (P. 412) had achieved not unimportant successes against the ports of Brundisium, Messana and Vibo, and at Messana especially had burnt the whole fleet in course of being fitted out for Cæsar; but the ships that were thus active, mostly from Asia Minor and Syria, were recalled by their communities in consequence of the Pharsalian battle, so that the expedition came to an end of itself. In Asia Minor and Syria there were at the moment The East. no troops of either party, with the exception of the Bosporan army of Pharnaces which had taken possession, ostensibly on Cæsar's account, of different regions belonging to his opponents. In Egypt there was still indeed a considerable Egypt. Roman army, formed of the troops left behind there by Gabinus (P. 154) and thereafter recruited from Italian vagrants and Syrian or Cilician banditti; but it was self-evident, and was soon officially confirmed by the recall of the Egyptian vessels, that the court of Alexandria by no means had the intention of holding firmly by the defeated party or of even placing its force of troops at their disposal. Somewhat more favourable prospects presented themselves to the vanquished in the West. In Spain Pompeian sym- Spain. pathies were so strong among the army as well as among the population, that the Cæsarians had on that account to give up the attack which they contemplated from this quarter against Africa, and an insurrection seemed inevitable, so soon as a leader of note should appear in the peninsula. In Africa Africa. moreover the coalition, or rather Juba king of Numidia who was the true regent there, had been arming unmolested since the autumn of 705. While the whole East was consequently 49. lost to the coalition by the battle of Pharsalus, it might on

the other hand continue the war after an honourable manner probably in Spain, and certainly in Africa; for to claim the aid of the king of Numidia who had for a long time been subject to the Roman community against revolutionary fellow-burgesses was for Romans a painful humiliation doubtless, but by no means an act of treason. Those again who in this conflict of despair had no further regard for right or honour, might declare themselves beyond the pale of the law, and commence hostilities as robbers; or might enter into alliance with independent neighbouring states, and introduce the public foe into the intestine strife; or, lastly, might profess monarchy with the lips and prosecute the restoration of the legitimate republic with the dagger of the assassin.

Hostilities
of robbers
and pirates.

That the vanquished should withdraw and renounce the new monarchy, was at least the natural and so far the truest expression of their desperate position. The mountains and above all the sea had been in those times ever since the memory of man the asylum not only of all crime, but also of intolerable misery and of oppressed right; it was natural for Pompeians and republicans to wage a defiant war against the monarchy of Cæsar which ejected them in the mountains and on the seas, and especially natural for them to take up piracy on a greater scale, with more compact organization, and with more definite aims. Even after the recall of the squadrons that had come from the East they still possessed a very considerable fleet of their own, while Cæsar was as yet virtually without vessels of war; and their connection with the Dalmatæ who had risen in their own interest against Cæsar (P. 395), and their control over the most important seas and seaports, presented the most advantageous prospects for a naval war, especially on a small scale. As formerly Sulla's hunting out of the democrats had ended in the Sertorian insurrection, which was a conflict first waged by pirates and then by robbers and ultimately became a very serious war, so possibly, if there was in the Catonian aristocracy or among the adherents of Pompeius as much spirit and fire as in the Marian democracy, and if there was found among them a true sea king, a commonwealth independent of the monarchy of Cæsar and perhaps a match for it might arise on the still unconquered sea.

Parthian
alliance.

Far more serious disapproval in every respect is due to the idea of dragging an independent neighbouring state into the Roman civil war and of bringing about by its means a counter revolution; law and conscience condemn the de-

serter more severely than the robber, and a victorious band of robbers finds its way back to a free and well-ordered commonwealth more easily than the emigrants who are brought back by the public foe. Besides it was scarcely probable that the beaten party would be able to effect a restoration in this way. The only state, from which they could attempt to seek support, was that of the Parthians; and as to this it was at least doubtful whether it would make their cause its own, and very improbable that it would fight out that cause against Cæsar. The time for republican conspiracies had not yet come.

While the remnant of the defeated party thus allowed themselves to be helplessly driven about by fate and even those who had determined to continue the struggle knew not how or where to do so, Cæsar, quickly as ever resolving and quickly acting, laid everything aside to pursue Pompeius—the only one of his opponents whom he respected as an officer, and the one whose personal capture would have probably paralysed a half, and that perhaps the more dangerous half, of his opponents. With a few men he crossed the Hellespont—his single bark encountered in it a fleet of the enemy destined for the Black Sea and took the whole crews, struck as with stupefaction by the news of the battle of Pharsalus, prisoners—and as soon as the most necessary preparations were made, hastened in pursuit of Pompeius to the East. The latter had gone from the Pharsalian battle-field to Lesbos, whence he brought away his wife and his second son Sextus, and had sailed onward round Asia Minor to Cilicia and thence to Cyprus. He might have joined his partisans at Corcyra or Africa; but repugnance toward his aristocratic allies and the thought of the reception which awaited him there after the day of Pharsalus and above all after his disgraceful flight, appear to have induced him to take his own course and rather to resort to the protection of the Parthian king than to that of Cato. While he was employed in collecting money and slaves from the Roman revenue-farmers and merchants in Cyprus, and in arming a band of 2000 slaves, he received news that Antioch had declared for Cæsar and that the route to the Parthians was no longer open. So he altered his plan and sailed to Egypt, where a number of his old soldiers served in the army and the situation and rich resources of the country allowed him time and opportunity to reorganise the war.

Cæsar
pursues
Pompeius
to Egypt.

51. In Egypt, after the death of Ptolemy Auletes (May 703) his children, Cleopatra about sixteen years of age and Ptolemæus Dionysius about ten, had ascended the throne according to their father's will jointly, and as consorts; but soon the brother or rather his guardian Pothinus had driven the sister from the kingdom and compelled her to seek a refuge in Syria, whence she made preparations to get back to her paternal kingdom. Ptolemæus and Pothinus lay with the whole Egyptian army at Pelusium for the sake of protecting the eastern frontier against her, just when Pompeius cast anchor at the Casian promontory and sent a request to the king to allow him to land. The Egyptian court, long informed of the disaster at Pharsalus, was on the point of rejecting Pompeius; but the king's tutor Theodotus pointed out that in that case Pompeius would probably employ his connections in the Egyptian army to instigate rebellion; and that it would be safer, and also preferable with regard to Cæsar, if they embraced the opportunity of making away with Pompeius. Political reasonings of this sort did not readily fail of their effect among the statesmen of the Hellenic world. Achilles the general of the royal troops and some of Pompeius' former soldiers went off in a boat to Pompeius' vessel; and invited him to come to the king and, as the water was shallow, to enter their barge. As he was stepping on shore, the military tribune Lucius Septimius stabbed him from behind, under the eyes of his wife and son, who were compelled to be spectators of the murder from the deck of their vessel, without being able to rescue or revenge (28 Sept. 706). On the same day, on which thirteen years before he had entered the capital in triumph over Mithradates (P. 147), the man, who for a generation had been called the Great and for years had ruled Rome, died on the desert sands of the inhospitable Casian shore by the hand of one of his soldiers. A good officer, but otherwise of mediocre gifts of intellect and of heart, fate had with superhuman constancy for thirty years allowed him to solve all brilliant and toilless tasks; had permitted him to pluck all laurels planted and fostered by others; had presented to him all the conditions requisite for obtaining the supreme power—only in order to exhibit in his person an example of spurious greatness, to which history knows no parallel. Of all pitiful parts there is none more pitiful than that of passing for more than one really is; and it is the fate of monarchy that

Death of
Pompeius.

48.

this misfortune inevitably clings to it, for barely once in a thousand years does there arise among the people a man who is a king not merely in name, but in reality. If this disproportion between semblance and reality has never perhaps been so prominently marked as in Pompeius, the fact may well excite grave reflection that it was precisely he who in a certain sense opened the series of Roman monarchs.

When Cæsar following the track of Pompeius arrived in the roadstead of Alexandria, all was already over. With deep agitation he turned away, when the murderer brought to his ship the head of the man, who had been his son-in-law and for long years his colleague in rule, and to get whom alive into his power he had come to Egypt. The dagger of the rash assassin precluded an answer to the question, how Cæsar would have dealt with the captive Pompeius; but, while the humane sympathy, which still found a place in the great soul of Cæsar side by side with ambition, enjoined that he should spare his former friend, his interest also required that he should annihilate Pompeius otherwise than by the executioner. Pompeius had been for twenty years the acknowledged ruler of Rome; a dominion so deeply rooted does not perish with the ruler's death. The death of Pompeius did not break up the Pompeians, but gave to them instead of an aged, incapable, and worn-out chief in his sons Gnæus and Sextus two leaders, both of whom were young and active and the second was a man of decided capacity. To the newly-founded hereditary monarchy the hereditary pretendership attached itself at once like a parasite, and it was very doubtful whether by this change of persons Cæsar did not lose more than he gained.

Meanwhile in Egypt Cæsar had now nothing further to do, and the Romans and the Egyptians expected that he would immediately set sail and apply himself to the subjugation of Africa, and to the huge task of organisation which awaited him after the victory. But Cæsar faithful to his custom—wherever he found himself in the wide empire—of finally regulating matters at once and in person, and firmly convinced that no resistance was to be expected either from the Roman garrison or from the court, being, moreover, in urgent pecuniary embarrassment, landed in Alexandria with the two amalgamated legions accompanying him to the number of 3200 men and 800 Celtic and German cavalry, took up his quarters in the royal palace, and proceeded to collect

Cæsar regu-
lates Egypt.

- the necessary sums of money and to regulate the Egyptian succession, without allowing himself to be disturbed by the saucy remark of Pothinus that Cæsar should not for such petty matters neglect his own so important affairs. In his dealing with the Egyptians he was just and even indulgent. Although the aid which they had given to Pompeius justified the imposing of a war contribution, the exhausted land was spared from this; and, while the arrears of the sum stipulated for in 695 (P. 153) and since then only about half paid were remitted, there was required merely a final payment of 10,000,000 *denarii* (£400,000). The belligerent brother and sister were enjoined immediately to suspend hostilities, and were invited to have their dispute investigated and decided by arbitration. They submitted; the royal boy was already in the palace and Cleopatra also presented herself there. Cæsar adjudged the kingdom of Egypt, agreeably to the testament of Auletes, to the intermarried brother and sister Cleopatra and Ptolemæus Dionysius, and further gave unasked the kingdom of Cyprus—cancelling the earlier act of annexation (P. 152)—as the appanage of the second-born of Egypt to the younger children of Auletes, Arsinoë and Ptolemæus the younger.

Insurrec-
tion in
Alexandria.

But a storm was secretly preparing. Alexandria was a cosmopolitan city as well as Rome, hardly inferior to the Italian capital in the number of its inhabitants, far superior to it in stirring commercial spirit, in skill of handicraft, in taste for science and art: in the citizens there was a lively national self-importance, and, if there was no political sentiment, there was at any rate a turbulent spirit, which induced them to indulge in their street riots as regularly and as heartily as the Parisians of the present day: one may conceive their feelings, when they saw the Roman general ruling in the palace of the Lagidæ and their kings accepting the award of his tribunal. Pothinus and the boy-king, both as may be conceived very much discontented at once with the peremptory requisition of old debts and with the intervention in the throne-dispute which could only issue and did issue in favour of Cleopatra, sent—in order to the satisfaction of the Roman demands—the treasures of the temples and the gold plate of the king with intentional ostentation to be melted at the mint; with increasing indignation the Egyptians—who were pious even to superstition, and who rejoiced in the world-renowned magnificence of their court

as if it were a possession of their own—beheld the bare walls of their temples and the wooden cups on the table of their king. The Roman army of occupation also, which had been essentially denationalised by its long abode in Egypt and the many intermarriages between the soldiers and Egyptian women, and which moreover numbered a multitude of the old soldiers of Pompeius and runaway Italian criminals and slaves in its ranks, was indignant at Cæsar by whose orders it had been obliged to suspend its action on the Syrian frontier, and at his handful of haughty legionaries. The tumult even at the landing, when the multitude saw the Roman axes carried into the old palace, and the numerous assassinations of his soldiers in the city, had taught Cæsar the immense danger in which he was placed with his small force in presence of that exasperated multitude. But it was difficult to return on account of the north-west winds prevailing at this season of the year, and the attempt at embarkation might easily become a signal for the outbreak of the insurrection; besides, it was not Cæsar's nature to depart without having accomplished his work. He accordingly ordered up at once reinforcements from Asia, and, till these arrived, displayed throughout the utmost self-possession. Never was there greater gaiety in his camp than during this rest at Alexandria; and while the beautiful and clever Cleopatra was not sparing of her charms in general and least of all towards her judge, Cæsar also appeared among all his victories to value most those won over beautiful women. It was a merry prelude to a very grave drama. Under the leadership of Achilles and, as was afterwards proved, by the secret orders of the king and his guardian, the Roman army of occupation stationed in Egypt appeared unexpectedly in Alexandria; and as soon as the citizens saw that it had come to attack Cæsar, they made common cause with the soldiers.

With a presence of mind, which in some measure justifies his earlier foolhardiness, Cæsar hastily collected his scattered men; seized the persons of the king and his minister; entrenched himself in the royal residence and the adjoining theatre; and gave orders, as there was no time to place in safety the war fleet stationed in the principal harbour immediately in front of the theatre, that it should be burnt and that Pharos, the island with the light-tower commanding the harbour, should be occupied by means of boats. Thus at least a

Cæsar in
Alexandria.

restricted position for defence was secured, and the way was kept open to procure supplies and reinforcements. At the same time orders were issued to the commandant of Asia Minor as well as to the nearest subject countries, the Syrians and Nabatæans, the Cretans and the Rhodians, to send troops and ships in all haste to Egypt. The insurrection, at the head of which the princess Arsinoë and her confidant the eunuch Ganymedes had placed themselves, meanwhile had free course in all Egypt and in the greater part of the capital. In the streets of the latter there was daily fighting, but without success either on the part of Cæsar in gaining freer scope and breaking through to the fresh water lake of Marea which lay behind the town, where he could have provided himself with water and forage, or on the part of the Alexandrians in acquiring superiority over the besieged and depriving them of all drinking water; for, when the Nile canals in Cæsar's part of the town had been spoiled by the introduction of salt water, drinkable water was unexpectedly found in the wells dug on the beach. As Cæsar was not to be overcome from the landward side, the exertions of the besiegers were directed to destroy his fleet and cut him off from the sea by which supplies reached him. The island with the light-house and the mole by which this was connected with the mainland divided the harbour into a western and an eastern half, which were in communication with each other through two arched openings in the mole. Cæsar commanded the island and the east harbour, while the mole and the west harbour were in possession of the citizens; and, as the Alexandrian fleet was burnt, his vessels sailed in and out without hindrance. The Alexandrians, after having vainly attempted to introduce fire-ships from the western into the eastern harbour, equipped with the remnant of their arsenal a small squadron and with this blocked up the way of Cæsar's vessels, when these were towing in a fleet of transports with a legion that had arrived from Asia Minor; but Cæsar's excellent Rhodian mariners mastered the enemy. Not long afterwards, however, the citizens captured the lighthouse-island,* and from that point totally closed the

* The loss of the lighthouse-island must, along with the description of a second naval engagement in which the Egyptian fleet beaten at Chersonesus was annihilated, have been inserted where there is now a chasm (*B. A.* 12), for the island was at first in Cæsar's power (*B. C.* iii. 12; *B. A.* 8). The mole must have been constantly in the power of the enemy, for Cæsar held intercourse with the island only by ships.

narrow and rocky mouth of the east harbour for larger ships; so that Cæsar's fleet was compelled to lie in the open roads before the east harbour, and his communication with the sea hung only on a weak thread. Cæsar's fleet, attacked in that roadstead repeatedly by the superior naval force of the enemy, could neither shun the unequal strife, since the loss of the lighthouse-island closed the inner harbour against it, nor take its departure, for the loss of the roadstead would have debarred Cæsar wholly from the sea. Though the brave legionaries, supported by the dexterity of the Rhodian sailors, had always hitherto decided these conflicts in favour of the Romans, the Alexandrians renewed and augmented their naval armaments with unwearied perseverance; the besieged had to fight as often as it pleased the besiegers, and if the former should be on a single occasion vanquished, Cæsar would be totally hemmed in and probably lost. It was absolutely necessary to make an attempt to recover the lighthouse-island. The double attack, which was made by boats from the side of the harbour and by the war vessels from the seaboard, in reality brought not only the island but also the lower part of the mole into Cæsar's power; it was only at the second arch-opening of the mole that Cæsar ordered the attack to be stopped, and the mole to be there closed towards the city by a transverse-wall. But while a violent conflict arose around the entrenchers, the Roman troops left the lower part of the mole adjoining the island bare of defenders; a division of Egyptians landed there unexpectedly, attacked in the rear the Roman soldiers and sailors crowded together on the mole at the transverse-wall, and drove the whole mass in wild confusion into the sea. A part were taken on board by the Roman ships; the most were drowned. Some 400 soldiers and a still greater number of men belonging to the fleet were sacrificed on this day; the general himself, who had shared the fate of his men, had been obliged to seek refuge in his ship, and when it sank from having been overloaded with men, he had to save himself by swimming to another. But, severe as was the loss suffered, it was amply compensated by the recovery of the lighthouse-island, which along with the mole as far as the first arch-opening remained in Cæsar's hands.

At length the longed for relief arrived. Mithradates of Pergamus, an able warrior of the school of Mithradates Eupator, whose natural son he claimed to be, brought up by

Relieving
army from
Asia Minor.

Battle at
the Nile.

Pacifica-
tion of
Alexandria.

land from Syria a motley army—the Ityræans of the prince of the Libanus (P. 131), the Bedouins of Jamblichus, son of Sampsiceramus (P. 131), the Jews under the minister Antipater, and the contingents generally of the petty chiefs and communities of Cilicia and Syria. From Pelusium, which Mithradates had the fortune to occupy on the day of his arrival, he took the great road towards Memphis with the view of avoiding the intersected ground of the Delta and crossing the Nile before its division; during which movement his troops received manifold support from the Jewish peasants who were settled in peculiar numbers in this part of Egypt. The Egyptians, with the young king Ptolemy now at their head, whom Cæsar had released to his people in the vain hope of allaying the insurrection by his means, despatched an army to the Nile, to detain Mithradates on its further bank. This army fell in with the enemy still beyond Memphis at the so-called Jews' camp, between Onion and Heliopolis; nevertheless Mithradates, trained in the Roman fashion of manœuvring and encamping, amidst successful conflicts gained the opposite bank at Memphis. Cæsar, on the other hand, as soon as he obtained news of the arrival of the relieving army, conveyed a part of his troops in ships to the end of the lake of Marea to the west of Alexandria, and marched round this lake and down the Nile to meet Mithradates advancing up the river. The junction took place without the enemy attempting to hinder it. Cæsar then marched into the Delta, whither the king had retreated, overthrew, notwithstanding the deeply cut canal in their front, the Egyptian vanguard at the first onset and immediately stormed the Egyptian camp itself. It lay at the foot of a rising ground between the Nile—from which only a narrow path separated it—and marshes difficult of access. Cæsar caused the camp to be assailed simultaneously from the front and from the flank on the path along the Nile; and during this assault ordered a third detachment to ascend unseen the heights behind the camp. The victory was complete; the camp was taken, and those of the Egyptians who did not fall beneath the sword of the enemy were drowned in the attempt to escape to the fleet on the Nile. With one of the boats, which sank overladen with men, the young king also disappeared in the waters of his native stream. Immediately after the battle Cæsar advanced at the head of his cavalry from the land-side straight into the portion of the

capital occupied by the Egyptians. In mourning attire, with the images of their gods in their hands, the enemy received him and sued for peace; and his troops, when they saw him return as victor from the side opposite to that by which he had set forth, welcomed him with boundless joy. The fate of the town, which had ventured to thwart the plans of the master of the world and had brought him within a hair's breadth of destruction, lay in Cæsar's hands; but he was too much of a ruler to be sensitive, and dealt with the Alexandrians as with the Massiliots. Cæsar—pointing to their city severely devastated and deprived of its granaries, of its world-renowned library, and of other important public buildings on occasion of the burning of the fleet—exhorted the inhabitants in future earnestly to cultivate the arts of peace alone, and to heal the wounds which they had inflicted on themselves; for the rest, he contented himself with granting to the Jews settled in Alexandria the same rights which the Greek population of the city enjoyed, and with placing in Alexandria, instead of the previous Roman army of occupation which nominally at least obeyed the king of Egypt, a formal Roman garrison—two of the legions besieged there, and a third which afterwards arrived from Syria—under a commander nominated by himself. For this position of trust a man was purposely selected, whose birth made it impossible for him to abuse it—Rufio an able soldier, but a freedman's son. Cleopatra and her younger brother Ptolemæus obtained the sovereignty of Egypt under the supremacy of Rome; the princess Arsinoë was carried off to Italy, that she might not serve once more as a pretext for insurrections to the Egyptians who were after the Oriental fashion quite as much devoted to their dynasty as they were indifferent towards the individual dynasts; Cyprus became again a part of the Roman province of Cilicia.

This Alexandrian insurrection, insignificant as it was in itself and slight as was its intrinsic connection with the events of importance in the world's history which took place at the same time in the Roman state, had nevertheless so far a momentous influence on them that it compelled the man, who was all in all and without whom nothing could be transacted and nothing could be solved, to leave his proper tasks in abeyance from October 706 up to March 707 in order to fight along with Jews and Bedouins against a city rabble. The consequences of personal rule began to make themselves

Course
of things
during
Cæsar's
absence in
Alexandria.

felt. They had the monarchy; but the wildest confusion prevailed everywhere, and the monarch was absent. The Cæsarians were for the moment, just like the Pompeians, without superintendence; the ability of the individual officers and, above all, accident decided matters everywhere.

Insubordi-
nation of
Pharnaces.

In Asia Minor there was, at the time of Cæsar's departure for Egypt, no enemy. But Cæsar's lieutenant there, the able Gnæus Domitius Calvinus, had received orders to take away again from king Pharnaces what he had without instructions wrested from the allies of Pompeius; and, as Pharnaces, an obstinate and arrogant despot like his father, perseveringly refused to evacuate Lesser Armenia, no course remained but to march against him. Calvinus had been obliged to despatch to Egypt two out of the three legions—formed out of the Pharsalian prisoners of war—left behind with him; he filled up the gap by one legion hastily gathered from the Romans domiciled in Pontus and two legions of Deiotarus exercised after the Roman manner, and advanced into Lesser Armenia. But the Bosporan army tried in numerous conflicts with the dwellers on the Black Sea showed itself more efficient than his. In an engagement at Nicopolis the Pontic levy of Calvinus was cut to pieces and the Galatian legions ran off; only the one old legion of the Romans fought its way through with moderate loss. Instead of conquering Lesser Armenia, Calvinus could not even prevent Pharnaces from repossessing himself of his Pontic "hereditary states," and pouring forth the whole vials of his hateful sultanic caprices on their inhabitants, especially the unhappy Amisenes (winter of 706-707).

Calvinus
defeated at
Nicopolis.

48-47.

When Cæsar in person arrived in Asia Minor and intimated to him that the service which Pharnaces had rendered to him personally by granting no help to Pompeius could not be taken into account against the injury inflicted on the empire, and that before any negotiation he must evacuate the province of Pontus and send back the property which he had pillaged, he declared himself ready to submit; nevertheless, well knowing how good reason Cæsar had for hastening to the West, he made no serious preparations for the evacuation. He did not know that Cæsar finished whatever he took in hand. Without negotiating further, Cæsar took with him the one legion which he brought from Alexandria and the troops of Calvinus and Deiotarus, and advanced against the camp of Pharnaces at Ziela. When the Bosporans

saw him approach, they boldly crossed the deep mountain-ravine which covered their front, and charged the Romans up the hill. Cæsar's soldiers were still occupied in pitching their camp, and the ranks wavered for a moment; but the veterans accustomed to war rapidly rallied and set the example for a general attack and for a complete victory (2 Aug. 707). In five days the campaign was ended—an invaluable piece of good fortune at this time, when every hour was precious. Cæsar intrusted the pursuit of the king, who had gone home by way of Sinope, to Pharnaces' illegitimate brother, the brave Mithradates of Pergamus, who as a reward for the services rendered by him in Egypt received the crown of the Bosporan kingdom in room of Pharnaces. In other respects the affairs of Syria and Asia Minor were peacefully settled; Cæsar's own allies were richly rewarded, those of Pompeius were dismissed on the whole with fines or reprimands. Deiotarus alone, the most powerful of the clients of Pompeius, was again confined to his narrow hereditary domain, the canton of the Tolistoboi. In his stead Ariobarzanes king of Cappadocia was invested with Lesser Armenia, and the tetrarchy of the Trocmi usurped by Deiotarus was conferred on the new king of the Bosporus, who was descended by the maternal side from one of the Galatian princely houses as by the paternal from that of Pontus.

Victory of
Cæsar at
Zela.

47.

Regulation
of Asia
Minor.

In Illyria also, while Cæsar was in Egypt, incidents of a very grave nature had occurred. The Dalmatian coast had been for centuries an annoyance to the Roman rule, and its inhabitants had been at open feud with Cæsar from the time of his governorship; while the interior also swarmed since the time of the Thessalian war with dispersed Pompeians. Quintus Cornificius had however, with the legions that followed him from Italy, kept both the natives and the refugees in check and had at the same time sufficiently managed the difficult task of provisioning the troops in these rugged districts. Even when the able Marcus Octavius, the victor of Curicta (P. 395), appeared with part of the Pompeian fleet in these waters to wage war there against Cæsar by sea and land, Cornificius not only knew how to maintain himself, resting for support on the ships and the harbour of the Iadertini (Zara), but in his turn also sustained several successful engagements at sea with the fleet of his antagonist. But when the new governor of Illyria, the Aulus Gabinius

War by
land and
sea in
Illyria.

- recalled by Cæsar from exile (P. 318), arrived by the landward route in Illyria in the winter of 706-707 with fifteen cohorts and 3,000 horse, the system of warfare changed. Instead of confining himself like his predecessor to war on a small scale, the bold active man undertook at once, in spite of the inclement season, an expedition with his whole force to the mountains. But the unfavourable weather, the difficulty of providing supplies, and the brave resistance of the Dalmatians swept away the army; Gabinius had to commence his retreat, was attacked in the course of it and disgracefully defeated by the Dalmatians, and with the feeble remains of his fine army had difficulty in reaching Salonæ, where he soon afterwards died. Most of the Illyrian coast towns thereupon surrendered to the fleet of Octavius; those that adhered to Cæsar, such as Salonæ and Epidaurus (Ragusa Vecchia), were so hard pressed by the fleet at sea and by the barbarians on land, that the surrender and capitulation of the remains of the army enclosed in Salonæ seemed not far distant. Then the commandant of the depôt at Brundisium, the energetic Publius Vatinius, in the absence of ships of war caused common boats to be provided with beaks and manned with the soldiers dismissed from the hospitals, and with this extemporised war-fleet gave battle to the far superior fleet of Octavius at the island of Tauris (Torcola between Lesina and Curzola)—a battle in which, as in so many cases, the bravery of the leader and of the marines compensated for the deficiencies of the vessels and the Cæsarians achieved a brilliant victory. Marcus Octavius left these waters and proceeded to Africa (spring of 707); the Dalmatians no doubt continued their resistance for years with great obstinacy, but it was nothing beyond a local mountain-warfare. When Cæsar returned from Egypt, his resolute adjutant had already got rid of the danger that was imminent in Illyria.
- All the more serious was the position of things in Africa, where the constitutional party had from the outset of the civil war ruled absolutely and had continually augmented their power. Down to the battle of Pharsalus king Juba had, strictly speaking, borne rule there; he had vanquished Curio, and his flying horsemen and his numberless archers were the main strength of the army; the Pompeian governor Varus played by his side so subordinate a part that he even had to deliver those soldiers of Curio who had surrendered

48-47.

Defeat of
Gabinius.Naval
victory at
Tauris.

47.

Reorganisa-
tion of the
coalition in
Africa.

to him over to the king, and had to look on while they were executed or carried away into the interior of Numidia. After the battle of Pharsalus a change took place. With the exception of Pompeius himself, hardly a man of note among the defeated party thought of flight to the Parthians. As little did they attempt to hold the sea with their united resources; the warfare waged by Marcus Octavius in the Illyrian waters was isolated, and was without permanent success. The great majority of the republicans as of the Pompeians betook themselves to Africa, where alone an honourable and constitutional warfare might still be waged against the usurper. There the fragments of the army scattered at Pharsalus, the troops that had garrisoned Dyrrhachium, Coreyra, and the Peloponnesus, the remains of the Illyrian fleet, gradually congregated; there the second commander-in-chief Metellus Scipio, the two sons of Pompeius, Gnæus and Sextus, the political leader of the republicans Marcus Cato, the able officers Labienus, Afranius, Petreius, Octavius and others met. If the resources of the emigrants had diminished, their fanaticism had if possible increased. Not only did they continue to murder their prisoners and even the officers of Cæsar under flag of truce, but king Juba, in whom the exasperation of the partisan mingled with the fury of the half-barbarous African, laid down the maxim that in every community suspected of sympathizing with the enemy the burgesses ought to be extirpated and the town burnt, and even practically carried out this theory against some townships, such as the unfortunate Vaga near Hadrumetum. In fact it was solely owing to the energetic intervention of Cato that the capital of the province itself, the flourishing Utica—which, just like Carthage formerly, had been long regarded with a jealous eye by the Numidian kings—did not experience the same treatment from Juba, and that measures of precaution merely were adopted against its citizens, who certainly were not unjustly accused of leaning towards Cæsar.

As neither Cæsar himself nor any of his lieutenants undertook the smallest movement against Africa, the coalition had full time to acquire political and military reorganisation there. First of all, it was necessary to fill up anew the place of commander-in-chief vacant by the death of Pompeius. King Juba was not disinclined still to maintain the position which he had held in Africa up to the battle of

Pharsalus ; indeed he bore himself no longer as a client of the Romans but as an equal ally or even as a protector, and took it upon him, for example, to coin Roman silver money with his name and device ; nay, he even raised a claim to be the sole wearer of purple in the camp, and suggested to the Roman commanders that they should lay aside their purple mantle of office. Metellus Scipio, moreover, demanded the supreme command for himself, because Pompeius had recognised him in the Thessalian campaign as on a footing of equality, more from the consideration that he was his son-in-law than on military grounds. The like demand was raised by Varus as the governor — self-nominated, it is true — of Africa, seeing that the war was to be waged in his province. Lastly the army desired for its leader the proprætor Marcus Cato. Obviously it was right. Cato was the only man who possessed the requisite devotedness, energy, and authority for the difficult office ; if he was no military man, it was infinitely better to appoint as commander-in-chief a non-military man who understood how to listen to reason and make his subordinates act, than an officer of untried capacity like Varus, or one of tried incapacity like Metellus Scipio. But the decision fell at length on this same Scipio, and it was Cato himself who mainly determined that decision. He did so, not because he felt himself unequal to the task, or because his vanity found its account rather in declining than in accepting ; still less because he loved or respected Scipio, with whom he on the contrary was personally at variance, and who with his notorious inefficiency had attained a certain importance merely in virtue of his position as father-in-law to Pompeius ; but simply and solely because his obstinate legal formalism chose rather to let the republic go to ruin in due course of law than to save it in an irregular way. When after the battle of Pharsalus he met with Marcus Cicero at Corcyra, he had offered to hand over the command in Corcyra to the latter—who was still from the time of his Cilician administration invested with the rank of general—as the officer of higher standing according to the letter of the law, and by this readiness had driven the unfortunate advocate, who now cursed a thousand times his laurels from the Amanus, almost to despair ; but he had at the same time astonished all men of any tolerable discernment. The same principles were applied now, when something more was at stake ; Cato weighed the question to

whom the place of commander-in-chief belonged, as if the matter had reference to a field at Tusculum, and adjudged it to Scipio. By this sentence his own candidature and that of Varus were set aside. But he it was also, and he alone, who confronted with energy the claims of king Juba, and made him feel that the Roman nobility came to him not suppliant as to the great prince of the Parthians with a view to ask aid at the hands of a protector, but as entitled to command and require aid from a subject. In the present state of the Roman forces in Africa Juba could not avoid lowering his claims to some extent, although he still carried his point with the weak Scipio that the pay of his troops should be charged on the Roman treasury and the cession of the province of Africa should be assured to him in the event of victory.

By the side of the new general-in-chief the senate of the "three hundred" again emerged. It established its seat in Utica, and filled up its thinned ranks by the admission of the most esteemed and the wealthiest men of the equestrian order.

The warlike preparations were pushed forward, chiefly through the zeal of Cato, with the greatest energy, and every man capable of arms, even the freedman and Libyan, was enrolled in the legions; by which course so many hands were withdrawn from agriculture that a great part of the fields remained uncultivated, but an imposing result was certainly attained. The heavy infantry numbered fourteen legions, of which two were already raised by Varus, eight others were formed partly from the refugees, partly from the conscripts in the province, and four were legions of king Juba armed in the Roman manner. The heavy cavalry, consisting of the Celts and Germans who arrived with Labienus and sundry others incorporated in their ranks, was, apart from Juba's squadron of cavalry equipped in the Roman style, 1600 strong. The light troops consisted of innumerable masses of Numidians riding without bridle or rein and armed merely with javelins, of a number of mounted bowmen, and a large host of archers on foot. To these fell to be added Juba's 120 elephants, and the fleet of 55 sail commanded by Publius Varus and Marcus Octavius. The urgent want of money was in some measure remedied by a self-taxation on the part of the senate, which was the more productive as the richest African capitalists had been induced

to enter it. Corn and other supplies were accumulated in immense quantities in the fortresses capable of defence; at the same time the stores were as much as possible removed from the open towns. The absence of Cæsar, the troublesome temper of his legions, the agitation in Spain and Italy gradually raised men's spirits and the recollection of the Pharsalian defeat began to give way to fresh hopes of victory.

The time lost by Cæsar in Egypt nowhere revenged itself more severely than here. Had he proceeded to Africa immediately after the death of Pompeius, he would have found there a weak, disorganised, and frightened army and utter anarchy among the leaders; whereas there was now in Africa, owing more especially to Cato's energy, an army equal in number to that defeated at Pharsalus, under leaders of note, and under a regulated superintendence.

Movements
in Spain.

A peculiar evil star seemed altogether to preside over this African expedition of Cæsar. Cæsar had, even before his embarkation for Egypt, arranged in Spain and Italy various measures preliminary and preparatory to the African war; but out of all there had sprung nothing but mischief. From Spain, according to Cæsar's arrangement, the governor of the southern province Quintus Cassius Longinus was to cross with four legions to Africa, to form a junction there with Bogud king of West Mauretania,* and to advance with him towards Numidia and Africa. But that army destined for Africa included in it a number of native Spaniards and two whole legions formerly Pompeian; Pompeian sympa-

* The shape which the states in north-western Africa assumed during this period is very obscure. After the Jugurthine war Bocchus king of Mauretania ruled probably from the western sea to the port of Saldæ, in what is now Morocco and Algiers (iii. 162); the princes of Tingis (Tangiers)—probably from the outset different from the Mauretanian sovereigns—who occur even earlier (Plut. *Sert.* 9), and to whom it may be conjectured that Sallust's Leptasta (*Hist.* ii. 31 Kritz) and Cicero's Mastanesosus (*In Vat.* 5, 12) belong, may have been independent within certain limits or may have held from him as feudatories; just as Syphax already ruled over many chieftains of tribes (Appian, *Pun.* 10), and about this time in the neighbouring Numidia Cirta was possessed, probably however under Juba's supremacy, by the prince Massinissa (Appian, *B. C.* iv. 54). About 672 we find in Bocchus' stead a king called Bocut or Bogud (iii. 344), probably the son of Bocchus. From 705 the kingdom appears divided between king Bogud who possesses the western, and king Bocchus who possesses the eastern half; and to this the later partition of Mauretania into Bogud's kingdom or the state of Tingis and Bocchus' kingdom or the state of Jol (Cæsarea) refers (Plin. *H. N.* v. 2, 19; comp. *Bell. Afric.* 23).

32.

49.

thies prevailed in the army as in the province, and the unskilful and tyrannical behaviour of the Cæsarian governor was not fitted to allay them. A formal revolt took place; troops and towns took part for or against the governor; already those who had risen against the lieutenant of Cæsar were on the point of openly displaying the banner of Pompeius; already had Pompeius' elder son Gnæus embarked from Africa for Spain to take advantage of this favourable turn, when the disavowal of the governor by the most respectable Cæsarians themselves and the interference of the commander of the northern province suppressed just in right time the insurrection. Gnæus Pompeius, who had lost time on the way with a vain attempt to establish himself in Mauretania, came too late; Gaius Trebonius, whom Cæsar after his return from the East sent to Spain to relieve Cassius (autumn of 709), met everywhere with absolute obedience. But of course amidst these blunders nothing was done from Spain to disturb the organisation of the republicans in Africa; indeed in consequence of the complications with Longinus Bogud king of West Mauretania, who was on Cæsar's side and might at least have put some obstacles in the way of king Juba, had been called away with his troops to Spain.

47.

Still more critical were the occurrences among the troops whom Cæsar had caused to be collected in southern Italy, in order to his embarkation with them for Africa. They were for the most part the old legions, which had founded Cæsar's throne in Gaul, Spain, and Thessaly. The spirit of these troops had not been improved by victories, and had been utterly disorganised by long repose in Lower Italy. The almost superhuman demands which the general made on them, and the effects of which were only too clearly apparent in their fearfully thinned ranks, left behind even in these men of iron a leaven of secret rancour which required only time and quiet to set their minds in a ferment. The only man, who had influence over them, had been absent and almost unheard of for a year; while the officers placed over them were far more afraid of the soldiers than the soldiers of them, and overlooked in the conquerors of the world every outrage against those that gave them quarters and every breach of discipline. When the orders to embark for Sicily arrived, and the soldier was to exchange the luxurious ease of Campania for a third campaign certainly not inferior to those

Military
revolt in
Campania.

of Spain and Thessaly in point of hardship, the reins, which had been too long relaxed and were too suddenly drawn tight, snapt asunder. The legions refused to obey till the promised presents were paid to them, scornfully repulsed the officers sent by Cæsar, and even threw stones at them. An attempt to extinguish the incipient revolt by increasing the sums promised not only had no success, but the soldiers set out in masses to extort the fulfilment of the promises from the general in the capital. Several officers, who attempted to restrain the mutinous bands on the way, were slain. It was a formidable danger. Cæsar ordered the few soldiers who were in the city to occupy the gates, with the view of warding off the justly apprehended pillage at least at the first onset, and suddenly appeared among the furious bands demanding to know what they wanted. They exclaimed, "discharge." In a moment the request was granted. Respecting the presents, Cæsar added, which he had promised to his soldiers at his triumph, as well as respecting the lands which he had not promised to them but had destined for them, they might apply to him on the day when he and the other soldiers should triumph; in the triumph itself they could not of course participate, as having been previously discharged. The masses were not prepared for things taking this turn; convinced that Cæsar could not do without them for the African campaign, they had demanded their discharge only in order that, if it were refused, they might annex their own conditions to their service. Half unsettled in their belief as to their own indispensableness; too awkward to return to their object and to bring the negotiation which had missed its course back to the right channel; ashamed, as men, by the fidelity with which the emperor kept his word even to soldiers who had forgotten their allegiance, and by his generosity which even now granted far more than he had ever promised; deeply affected, as soldiers, when the general presented to them the prospect of their being necessarily mere civilian spectators of the triumph of their comrades, and when he called them no longer "comrades" but "burgesses,"—by this very form of address, which from his mouth sounded so strangely, destroying as it were with one blow the whole pride of their past soldierly career; and, besides all this, under the spell of the man whose presence had an irresistible power—the soldiers stood for a while mute and lingering, till from all sides a cry arose

that the general would once more receive them into favour and again permit them to be called Cæsar's soldiers. Cæsar, after having had a sufficient amount of entreaty, granted the permission; but the ringleaders in this mutiny had a third cut off from their triumphal presents. History knows no greater psychological masterpiece, and none that was more completely successful.

This mutiny operated injuriously on the African campaign, at least in so far as it considerably delayed the commencement of it. When Cæsar arrived at the port of Lilybæum destined for the embarkation, the ten legions intended for Africa were far from being fully assembled there, and it was the experienced troops that were furthest behind. Hardly however had six legions, of which five were newly formed, arrived there and the necessary war vessels and transports come forward, when Cæsar put to sea with them (25 Dec. 707 of the uncorrected, about 8 Oct. of the Julian, calendar). The enemy's fleet, which on account of the prevailing equinoctial gales was drawn up on the beach at the island Ægimurus in front of the bay of Carthage, did not oppose the passage; but the same storms scattered the fleet of Cæsar in all directions, and, when he availed himself of the opportunity of landing not far from Hadrumentum (Susa), he could not disembark more than some 3,000 men, mostly recruits, and 150 horsemen. His attempt to capture Hadrumentum strongly occupied by the enemy miscarried; but Cæsar possessed himself of the two seaports not far distant from each other Ruspina (Sahalil near Susa) and Little Leptis. Here he entrenched himself; but his position was so insecure, that he kept his cavalry in the ships and the ships ready for sea and provided with a supply of water, in order to re-embark at any moment if he should be attacked by a superior force. This however was not necessary, for just at the right time the ships that had been driven out of their course arrived (3 Jan. 708). On the very following day Cæsar, whose army suffered in consequence of the arrangements made by the Pompeians from want of corn, undertook with three legions an expedition into the interior of the country, but was attacked on the march not far from Ruspina by the corps which Labienus had brought up to dislodge Cæsar from the coast. As Labienus had exclusively cavalry and archers and Cæsar almost nothing but infantry of the line, the legions were quickly surrounded

Cæsar proceeds to Africa.

47.

46.

Conflict at Ruspina.

and exposed to the missiles of the enemy, without being able to retaliate or to attack with success. No doubt the deploying of the entire line relieved once more the flanks, and spirited charges saved the honour of their arms; but a retreat was unavoidable, and had Ruspina not been so near, the Moorish javelin would perhaps have accomplished the same result here as the Parthian bow at Carrhæ.

Cæsar's
position at
Ruspina.

Cæsar, whom this day had fully convinced of the difficulty of the impending war, would not again expose his soldiers untried and discouraged by the new mode of fighting to any such attack, but awaited the arrival of his veteran legions. The interval was employed in providing some sort of compensation against the crushing superiority of the enemy in the weapons of distant warfare. The incorporation of the suitable men from the fleet as light horsemen or archers in the land army could not be of much avail. The diversions which Cæsar procured were somewhat more effectual. He succeeded in bringing into arms against Juba the Gætulian pastoral tribes wandering on the southern slope of the great Atlas towards the Sahara; for the commotions of the Marian and Sullan period had reached even to them, and their indignation against Pompeius, who had at that time made them subordinate to the Numidian kings (iii. 344), rendered them from the outset favourably inclined to the heir of the mighty Marius of whose Jugurthine campaign they had still a lively recollection. The Mauretanian kings Bogud in Tingis and Bocchus in Jol were Juba's natural rivals and to a certain extent long since in alliance with Cæsar. Further, there still roamed in the border-region between the kingdoms of Juba and Bocchus the last of the Catilinarians, that Publius Sittius of Nuceria (P. 168), who eighteen years before had become converted from a bankrupt Italian merchant into a Mauretanian leader of free bands, and since that time had procured for himself a name and a body of retainers amidst the Libyan quarrels. Bocchus and Sittius united fell on the Numidian land, and occupied the important town of Cirta; and their attack as well as that of the Gætulians compelled king Juba to send a portion of his troops to his southern and western frontiers. Cæsar's situation, however, continued sufficiently unpleasant. His army was crowded together within a space of six square miles; though the fleet conveyed corn, the want of forage was as much felt by Cæsar's cavalry as by those of Pompeius

before Dyrrhachium. The light troops of the enemy remained notwithstanding all the exertions of Cæsar so immeasurably superior to his, that it seemed almost impossible to carry aggressive operations into the interior even with veterans. If Scipio retired and abandoned the coast towns, he might perhaps achieve a victory like those which the vizier of Orodes had won over Crassus and Juba over Curio, and he could at least endlessly protract the war. The simplest consideration suggested this plan of campaign; even Cato, although far from a strategist, counselled its adoption, and offered at the same time to cross with a corps to Italy and to call the republicans to arms—which, amidst the utter confusion there, might very well meet with success. But Cato could only advise, not command; Scipio the commander-in-chief decided that the war should be carried on in the region of the coast. This was a blunder, not merely inasmuch as they thereby dropped a plan of war promising a sure result, but also inasmuch as the region to which they transferred the war was in dangerous agitation, and a good part of the army which they opposed to Cæsar was likewise in a troublesome temper. The fearfully strict levy, the carrying off of the supplies, the devastating of the smaller townships, the feeling in general that they were being sacrificed for a cause which from the first was foreign to them and was already lost, had exasperated the native population against the Roman republicans fighting out their last struggle of despair on African soil; and the terrorist proceedings of the latter against all communities that were but suspected of indifference (P. 435) had raised this exasperation to the most intense hatred. The African towns declared, wherever they could venture to do so, for Cæsar; among the Gætulians and the Libyans, who served in numbers among the light troops and even in the legions, desertion was spreading. But Scipio with all the obstinacy characteristic of folly persevered in his plan, marched with all his force from Utica to appear before the towns of Ruspina and Little Leptis occupied by Cæsar, furnished Hadrumetum to the north and Thapsus to the south (on the promontory Râs ed Dimâs) with strong garrisons, and in concert with Juba, who likewise appeared before Ruspina with all his troops not required by the defence of the frontier, offered battle repeatedly to the enemy. But Cæsar was resolved to wait for his veteran legions. As these one after another arrived and appeared on the scene of strife, Scipio and

Juba lost the desire to risk a pitched battle, and Cæsar had no means of compelling them to fight owing to their extraordinary superiority in light cavalry. Nearly two months passed away in marches and skirmishes in the neighbourhood of Ruspina and Thapsus, which chiefly had relation to the finding out of the concealed store-pits (silos) common in the country, and to the extension of posts. Cæsar, compelled by the enemy's horsemen to keep as much as possible to the heights or to cover his flanks by entrenched lines, yet accustomed his soldiers gradually during this laborious and apparently endless warfare to the foreign mode of fighting. Friend and foe hardly recognised the rapid general in the cautious master of fence who trained his men carefully and not unfrequently in person; and they became almost puzzled by the masterly skill which displayed itself as conspicuously in delay as in promptitude of action.

Battle at
Thapsus.

At last Cæsar, after being joined by his last reinforcements, made a lateral movement towards Thapsus. Scipio had, as we have said, strongly garrisoned this town and thereby committed the blunder of presenting to his opponent an object of attack easy to be seized; to this first error he soon added the second still less excusable blunder of now for the rescue of Thapsus giving the battle, which Cæsar had wished and Scipio had hitherto rightly refused, on ground which placed the decision in the hands of the infantry of the line. Immediately along the shore, opposite to Cæsar's camp, the legions of Scipio and Juba appeared, the fore ranks ready for fighting, the hinder ranks occupied in forming an entrenched camp; at the same time the garrison of Thapsus prepared for a sally. Cæsar's camp-guard sufficed to repulse the latter. His legions accustomed to war, already forming a correct estimate of the enemy from the want of precision in their mode of array and their ill-closed ranks, while the entrenching was still going forward on that side and before even the general gave the signal, compelled a trumpeter to sound for the attack, and advanced along the whole line headed by Cæsar himself, who, when he saw his men advance without waiting for his orders, galloped forward to lead them against the enemy. The right wing, in advance of the other divisions, frightened the line of elephants opposed to it—this was the last great battle in which these animals were employed—by throwing bullets and arrows, so that they wheeled round on their own ranks. The covering

force was cut down, the left wing of the enemy was broken, and the whole line was overthrown. The defeat was the more destructive, as the new camp of the beaten army was not yet ready and the old one was at a considerable distance; both were successively captured almost without resistance. The mass of the defeated army threw away their arms and sued for quarter; but Cæsar's soldiers were no longer the same who had readily refrained from battle before Ilerda and honourably spared the defenceless at Pharsalus. The habit of civil war and the rancour left behind by the mutiny asserted their power in a terrible manner on the battle-field of Thapsus. If the hydra with which they fought always put forth new energies, if the army was hurried from Italy to Spain, from Spain to Macedonia, from Macedonia to Africa, and if the repose ever more eagerly longed for never came, the soldier sought, and not wholly without cause, the reason of this state of things in the unseasonable clemency of Cæsar. He had sworn to retrieve the general's neglect, and remained deaf to the entreaties of his disarmed fellow-citizens as well as to the commands of Cæsar and the superior officers. The fifty thousand corpses that covered the battle-field of Thapsus, among whom were several Cæsarian officers known as secret opponents of the new monarchy and therefore killed on this occasion by their own men, showed how the soldier procures for himself repose. The victorious army on the other hand numbered no more than fifty dead (6 April 708).

There was as little a continuance of the struggle in Africa 46.
after the battle of Thapsus, as there had been a year and a Cato in
half before in the East after the defeat of Pharsalus. Utica.
Cato as commandant of Utica convoked the senate, set forth how the means of defence stood, and submitted it to the decision of those assembled whether they would yield or defend themselves to the last man—only adjuring them to resolve and to act not each one for himself, but all in unison. The more courageous view found several supporters; it was proposed to manumit on behalf of the state the slaves capable of arms, which however Cato rejected as an illegal interference with private property and suggested in its stead a patriotic appeal to the slave-owners. But soon this fit of resolution in an assembly consisting in great part of African merchants passed off, and they agreed to capitulate. Thereupon when Faustus Sulla, son of the regent, and Lucius Afranius arrived in Utica with a strong division of cavalry from the

His death.

field of battle, Cato still made an attempt to hold the town through them; but he indignantly rejected their demand to let them first of all put to death the untrustworthy citizens of Utica *en masse*, and chose to let the last stronghold of the republicans fall into the hands of the monarch without resistance rather than to profane the last moments of the republic by such a massacre. After he had partly by his authority, partly by liberal largesses checked so far as he could the fury of the soldiery against the unfortunate Uticans; after he had with touching solicitude furnished to those who preferred not to trust themselves to Cæsar's mercy the means for flight, and to those who wished to remain the opportunity of capitulating under the most tolerable conditions, so far as his ability reached; and after having thoroughly satisfied himself that he could render to no one any further aid, he held himself released from his command, retired to his bedchamber, and plunged his sword into his breast.

The leaders
of the re-
publicans
put to
death.

Of the other fugitive leaders only a few escaped. The cavalry that fled from Thapsus encountered the bands of Sittius and were cut down or captured by them; their leaders Afranius and Faustus were delivered up to Cæsar and, when the latter did not order their immediate execution, they were slain in a tumult by his veterans. The commander-in-chief Metellus Scipio with the fleet of the defeated party fell into the power of the cruisers of Sittius and, when they were about to lay hands on him, stabbed himself. King Juba, not unprepared for such an issue, had in that case resolved to die in a way which seemed to him befitting a king, and had caused an enormous funeral pile to be prepared in the market-place of his city Zama, which was intended to consume along with his body all his treasures and the dead bodies of the whole citizens of Zama. But the inhabitants of the town showed no desire to let themselves be employed by way of decoration for the funeral rites of the African Sardanapalus; and they closed the gates against the king when fleeing from the battle-field he appeared, accompanied by Marcus Petreius, before their city. The king—one of those natures that become savage amidst a life of dazzling and insolent enjoyment and prepare for themselves even out of death an intoxicating feast—resorted with his companion to one of his country houses, caused a copious banquet to be served up and at the close of the feast

challenged Petreius to fight him to death in single combat. It was the victor of Catilina that received his death at the hand of the king; the latter thereupon caused himself to be stabbed by one of his slaves. The few men of eminence that escaped, such as Labienus and Sextus Pompeius, followed the elder brother of the latter to Spain and sought, like Sertorius formerly, the last refuge of robbers and pirates in the waters and the mountains of that still half-independent land.

Without resistance Cæsar regulated the affairs of Africa. Regulation of Africa. As Curio had already proposed, the kingdom of Massinissa was broken up. The most eastern portion or region of Sitifis was united with the kingdom of Bocchus king of East Mauretania (iii. 162) and the faithful king Bogud of Tingis was rewarded with considerable gifts. Cirta (Constantine) and the surrounding district, hitherto possessed under the supremacy of Juba by the prince Massinissa and his son Arabion, were conferred on the condottiere Publius Sittius that he might settle his half-Roman bands there;* but at the same time this district, as well as by far the largest and most fertile portion of the late Numidian kingdom, were united as "New Africa" with the older province of Africa, and the defence of the country along the coast against the roving tribes of the desert, which the republic had intrusted to a client-king, was imposed by the new monarch on the empire itself.

The struggle, which Pompeius and the republicans had undertaken against the monarchy of Cæsar, thus terminated The victory of monarchy. after having lasted for four years, in the complete victory of the new monarch. No doubt the monarchy was not established for the first time on the battle-fields of Pharsalus and Thapsus; it might already be dated from the moment when Pompeius and Cæsar in league had established their joint rule and overthrown the previous aristocratic constitution. Yet it was only those baptisms of blood of the ninth August 706 and the sixth April 708 that set aside the joint rule so opposed to the nature of absolute dominion, and conferred fixity and formal recognition on the new mo-

48. 46.

* The inscriptions of the region referred to preserve numerous traces of this colonization. The name of the Sittii is there unusually frequent; the African township Milev bears as Roman the name *colonia Sarnensis* (Renier, *Inscr.* 1254, 2323, 2324), evidently from the Nucerian river-god Sarnus (Sueton. *Rhet.* 4).

narchy. Risings of pretenders and republican conspiracies might ensue and provoke new commotions, perhaps even new revolutions and restorations; but the continuity of the free republic that had been uninterrupted for five hundred years was broken through, and monarchy was established throughout the range of the Roman empire by the legitimacy of accomplished fact.

The end
of the
republic.

The constitutional struggle was at an end; and that it was so, was proclaimed by Marcus Cato when he fell on his sword at Utica. For many years he had been the foremost man in the struggle of the legitimate republic against its oppressors; he had continued it, long after he had ceased to cherish any hope of victory. But now the struggle itself had become impossible; the republic, which Marcus Brutus had founded, was dead and never to be revived; what were the republicans now to do on the earth? The treasure was carried off, the sentinels were thereby relieved; who could blame them, if they departed? There was more nobility, and above all more judgment, in the death of Cato than there had been in his life. Cato was anything but a great man; but with all that shortsightedness, that perversity, that dry prolixity, and those spurious phrases which have stamped him, for his own and for all time, as the ideal of unreflecting republicanism and the favourite of all who make it their hobby, he was yet the only man who honourably and courageously defended in the last struggle the great system doomed to destruction. Just because the shrewdest lie feels itself inwardly annihilated before the simple truth, and because all the dignity and glory of human nature ultimately depend not on shrewdness but on honesty, Cato has played a greater part in history than many men far superior to him in intellect. It only elevates the deep and tragic significance of his death, that he was himself a fool; in truth it is just because Don Quixote is a fool, that he is a tragic figure. It is an affecting fact, that on that world-stage, on which so many great and wise men had moved and acted, the fool was destined to give the epilogue. He too died not in vain. It was a fearfully striking protest of the republic against the monarchy, that the last republican went as the first monarch came; a protest, which tore asunder like gossamer all that so-called constitutional character with which Cæsar invested his monarchy, and exposed in all its hypocritical falsehood the shibboleth of the reconciliation of all parties, under the

ægis of which despotism grew up. The unrelenting warfare which the ghost of the legitimate republic waged for centuries, from Cassius and Brutus down to Thræsa and Tacitus, nay even far later, against the Cæsarian monarchy—a warfare of plots and of literature—was the legacy which the dying Cato bequeathed to his enemies. This republican opposition borrowed from Cato its whole attitude—stately, transcendental in its rhetoric, pretentiously rigid, hopeless, and faithful to death; and accordingly it began even immediately after his death to revere as a saint the man, who in his lifetime was not unfrequently its laughing-stock and its scandal. But the greatest of these marks of respect was the involuntary homage which Cæsar rendered to him, when he made an exception to the contemptuous clemency with which he was wont to treat his opponents, Pompeians as well as republicans, in the case of Cato alone, and pursued him even beyond the grave with that energetic hatred which practical statesmen are wont to feel towards antagonists who oppose them in a domain of ideas which is as dangerous in their view as it lies beyond their reach.

CHAPTER XI.

THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY.

Character
of Cæsar.
102.

THE new monarch of Rome, the first ruler of the whole domain of Romano-Hellenic civilisation, Gaius Julius Cæsar, was in his fifty-sixth year (born 12 July 652?) when the battle of Thapsus, the last link in a long chain of momentous victories, placed the decision of the future of the world in his hands. Few men have had their elasticity so thoroughly put to the proof as Cæsar—the sole creative genius produced by Rome, and the last produced by the ancient world, which accordingly moved on in the track that he marked out for it until its sun had set. Sprung from one of the oldest noble families of Latium—which traced back its lineage to the heroes of the Iliad and the kings of Rome, and in fact to the Venus-Aphrodite common to both nations—he spent the years of his boyhood and early manhood as the genteel youth of that epoch were wont to spend them. He had tasted the sweetness as well as the bitterness of the cup of fashionable life, had recited and declaimed, had practised literature and made verses in his idle hours, had prosecuted love-intrigues of every sort, and got himself initiated into all the mysteries of shaving, curls, and ruffles pertaining to the toilette-wisdom of the day, as well as into the far more mysterious art of always borrowing and never paying. But the flexible steel of that nature was proof against even these dissipated and flighty courses; Cæsar retained both his bodily vigour and his elasticity of mind and heart unimpaired. In fencing and in riding he was a match for any of his soldiers, and his swimming saved his life at Alexandria; the incredible rapidity of his journeys which usually for the sake of gaining time were

performed by night—a thorough contrast to the procession-like slowness with which Pompeius moved from one place to another—was the astonishment of his contemporaries and not the least among the causes of his success. The mind was like the body. His remarkable power of intuition revealed itself in the precision and practicability of all his arrangements, even where he gave orders without having seen with his own eyes. His memory was matchless, and it was easy for him to carry on several occupations simultaneously with equal self-possession. Although a gentleman, a man of genius, and a monarch, he had still a heart. So long as he lived, he cherished the purest veneration for his worthy mother Aurelia (his father having died early); to his wives and above all to his daughter Julia he devoted an honourable affection, which was not without reflex influence even on political affairs. With the ablest and most excellent men of his time, of high and of humble rank, he maintained noble relations of mutual fidelity, with each after his kind. As he himself never abandoned any of his partisans after the pusillanimous and unfeeling manner of Pompeius, but adhered to his friends—and that not merely from calculation—through good and bad times without wavering, several of these, such as Aulus Hirtius and Gaius Matius, even after his death gave noble testimonies of their attachment to him. If in a nature so harmoniously organised there is any one trait to be singled out as characteristic, it is this—that he stood aloof from all ideology and everything fanciful. As a matter of course Cæsar was a man of passion, for without passion there is no genius; but his passion was never stronger than he could control. He had had his season of youth, and song, love, and wine had taken joyous possession of his mind; but with him they did not penetrate to the inmost core of his nature. Literature occupied him long and earnestly; but, while Alexander could not sleep for thinking of the Homeric Achilles, Cæsar in his sleepless hours mused on the inflections of the Latin nouns and verbs. He made verses as everybody then did, but they were weak; on the other hand he was interested in subjects of astronomy and natural science. While wine was and continued to be with Alexander the destroyer of care, the temperate Roman, after the revels of his youth were over, avoided it entirely. Around him, as around all those whom the full lustre of woman's love has dazzled in youth, fainter gleams of it continued imperishably to linger; even

in later years he had his love adventures and successes with women, and he retained a certain foppishness in his outward appearance or, to speak more correctly, a pleasing consciousness of his own manly beauty. He carefully covered the baldness which he keenly felt with the laurel chaplet that he wore in public in his later years, and he would doubtless have surrendered some of his victories, if he could thereby have brought back his youthful locks. But, however much even when monarch he enjoyed the society of women, he only amused himself with them and allowed them no manner of influence over him; even his much-censured relation to queen Cleopatra was only contrived to mask a weak point in his political position (P. 427). Cæsar was thoroughly a realist and a man of sense; and whatever he undertook and achieved was penetrated and guided by the cool sobriety which constitutes the most marked peculiarity of his genius. To this he owed the power of living energetically in the present, undisturbed either by recollection or by expectation; to this he owed the capacity of acting at any moment with collected vigour and applying his whole genius even to the smallest and most incidental enterprise; to this he owed the many-sided power, with which he grasped and mastered whatever understanding can comprehend and will can compel; to this he owed the self-possessed ease with which he arranged his periods as well as projected his campaigns; to this he owed the "marvellous serenity" which remained steadily with him through good and evil days; to this he owed the complete independence, which admitted of no control by favourite or by mistress or even by friend. It resulted, moreover, from this clearness of judgment that Cæsar never formed to himself illusions regarding the power of fate and the ability of man; in his case the friendly veil was lifted up, which conceals from man the inadequacy of his working. However prudently he planned and contemplated all possibilities, the feeling was never absent from his heart that in all things fortune, that is to say accident, must bestow success; and with this may be connected the circumstance that he so often played a desperate game with destiny, and in particular again and again hazarded his person with daring indifference. As indeed occasionally men of predominant sagacity betake themselves to a pure game of hazard, so there was in Cæsar's rationalism a point at which it came in some measure into contact with mysticism.

Gifts such as these could not fail to produce a statesman. From early youth accordingly Cæsar was a statesman in the deepest sense of the term, and his aim was the highest which man is allowed to propose to himself—the political, military, intellectual, and moral regeneration of his own deeply decayed nation, and of the still more deeply decayed Hellenic nation intimately akin to his own. The hard school of thirty years' experience changed his views as to the means by which this aim was to be reached; his aim itself remained the same in the times of his hopeless humiliation and of his unlimited plenitude of power, in the times when as demagogue and conspirator he stole towards it by paths of darkness, and in those when, as joint possessor of the supreme power and then as monarch, he worked at his task in the full light of day before the eyes of the world. All the measures of a permanent kind that proceeded from him at the most various times assume their appropriate places in the great building-plan. We cannot therefore properly speak of isolated achievements of Cæsar; he did nothing isolated. With justice men commend Cæsar the orator for his masculine eloquence which, scorning all the arts of the advocate, like a clear flame at once enlightened and warned. With justice men admire in Cæsar the author the inimitable simplicity of the composition, the unique purity and beauty of the language. With justice the greatest masters of war of all times have praised Cæsar the general, who, in a singular degree disregarding routine and tradition, knew always how to find out the mode of warfare by which in the given case the enemy was conquered, and which was consequently in the given case the right one; who with the certainty of divination found the proper means for every end; who after defeat stood ready for battle like William of Orange and ended the campaign invariably with victory; who managed that element of warfare, the treatment of which serves to distinguish military genius from the mere ordinary ability of an officer—the rapid movement of masses—with unsurpassed perfection, and found the guarantee of victory not in the massiveness of his forces but in the celerity of their movements, not in long preparation but in rapid and bold action even with inadequate means. But all these were with Cæsar mere secondary matters; he was no doubt a great orator, author, and general, but he became each of these, merely because he was a consummate statesman. The

soldier more especially played in him altogether an accessory part, and it is one of the principal peculiarities by which he is distinguished from Alexander, Hannibal, and Napoleon, that he began his political activity not as an officer, but as a demagogue. According to his original plan he had purposed to reach his object like Pericles and Gaius Gracchus without force of arms, and throughout eighteen years he had as leader of the popular party moved exclusively amid political plans and intrigues—until, reluctantly convinced of the necessity for a military support, he, when already forty years of age, headed an army. It was natural that he should even afterwards remain still more statesman than general—just like Cromwell, who also transformed himself from a leader of opposition into a military chief and democratic king, and who in general, little as the Puritan hero seems to resemble the dissolute Roman, is yet in his development as well as in the objects which he aimed at and the results which he achieved of all statesmen perhaps the most akin to Cæsar. Even in his mode of warfare this improvised generalship may still be recognised; the enterprises of Napoleon against Egypt and against England do not more clearly exhibit the artillery-lieutenant who had risen by service to command than the similar enterprises of Cæsar exhibit the demagogue metamorphosed into a general. A regularly trained officer would hardly have been prepared, through political considerations of a not altogether stringent nature, to set aside the best-founded military scruples in the way in which Cæsar did so on several occasions, most strikingly in the case of his landing in Epirus. Several of his acts are therefore censurable in a military point of view; but what the general loses, the statesman gains. The task of the statesman is universal in its nature like Cæsar's genius; if he undertook things the most varied and most remote one from another, they had all without exception a bearing on the one great object to which with infinite fidelity and consistency he devoted himself; and he never preferred one to another of the manifold aspects and directions of his great activity. Although a master of the art of war, he yet from statesmanly considerations did his utmost to avert the civil strife and, when it nevertheless began, to keep his laurels from the stain of blood. Although the founder of a military monarchy, he yet with an energy unexampled in history allowed no hierarchy of marshals or

government of prætorians to come into existence. If he had a preference for any one form of services rendered to the state, it was for the sciences and arts of peace rather than for those of war. The most remarkable peculiarity of his action as a statesman was its perfect harmony. In reality all the conditions for this most difficult of all human functions were united in Cæsar. A thorough realist, he never allowed the images of the past or venerable tradition to disturb him; with him nothing was of value in politics but the living present and the law of reason, just as in grammar he set aside historical and antiquarian research and recognised nothing but on the one hand the living *usus loquendi* and on the other hand the rule of symmetry. A born ruler, he governed the minds of men as the wind drives the clouds, and compelled the most heterogeneous natures to place themselves at his service—the smooth citizen and the rough subaltern, the noble matrons of Rome and the fair princesses of Egypt and Mauretania, the brilliant cavalry-officer and the calculating banker. His talent for organisation was marvellous; no statesman has ever compelled alliances, no general has ever collected an army out of unyielding and refractory elements with such decision, and kept them together with such firmness, as Cæsar displayed in constraining and upholding his coalitions and his legions; never did regent judge his instruments and assign each to the place appropriate for him with so acute an eye. He was monarch; but he never played the king. Even when absolute lord of Rome, he retained the deportment of the party-leader; perfectly pliant and smooth, easy and charming in conversation, complaisant towards every one, it seemed as if he wished to be nothing but the first among his peers. Cæsar entirely avoided the blunder of so many men otherwise on an equality with him, who have carried into politics the tone of military command; however much occasion his disagreeable relations with the senate gave for it, he never resorted to outrages such as that of the eighteenth Brumaire. Cæsar was monarch; but he was never seized with the giddiness of the tyrant. He is perhaps the only one among the mighty men of the earth, who in great matters and little never acted according to inclination or caprice, but always without exception according to his duty as ruler, and who, when he looked back on his life, found doubtless erroneous calculations to deplore, but no

false step of passion to regret. There is nothing in the history of Cæsar's life, which even on a small scale* can be compared with those poetico-sensual ebullitions—such as the murder of Kleitos or the burning of Persepolis—which the history of his great predecessor in the East records. He is, in fine, perhaps the only one of those mighty men, who has preserved to the end of his career the statesman's tact of discriminating between the possible and the impossible, and has not broken down in the task which for nobly gifted natures is the most difficult of all—the task of recognising, when on the pinnacle of success, its natural limits. What was possible he performed, and never left the possible good undone for the sake of the impossible better, never disdained at least to mitigate by palliatives evils that were incurable. But where he recognised that fate had spoken, he always obeyed. Alexander on the Hyphasis, Napoleon at Moscow turned back because they were compelled to do so, and were indignant at destiny for bestowing even on its favourites merely limited successes; Cæsar turned back voluntarily on the Thames and on the Rhine; and at the Danube and the Euphrates thought not of unbounded plans of world-conquest, but merely of carrying into effect a well-considered regulation of the frontiers.

Such was this unique man, whom it seems so easy and yet is so infinitely difficult to describe. His whole nature is transparent clearness; and tradition preserves more copious and more vivid information regarding him than regarding any of his peers in the ancient world. Of such a person our conceptions may well vary in point of shallowness or depth, but they cannot be, strictly speaking, different; to every not utterly perverted inquirer the grand figure has exhibited the same essential features, and yet no one has succeeded in reproducing it to the life. The secret lies in its perfection. In his character as a man as well as in his place in history, Cæsar occupies a position where the great contrasts of existence meet and balance each other. Of the mightiest creative power and yet at the same time of the most penetrating judgment; no longer a youth and not yet an old

* The affair with Laberius, told in the well-known prologue, has been quoted as an instance of Cæsar's tyrannical caprices, but those who have done so have thoroughly misunderstood the irony of the situation as well as of the poet; to say nothing of the *naïveté* of lamenting as a martyr the poet who readily pockets his honorarium.

man ; of the highest energy of will and the highest capacity of execution ; filled with republican ideals and at the same time born to be a king ; a Roman in the deepest essence of his nature, and yet called to reconcile and combine in himself as well as in the outer world the Roman and the Hellenic types of culture—Cæsar was the entire and perfect man. Accordingly we miss in him more than in any other historical personage what are called characteristic features, which are in reality nothing else than deviations from the natural course of human development. What in Cæsar passes for such at the first superficial glance is, when more closely observed, seen to be the peculiarity not of the individual, but of the epoch of culture or of the nation ; his youthful adventures, for instance, were common to him with all his more gifted contemporaries of like position, his unpoetical but strongly logical temperament was the temperament of Romans in general. It formed part also of Cæsar's full humanity that he was in the highest degree influenced by the conditions of time and place ; for there is no abstract humanity—the living man cannot but occupy a place in a given nationality and in a definite line of culture. Cæsar was a perfect man just because he more than any other placed himself amidst the currents of his time, and because he more than any other possessed the essential peculiarity of the Roman nation—practical aptitude as a citizen—in perfection ; for his Hellenism in fact was only the Hellenism which had been long intimately blended with the Italian nationality. But in this very circumstance lies the difficulty, we may perhaps say the impossibility, of depicting Cæsar to the life. As the artist can paint everything save only consummate beauty, so the historian, when once in a thousand years he falls in with the perfect, can only be silent regarding it. For normality admits doubtless of being expressed, but it gives us only the negative notion of the absence of defect ; the secret of nature, whereby in her most finished manifestations normality and individuality are combined, is beyond expression. Nothing is left for us but to deem those fortunate who beheld this perfection, and to gain some faint conception of it from the reflected lustre which rests imperishably on the works that were the creation of this great nature. These also, it is true, bear the stamp of the time. The Roman hero himself stood by the side of his youthful Greek predecessor not merely as an equal, but as a superior ; but the world had

meanwhile become old and its youthful lustre had faded. The action of Cæsar was no longer, like that of Alexander, a joyous marching onward towards a goal indefinitely remote; he built on, and out of, ruins, and was content to establish himself as tolerably and as securely as possible within the ample but yet definite bounds once assigned to him. With reason therefore the delicate poetic tact of the nations has not troubled itself about the unpoetical Roman, and has invested the son of Philip alone with all the golden lustre of poetry, with all the rainbow hues of legend. But with equal reason the political life of nations has during thousands of years again and again reverted to the lines which Cæsar drew; and the fact, that the peoples to whom the world belongs still at the present day designate the highest of their monarchs by his name, conveys a warning deeply significant and, unhappily, fraught with shame.

Setting
aside of the
old parties.

If the old, in every respect vicious, state of things was to be successfully got rid of and the commonwealth was to be renovated, it was necessary first of all that the country should be practically tranquilized and that the ground should be cleared from the *débris* with which since the recent catastrophe it was everywhere strewed. In this work Cæsar set out from the principle of the reconciliation of the hitherto subsisting parties or, to put it more correctly—for where the antagonistic principles are irreconcilable, we cannot speak of real reconciliation—from the principle that the arena, on which the nobility and the populace had hitherto contended with each other, was to be abandoned by both parties, and that both were to meet together on the ground of the new monarchical constitution. First of all therefore all the older quarrels of the republican past were regarded as done away for ever and irrevocably. While Cæsar gave orders that the statues of Sulla which had been thrown down by the mob of the capital on the news of the battle of Pharsalus should be re-erected, and thus recognised the fact that it became history alone to sit in judgment on that great man, he at the same time cancelled the last remaining effects of his exceptional laws, recalled from exile those who had been banished in the times of the Cinnan and Sertorian troubles, and restored to the children of those outlawed by Sulla their forfeited privilege of eligibility to office. In like manner all those were restored, who in the preliminary stage of the recent catastrophe had lost their seat in the

senate or their civil existence through sentence of the censors or political process, especially through the impeachments raised on the basis of the exceptional laws of 702. Those alone who had put to death the proscribed for money remained, as was reasonable, still under attainder; and Milo, the most daring condottiere of the senatorial party, was excluded from the general pardon. 52.

Far more difficult than the settlement of these questions which already belonged substantially to the past was the treatment of the parties confronting each other at the moment—on the one hand Cæsar's own democratic adherents, on the other hand the overthrown aristocracy. That the former should be, if possible, still less satisfied than the latter with Cæsar's conduct after the victory and with his summons to abandon the old standing-ground of party, was to be expected. Cæsar himself desired doubtless on the whole the same issue which Gaius Gracchus had contemplated; but the designs of the Cæsarians were no longer those of the Gracchans. The Roman popular party had been driven onward in gradual progression from reform to revolution, from revolution to anarchy, from anarchy to a war against property; they celebrated among themselves the memory of the reign of terror and now adorned the tomb of Catilina, as formerly that of the Gracchi, with flowers and garlands; they had placed themselves under Cæsar's banner, because they expected him to do for them what Catilina had not been able to accomplish. But as it speedily became plain that Cæsar was very far from intending to be the executor of Catilina, and that the utmost which debtors might expect from him was some alleviations of payment and modifications of procedure, indignation found loud vent in the inquiry, For whom then had the popular party conquered, if not for the people? and the rabble of this description, high and low, out of pure chagrin at the miscarriage of their politico-economic Saturnalia began first to coquet with the Pompeians, and then even during Cæsar's absence of nearly two years from Italy (Jan. 706—autumn 707) to instigate there a second civil war within the first. 48-47.

The prætor Marcus Cælius Rufus, a good aristocrat and bad payer of debts, of some talent and much culture, as a vehement and fluent orator hitherto in the senate and in the Forum one of the most zealous champions for Cæsar, proposed Cælius and Milo.

to the people—without being instructed from any higher quarter to do so—a law which granted to debtors a respite of six years free of interest, and then, when he was opposed in this step, proposed a second law which even cancelled all claims from loans and current house rents; whereupon the Cæsarian senate deposed him from his office. It was just on the eve of the battle of Pharsalus, and the balance in the great contest seemed to incline to the side of the Pompeians; Rufus entered into communication with the old senatorian band-leader Milo, and the two contrived a counter-revolution, which inscribed on its banner partly the republican constitution, partly the cancelling of creditors' claims and the manumission of slaves. Milo left his place of exile Massilia, and called the Pompeians and the slave-herdsmen to arms in the region of Thurii; Rufus made arrangements to seize the town of Capua by armed slaves. But the latter plan was detected before its execution and frustrated by the Capuan militia; Quintus Pedius, who advanced with a legion into the territory of Thurii, scattered the band making havoc there; and the fall of the two leaders put an end to the scandal (706). Nevertheless there was found in the following year (707) a second fool, the tribune of the people Publius Dolabella, who, equally insolvent but far from being equally gifted with his predecessor, introduced afresh his law as to creditors' claims and house rents, and with his colleague Lucius Trebellius began on that point once more—it was the last time—the demagogic war; there were serious frays between the armed bands on both sides and various street-riots, till the commandant of Italy Marcus Antonius ordered the military to interfere, and soon afterwards Cæsar's return from the East completely put an end to the absurd proceedings. Cæsar attributed to these silly attempts to revive the projects of Catilina so little importance, that he tolerated Dolabella in Italy and indeed after some time even received him again into favour. Against a rabble of this sort, who are not intent on any political question at all, but solely on a war against property—as against gangs of banditti—the mere existence of a strong government is sufficient; and Cæsar was too great and too considerate to busy himself with the apprehensions which the Italian alarmists felt regarding the communists of that day, and thereby unduly to procure a false popularity for his monarchy.

While Cæsar thus might leave, and actually left, the late

48.

47.

Dolabella.

democratic party to the process of decomposition which had already in its case advanced almost to the utmost limit, he had on the other hand, with reference to the former aristocratic party possessing a far greater vitality, to pave the way for, and initiate, its dissolution—which time alone could accomplish—by a proper combination of repression and conciliation. Among minor measures, Cæsar, even from a natural sense of propriety, avoided exasperating the fallen party by empty sarcasm; he did not triumph over his conquered fellow-burgesses;* he mentioned Pompeius often and always with respect, and caused his statue overthrown by the people to be re-erected at the senate-house, when the latter was restored, in its earlier distinguished place. To political prosecutions after the victory Cæsar assigned the narrowest possible limits. No investigation was instituted into the various communications which the constitutional party had held with nominal Cæsarians; Cæsar threw the piles of papers found in the enemy's head-quarters at Pharsalus and Thapsus into the fire unread, and spared himself and the country from political processes against individuals suspected of high treason. Further, all the common soldiers who had followed their Roman or provincial officers into the contest against Cæsar came off with impunity. The sole exception made was in the case of those Roman burgesses, who had taken service in the army of the Numidian king Juba; their property was confiscated by way of penalty for their treason. Even to the officers of the conquered party Cæsar had granted unlimited pardon up to the close of the Spanish campaign of 705; but he became convinced that in this he had gone too far, and that the removal at least of the leaders among them was inevitable. The rule by which he was thenceforth guided was, that every one who after the capitulation of Ilerda had served as an officer in the enemy's army or had sat in the opposition-senate, if he survived the close of the struggle, forfeited his property and his political rights, and was banished from Italy for life; if he did not survive the close of the struggle, his property at least fell to the state; but any one of these, who had formerly accepted pardon from Cæsar and was once more found in the ranks of the enemy, in that case forfeited his life. These rules were however materially

Measures
against
Pompeians
and republicans.

49

* The triumph after the battle of Munda subsequently to be mentioned probably had reference only to the Lusitanians who served in great numbers in the conquered army.

modified in the execution. The sentence of death was actually executed only against a very few of the numerous backsliders. In the confiscation of the property of the fallen not only were the debts attaching to the several portions of the estate as well as the claims of the widows for their dowries paid off, as was reasonable, but a portion of the paternal estate was left also to the children of the deceased. Lastly not a few of those, who in consequence of those rules were liable to punishment and confiscation of property, were at once pardoned entirely or got off with fines, like the African capitalists who were impressed as members of the senate of Utica. And even the others almost without exception got their freedom and property restored to them, if they could only prevail on themselves to petition Cæsar to that effect; on several who declined to do so, such as the consular Marcus Marcellus, pardon was even conferred unasked, and ultimately in 710 a general amnesty was issued for all who were still unrecalled.

44.

Amnesty.

The republican opposition submitted to be pardoned; but it was not reconciled. Discontent with the new order of things and exasperation against the unwonted ruler were general. For open political resistance there was indeed no further opportunity—it was hardly worth taking into account, that some oppositional tribunes on occasion of the question of title acquired for themselves the republican crown of martyrdom by a demonstrative intervention against those who had called Cæsar king—but republicanism found expression all the more decidedly as an opposition of opinion, and in secret agitation and plotting. Not a hand stirred when the Emperor appeared in public. There was abundance of wall-placards and sarcastic verses full of bitter and telling popular satire against the new monarchy. When a comedian ventured on a republican allusion, he was saluted with the loudest applause. The praise of Cato formed the fashionable theme of oppositional pamphleteers, and their writings found a public all the more grateful because even literature was no longer free. Cæsar indeed combated the republicans even now on their own field; he himself and his abler confidants replied to the Cato-literature with *Anticatones*, and the republican and Cæsarian scribes fought round the dead hero of Utica like the Trojans and Hellenes round the dead body of Patroclus; but as a matter of course in this conflict—where the public thoroughly republican in its

feelings was judge—the Cæsarians had the worst of it. No course remained but to overawe the authors; on which account men well known and dangerous in a literary point of view, such as Publius Nigidius Figulus and Aulus Cæcina, had more difficulty in obtaining permission to return to Italy than other exiles, while the oppositional writers tolerated in Italy were subjected to a practical censorship, the restraints of which were all the more annoying that the measure of punishment to be dreaded was utterly arbitrary.* The underground machinations of the overthrown parties against the new monarchy will be more fitly set forth in another connection. Here it is sufficient to say that risings of pretenders as well as of republicans were incessantly brewing throughout the Roman empire; that the flames of civil war kindled now by the Pompeians, now by the republicans, again burst forth brightly at various places; and that in the capital there was perpetual conspiracy against the life of the monarch. But Cæsar could not be induced by these plots even to surround himself permanently with a body-guard, and usually contented himself with making known the detected conspiracies by public placards. However much Cæsar was wont to treat all things relating to his personal safety with daring indifference, he could not possibly conceal from himself the very serious danger with which this mass of malcontents threatened not merely himself but also his creations. If nevertheless, disregarding all the warning and urgency of his friends, he without deluding himself as to the implacability of the very opponents to whom he showed mercy persevered with marvellous composure and energy in the course of pardoning by far the greater number of them, he did so neither from the chivalrous magnanimity of a proud, nor from the sentimental clemency of an effeminate, nature, but from the correct statesmanly consideration that vanquished parties are disposed of more rapidly and with less public injury by their absorption within the state than by any attempt to extirpate them by proscription or to eject them from the commonwealth by banishment. Cæsar could not for his high objects dispense with the constitutional party itself, which in fact embraced not the aristocracy merely but all the elements of a free and national spirit

Bearing of
Cæsar
towards the
parties.

* Any one who desires to compare the old and new hardships of authors will find opportunity of doing so in the letter of Cæcina (Cicero *Ad. Fam.* vi. 7).

among the Italian burgesses; for his schemes, which contemplated the renovation of the antiquated state, he needed the whole mass of talent, culture, hereditary and self-acquired distinction, which this party embraced; and in this sense he may well have named the pardoning of his opponents the finest reward of victory. Accordingly the most prominent chiefs of the defeated parties were indeed removed, but full pardon was not withheld from the men of the second and third rank and especially of the younger generation; they were not, however, allowed to sulk in passive opposition, but were by more or less gentle pressure induced to take an active part in the new administration, and to accept honours and offices from it. As with Henry the Fourth and William of Orange, so with Cæsar his greatest difficulties began only after the victory. Every revolutionary conqueror learns by experience that, if after vanquishing his opponents he would not remain like Cinna and Sulla a mere party chief, but would like Henry the Fourth and William of Orange substitute the welfare of the commonwealth for the necessarily one-sided programme of his own party, for the moment all parties, his own as well as the vanquished, unite against the new chief; and the more so, the more great and pure his idea of his new vocation. The friends of the constitution and the Pompeians, though doing homage with the lips to Cæsar, bore yet in heart a grudge either at monarchy or at least at the dynasty; the degenerate democracy was in open rebellion against Cæsar from the moment of its perceiving that Cæsar's objects were by no means its own; even the personal adherents of Cæsar murmured, when they found that their chief was establishing instead of a state of *condottieri* a monarchy equal and just towards all, and that the portions of gain accruing to them were to be diminished by the accession of the vanquished. This settlement of the commonwealth was acceptable to no party, and had to be imposed on his associates no less than on his opponents. Cæsar's own position was now in a certain sense more imperilled than before the victory; but what he lost, the state gained. By annihilating the parties and not simply sparing the partisans but allowing every man of talent or even merely of good descent to attain to office irrespective of his political past, he gained for his great building all the working power extant in the state; and not only so, but the

voluntary or compulsory participation of men of all parties in the same work led the nation also over imperceptibly to the newly prepared ground. The fact that this reconciliation of the parties was for the moment only external and that they were for the present much less agreed in adherence to the new state of things than in hatred against Cæsar, did not mislead him; he knew well that antagonisms lose their keenness when brought into such outward union, and that only in this way can the statesman anticipate the work of time, which alone is able finally to heal such a strife by laying the old generation in the grave. Still less did he inquire who hated him or meditated his assassination. Like every genuine statesman he served not the people for reward—not even for the reward of their love—but sacrificed the favour of his contemporaries for the blessing of posterity, and above all for the permission to save and renew his nation.

In attempting to give a detailed account of the mode in which the transition was effected from the old to the new state of things, we must first of all recollect that Cæsar came not to begin, but to complete. The plan of a new polity suited to the times, long ago projected by Gaius Gracchus, had been maintained by his adherents and successors with more or less of spirit and success, but without wavering. Cæsar, from the outset and as it were by hereditary right the head of the popular party, had for thirty years borne aloft its banner without ever changing or even so much as concealing his colours; he remained democrat even when monarch. As he accepted without limitation, apart of course from the preposterous projects of Catilina and Clodius, the heritage of his party; as he displayed the bitterest, even personal, hatred to the aristocracy and the genuine aristocrats; and as he retained unchanged the essential ideas of Roman democracy, viz. alleviation of the burdens of debtors, transmarine colonization, gradual equalisation of the differences of rights among the classes belonging to the state, emancipation of the executive power from the senate; his monarchy was so little at variance with democracy, that democracy on the contrary only attained its completion and fulfilment by means of that monarchy. For his monarchy was not the Oriental despotism of divine right, but a monarchy such as Gaius Gracchus wished to found, such as Pericles and Cromwell founded—the representation of the nation by the man in whom it puts supreme and unlimited confidence.

Cæsar's
work.

The ideas, which lay at the foundation of Cæsar's work, were so far not strictly new; but to him belongs their realisation, which after all is everywhere the main matter; and to him pertains the grandeur of execution, which would probably have surprised the brilliant projector himself if he could have seen it, and which has impressed, and will always impress, every one to whom it has been presented in the living reality or in the mirror of history—to whatever historical epoch or whatever shade of politics he may belong—according to the measure of his ability to comprehend human and historical greatness, with deep and ever-deepening admiration.

At this point however it is proper expressly once for all to postulate what the historian everywhere tacitly presumes, and to protest against the custom—common to simplicity and perfidy—of using historical praise and historical censure, dissociated from the given circumstances, as phrases of general application, and in the present case of construing our judgment respecting Cæsar into a judgment respecting what is called Cæsarianism. It is true that the history of past centuries ought to be the instructress of the present; but not in the vulgar sense, as if one could simply by turning over the leaves discover the conjunctures of the present in the records of the past and collect from these the symptoms for a political diagnosis and the specifics for a prescription; it is instructive only so far as the observation of earlier forms of culture reveals the organic conditions of civilisation generally—the fundamental forces everywhere alike, and the manner of their combination everywhere different—and leads and encourages men, not to unreflecting imitation, but to independent reproduction. In this sense the history of Cæsar and of Roman Imperialism, with all the unsurpassed greatness of the master-worker, with all the historical necessity of the work, is in truth a more bitter censure of modern autocracy than could be written by the hand of man. According to the same law of nature in virtue of which the smallest organism infinitely surpasses the most artistic machine, every constitution however defective which gives play to the free self-determination of a majority of citizens infinitely surpasses the most brilliant and humane absolutism; for the former is capable of development and therefore living, the latter is what it is and therefore dead. This law of nature has verified itself in the Roman absolute military monarchy and verified itself all the more completely, that,

under the impulse of its creator's genius and in the absence of all material extraneous complications, that monarchy developed itself more purely and freely than any similar state. From Cæsar's time, as the sequel will show and Gibbon has shown long ago, the Roman system had only an external coherence and received only a mechanical extension, while internally it became even with him utterly withered and dead. If in the early stages of the autocracy and above all in Cæsar's own soul (P. 199) the hopeful dream of a combination of free popular development and absolute rule was still cherished, the government of the highly-gifted emperors of the Julian house soon taught men in a terrible form how far it was possible to hold fire and water in the same vessel. Cæsar's work was necessary and salutary, not because it was or could be fraught with blessing in itself, but because—with the national organization of antiquity, which was based on slavery and was utterly a stranger to republican-constitutional representation, and in presence of the legitimate civic constitution which in the course of five hundred years had ripened into oligarchic absolutism—absolute military monarchy was the copestone logically necessary and the least of evils. When once the slave-holding aristocracy in Virginia and the Carolinas shall have carried matters as far as their congeners in the Sullan Rome, Cæsarism will there too be legitimised in the view of the spirit of history;* where it appears under other conditions of development, it is at once a caricature and a usurpation. But history will not submit to curtail the true Cæsar of his due honour, because her verdict may lead simplicity astray in the presence of bad Cæsars, and may give to roguery occasion for lying and fraud. She too is a Bible, and if she cannot any more than the Bible hinder the fool from misunderstanding and the devil from quoting her, she too will be able to bear with, and to requite, them both.

The position of the new chief of the state assumed, formally, a singular shape. Cæsar was invested with the dictatorship at first temporarily after the return from Spain in 705, then after the battle of Pharsalus from the autumn of 706 for an indefinite time, lastly after the battle of Thapsus from the 1st Jan. 709 as an annual office, to which he was designated

Formal
shape of the
49.] new
48.] mo-
narchy.

45.

* When this was written—in the year 1857—no one could foresee how soon the mightiest struggle and most glorious victory as yet recorded in human annals would save the United States from this fearful trial, and secure the future existence of an absolute self-governing freedom not to be permanently kept in check by any local Cæsarism.

44. at first for ten years, and ultimately in 710 for life;* also with the censorship under the new title of *præfectus morum*
46. 44. in 708 for three years, in 710 for life; likewise with the consulship at first for 706 in the usual way—this was the office, the holding of which immediately occasioned the civil war—afterwards for five, finally for ten years, once also without colleague; moreover, not with the tribunate of the people indeed, but with a power similar to the tribunician in 706 for life; then with the first place, and along with this the right of leading the vote, in the senate; lastly (708) with the title of *Imperator* for life.† Cæsar did not need to have the supervision of worship now intrusted to him, as he already held the office of *Pontifex maximus* (P. 160); he became, however, a member of the second great priestly college of the augurs. To this motley union of civil and priestly offices there was added a yet far more motley multitude of laws and decrees of the senate, which committed to Cæsar the right of deciding on war and peace without consulting the senate or the people, the disposal of armies and treasures, the nomination of the provincial governors, a binding right of proposal as respected a portion of the magistrates of the city of Rome, the conducting of elections in the centuriate comitia, the right of nominating patricians, and other such extraordinary prerogatives; to say nothing of the empty honours and decorations, the conferring of the title of “father of his fatherland,” the designation of the month in which he was born by the name which it still bears of Julius, and other manifestations of the foolish tendency to a courtly tone, which ultimately passed into the silliest adoration. Evidently an attempt was thus made—apparently by way of compromise between the new courtly devotion and

44. * He was thus, when he died (710) dictator for the fourth time and designated dictator for life; as he is so named in the document in Josephus, *Antiq.* xiv. 10, 7.

† The name *imperator* belonged in the republican period to the victorious general, and was accordingly laid aside with the surrender of the military command. Cæsar bore it at first as governor of Gaul in the usual way; but the retention of the title after the termination of his generalship and the celebration of his triumph was new. So far there was certainly laid in this the ground for a distinction, as regards the title of *imperator*, between the permanent title, which was subsequently prefixed to the name, and that which was temporary and therefore capable of repetition, which was placed after the name; and we find also that Cæsar, even when he had been called in the former sense *Imperator* once for all, was yet after the gaining of victories saluted by acclamation on the battle-field as *imperator*; he never bore the title, however, prefixed to his name, but constantly called himself and made others call him simply *Cæsar imperator* (without adding any sign of repetition.)

the republican aversion to call the monarchy by its right name—to analyse the absolute authority of the monarch into its individual constituent elements; which in truth was as superfluous as it was logically mistaken, for absolute power by virtue of its very nature withdraws itself from all specification. That Cæsar himself intended to manufacture his new kingly power out of this bundle of old and new offices and extraordinary commissions, is a conjecture more naive than ingenious. Men of judgment will not require any proof, either that Cæsar intended to engraft on the commonwealth his supreme power, not merely for a few years or even as a personal office for an indefinite period or for life somewhat like Sulla's regency, but as an essential and permanent organ—in other words, as hereditary power—or that he selected for the new institution an appropriate and simple designation; for if it is a political blunder to create names without substantial meaning, it is scarcely a less error to set up the substance of plenary power without a name. Only it is not easy to determine what was the formal shape chosen by Cæsar; partly because in this period of transition the ephemeral and the permanent buildings are not clearly discriminated from each other, partly because the devotion of his clients which already anticipated the nod of their master loaded him with a multitude—offensive doubtless to himself—of decrees of confidence and laws conferring honours. Least of all did the tribunician power furnish an available expression to designate the functions of the new chief of the state, for the tribune of the people constitutionally could not command, but could only forbid others commanding. Nor could the new monarchy fitly attach itself to the consulship, on account of the collegiate character that could not well be separated from this office; Cæsar too laboured evidently to degrade this hitherto supreme magistracy into an empty title, and even when he undertook it, did not ordinarily hold it for the whole year, but soon resigned it to subordinate personages. The dictatorship was practically the most prominent in point of frequency and definiteness among Cæsar's many offices, evidently because Cæsar employed it in the significance which it had from of old in the constitutional machinery—as an extraordinary presidency for surmounting extraordinary crises. On the other hand it was far from recommending itself as the expression of the new monarchy, for it was a magistracy clothed with an exceptional and unpopular character, and it was much too narrow to embrace the new monarchy,

if Cæsar was invested—as seems to have been the case, and as from his earlier party position it could hardly be otherwise—not with the anomalous Sullan, but with (the limit of time excepted) the ordinary republican, dictatorship.

Cæsar
Imperator.

The new name of Imperator, on the other hand, appears in every respect the appropriate formal expression for the new monarchy; just because it is new, and no definite outward occasion for its introduction is apparent. The new wine might not be put into old bottles; here is a new name for the new thing, and that name most pregnantly sums up what the democratic party had already expressed in the Gabinian law, only with less precision, as the function of its chief—the concentration of official power (*imperium*) in the hands of a popular chief independent of the senate. We find on Cæsar's coins, especially those of the last period, alongside of the dictatorship the title of Imperator prevailing, and in Cæsar's law as to political crimes the monarch seems to have been designated by this name; and, what is quite decisive, the authority of Imperator was given to Cæsar not merely for his own person, but also for his bodily or adopted descendants. Accordingly the following times, though not immediately, connected the monarchy with the title of Imperator. To lend to this new office at once a democratic and a religious sanction, Cæsar probably intended to associate with it on the one hand the tribunician power, on the other the supreme pontificate, as heirlooms, although it is only in the case of the supreme priesthood that we have express testimony to his having made it hereditary. In point of state-law the new office of Imperator was based on the position which the consuls or proconsuls occupied outside of the *pomerium*, so that not merely the military command, but the supreme judicial and consequently also the administrative power, were included in it.* The Imperator stood to the consul

* The widely spread opinion, which sees in the imperial office of Imperator an essentially military power, namely, the dignity of general of the empire tenable for life, is entirely erroneous, and is not warranted either by the signification of the word or by the view taken by the old authorities. *Imperium* is the power of command, *imperator* is the possessor of that power; in these words as in the corresponding Greek terms *κράτος*, *αυτοκράτωρ* so little is there implied a specific military reference, that it is on the contrary the very characteristic of the Roman official power, where it appears purely and completely, that it comprehends war and process—that is, the military and the civil power of command—as one inseparable whole. Dio says quite correctly (liii. 17; comp. xliii. 44; lii. 41) that the name Imperator was assumed by the emperors “to indicate their full power instead of the title of king and dictator (*πρὸς δῆλωσιν τῆς αὐτοτελοῦς σφῶν ἐξουσίας, ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ*

in a certain measure as the latter stood to the prætor, inasmuch as their authority was similar in kind, but in case of collision, as the prætor gave way to the consul, so the consul gave way to the Emperor; which was also distinctly marked externally by the elevated imperial chair placed between the two official seats of the consuls. The authority of the Emperor was qualitatively superior to the consular-proconsular, only in so far as the former was not limited as respected time or space but was held for life and heritable and operative also in the capital; as the Emperor could not, while the consul could, be checked by colleagues of equal power; and as all the restrictions placed in course of time on the original supreme official power—especially the obligation to give place to the *provocatio* and to respect the advice of the senate—did not apply to the Emperor.

In a word, this new office of Emperor was nothing else than the primitive regal office re-established; for it was those very restrictions—as respected the temporal and local limitation of power, the collegiate arrangement, and the co-operation of the senate or the community that was necessary in certain cases—which distinguished the consul from the king (i. 257 *et seq.*). There is hardly a trait of the new monarchy which was not found in the old: the union of the supreme military, judicial, and administrative authority in the hands of the prince; a religious presidency over the commonwealth; the right of issuing ordinances with binding power; the reduc-

Re-esta-
blishment
of the regal
power.

βασιλέως τοῦ τε δικτάτωρος ἐπικλήσεως); for these older titles disappeared in name, but in reality the title of Emperor gives the same prerogatives (τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔργον αὐτῶν τῇ τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος προσηγορίᾳ βεβαιοῦνται), for instance the right of levying soldiers, imposing taxes, declaring war and concluding peace, exercising the supreme authority over burgess and non-burgess in and out of the city and punishing any one at any place capitally or otherwise, and in general of assuming the prerogatives connected with the supreme *imperium* in the earliest times." It could not well be said in plainer terms, that *imperator* is nothing but a synonym for *rex*, just as *imperare* coincides with *regere*.

It is no doubt inconsistent with this view—and the circumstance seems to have primarily given rise to the conception of the imperial dignity of Emperor as a military office—that Tiberius called himself the master of his slaves, the imperator of his soldiers, the prince (πρόκριτος, *princeps*) of his fellow-burgesses (Dio lvii. 8). But in this very statement lies its most complete confirmation; for Tiberius in fact rejected that new imperial *imperium* (Sueton. *Tib.* 26; Dio, lvii. 2; Eckhel, vi. 200) and was imperator only in the more special sense, in which this name was certainly purely military but also a mere title.

tion of the senate to a council of state; the revival of the patriciate and of the prefecture of the city; the peculiar quasi-hereditary character, for the constitution of Cæsar, exactly like those of Cromwell and Napoleon, allowed the monarch to nominate his successor under the forms of adoption. But still more striking than these analogies is the internal similarity of the monarchy of Servius Tullius and the monarchy of Cæsar; if those old kings of Rome with all their plenitude of power had yet been sovereigns of a free community and themselves the protectors of the commons against the nobility, Cæsar too had not come to destroy liberty but to fulfil it, and primarily to break the intolerable yoke of the aristocracy. Nor need it surprise us that Cæsar, anything but a political antiquary, went back five hundred years to find the model for a new state; for, seeing that the supreme magistracy of the Roman commonwealth had remained at all times a royalty restricted by a number of special laws, the idea of the regal office itself had by no means become obsolete. At very various periods and from very different sides—in the republican dictatorship, in the decemviral power, in the Sullan regency—there had been even during the republic a practical recurrence to it; indeed by a certain logical necessity, whenever an exceptional power seemed to be needed, the unlimited *imperium*, which was simply nothing else than the regal power, came into play in contradistinction to the usual limited *imperium*. Lastly, outward considerations also recommended this recurrence to the former royalty. Mankind have infinite difficulty in reaching new creations, and therefore cherish the once developed forms as sacred heirlooms. Accordingly Cæsar very judiciously connected himself with Servius Tullius, in the same way as subsequently Charlemagne connected himself with Cæsar, and Napoleon attempted at least to connect himself with Charlemagne. He did so, not in a circuitous way and secretly, but, as well as his successors, in the most open manner possible; it was indeed the very object of this connection to find a clear, national and popular form of expression for the new state. From ancient times there stood on the Capitol the statues of those seven kings, whom the conventional history of Rome was wont to bring on the stage; Cæsar ordered his own to be erected beside them as the eighth. He appeared publicly in the costume of the old kings of Alba. In his new law as to political offenders the principal

variation from that of Sulla was, that there was placed alongside of the national community, and on a level with it, the Emperor as the living and personal expression of the people. In the formula used for political oaths there was added to the Jovis and the Penates of the Roman people the Genius of the Emperor. The outward badge of monarchy was, according to the view universally diffused in antiquity, the image of the monarch on the coins; from the year 710 the head of Cæsar appears on those of the Roman state. There could accordingly be no complaint at least on the score that Cæsar left the public in the dark as to his view of his position; as distinctly and as formally as possible he came forward not merely as monarch, but as very king of Rome. It is possible even, although not exactly probable and at any rate of subordinate importance, that he had it in view to designate his official power not with the new name of Emperor, but directly with the old one of king.* Even in his lifetime many of his enemies as of his friends were of opinion that he intended to have himself expressly nominated king of Rome; several indeed of his most vehement adherents suggested to him in different ways and at different times that he should assume the crown; most strikingly of all, Marcus Antonius, when he as consul offered the diadem to Cæsar before all the people (15 Feb. 710). But Cæsar rejected these proposals without exception at once. If he

* On this question there may be difference of opinion; the hypothesis however that it was Cæsar's intention to rule the Romans as Emperor, the non-Romans as Rex, must be simply dismissed. It is based solely on the story that in the sitting of the senate in which Cæsar was assassinated a Sibylline utterance was brought forward by one of the priests in charge of the oracles, Lucius Cotta, to the effect that the Parthians could only be vanquished by a "king," and in consequence of this the resolution was adopted to commit to Cæsar regal power over the Roman provinces. This story was certainly in circulation immediately after Cæsar's death. But not only does it nowhere find any sort of even indirect confirmation, but it is even expressly pronounced false by the contemporary Cicero (*De Dio*. ii. 54, 119) and reported by the later historians, especially by Suetonius (79) and Dio (xliv. 15) merely as a rumour which they are far from wishing to guarantee; and it is under such circumstances no better accredited by the fact of Plutarch (*Cæs.* 60, 64; *Brut.* 10) and Appian (*B. C.* ii. 110) repeating it after their wont, the former by way of anecdote, the latter methodically. But the story is not merely unattested; it is also intrinsically impossible. Even leaving out of account that Cæsar had too much intellect and too much political tact to decide important questions of state after the oligarchic fashion by a stroke of the oracle-machinery, he could never think of thus formally and legally splitting up the state which he wished to reduce to a level.

at the same time took steps against those who made use of these incidents to stir republican opposition, it by no means follows from this that he was not in earnest with his rejection; and as little has proof been adduced that these invitations took place at his bidding, with the view of preparing the multitude for the unwonted spectacle of the Roman diadem. It may have been the uncalled-for zeal of vehement adherents alone that occasioned these incidents; it may be also, that Cæsar merely permitted or even suggested the scene with Antonius, in order to put an end in as marked a manner as possible to the inconvenient gossip by a declinature made before the eyes of the burgesses and inserted by supreme command even in the calendar of the state. The probability is that Cæsar, who appreciated alike the value of a convenient formal designation and the antipathies of the multitude which fasten more on the names than on the essence of things, was resolved to avoid the name of king as tainted with an ancient curse and as more familiar to the Romans of his time when applied to the despots of the East than to their own Numa and Servius, and to appropriate the substance of royalty under the title of Imperator.

The new
court.

But, whatever may have been the style and title, the sovereign ruler was there, and accordingly the court established itself at once with all its due accompaniments of pomp, insipidity, and emptiness. Cæsar appeared in public not in the robe of the consuls which was bordered with purple stripes, but in the robe wholly of purple which was reckoned in antiquity as the proper regal attire, and received, sitting on his golden chair and without rising from it, the solemn procession of the senate. The festivals in his honour commemorative of birthday, of victories, and of vows, filled the calendar. When Cæsar came to the capital, his principal servants marched forth in troops to great distances so as to meet and escort him. To be near to him began to be of such importance, that the rents rose in the quarter of the city where he lived. Personal interviews with him were rendered so difficult by the multitude of individuals soliciting audience, that Cæsar found himself compelled in many cases to communicate even with his intimate friends in writing, and that persons even of the highest rank had to wait for hours in the ante-chamber. People felt, more clearly than was agreeable to Cæsar himself, that they no longer approached a fellow-citizen. There arose a monarchi-

cal aristocracy, which was in a remarkable manner at once new and old, and which had sprung out of the idea of casting into the shade the aristocracy of the oligarchy by that of royalty, the nobility by the patriciate. The patrician body still subsisted, although without essential privileges as an order, in the character of a close aristocratic guild (i. 307); but as it could receive no new *gentes* (i. 265) it had dwindled away more and more in the course of centuries, and in Cæsar's time there were not more than fifteen or sixteen patrician *gentes* still in existence. Cæsar, himself sprung from one of them, got the right of creating new patrician *gentes* conferred on the Emperor by decree of the people, and so established, in contrast to the republican nobility, the new aristocracy of the patriciate, which most happily combined all the requisites of a monarchical aristocracy—the charm of antiquity, entire dependence on the government, and total insignificance. On all sides the new sovereignty revealed itself.

Under a monarch thus practically unlimited there could hardly be room for a constitution at all—still less for a continuance of the hitherto existing commonwealth based on the legal co-operation of the burgesses, the senate, and the several magistrates. Cæsar fully and definitely reverted to the tradition of the regal period; the burgess-assembly remained—what it had already been in that period—by the side of and with the king the supreme and ultimate expression of the will of the sovereign people; the senate was brought back to its original destination of giving advice to the ruler when he requested it; and lastly the ruler concentrated in his person anew the whole magisterial authority, so that there existed no independent state-official by his side any more than by the side of the kings of the earliest times.

In legislation the democratic monarch adhered to the primitive maxim of Roman state-law, that the community of the people in concert with the king convoking them had alone the power of organically regulating the commonwealth; and he had his constitutive enactments regularly sanctioned by decree of the people. The free energy and the authority half-moral, half-political, which the yea or nay of those old warrior-assemblies had carried with it, could not indeed be again instilled into the so-called comitia of this period; the co-operation of the burgesses in legislation, which in the old constitution had been extremely limited but real and living, was in the new practically an unsubstantial shadow. There

The new
patrician
nobility.

Legislation.

was therefore no need of special restrictive measures against the comitia; many years' experience had shown that every government—the oligarchy as well as the monarch—easily kept on good terms with this formal sovereign. These Cæsarian comitia were an important element in the Cæsarian system and indirectly of practical significance, only in so far as they served to retain in principle the sovereignty of the people and to constitute an energetic protest against sultanism.

Edicts.

But at the same time—as is not only obvious of itself, but is also distinctly stated—the other maxim also of the oldest state law was revived by Cæsar himself, and not merely for the first time by his successors; viz. that what the supreme, or rather sole, magistrate commands is unconditionally valid so long as he remains in office, and that, while legislation no doubt belongs only to the king and the burgesses in concert, the royal edict is equivalent to law at least till the demission of its author.

The senate
as the
monarch's
state-
council.

While the democratic king thus conceded to the community of the people at least a formal share in the sovereignty, it was by no means his intention to divide his authority with what had hitherto been the governing body, the college of senators. The senate of Cæsar was to be—in a quite different way from the later senate of Augustus—nothing but a supreme council of state, which he made use of for advising with him beforehand as to laws, and for the issuing of the more important administrative ordinances through it, or at least under its name—for cases in fact occurred where decrees of senate were issued, of which none of the senators recited as present at their preparation had any cognisance. There were no material difficulties of form, in reducing the senate to its original deliberative position, which it had overstepped more *de facto* than *de jure*; but in this case it was necessary to protect himself from practical resistance, for the Roman senate was as much the headquarters of the opposition to Cæsar as the Attic Areopagus was of the opposition to Pericles. Chiefly for this reason the number of senators, which had hitherto amounted at most to six hundred in its normal condition (iii. 360) and had been greatly reduced by the recent crises, was raised by extraordinary supplement to nine hundred; and at the same time, to keep it at least up to this mark, the number of quæstors to be nominated annually, that is of members annually admitted to

the senate, was raised from twenty to forty.* The extraordinary filling up of the senate was undertaken by the monarch alone. In the case of the ordinary additions he secured to himself a permanent influence through the circumstance, that the electoral colleges were bound by law to give their votes to the first twenty candidates for the quæstorship who were provided with letters of recommendation from the monarch; besides, the crown was at liberty to confer the honorary rights attaching to the quæstorship or to any office superior to it, and consequently a seat in the senate in particular, by way of exception even on individuals not qualified. The selection of the extraordinary members who were added naturally fell in the main on adherents of the new order of things, and introduced, along with *equites* of respectable standing, various dubious and plebeian personages into the proud corporation—former senators who had been erased from the roll by the censor or in consequence of a judicial sentence, foreigners from Spain and Gaul who had to some extent to learn their Latin in the senate, men lately subaltern officers who had not previously received even the equestrian ring, sons of freedmen or of such as followed dishonourable trades, and other elements of a like kind. The exclusive circles of the nobility, to whom this change in the personal composition of the senate naturally gave the bitterest offence, saw in it an intentional depreciation of the very institution itself. Cæsar was not capable of such a self-destructive policy; he was as determined not to let himself be governed by his council as he was convinced of the necessity of the institute in itself. They might more correctly have discerned in this proceeding the intention of the monarch to take away from the senate its former character of an exclusive representation of the oligarchic aristocracy, and to make it once more—what it had been in the regal period—a state-council representing all classes of persons belonging to the state through their most intelligent elements, and not necessarily excluding the man of humble birth or even the foreigner; just as those earliest kings introduced non-burgesses (i. 71, 100, 266), Cæsar introduced non-Italians into his senate.

While the rule of the nobility was thus set aside and its existence undermined, and while the senate in its new form

* According to the probable estimate formerly assumed (iii. 360) this person, would yield an average aggregate number of from 1000 to 1200 senators.

was merely a tool of the monarch, autocracy was at the same time most strictly carried out in the administration and government of the state, and the whole executive was concentrated in the hands of the monarch. First of all, the Emperor naturally decided in person every question of any moment. Cæsar was able to carry personal government to an extent which we puny men can hardly conceive, and which is not to be explained solely from the unparalleled rapidity and decision of his working, but has moreover its ground in a more general cause. When we see Cæsar, Sulla, Gaius Gracchus, and Roman statesmen in general displaying throughout an activity which transcends our notions of human powers of working, the reason lies, not in any change that human nature has undergone since that time, but in the change which has taken place since then in the organization of the household. The Roman house was a machine, in which even the intellectual powers of the slaves and freedmen yielded their produce to the master; a master, who knew how to govern these, worked as it were with countless minds. It was the *beau idéal* of bureaucratic centralisation; which our counting-house system strives indeed zealously to imitate, but remains as far behind the prototype as the modern power of capital is inferior to the ancient system of slavery. Cæsar knew how to profit by this advantage; wherever any post demanded special confidence, we see him filling it up on principle—so far as other considerations at all permit—with his slaves, freedmen, or clients of humble birth. His works as a whole show what an organizing genius like his could accomplish with such an instrument; but to the question, how the details of these marvellous feats were achieved, we have no adequate answer. Bureaucracy resembles a manufactory in this respect also, that the work done does not appear as that of the individuals who have worked at it, but as that of the manufactory which stamps it. This much only is quite clear, that Cæsar had no helper at all in his work who exerted a personal influence over it or was even so much as initiated into the whole plan; he was not only the sole master-workman, but he worked also without skilled associates, merely with common labourers.

With respect to details as a matter of course in strictly political affairs Cæsar avoided, so far as it was at all possible, any delegation of his functions. Where it was inevitable, as especially when during his frequent absence from Rome he

had need of a higher organ there, the person destined for this purpose was, significantly enough, not the legal deputy of the monarch, the prefect of the city, but a confidant without officially recognized jurisdiction, usually Cæsar's banker, the cunning and pliant Phœnician merchant Lucius Cornelius Balbus from Gades. In administration Cæsar was above all careful to resume the keys of the state-chest—^{in matters of finance,} which the senate had appropriated to itself after the fall of the regal power, and by means of which it had possessed itself of the government—and to entrust them only to those servants who with their persons were absolutely and exclusively devoted to him. In respect of ownership indeed the private means of the monarch remained, of course, strictly separate from the property of the state; but Cæsar took in hand the administration of the whole financial and monetary system of the state, and conducted it entirely in the way in which he and the Roman grandees generally were wont to manage the administration of their own means and substance. For the future the levying of the provincial revenues and in the main also the management of the coinage were entrusted to the slaves and freedmen of the Emperor, and men of the senatorial order were excluded from it—a momentous step, out of which grew in course of time the important class of procurators and the “imperial household.” Of the governor-^{in the governor-ships,}ships on the other hand, which, after they had handed their financial business over to the new imperial tax-receivers, were still more than they had formerly been essentially military commands, that of Egypt alone was transferred to the monarch's own retainers. The country of the Nile, in a peculiar manner geographically isolated and politically centralized, was better fitted than any other district to break off permanently under an able leader from the central power, as the attempts which had repeatedly been made by hard-pressed Italian party-chiefs to establish themselves there during the recent crisis sufficiently proved. Probably it was simply this consideration that induced Cæsar not to declare the land formally a province, but to tolerate the comparatively harmless *Lagidæ* there; and certainly for this reason the legions stationed in Egypt were not entrusted to a man belonging to the senate or in other words to the former government, but this command was, just like the posts of tax-receivers, treated as a menial office (P. 431). In general however the consideration had weight with Cæsar, that the

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in the
administra-
tion of the
capital.

47.

49.

soldiers of Rome should not, like those of Oriental kings, be commanded by lackeys. It remained the rule to entrust the more important governorships to those who had been consuls, the less important to those who had been prætors; and once more, instead of the five years' interval prescribed by the law of 702 (P. 324), the commencement of the governorship was in the ancient fashion directly annexed to the close of the official functions in the city. On the other hand the distribution of the provinces among the qualified candidates, which had hitherto been arranged sometimes by decree of the people or senate, sometimes by concert among the magistrates or by lot, passed to the monarch. And, as the consuls were frequently induced to abdicate before the end of the year and to make room for after-elected consuls (*consules suffecti*); as, moreover, the number of prætors annually nominated was raised from eight to sixteen, and the nomination of half of them was entrusted to the Emperor in the same way as that of the half of the quæstors; and, lastly, as there was reserved to the Emperor the right of nominating, if not titular consuls, at any rate titular prætors and titular quæstors; Cæsar secured a sufficient number of candidates acceptable to him for filling up the governorships. Their recall remained of course left to the discretion of the regent as well as their nomination; as a rule it was assumed that the consular governor should not remain more than two years, nor the prætorian more than one year, in the province. Lastly, so far as concerns the administration of the city which was his capital and residence, the Emperor evidently intended for a time to entrust this also to magistrates similarly nominated by him. He revived the old city-lieutenancy of the regal period (i. 68); on different occasions he committed during his absence the administration of the capital to one or more such lieutenants nominated by him without consulting the people and for an indefinite period, who united in themselves the functions of all the administrative magistrates and possessed even the right of coining money with their own name, although of course not with their own effigy. In 707 and in the first nine months of 709 there were, moreover, neither prætors nor curule ædiles nor quæstors; the consuls too were nominated in the former year only towards its close, and in the latter Cæsar was even consul without a colleague. This looks altogether like an attempt to revive completely the old regal authority within the city of Rome, as far as the

limits enjoined by the democratic past of the new monarch; in other words, of magistrates additional to the king himself, to allow only the prefect of the city during the king's absence and the tribunes and plebeian ædiles appointed for protecting popular freedom to continue in existence, and to abolish the consulship, the censorship, the prætorship, the curule ædileship and the quæstorship.* But Cæsar subsequently departed from this; he neither accepted the royal title himself, nor did he cancel those venerable names interwoven with the glorious history of the republic. The consuls, prætors, ædiles, tribunes, and quæstors retained substantially their previous formal powers; nevertheless their position was totally altered. It was the political idea lying at the foundation of the republic that the Roman empire was identified with the city of Rome, and in consistency with it the municipal magistrates of the capital were treated throughout as magistrates of the empire. In the monarchy of Cæsar that view and this consequence of it fell into abeyance; the magistrates of Rome formed thenceforth only the first among the many municipalities of the empire, and the consulship in particular became a purely titular post, which preserved a certain practical importance only in virtue of the reversion of a higher governorship annexed to it. The fate, which the Roman community had been wont to prepare for the vanquished, now by means of Cæsar befel itself; its sovereignty over the Roman empire was converted into a limited communal freedom within the Roman state. That at the same time the number of the prætors and quæstors was doubled, has been already mentioned; the same course was followed with the plebeian ædiles, to whom two new "corn-ædiles" (*ædiles Ceresiales*) were added to superintend the supplies of the capital. The appointment to those offices remained with the community, and was subject to no restriction as respected the consuls, tribunes of the people, and plebeian ædiles; we have already adverted to the fact, that the Imperator reserved a right of proposal binding on the electors as regards the half of the prætors, curule ædiles, and quæstors to be annually nominated. In general the ancient, and sacred

* Hence accordingly the cautious turns of expression on the mention of these magistracies in Cæsar's laws; *cum censor aliusve quis magistratus Romæ populi censum aget* (*L. Jul. mun.* l. 144); *prætor isve quei Romæ jure decimundo præerit* (*L. Rubr.* often); *quæstor urbanus quæve ærario præerit* (*L. Jul. mun.* l. 37 etc.)

palladia of popular freedom were not touched; which, of course, did not prevent the individual refractory tribune of the people from being seriously interfered with and, in fact, deposed and erased from the roll of senators. As the Emperor was thus for all the more general and more important questions his own minister; as he controlled the finances by his servants, and the army by his adjutants; as the old republican state-magistracies were again converted into municipal magistracies of the city of Rome; and as in addition to all this he acquired the right of himself nominating his successor—the autocracy was sufficiently established.

The state-hierarchy.

In the spiritual hierarchy on the other hand Cæsar, although he issued a detailed law respecting this portion of the state-economy, made no material alteration, except that he attached the supreme pontificate and the augurship to the person of the regent; and, partly in connection with this, one new stall was created in each of the three supreme colleges, and three new stalls in the fourth college of the banquet-masters. If the Roman state-hierarchy had hitherto served as a support to the ruling oligarchy, it might render precisely the same service to the new monarchy. The conservative religious policy of the senate was transferred to the new kings of Rome; when the strictly conservative Varro published about this time his “Antiquities of Divine Things,” the great fundamental repository of Roman state-theology, he could dedicate it to the *Pontifex Maximus* Cæsar. The faint lustre which the worship of Jovis was still able to impart shone round the newly established throne; and the old national faith became in its last stages the instrument of a Cæsarian papacy, which, however, was from the outset but hollow and feeble.

Regal jurisdiction.

In judicial matters, first of all, the old regal jurisdiction was re-established. As the king had originally been judge in criminal and civil causes, without being legally bound in the former to respect an appeal to the prerogative of mercy in the people, or in the latter to commit the decision of the question in dispute to jurymen; so Cæsar claimed the right of bringing capital causes as well as private processes for sole and final decision to his own bar, and disposing of them in the event of his presence personally, in the event of his absence by the city-lieutenant. In fact we find him, quite after the manner of the ancient kings, now sitting in judg-

ment publicly in the Forum of the capital on Roman burgesses accused of high treason, now holding a judicial inquiry in his house regarding the client princes accused of the like crime; so that the only privilege, which the Roman burgesses had as compared with the other subjects of the king, seems to have consisted in the publicity of the judicial procedure. But this resuscitated supreme jurisdiction of the kings, although Cæsar discharged its duties with impartiality and care, could only from the nature of the case find practical application in exceptional cases. For the usual procedure in criminal and civil causes the former republican mode of administering justice was substantially retained. Criminal causes were still disposed of as formerly before the different jury-commissions entitled to deal with the several crimes, civil causes partly before the court of inheritance or, as it was commonly called, of the *centumviri*, partly before the single *judices*; the superintendence of judicial proceedings was as formerly conducted in the capital chiefly by the prætors, in the provinces by the governors. Political crimes too continued even under the monarchy to be referred to a jury-commission; the new ordinance, which Cæsar issued respecting them, specified the acts legally punishable with precision and in a liberal spirit which excluded all prosecution of opinions, and it fixed as the penalty not death, but banishment. As respects the selection of the jurymen, whom the senatorial party desired to see chosen exclusively from the senate and the strict Gracchans exclusively from the equestrian order, Cæsar, faithful to the principle of reconciling the parties, left the matter on the footing of the compromise-law of Cotta (P. 95), but with the modification—for which the way was probably prepared by the law of Pompeius of 699 (P. 317)—that the *tribuni aerarii* who came from the lower ranks of the people were set aside; so that there was established a rating for jurymen of at least 400,000 sesterces (£4,000), and senators and equites now divided the functions of jurymen which had so long been an apple of discord between them.

Retention of
the previous
administra-
tion of
justice.

105.

The relations of the regal and the republican jurisdiction were on the whole co-ordinate, so that any cause might be entered upon as well before the king's bar as before the competent republican tribunal, the latter of course in the event of collision giving way; if on the other hand the one or the other tribunal had pronounced sentence, the cause was thereby finally disposed of. But in another way the new

Appeal to
the
monarch.

king acquired the power of revising under certain circumstances a judicial sentence. The tribune of the people might interfere so as to cancel—like any other official act—the sentence pronounced by jurymen under the direction of a magistrate; unless where special exceptional laws excluded the tribunician intercession—which was the case with the jury-courts of the *centumviri* and of the different criminal commissions instituted by recent laws. With the exception of these sentences, accordingly, the Emperor might by virtue of his tribunician power annul any judgment of jurymen, and particularly any decision in the ordinary private process before civil jurymen, and might then by virtue of his supreme judicial prerogative order the cause to be discussed anew before himself. Thus Cæsar established,* by the side of his regal tribunal of first and sole jurisdiction which was co-ordinate with the former ordinary tribunals, a regal appellate jurisdiction; and thereby originated the legal form of appeal to a court of higher resort, which was thoroughly foreign to the earlier procedure, and which was to be so important for the succeeding, and even for modern, times.

Decay of
the judicial
system.

Certainly these innovations, the most important of which—the introduction of the principle of appeal—cannot even be reckoned absolutely an improvement, by no means healed thoroughly the evils from which the Roman administration of justice was suffering. Criminal procedure cannot be sound in any slave state, inasmuch as the task of proceeding against slaves lies, if not *de jure*, at least *de facto* in the hands of the master. The Roman master, as may readily be conceived, punished throughout the crime of his serf, not as a crime, but only so far as it rendered the slave useless or disagreeable to him; slave-criminals were merely drafted off somewhat like oxen addicted to goring, and, as the latter were sold to the butcher, so were the former sold to the fighting-booth. But even the criminal procedure against free men, which had been from the outset and always in great part continued to be a political process, had amidst the disorder of the last generations become transformed from a grave lawsuit into a faction-fight to be fought out by means of favour, money, and violence. The blame rested jointly on all that took

* These rules certainly cannot be fully proved to have existed anterior to Augustus; but, as all the elements of this remarkable judicial reform are implied in the powers of the Emperor as arranged by Cæsar, we may be allowed to refer their origin to him.

part in it, on the magistrates, the jury, the parties, even the public who were spectators; but the most incurable wounds were inflicted on justice by the doings of the advocates. In proportion as the parasitic plant of Roman forensic eloquence flourished, all positive ideas of right became broken up; and the distinction, so difficult of apprehension by the public, between opinion and evidence was in reality expelled from the Roman criminal practice. "A plain simple defendant," says a Roman advocate of much experience at this period, "may be accused of any crime at pleasure which he has or has not committed, and will be certainly condemned." Numerous pleadings in criminal causes have been preserved to us from this epoch; there is hardly one of them which makes even a serious attempt to fix the crime in question and to put into proper shape the proof or counterproof.* That the contemporary civil procedure was likewise in various respects unsound, we need scarcely mention; it too suffered from the effects of the party politics mixed up with all things, as for instance in the process of Publius Quinctius (671—673), where the most contradictory decisions were given according as Cinna or Sulla had the ascendancy in Rome; and the advocates, frequently non-jurists, produced here also intentionally and unintentionally abundance of confusion. But it was implied in the nature of the case, that party mixed itself up with such matters only by way of exception, and that here the quibbles of advocates could not so rapidly or so deeply break up the ideas of right; accordingly the civil pleadings which we possess from this epoch, while not according to our stricter ideas effective compositions for their purpose, are yet of a far less libellous and far more juristic character than the contemporary speeches in criminal causes. If Cæsar permitted the curb imposed on advocates' eloquence by Pompeius (P. 325) to remain or even rendered it more severe, there was at least nothing lost by this; and much was gained, when better selected and better superintended magistrates and jurymen were nominated and the palpable corruption and intimidation of the courts came to an end. But

83-81.

* *Plura enim multo*, says Cicero in his treatise *De Oratore* (ii. 42, 178), primarily with reference to criminal trials, *homines judicant odio aut amore aut cupiditate aut iracundia aut dolore aut letitia aut spe aut timore aut errore aut aliqua permotione mentis, quam veritate aut præscripto aut juris norma aliqua aut judicii formula aut legibus*. On this accordingly are founded the further instructions which he gives for advocates entering on their profession.

the sacred sense of right and the reverence for the law, which it is difficult to destroy in the minds of the multitude, it is still more difficult to reproduce. Though the legislator did away with various abuses, he could not heal the root of the evil; and it might be doubted whether time, which cures everything curable, would in this case bring relief.

Decay of
the Roman
military
system.

The Roman military system of this period was nearly in the same condition as the Carthaginian at the time of Hannibal. The governing classes furnished only the officers; the subjects, plebeians and provincials, formed the army. The general was, financially and militarily, almost independent of the central government, and, whether in fortune or misfortune, substantially left to himself and to the resources of his province. Civic and even national spirit had vanished from the army, and the *esprit de corps* was alone left as a bond of inward union. The army had ceased to be an instrument of the commonwealth; in a political point of view it had no will of its own, but it was doubtless able to adopt that of the master who wielded it; in a military point of view it sank under the ordinary miserable leaders into a disorganized useless rabble, but under a right general it attained a military perfection which the burgess army could never reach. The class of officers especially had deeply degenerated. The higher ranks, senators and equites, grew more and more unused to arms. While formerly there had been a zealous competition for the post of staff officers, now every man of equestrian rank, who chose to serve, was sure of a military tribuneship, and several of these posts had even to be filled with men of humbler rank; and any man of quality at all, who still served, sought at least to finish his term of service in Sicily or some other province where he was sure not to face the enemy. Officers of ordinary bravery and efficiency were stared at as prodigies; as to Pompeius especially, his contemporaries practised a military idolatry which in every respect compromised them. The staff, as a rule, gave the signal for desertion and for mutiny; in spite of the culpable indulgence of the commanders proposals for the cashiering of officers of rank were daily occurrences. We still possess the picture—drawn not without irony by Cæsar's own hand—of the state of matters at his head-quarters when orders were given to march against Ariovistus, of the cursing and weeping, and preparing of testaments, and presenting even of requests for furlough. In the soldiery

not a trace of the better classes could any longer be discovered. In law the general obligation to bear arms still subsisted; but the levy took place in the most irregular and unfair manner; numerous persons liable to serve were wholly passed over, while those once levied were retained thirty years and longer beneath the eagles. The Roman burgess-cavalry now merely vegetated as a sort of mounted noble guard, whose perfumed cavaliers and exquisite high-bred horses only played a part in the festivals of the capital; the so-called burgess-infantry was a troop of mercenaries swept together from the lowest ranks of the burgess-population; the subjects furnished the cavalry and the light troops exclusively, and began to be more and more extensively employed also in the infantry. The posts of centurions in the legions, on which in the mode of warfare of that time the efficiency of the divisions essentially depended, and to which according to the national military constitution the soldier served his way upward with the pike, were now not merely regularly conferred according to favour, but were not unfrequently sold to the highest bidder. In consequence of the bad financial management of the government and the venality and fraud of the great majority of the magistrates, the payment of the soldiers was extremely defective and irregular.

The necessary consequence of this was, that in the ordinary course of things the Roman armies pillaged the provincials, mutinied against their officers, and ran off in presence of the enemy; instances occurred where considerable armies, such as the Macedonian army of Piso in 697 (P. 290), were without any proper defeat utterly ruined simply by this misconduct. Capable leaders on the other hand, such as Pompeius, Cæsar, Gabinius, formed doubtless out of the existing materials able and efficient, and to some extent exemplary, armies; but these armies belonged far more to their general than to the commonwealth. The still more complete decay of the Roman marine—which, moreover, had remained an object of antipathy to the Romans and had never been fully nationalised—scarcely requires to be mentioned. Here too, in all directions, everything that could be ruined had been reduced to ruin under the oligarchic government.

The reorganization of the Roman military system by Cæsar was substantially limited to the tightening and strengthening of the reins of discipline, which had been relaxed under

57.

Its reorganization by Cæsar.

the negligent and incapable supervision previously subsisting. The Roman military system seemed to him neither to need, nor to be capable of, radical reform; he accepted the elements of the army, just as Hannibal had accepted them. The enactment of his municipal ordinance that, in order to the holding of a municipal magistracy or sitting in the municipal council before the thirtieth year, three years' service on horseback—that is, as officer—or six years' service on foot should be required, proves indeed that he wished to attract the better classes to the army; but it proves equally clearly that amidst the ever-increasing prevalence of an unwarlike spirit in the nation he himself held it no longer possible to associate the holding of an honorary office with the fulfilment of the time of service unconditionally as hitherto: This very circumstance serves to explain why Cæsar made no attempt to re-establish the Roman burgess-cavalry. The levy was better arranged, the time of service was regulated and abridged; otherwise matters remained on the footing that the infantry of the line were raised chiefly from the lower orders of the Roman burgesses, the cavalry and the light infantry from the other subjects. That nothing was done for the reorganization of the fleet, is surprising. It was an innovation—hazardous beyond doubt even in the view of its author—to which the untrustworthy character of the cavalry furnished by the subjects compelled him (P. 270), that Cæsar for the first time deviated from the old Roman system of never fighting with mercenaries, and incorporated in the cavalry hired foreigners, especially Germans. Another innovation was the appointment of adjutants of the legion with prætorian powers (*legati legionis pro prætore*). Hitherto the military tribunes, nominated partly by the burgesses, partly by the governor concerned, had led the legions in such a way that six of them were placed over each legion, and the command alternated among these; a single commandant of the legion was appointed by the general only as a temporary and extraordinary measure. In subsequent times on the other hand those colonels or adjutants of legions appear as a permanent and organic institution, and as nominated no longer by the governor whom they obey, but by the supreme command in Rome; both changes seem referable to Cæsar's arrangements connected with the Gabinian law (P. 104). The reason for the introduction of this important intervening step in the military

Foreign
mercenaries.

Adjutants
of the
legion.

hierarchy must be sought partly in the necessity for a more energetic centralization of the command, partly in the felt want of able superior officers, partly and above all in the design of providing a counterpoise to the governor by associating with him one or more colonels nominated by the Emperor. The most essential change in the military system consisted in the institution of a permanent military head in the person of the Emperor, who, superseding the previous unmilitary and in every respect incapable governing corporation, united in his hands the whole control of the army, and thus converted it from a direction which for the most part was merely nominal into a real and energetic supreme command. We are not properly informed as to the position which this supreme command occupied towards the special commands hitherto omnipotent in their respective spheres. Probably the analogy of the relation subsisting between the prætor and the consul or the consul and the dictator served generally as a basis, so that, while the governor in his own right retained the supreme military authority in his province, the Emperor was entitled at any moment to take it away from him and assume it for himself or his delegates, and, while the authority of the governor was confined to the province, that of the Emperor, like the regal and the earlier consular authority, extended over the whole empire. Moreover it is extremely probable that now the nomination of the officers; both the military tribunes and the centurions, so far as it had hitherto belonged to the governor,* as well as the nomination of the new adjutants of the legion passed directly into the hands of the Emperor; and in like manner even now the arrangement of the levies, the bestowal of leave of absence, and the more important criminal cases may have been submitted to the judgment of the commander-in-chief. With this limitation of the powers of the governors and with the regulated control of the Emperor, there was no great room to apprehend in future either that the armies might be utterly disorganised or that they might be converted into retainers personally devoted to their respective officers.

The new
commander-
ship-in-
chief.

But, however decidedly and urgently the circumstances pointed to military monarchy, and however distinctly Cæsar took the supreme command exclusively for himself, he was nevertheless not at all inclined to establish his authority

Cæsar's
military
plans.

* With the nomination of a part of the military tribunes by the burgesses (ii. 323) Cæsar—in this also a democrat—did not meddle.

Defence of the frontier. by means of, and on, the army. No doubt he deemed a standing army necessary for his state, but only because from its geographical position it required a comprehensive regulation of the frontiers and permanent frontier garrisons. Partly at earlier periods, partly during the recent civil war he had worked at the tranquillising of Spain, and had established strong positions for the defence of the frontier in Africa along the great desert, and in the north-west of the empire along the line of the Rhine. He occupied himself with similar plans for the countries on the Euphrates and on the Danube. Above all he designed an expedition against the Parthians, to avenge the day of Carrhæ; he had destined three years for this war, and was resolved to settle accounts with these dangerous enemies once for all and not less cautiously than thoroughly. In like manner he had projected the scheme of attacking Bœrebistas king of the Getæ who was greatly extending his power on both sides of the Danube (P. 291), and of protecting Italy in the north-east by border-districts similar to those which he had created for it in Gaul. On the other hand there is no evidence at all that Cæsar contemplated like Alexander an indefinite career of victory; it is said indeed that he had intended to march from Parthia to the Caspian and from this to the Black Sea and then along its northern shores to the Danube, to annex to the empire all Scythia and Germany as far as the Northern Ocean—which according to the notions of that time was not so very distant from the Mediterranean—and to return home through Gaul; but no authority at all deserving of credit vouches for the existence of these fabulous projects. In the case of a state which, like the Roman state of Cæsar, already included a mass of barbaric elements difficult to be controlled, and had still for centuries to come more than enough to do with their assimilation, such conquests, even granting their military practicability, would have been simply blunders far more brilliant and far worse than the Indian expedition of Alexander. Judging both from Cæsar's conduct in Britain and Germany and from the conduct of those who became the heirs of his political ideas, it is in a high degree probable that Cæsar with Scipio Æmilianus called on the gods not to increase the empire, but to preserve it, and that his schemes of conquest were confined to a settlement of the frontier—measured, it is true, by his own great scale—which should

secure the line of the Euphrates and, instead of the very variable and militarily useless boundary of the empire on the north-east, should establish and render defensible the line of the Danube.

But, if it remains a mere probability that Cæsar ought not to be designated a world-conqueror in the same sense as Alexander and Napoleon, it is quite certain that his design was not to rest his new monarchy primarily on the support of the army nor generally to place the military authority above the civil, but to incorporate it with, and as far as possible subordinate it to, the civil commonwealth. The invaluable pillars of a military state, those old and far-famed Gallic legions, were honourably dissolved just on account of the incompatibility of their *esprit de corps* with a civil commonwealth, and their glorious names were only perpetuated in newly-founded civic communities. The soldiers presented by Cæsar with allotments of land on their discharge were not, like those of Sulla, settled together—as it were militarily—in colonies of their own, but, especially when they settled in Italy, were isolated as much as possible and scattered throughout the peninsula; except in the case of the portions of the Campanian land that remained at his disposal, where an aggregation of the old soldiers of Cæsar could not be avoided. Cæsar sought to solve the difficult task of keeping the soldiers of a standing army within the sphere of civil life, partly by retaining the former arrangement which prescribed merely certain years of service, and not a service strictly constant, that is uninterrupted by any dismissal; partly by the already mentioned shortening of the term of service, which occasioned a speedier change in the personal composition of the army; partly by the regular settlement of the soldiers who had served out their time as agricultural colonists; partly and principally by keeping the army aloof from Italy and generally from the proper seats of the civil and political life of the nation, and directing the soldier to the points, where according to the opinion of the great king he was alone in his place—to the frontier stations, that he might ward off the extraneous foe. The true criterion also of the military state—the development of, and the privileged position assigned to, the corps of guards—is not to be met with in the case of Cæsar. Although as respects the army on active service the institution of a special body-guard for the general had been already long in existence (iii. 202), in Cæsar's

Attempts of
Cæsar to
avert a
military
despotism.

system it fell completely into the background ; his prætorian cohort seems to have essentially consisted merely of orderly officers or non-military attendants, and never to have been a proper select corps, consequently never an object of jealousy to the troops of the line. While Cæsar thus as general practically dropped the body-guard, he still less as king tolerated a guard round his person. Although constantly beset by lurking assassins and well aware of it, he yet rejected the proposal of the senate to institute a select guard ; dismissed, as soon as things grew in some measure quiet, the Spanish escort which he had made use of at first in the capital ; and contented himself with the retinue of lictors sanctioned by traditional usage for the Roman supreme magistrates. However much of the ideal of his party and of his youth—the founding of a Periclean government in Rome not by virtue of the sword, but by virtue of the confidence of the nation—Cæsar had been obliged to abandon in the struggle with realities, he retained even now the fundamental idea of founding no military monarchy with an energy to which history scarcely supplies a parallel. Certainly this too was an impracticable ideal—it was the sole illusion, in regard to which the longing desire of that vigorous mind was more powerful than its clear judgment. A government, such as Cæsar had in view, was not merely of necessity very much based on his personal influence, and so liable to perish with the death of its author just as the kindred creations of Pericles and Cromwell with the death of their founders ; but, amidst the deeply disorganized state of the nation, it was not at all credible that the eighth king of Rome would succeed even for his lifetime in ruling, as his seven predecessors had ruled, his fellow-burgesses merely by virtue of law and justice, and as little probable that he would succeed in incorporating the standing army—after it had during the last civil war learned its power and unlearned its reverence—once more as a duly subordinate element in civil society. To any one who calmly considered to what extent reverence for the law had disappeared from the lowest as from the highest ranks of society, the former hope must have seemed almost a dream ; and, if with the Marian reform of the military system the soldier generally had ceased to be a citizen (iii. 203), the Campanian mutiny and the battle-field of Thapsus showed with fatal clearness the nature of the support which the army now lent to the

law. Even the great democrat could only with difficulty and imperfectly hold in check the powers which he had unchained ; thousands of swords still flew at his signal from the scabbard, but they no longer returned to the scabbard at his signal. Fate is mightier than genius. Cæsar desired to become the restorer of the civil commonwealth, and became the founder of the military monarchy which he abhorred ; he overthrew the régime of aristocrats and bankers in the state, only to put a military régime in their place, and the commonwealth continued as before to be tyrannized and turned to profit by a privileged minority. And yet it is a privilege of the highest natures thus creatively to err. The brilliant attempts of great men to realize the ideal, though they do not reach their aim, form the best treasure of nations. It was owing to the work of Cæsar that the Roman military state did not become a police-state till after the lapse of several centuries, and that the Roman Emperors, however little they otherwise resembled the great founder of their sovereignty, yet employed the soldier in the main not against the citizen but against the public foe, and esteemed both nation and army too highly to place the latter as constable over the former.

The regulation of financial matters occasioned comparatively little difficulty in consequence of the solid foundations which the immense magnitude of the empire and the exclusion of the system of credit supplied. If the state had hitherto found itself in perpetual financial embarrassment, the fault was far from chargeable on the inadequacy of the state revenues ; on the contrary these had of late years immensely increased. To the earlier aggregate income, which is estimated at 200,000,000 sesterces (in round numbers £2,000,000) there were added 85,000,000 sesterces (£850,000) by the erection of the provinces of Bithynia-Pontus and Syria ; which increase, along with the other newly opened up or augmented sources of income, especially from the constantly increasing produce of the taxes on luxuries, far outweighed the loss of the Campanian rents. Besides, immense sums had been brought from extraordinary sources into the exchequer through Lucullus, Metellus, Pompeius, Cato and others. The cause of the financial embarrassments rather lay partly in the increase of the ordinary and extraordinary expenditure, partly in the disorder of management. Under the former head, the distribution of corn to the multitude

Financial
administra-
tion.

63. of the capital claimed exorbitant sums; through the extension given to it by Cato in 691 (P. 184) the yearly expenditure for that purpose amounted to 30,000,000 sesterces
58. (£300,000) and after the abolition in 696 of the compensation hitherto paid it swallowed up even a fifth of the state revenues. The military budget also had risen, since the garrisons of Cilicia, Syria, and Gaul had been added to those of Spain, Macedonia, and the other provinces. Among the extraordinary items of expenditure must be named in the first place the great cost of fitting out fleets, on which, for
67. example, five years after the great razzia of 687, 34,000,000 sesterces (£340,000) were expended at once. Add to this the very considerable sums which were consumed in wars and warlike preparations; such as 18,000,000 sesterces (£180,000) paid at once to Piso merely for the outfit of the Macedonian army, 24,000,000 sesterces (£240,000) even annually to Pompeius for the maintenance and pay of the Spanish army, and similar sums to Cæsar for the Gallic legions. But considerable as were these demands made on the Roman exchequer, it would still have been able probably to meet them, had not its administration once so exemplary been affected by the universal laxity and dishonesty of this age; the payments of the treasury were often suspended merely because of the neglect to call up its outstanding claims. The magistrates placed over it, two of the quæstors—young men annually changed—contented themselves at the best with inaction; among the official staff of clerks and others, formerly so justly held in high esteem for its integrity, the worst abuses now prevailed, more especially since such posts had come to be bought and sold.

Financial
reforms of
Cæsar.

As soon however as the threads of Roman state-finance were concentrated no longer as hitherto in the senate, but in the cabinet of Cæsar, new life, stricter order, and more compact connection at once pervaded all the wheels and springs of that great machine. The two institutions, which originated with Gaius Gracchus and ate like a gangrene into the Roman financial system—the leasing of the direct taxes, and the distributions of grain—were partly abolished, partly remodelled. Cæsar wished not like his predecessor to hold the nobility in check by the banker-aristocracy and the populace of the capital, but to set them aside and to deliver the commonwealth from all parasites whether high or low; and therefore he went in these two important questions not

with Gaius Gracchus, but with the oligarch Sulla. The leasing system was allowed to continue for the indirect taxes, in the case of which it was very old and—under the maxim of Roman financial administration, which was retained inviolable also by Cæsar, that the levying of the taxes should at any cost be kept simple and readily manageable—absolutely could not be dispensed with. But the direct taxes were thenceforth universally either treated, like the African and Sardinian deliveries of corn and oil, as contributions in kind to be directly supplied to the state, or converted, like the revenues of Asia Minor, into fixed money payments, in which case the collection of the several sums payable was entrusted to the tax-districts themselves. The corn distributions in the capital had hitherto been looked on as a profitable prerogative of the community which ruled, and, because it ruled, had to be fed by its subjects. This infamous principle was set aside by Cæsar; but it could not be overlooked that a multitude of wholly destitute burgesses had been protected solely by these largesses of food from starvation. In this aspect Cæsar retained them. While according to the Sempronian ordinance renewed by Cato every Roman burgess settled in Rome had possessed a legal claim to bread-corn without payment, this list of recipients, which had at last risen to the number of 320,000, was reduced by the exclusion of all individuals having means or otherwise provided for to 150,000, and this number was fixed once for all as the maximum number of recipients of free corn; at the same time an annual revision of the list was ordered, so that the places vacated by removal or death might be filled up with the most needful among the applicants. By this conversion of the political privilege into a provision for the poor, a principle remarkable in a moral as well as in a historical point of view came for the first time into living operation. Civil society but slowly and gradually attains to a perception of the interdependence of interests; in earlier antiquity the state doubtless protected its members from the public enemy and the murderer, but it was not bound to protect the totally helpless fellow-citizen from the worse enemy, want, by affording the needful means of subsistence. It was the Attic civilization which first developed, in the Solonian and subsequent legislation, the principle that it is the duty of the community to provide for its invalids and for the poor generally; and it was Cæsar that first developed what in the

Leasing of
the direct
taxes
abolished.

Reform of
the distribu-
tion of
corn.

restricted compass of Attic life had remained a municipal matter into an organic institution of state, and transformed an arrangement which was a burden and a disgrace to the commonwealth into the first of those institutions—in modern times equally numerous and beneficial—where the infinite depth of human compassion contends with the infinite depth of human misery.

The budget
of income.

In addition to these fundamental reforms a thorough revision of the income and expenditure took place. The ordinary items of income were everywhere regulated and fixed. Exemption from taxation was conferred on not a few communities and even on whole districts, whether indirectly by the bestowal of the Roman or Latin franchise, or directly by special privilege; it was obtained *e.g.* by all the Sicilian communities* in the former, by the town of Ilion in the latter, way. Still greater was the number of those, whose proportion of tribute was lowered; the communities in Further Spain, for instance, already after Cæsar's governorship had on his suggestion a reduction of tribute granted to them by the senate, and now the deeply oppressed province of Asia had not only the levying of its direct taxes facilitated, but also a third of them wholly remitted. The newly added taxes, such as those of the communities subdued in Illyria and above all of the Gallic communities—which latter together paid annually 40,000,000 sesterces (£400,000)—were fixed throughout on a low scale. It is true on the other hand that various towns, such as Little Leptis in Africa, Sulci in Sardinia, and several Spanish communities, had their tribute raised by way of penalty for their conduct during the last war. The very lucrative Italian harbour-tolls abolished in the recent times of anarchy (P. 195) were re-established all the more readily, that this tax fell essentially on luxuries imported from the East. To these new or revived sources of ordinary income were added the sums which accrued by extraordinary means, especially in consequence of the civil war, to the victor—the booty collected in Gaul; the stock of cash in the capital; the treasures taken from the Italian and Spanish temples; the sums raised in

* This follows from the very fact that Sicily obtained Latin rights; but Varro also directly attests the discontinuance of the Sicilian *decumæ* in a treatise published after Cicero's death (*De R. R.* 2 *præf.*) where he names—as the corn-provinces whence Rome derives her subsistence—only Africa and Sardinia, no longer Sicily.

the shape of forced loan, compulsory present, or fine, from the dependant communities and dynasts, and the pecuniary penalties imposed in a similar way by judicial sentence, or simply by sending an order to pay, on individual wealthy Romans; and above all things the proceeds from the estates of his defeated opponents. How productive these sources of income were, we may learn from the fact, that the fine of the African capitalists who sat in the opposition-senate alone amounted to 100,000,000 sesterces (£1,000,000) and the price paid by the purchasers of the property of Pompeius to 70,000,000 sesterces (£700,000). This course was necessary, because the power of the beaten nobility rested in great measure on their colossal wealth and could only be effectually broken by imposing on them the defrayment of the costs of the war. But the odium of the confiscations was in some measure mitigated by the fact that Cæsar directed their proceeds solely to the benefit of the state, and, instead of overlooking after the manner of Sulla any act of fraud in his favourites, exacted the purchase-money with rigour even from his most faithful adherents such as Marcus Antonius.

In the expenditure a diminution was in the first place obtained by the considerable restriction of the largesses of grain. The distribution of corn to the poor of the capital which was retained, as well as the kindred supply of oil for the Roman baths newly introduced by Cæsar, were at least in great part charged once for all on the contributions in kind from Sardinia and especially from Africa, and were thereby wholly or for the most part kept separate from the exchequer. On the other hand the regular expenditure for the military system was increased partly by the augmentation of the standing army, partly by the raising of the pay of the legionary from 480 sesterces (£5) to 900 (£9) annually. Both steps were in fact indispensable. There was a total want of any real defence for the frontiers, and an indispensable preliminary to it was a considerable increase of the army; and the doubling of the pay, although employed doubtless by Cæsar to attach his soldiers to him (P. 365), was not introduced as a permanent alteration on that account. The former pay of $1\frac{1}{2}$ sesterces ($3\frac{1}{2}d.$) per day had been fixed in very ancient times, when money had an altogether different value from that which it had in the Rome of Cæsar's day; it could only have been retained down to a period when the common day-labourer in the capital earned by the labour of his hands

The budget
of expen-
diture.

daily on an average 3 sesterces ($7\frac{1}{2}d.$), because in those times the soldier entered the army not for the sake of the pay, but chiefly for the sake of the—in great measure illicit—perquisites of military service. The first condition in order to a serious reform in the military system, and to the getting rid of the irregular gains of the soldier which formed a burden mostly on the provincials, was an increase suitable to the times in the regular pay; and the fixing of it at $2\frac{1}{2}$ sesterces ($6\frac{1}{2}d.$) may be regarded as equitable, while the great burden thereby imposed on the treasury was a necessary and in its consequences a very beneficial step. Of the amount of the extraordinary expenses which Cæsar had to undertake or voluntarily undertook, it is difficult to form any conception. The wars themselves consumed enormous sums; and sums perhaps not less were required to fulfil the promises which Cæsar had been obliged to make during the civil war. It was a bad example and one unhappily not lost sight of in the sequel, that every common soldier received for his participation in the civil war 20,000 sesterces (£200), every burgess of the multitude in the capital for his non-participation in it 300 sesterces (£3) as an addition to his aliment; but Cæsar, after having once under the pressure of circumstances pledged his word, was too much of a king to abate from it. Besides, Cæsar answered innumerable demands of honourable liberality, and put into circulation immense sums for building especially, which had been shamefully neglected during the financial distress of the last times of the republic—the cost of his buildings executed partly during the Gallic campaigns, partly afterwards, in the capital was reckoned at 160,000,000 (£1,600,000). The general result of the financial administration of Cæsar is expressed in the fact that, while by sagacious and energetic reforms and by a right combination of economy and liberality he amply and fully met all equitable claims, nevertheless in March 710 there lay in the public treasury 700,000,000, and in his own 100,000,000 sesterces (together £8,000,000)—a sum which exceeded by tenfold the amount of cash in the treasury in the most flourishing times of the republic (ii. 331).

44.

Social condition of the nation.

But the task of breaking up the old parties and furnishing the new commonwealth with an appropriate constitution, an efficient army, and well-ordered finances, difficult as it was, was not the most difficult part of Cæsar's work. If the Italian nation was really to be regenerated, it required a

reorganisation, which should transform all parts of the great empire—Rome, Italy, and the provinces—to the very foundation. Let us endeavour here also to delineate the old state of things, as well as the beginnings of a new and more tolerable time.

The good stock of the Latin nation had long since wholly disappeared from Rome. It is implied in the very nature of the case, that a capital loses its municipal and even its national stamp more quickly than any subordinate community. There the upper classes speedily withdraw from urban public life, in order to find their home rather in the whole state than in a single city; there are inevitably concentrated the foreign settlers, the fluctuating population of travellers on pleasure or business, the mass of the indolent, lazy, criminal, financially and morally bankrupt, and for that very reason cosmopolitan, rabble. All this pre-eminently applied to Rome. The opulent Roman frequently regarded his house in town merely as a lodging. When the urban municipal offices were converted into imperial magistracies; when the urban *comitia* became the assembly of burgesses of the empire; and when smaller self-governing tribal or other associations were not tolerated within the capital: all proper communal life ceased for Rome. From the whole compass of the wide-spread empire people flocked to Rome, for speculation, for debauchery, for intrigue, for accomplishment in crime, or even for the purpose of hiding there from the eye of the law. These evils arose in some measure necessarily from the very nature of a capital; others more accidental and perhaps still more grave were associated with them. There has never perhaps existed a great city so thoroughly destitute of the means of support as Rome; importation on the one hand, and domestic manufacture by slaves on the other, rendered any free industry from the first impossible there. The injurious consequences of the radical evil pervading the politics of antiquity in general—the slave-system—were more conspicuous in the capital than anywhere else. Nowhere were such masses of slaves accumulated as in the city palaces of the great families or of wealthy upstarts. Nowhere were the nations of the three continents mingled as in the slave population of the capital—Syrians, Phrygians and other half-Hellenes with Libyans and Moors, Gætæ and Iberians with the daily-increasing influx of Celts and Germans. The demoralisation insepar-

The capital.

The population
lacked there.

Relations of
the oli-
garchy to
the popu-
lace.

able from the absence of freedom, and the terrible inconsistency between formal and moral right, were far more glaringly apparent in the case of the half or wholly cultivated—as it were genteel—city-slave than in that of the rural serf who tilled the field in chains like the fettered ox. Still worse than the masses of slaves were those who had been *de jure* or simply *de facto* released from slavery—a mixture of mendicant rabble and extremely rich parvenus, no longer slaves and not yet fully burgesses, economically and even legally dependent on their master and yet with the pretensions of free men; these freedmen were peculiarly attracted towards the capital, where gain of various sorts was to be had and the retail traffic as well as the minor handicrafts were almost wholly in their hands. Their influence on the elections is expressly attested; and that they took a leading part in the street riots, is evident even from the ordinary signal by means of which these were as it were proclaimed by the demagogues—the closing of the shops and places of sale. Moreover, the government not only did nothing to counteract this corruption of the population of the capital, but even encouraged it for the benefit of their selfish policy. The judicious rule of law, which prohibited persons condemned for a capital offence from dwelling in the capital, was not carried into effect by the negligent police. The police-supervision of the association and clubs of the rabble, so urgently required, was at first neglected, and afterwards (P. 296) even declared punishable as a restriction inconsistent with the freedom of the people. The popular festivals had been allowed so to increase that the seven ordinary ones alone—the Roman, the Plebeian, those of the Mother of the Gods, of Ceres, of Apollo, of Flora (ii. 411) and of Victoria—lasted altogether sixty-two days; and to these were added the gladiatorial games and numerous other extraordinary amusements. The duty of providing grain at low prices—which was unavoidably necessary with such a proletariat living wholly from hand to mouth—was treated with the most unscrupulous frivolity, and the fluctuations in the price of bread corn were of a fabulous and incalculable description.* Lastly, the distributions of grain formed an

* In Sicily, the country of production, the *modius* was sold within a few years at two and at twenty sesterces; from this we may guess what must have been the fluctuations of price in Rome, which subsisted on transmarine corn and was the seat of speculators.

official invitation to the whole burgess-proletariate who were destitute of food and indisposed for work to take up their abode in the capital. The seed sown was bad, and the harvest corresponded. The system of clubs and bands in the sphere of politics, the worship of Isis and similar pious extravagances in that of religion, had their root in this state of things. People were constantly in prospect of a dearth, and not unfrequently in utter famine. Nowhere was a man less secure of his life than in the capital; murder professionally prosecuted by banditti was the single trade peculiar to it; the alluring of the victim to Rome was the preliminary to his assassination; no one ventured into the country in the vicinity of the capital without an armed retinue. Its outward condition corresponded to this inward disorganisation, and seemed a keen satire on the aristocratic government. Nothing was done for the regulation of the stream of the Tiber; excepting that they caused the only bridge, with which they still made shift (iii. 405), to be constructed of stone at least as far as the Tiber-island. As little was anything done toward the levelling of the city on the seven hills, except where perhaps the accumulation of rubbish had effected some improvement. The streets ascended and descended narrow and angular, and were wretchedly kept; the foot-paths were small and ill paved. The ordinary houses were built of bricks negligently and to a giddy height, mostly by speculative builders on account of the small proprietors; by which means the former became prodigiously rich, and the latter were reduced to beggary. Like isolated islands amidst this sea of wretched buildings were seen the splendid palaces of the rich, which curtailed the space for the smaller houses just as their owners curtailed the burgess-rights of smaller men in the state, and beside whose marble pillars and Greek statues the decaying temples, with their images of the gods still in great part carved of wood, made a melancholy figure. A police-supervision of streets, of river-banks, of fires, or of building was almost unheard of; if the government troubled itself at all about the inundations, conflagrations, and falls of houses which were of yearly occurrence, it was only to ask from the state-theologians their report and advice regarding the true import of such signs and wonders. If we try to conceive to ourselves a London with the slave-population of New Orleans, with the police of Constantinople, with the non-industrial character of

Anarchy of
the capital.

the modern Rome, and agitated by politics after the fashion of the Paris in 1848, we shall acquire an approximate idea of the republican glory, the departure of which Cicero and his associates in their sulky letters deplore.

Cæsar's
treatment
of matters
in the
capital.

Cæsar did not deplore, but he sought to help so far as help was possible. Rome remained, of course, what it was—a cosmopolitan city. Not only would the attempt to give to it once more a specially Italian character have been impracticable; it would not have suited Cæsar's plan. Just as Alexander found for his Græco-Oriental empire an appropriate capital in the Hellenic, Jewish, Egyptian, and above all cosmopolitan, Alexandria, so the capital of the new Romano-Hellenic universal empire, situated at the meeting-point of the East and the West, was to be not an Italian community, but the denationalised capital of many nations. For this reason Cæsar tolerated the worship of the newly-settled Egyptian gods alongside of Father Jovis, and granted even to the Jews the free exercise of their strangely foreign ritual in the very capital of the empire. However offensive was the motley mixture of the parasitic—especially the Hellenic-Oriental—population in Rome, he nowhere opposed its extension; it is significant, that at his popular festivals for the capital he caused dramas to be performed not merely in Latin and Greek, but also in other languages, probably in Phœnician, Hebrew, Syrian, or Spanish.

Diminution
of the pro-
letariate.

But, while Cæsar accepted with the full consciousness of what he was doing the fundamental character of the capital as he found it, he yet worked energetically at the improvement of the lamentable and disgraceful state of things prevailing there. Unhappily the primary evils were the least capable of being eradicated. Cæsar could not abolish slavery with its train of national calamities; it must remain an open question, whether he would in the course of time have attempted at least to limit the slave population in the capital, as he undertook to do so in another field. As little could Cæsar conjure into existence a free industry in the capital; yet the great building-operations remedied in some measure the want of means of support there, and opened up to the proletariat a source of small but honourable gain. On the other hand Cæsar laboured energetically to diminish the mass of the free proletariat. The constant influx of persons brought by the corn-largesses to Rome was, if not wholly

stopped,* at least very materially restricted by the conversion of these largesses into a provision for the poor limited to a fixed number. The ranks of the existing proletariat were thinned on the one hand by the tribunals which were instructed to proceed with unrelenting rigour against the rabble, on the other hand by a comprehensive transmarine colonisation; of the 80,000 colonists, whom Cæsar sent beyond the seas in the few years of his government, a very great portion must have been taken from the lower ranks of the population of the capital; most of the Corinthian settlers indeed were freedmen. But this must have been more than a mere temporary arrangement; Cæsar, convinced like every other man of sense that the only true remedy for the misery of the proletariat consisted in a well-regulated system of colonisation, and placed by the condition of the empire in a position to realise it to an almost unlimited extent, must have had the design of permanently continuing the process, and so opening up a constant means of abating an evil which was constantly reproducing itself. Measures were further taken to set bounds to the serious fluctuations in the price of the most important means of subsistence in the markets of the capital. The newly-organised and liberally-administered finances of the state furnished the means for this purpose, and two newly-nominated magistrates, the corn ædiles (P. 481) were charged with the special supervision of the contractors and of the market of the capital. The club system was checked, more effectually than was possible through prohibitive laws, by the change of the constitution; inasmuch as with the republic and the republican elections and tribunals the corruption and violence of the electioneering and judicial *collegia*—and generally the political Saturnalia of the *canaille*—came to an end of themselves. Moreover the combinations called into existence by the Clodian law were broken up, and the whole system of association was placed under the superintendence of the governing authorities. With the exception of the ancient guilds and associations, of the religious unions

The club
system
restricted.

* It is a fact not without interest that a political writer of later date but much judgment, the author of the letters addressed in the name of Sallust to Cæsar, gives the latter the advice to transfer the corn distribution of the capital to the several *municipia*. There is good sense in the admonition; as indeed similar ideas obviously prevailed in the noble municipal provision for orphans under Trajan.

Street-
police.

Buildings of
the capital.

of the Jews, and of other specially excepted categories, for which a simple intimation to the senate seems to have sufficed, the permission to constitute a permanent society with fixed times of assembling and standing deposits was made dependent on a concession to be granted by the senate after the consent of the monarch had been obtained. To this was added a stricter administration of criminal justice and an energetic police. The laws, especially as regards the crime of violence, were rendered more severe; and the irrational regulation of the republican law, that the convicted criminal was entitled to withdraw himself from a part of the penalty which he had incurred by self-banishment, was with reason set aside. The detailed regulations, which Cæsar issued regarding the police of the capital, are in great part still preserved; and all who choose may convince themselves that the Emperor did not disdain to insist on the house proprietors putting the streets into repair and paving the footpath in its whole breadth with hewn stones, and to issue appropriate enactments regarding the carrying of litters and the driving of waggons, which from the nature of the streets were only allowed to move freely through the capital in the evening and by night. The supervision of the local police remained as hitherto chiefly with the four ædiles, who were instructed now at least, if not earlier, each to superintend a distinctly marked-off police district within the capital. Lastly, building in the capital, and the provision connected therewith, of institutions for the public benefit, received from Cæsar—who combined in himself the love for building of a Roman and of an organiser—a sudden stimulus, which not merely put to shame the mismanagement of the recent anarchic times, but also left all that the Roman aristocracy had done in their best days as far behind as the genius of Cæsar surpassed the honest endeavours of the Marcii and Æmilii. It was not merely by the extent of the buildings in themselves and the magnitude of the sums expended on them that Cæsar excelled his predecessors; but a genuine statesmanly perception of what was for the public good distinguishes what Cæsar did for the public institutions of Rome from all similar services. He did not build, like his successors, temples and other splendid structures, but he relieved the market-place of Rome—in which the burgess-assemblies, the seats of the chief courts, the exchange, and the daily business as well as the

daily idleness, still were crowded together—at any rate from the assemblies and the courts by constructing for the former a new *comitium*, the *Sæpta Julia* in the *Campus Martius*, and for the latter a separate place of judicature, the *Forum Julium* between the *Capitol* and *Palatine*. Of a kindred spirit is the arrangement originating with him, by which there were supplied to the baths of the capital annually three million pounds of oil, mostly from *Africa*, and they were thereby enabled to furnish to the bathers the oil required for the anointing of the body gratuitously—a measure of cleanliness and sanitary police which, according to the ancient dietetics based substantially on bathing and anointing, was highly judicious. But these noble arrangements were only the first steps towards a complete remodelling of *Rome*. Projects were already formed for a new senate-house, for a new magnificent bazaar, for a theatre to rival that of *Pompeius*, for a public Latin and Greek library after the model of that recently destroyed at *Alexandria*—the first institution of the sort in *Rome*—lastly for a temple of *Mars*, which was to surpass all that had hitherto existed in riches and glory. Still more brilliant was the idea of altering the whole lower course of the *Tiber* and of conducting it from the present *Ponte Molle*—instead of between the *Campus Vaticanus* and the *Campus Martius* to *Ostia*—round the *Campus Vaticanus* and the *Janiculum* across the *Pomptine marshes* to the port of *Tarracina*. By this gigantic plan three objects would have been accomplished at once: the extremely limited facilities for building in the capital would have been enlarged by substituting the *Campus Vaticanus* now transferred to the left bank of the *Tiber* for the *Campus Martius*, and employing the latter spacious field for public and private edifices; the *Pomptine marshes* and the *Latin coast* generally would have been drained; and the capital would have been supplied with a safe seaport, the want of which was so painfully felt. It seemed as if the *Imperator* would remove mountains and rivers, and venture to contend with nature herself.

Much however as the city of *Rome* gained by the new order of things in commodiousness and magnificence, its political supremacy was, as we have already said, lost to it irrecoverably through that very change. The idea that the *Roman state* should coincide with the city of *Rome* had indeed in the course of time become more and more unnatural

and preposterous; but the maxim had been so intimately blended with the essence of the Roman republic, that it could not perish before the republic itself. It was only in the new state of Cæsar that it was, with the exception perhaps of some legal fictions, completely set aside, and the community of the capital was placed legally on a level with all other municipalities; indeed Cæsar—here as everywhere endeavouring not merely to regulate the thing, but also to call it officially by the right name—issued his Italian municipal ordinance, beyond doubt purposely, at once for the capital and for the other urban communities. We may add that Rome, just because it was incapable of a living communal character as a capital, was even essentially inferior to the other municipalities of the imperial period. The republican Rome was a den of robbers, but it was at the same time the state; the Rome of the monarchy, although it began to embellish itself with all the glories of the three continents and to glitter in gold and marble, was yet nothing in the state but a royal residence in connection with a poor-house, or in other words a necessary evil.

Italy.

Italian
agriculture.

While in the capital the only object aimed at was to get rid of palpable evils by police ordinances on the greatest scale, it was a far more difficult task to remedy the deep disorganisation of Italian society. Its radical misfortunes were those which we previously noticed in detail—the disappearance of the agricultural, and the unnatural increase of the mercantile, population—with which an endless train of other evils was associated. The reader will not fail to remember what was the state of Italian agriculture. In spite of the most earnest attempts to check the annihilation of the small holdings, farm-husbandry was scarcely any longer the predominant species of economy during this epoch in any region of Italy proper, with the exception perhaps of the valleys of the Apennines and Abruzzi. As to the management of estates, no material difference is perceptible between the Catonian system formerly set forth (ii. 363–372) and that described to us by Varro, except that the latter shows the traces for better and for worse of the progress of fashionable life in Rome. “Formerly,” says Varro, “the barn on the estate was larger than the manor-house; now it is wont to be the reverse.” In the domains of Tusculum and Tibur, on the shores of Tarracina and Baiæ—where the old Latin and Italian farmers had sown

and reaped—there now rose in barren splendour the villas of the Roman nobles, some of which covered the space of a moderate-sized town with their appurtenances of garden-grounds and aqueducts, fresh and salt water ponds for the preservation and breeding of river and marine fishes, nurseries of snails and slugs, game-preserves for keeping hares, rabbits, stags, roes, and wild boars, and aviaries in which even cranes and peacocks were kept. But the luxury of a great city enriches also many an industrious hand, and supports more poor than philanthropy with its expenditure of alms. Those aviaries and fishponds of the grandees were of course under ordinary circumstances a very costly indulgence. But this system was carried to such an extent and prosecuted with so much keenness, that *e. g.* the stock of a pigeon-house was valued at 100,000 sesterces (£1000); a methodical system of fattening had sprung up, and the manure got from the aviaries became of importance in agriculture; a single bird-dealer was able to furnish at once 5000 fieldfares—for they knew how to rear these also—at three denarii (2s.) each, and a single possessor of a fish-pond 2000 *murænae*; and the fishes left behind by Lucius Lucullus brought 40,000 sesterces (£400). As may readily be conceived, under such circumstances any one who followed this occupation industriously and intelligently might obtain very large profits with a comparatively small outlay of capital. A small bee-breeder of this period sold from his thyme-garden not larger than an acre in the neighbourhood of Falerii honey to an average annual amount of at least 10,000 sesterces (£100). The rivalry of the growers of fruit was carried so far, that in elegant villas the fruit-chamber lined with marble was not unfrequently fitted up at the same time as a dining-room, and sometimes fine fruit acquired by purchase was exhibited there as of home growth. At this period the cherry from Asia Minor and other foreign fruit-trees were first planted in the gardens of Italy. The vegetable gardens, the beds of roses and violets in Latium and Campania, yielded rich produce, and the “market for dainties” (*forum cupedinis*) by the side of the Via Sacra, where fruits, honey, and chaplets were wont to be exposed for sale, played an important part in the life of the capital. Generally the management of estates, worked as they were on the planter-system, had reached in an economic point of view a height scarcely to be surpassed. The valley of Rieti, the

region round the Fucine lake, the districts on the Liris and Volturnus, and indeed Central Italy in general, were as respects husbandry in the most flourishing condition; even certain branches of industry, which were suitable accompaniments of the management of an estate by means of slaves, were taken up by intelligent landlords, and, where the circumstances were favourable, inns, weaving factories, and especially brickworks were constructed on the estate. The Italian producers of wine and oil in particular not only supplied the Italian markets, but carried on also in both articles a considerable business of transmarine exportation. A homely professional treatise of this period compares Italy to a great fruit-garden; and the pictures which a contemporary poet gives of his beautiful native land, where the well-watered meadow, the luxuriant corn-field, the pleasant vine-covered hill are fringed by the dark line of the olive-trees—where the “ornament” of the land, smiling in varied charms, cherishes the loveliest gardens in its bosom and is itself wreathed round by food-producing trees—these descriptions, evidently faithful pictures of the landscape daily presented to the eye of the poet, transplant us into the most flourishing districts of Tuscany and Terra di Lavoro. The pastoral husbandry, it is true, which for reasons formerly explained was always spreading further especially in the south and south-east of Italy, was in every respect a retrograde movement; but it too participated to a certain degree in the general progress of agriculture; much was done for the improvement of the breeds, and *e. g.* asses for breeding brought 60,000 sesterces (£600), 100,000 (£1000), and even 400,000 (£4000). The solid Italian husbandry obtained at this period, when the general development of intelligence and abundance of capital rendered it fruitful, far more brilliant results than ever the old system of small cultivators could have given; and was carried even already beyond the bounds of Italy, for the Italian agriculturist turned to account large tracts in the provinces by raising cattle and even cultivating corn.

Money-
dealing.

In order to show what dimensions money-dealing assumed by the side of this estate-husbandry unnaturally prospering over the ruin of the small farmers, how the Italian merchants vying with the Jews poured themselves into all the provinces and client-states of the kingdom, and how all capital ultimately flowed to Rome, it will be sufficient, after what has been already said, to point to the single fact that in the

money-market of the capital the regular rate of interest at this time was six per cent., and consequently money there was cheaper by a half than it was on an average elsewhere in antiquity.

In consequence of this economic system based both in its agrarian and mercantile aspects on masses of capital and on speculation, there arose a most fearful disproportion in the distribution of wealth. The often used and often abused phrase of a commonwealth composed of millionaires and beggars applies perhaps nowhere so completely as to the Rome of the last age of the republic; and nowhere perhaps has the essential maxim of the slave-state—that the rich man who lives by the exertions of his slaves is necessarily respectable, and the poor man who lives by the labour of his hands is necessarily vulgar—been recognised with so terrible precision as the undoubted principle underlying all public and private intercourse.* A real middle class in our sense of the term there was not, as indeed no such class

Social dis-
proportion.

* The following exposition in Cicero's treatise *De Officiis* (i. 42) is characteristic: *Jam de artificibus et quæstibus, qui liberales habendi, qui sordidi sint, hæc fere accepimus. Primum improbantur ii quæstus, qui in odia hominum incurrunt, ut portitorum, ut feneratorum. Iliberales autem et sordidi quæstus mercenariorum omnium, quorum operæ, non artes emuntur. Est autem in illis ipsa merces auctoramentum servitutis. Sordidi etiam putandi, qui mercantur a mercatoribus quod statim vendant, nihil enim proficiant, nisi admodum mentiantur. Nec vero est quidquam turpius vanitate. Opificesque omnes in sordida arte versantur; nec enim quidquam ingenuum habere potest officina. Minimeque artes eæ probandæ, quæ ministræ sunt voluptatum,*

"Cetariû, lanii, coqui, fartores, piscatores,"

ut ait Terentius. Adde huc, si placet, unguentarios, saltatores, totumque ludum talarium. Quibus autem artibus aut prudentia major inest, aut non mediocris utilitas quaeritur, ut medicina, ut architectura, ut doctrina rerum honestarum, eæ sunt iis, quorum ordini conveniunt, honestæ. Mercatura autem, si tenuis est, sordida putanda est; sin magna et copiosa, multa undique apportans, multaque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum vituperanda; atque etiam, si satiata quæstu, vel contenta potius; ut sæpe ex alto in portum, ex ipso portu in agros se possessionesque contulerit, videtur optimo jure posse laudari. Omnium autem rerum, ex quibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agricultura melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine libero dignius. According to this the respectable man must, in strictness, be a landowner; the trade of a merchant becomes him only so far as it is a means to this ultimate end: science as a profession is suitable only for the Greeks and for Romans not belonging to the ruling classes, who by this means may purchase at all events a certain toleration of their personal presence in genteel circles. It is a thoroughly developed aristocracy of planters, with a strong infusion of mercantile speculation and a slight shading of general culture.

can exist in any fully developed slave state; what appears as if it were a good middle class and is so in a certain measure, is composed of those rich men of business and landholders who are so uncultivated or so highly cultivated as to content themselves within the sphere of their activity and to keep aloof from public life. Of the men of business—a class, among whom the numerous freedmen and other upstarts, as a rule, were seized with the giddy fancy of playing the man of quality—there were not very many who showed so much judgment. A model of this sort was the Titus Pomponius Atticus frequently mentioned in the accounts of this period. He acquired an immense fortune partly from the great estate-farming which he prosecuted in Italy and Epirus, partly from his money-transactions which ramified throughout Italy, Greece, Macedonia, and Asia Minor; but at the same time he continued to be throughout the simple man of business, did not allow himself to be seduced into soliciting office or even into monetary transactions with the state, and, equally remote from the avaricious niggardliness and from the prodigal and burdensome luxury of his time—his table, for instance, was maintained at a daily cost of 100 sesterces (£1)—contented himself with an easy existence appropriating to itself the charms of a country and a city life, the pleasures of intercourse with the best society of Rome and Greece, and all the enjoyments of literature and art. More numerous and more solid were the Italian landholders of the old type. Contemporary literature preserves in the description of Sextus Roscius, who was murdered amidst the proscriptions of 673, the picture of such a rural nobleman (*pater familias rusticanus*); his wealth, estimated at 6,000,000 sesterces (£60,000), is mainly invested in his thirteen landed estates; he attends to its management in person systematically and with enthusiasm; he comes seldom or never to the capital, and, when he does appear there, by his clownish manners he contrasts not less with the polished senator than the innumerable hosts of his uncouth rural slaves with the elegant train of domestic slaves in the capital. More than the circles of the nobility with their cosmopolitan culture and the mercantile class at home everywhere and nowhere, these landlords and the “country towns” to which they essentially gave tone (*municipia rusticana*) preserved as well the discipline and manners of their fathers

81.

as their pure and noble language. The order of landlords was regarded as the flower of the nation; the speculator, who has made his fortune and wishes to appear among the notables of the land, buys an estate and seeks, if not to become himself the squire, at any rate to rear his son with that view. We meet the traces of this class of landlords, wherever a national movement appears in politics, and wherever literature puts forth any fresh growth; from it the patriotic opposition to the new monarchy drew its best strength; to it belong Varro, Lucretius, Catullus; and nowhere perhaps does the comparative freshness of this landlord life come more characteristically to light than in the graceful Arpinate introduction to the second book of Cicero's treatise *De Legibus*—a green oasis amidst the fearful desert of that equally empty and voluminous writer.

But the cultivated class of merchants and the vigorous The poor. order of landlords are far overgrown by the two classes that gave tone to society—the mass of beggars, and the world of quality proper. We have no statistical figures to indicate precisely the relative proportions of poverty and riches for this epoch; yet we may here perhaps again recall the expression which a Roman statesman employed some fifty years before (iii. 138)—that the number of families of firmly established riches among the Roman burgesses did not amount to 2,000. The burgess-body had since then become different; but clear indications attest that the disproportion between poor and rich had remained at least as great. The increasing impoverishment of the multitude shows itself only too plainly in their crowding to the corn-largesses and to enlistment in the army; the corresponding increase of riches is attested expressly by an author of this generation, when, speaking of the circumstances of the Marian period, he describes an estate of 2,000,000 sesterces (£20,000) as “riches according to the circumstances of that day;” and the statements which we find as to the property of individuals lead to the same conclusion. The extremely rich Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus promised to twenty thousand soldiers four *jugera* of land each, out of his own property; the estate of Pompeius amounted to 70,000,000 sesterces (£700,000), that of Æsopus the actor to 20,000,000 (£200,000); Marcus Crassus, the richest of the rich, possessed at the outset of his career 7,000,000 (£70,000), at its close, after lavishing enormous sums on the people, 170,000,000 sesterces

(£1,700,000). The effect of such poverty and such riches was on both sides an economic and moral disorganisation outwardly different, but at bottom of the same character. If the common man was saved from starvation only by support from the resources of the state, it was the necessary consequence of this mendicant misery—although it also reciprocally appears as a cause of it—that he addicted himself to mendicant laziness and to mendicant good cheer. The Roman plebeian was fonder of gazing in the theatre than of working; the taverns and brothels were so frequented, that the demagogues found their special account in gaining the possessors of such establishments over to their interests. The gladiatorial games—which revealed, at the same time that they fostered, the worst demoralisation of the ancient world—had become so flourishing that a lucrative business was done in the sale of the programmes for them; and it was at this time that the horrible innovation was adopted by which the decision as to the life or death of the vanquished became dependent not on the law of duel or on the pleasure of the victor but on the caprice of the on-looking public, and according to its signal the victor either spared or transfixed his prostrate antagonist. The trade of fighting had so risen or freedom had so fallen in value, that the intrepidity and the emulation, which were lacking on the battle-fields of this age, were universal in the armies of the arena, and, where the law of the duel required, every gladiator allowed himself to be stabbed mutely and without shrinking; that in fact free men not unfrequently sold themselves to the contractors for board and wages as gladiatorial slaves. The plebeians of the fifth century had also suffered want and famine, but they had not sold their freedom; and still less would the jurisconsults of that period have lent themselves to pronounce the equally immoral and illegal contract of such a gladiatorial slave “to let himself be chained, scourged, burnt or killed without opposition, if the laws of the institution should so require” by means of unbecoming juristic subtleties as a contract lawful and actionable.

In the world of quality such things did not occur, but at bottom it was hardly different, and least of all better. In doing nothing the aristocrat boldly competed with the proletarian; if the latter lounged on the pavement, the former lay in bed till far on in the day. Extravagance prevailed here

as unbounded as it was devoid of taste. It was lavished on politics and on the theatre, of course to the corruption of both; the consular office was purchased at an incredible price—in the summer of 700 the first voting-division alone was paid 10,000,000 sesterces (£100,000)—and all the pleasure of the man of culture in the drama was spoilt by the insane luxury of decoration. Rents in Rome appear to have been on an average four times as high as in the country towns; a house there was once sold for 15,000,000 sesterces (£150,000). The house of Marcus Lepidus (consul in 676) which was at the time of the death of Sulla the finest in Rome, did not rank a generation afterwards even as the hundredth on the list of Roman palaces. We have already mentioned the extravagance practised in the matter of country-houses; we find that 4,000,000 sesterces (£40,000) were paid for such a house, which was valued chiefly for its fishpond; and the thoroughly fashionable grandee now needed at least two villas—one in the Sabine or Alban mountains near the capital, and a second in the vicinity of the Campanian baths—and in addition if possible a garden immediately outside of the gates of Rome. Still more irrational than these villa-palaces were the palatial sepulchres, several of which still existing at the present day attest what a lofty pile of masonry the rich Roman needed in order to die as became his rank. Fanciers of horses and dogs too were not wanting; 24,000 sesterces (£240) was no uncommon price for a showy horse. They indulged in furniture of fine wood—a table of African cypress-wood cost 1,000,000 sesterces (£10,000); in dresses of purple stuffs or transparent gauzes accompanied by an elegant adjustment of their folds before the mirror—the orator Hortensius is said to have brought an action of damages against a colleague because he ruffled his dress in a crowd; in precious stones and pearls, which first at this period took the place of the far more beautiful and more artistic ornaments of gold—it was already utter barbarism, when at the triumph of Pompeius over Mithradates the image of the victor appeared wrought wholly of pearls, and when the sofas and the shelves in the dining-hall were silver-mounted and even the kitchen-utensils were made of silver. In a similar spirit the collectors of this period took out the artistic medallions from the old silver cups, to set them anew in vessels of gold. Nor was there any lack of luxury also in travelling. “When

54.

78.

the governor travelled," Cicero tells us as to one of the Sicilian governors, "which of course he did not in winter, but only at the beginning of spring—not the spring of the calendar but the beginning of the season of roses—he had himself conveyed, as was the custom with the kings of Bithynia, in a litter with eight bearers, sitting on a cushion of Maltese gauze stuffed with rose-leaves, with one garland on his head and a second twined round his neck, applying to his nose a little smelling-bag of fine linen, with minute meshes, filled with roses; and thus he had himself carried even to his bedchamber." But no sort of luxury flourished so much as the coarsest of all, the luxury of the table. The whole villa arrangements and the whole villa life had ultimate reference to dining; not only had they different dining-rooms for winter and summer, but dinner was served in the picture-gallery, in the fruit-chamber, in the aviary, or on a platform erected in the deer-park, around which, when the bespoken "Orpheus" appeared in theatrical costume and blew his flourish, the duly trained roes and wild boars congregated. Such was the care bestowed on decoration; but amidst all this the reality was by no means forgotten. Not only was the cook a graduate in gastronomy, but the master himself often acted as the instructor of his cooks. The roast had been long ago thrown into the shade by marine fishes and oysters; now the Italian river-fishes were utterly banished from good tables, and Italian delicacies and Italian wines were looked on as almost vulgar. Now even at the popular festivals there were distributed, besides the Italian Falerian, three sorts of foreign wine—Sicilian, Lesbian, Chian, while a generation before it had been sufficient even at great banquets to send round Greek wine once; in the cellar of the orator Hortensius there was found a stock of 10,000 jars (at 33 quarts) of foreign wine. It was no wonder that the Italian wine-growers began to complain of the competition of the wines from the Greek islands. No naturalist could ransack land and sea more zealously for new animals and plants, than the epicures of that day ransacked them for new culinary dainties.* The circum-

63. * We have still (Macrobius iii. 13) the bill of fare of the banquet, which Mucius Lentulus Niger gave before 691 on entering on his pontificate, and of which the pontifices—Cæsar included—the Vestal Virgins, and some other priests and ladies nearly related to them partook. Before the dinner proper came sea-hedgehogs; fresh oysters as many as the guests wished; large

stance of the guest taking an emetic after a banquet, to avoid the consequences of the varied fare set before him, no longer created surprise. Debauchery of every sort became so systematic and aggravated that it found its professors, who earned a livelihood by serving as instructors of the youth of quality in the theory and practice of vice. It will not be necessary to dwell longer on this confused picture, so monotonous in its variety; and the less so, that the Romans were far from original in this respect, and confined themselves to exhibiting a copy of the Hellenic-Asiatic luxury, still more exaggerated and stupid than their model. Plutus naturally devours his children as well as Kronos; the competition for all these mostly worthless objects of fashionable longing so forced up prices, that those who swam with the stream found the most colossal estate melt away in a short time, and even those, who only for credit's sake joined in what was most necessary, saw their inherited and firmly-established wealth rapidly undermined. The canvass for the consulship, for instance, was the usual highway to ruin for houses of distinction; and nearly the same description applies to the games, the great buildings, and all those other pleasant but doubtless expensive pursuits. The princely wealth of that period is only surpassed by its still more princely liabilities; Cæsar owed about 692 after deducting his assets 25,000,000 sesterces (£250,000); Marcus Antonius, at the age of twenty-four, 6,000,000 sesterces (£60,000), fourteen years afterwards 40,000,000 (£400,000); Curio owed 60,000,000 (£600,000); Milo 70,000,000 (£700,000). That those extravagant habits of the Roman world of quality rested throughout on credit, is shown by the fact that the rate of interest in Rome was once suddenly

Debt.

62.

mussels; sphondyli; fieldfares with asparagus; fattened fowls; oyster and mussel pasties; black and white sea-acorns; sphondyli again; glycimarides; sea-nettles; beca-ficoes; roe-ribs; boar's-ribs; fowls dressed with flour; beca-ficoes; purple shell-fish of two sorts. The dinner itself consisted of sow's udder; boar's head; fish-pasties; boar-pasties; ducks; boiled teals; hares; roasted fowls; starch-pastry; Pontic pastry.

These are the college-banquets regarding which Varro (*De R. R.* iii. 2, 16) says that they forced up the price of all delicacies. Varro in one of his Satires enumerates the following as the most notable foreign delicacies: peacocks from Samos; grouse from Phrygia; cranes from Melos; kids from Ambracia; tunny-fishes from Chalcedon; murænas from the Straits of Gades; ass-fishes (? *aselli*) from Pessinus; oysters and scallops from Tarentum; sturgeons (?) from Rhodes; *scarus*-fishes (?) from Cilicia; nuts from Thasos; dates from Egypt; acorns from Spain.

raised from four to eight per cent. through the borrowing of the different competitors for the consulship. Insolvency, instead of leading in due time to a meeting of creditors or at any rate to a liquidation which might at least place matters once more on a clear footing, was ordinarily prolonged by the debtor as much as possible; instead of selling his property and especially his landed estates, he continued to borrow and to present the semblance of riches, till the crash only became the worse and the winding-up yielded a result like that of Milo, in which the creditors obtained somewhat above four per cent. of the sums for which they ranked. Amidst this startlingly rapid transition from riches to bankruptcy and this systematic swindling, nobody of course gained so much as the cool banker, who knew how to give and refuse credit. The relations of debtor and creditor thus returned almost to the same point at which they had stood in the worst times of the social crises of the fifth century; the nominal landowners held virtually by sufferance of their creditors; the debtors were either in servile subjection to their creditors, so that the humbler of them appeared like freedmen in the creditors' train and those of higher rank spoke and voted even in the senate at the nod of their creditor-lord; or they were ready to make war on property itself, and either to intimidate their creditors by threats or to get rid of them by conspiracy and civil war. On these relations was based the power of Crassus; out of them arose the insurrections—whose motto was “a clear sheet”—of Cinna (iii. 258, 325) and still more definitely of Catilina, of Coelius, of Dolabella, entirely resembling the battles between those who had and those who had not, which a century before agitated the Hellenic world (ii. 292). That amidst so rotten an economic condition every financial or political crisis should occasion the most dreadful confusion, was to be expected from the nature of the case; we need hardly mention, that the usual phenomena—the disappearance of capital, the sudden depreciation of landed estates, innumerable bankruptcies, and an almost universal insolvency—made their appearance now during the civil war, just as they had done during the Social and Mithradatic wars (iii. 410).

Immorality. Under such circumstances, as a matter of course, morality and family life were treated as antiquated things among all ranks of society. To be poor was not merely the saddest

disgrace and the worst crime, but the only disgrace and the only crime ; for money the statesman sold the state, and the burgess sold his freedom ; the post of the officer and the vote of the jurymen were to be had for money ; for money the lady of quality surrendered her person as well as the common courtesan ; falsifying of documents and perjuries had become so common, that in a popular poet of this age an oath is called "the plaster for debts." Men had forgotten what honesty was ; a person who refused a bribe was regarded not as an upright man, but as a personal foe. The criminal statistics of all times and countries will hardly furnish a parallel to the dreadful picture of crimes—so varied, so horrible, and so unnatural—which the trial of Aulus Cluentius unrolls before us in the bosom of one of the most respectable families of an Italian country town.

But while at the bottom of the national life the slime was Friendship. thus constantly accumulating more and more deleteriously and deeply, so much the more smooth and glittering was the surface, overlaid with the varnish of polished manners and universal friendship. All the world interchanged visits ; so that in the houses of quality it was necessary to admit the persons presenting themselves every morning for the levee in a certain order fixed by the master or occasionally by the attendant in waiting, and to give audience only to the more notable one by one, while the rest were more summarily admitted partly in groups, partly in a body at the close—a distinction which Gaius Gracchus, in this too the first founder of the new monarchy, is said to have introduced. The interchange of letters of courtesy was carried to as great an extent as the visits of courtesy ; "friendly" letters flew over land and sea between persons who had neither personal relations nor business with each other, whereas proper and formal business-letters scarcely occur except where the letter is addressed to a corporation. In like manner invitations to dinner, the customary new year's presents, the domestic festivals, were divested of their proper character and converted almost into public ceremonials ; even death itself did not release the Roman from these attentions to his countless "neighbours," but in order to die with due respectability he had to provide each of them at any rate with a keepsake. Just as in certain circles of our mercantile world, the genuine intimacy of family ties and family friendships had so totally vanished from the Rome of

that day, that the whole intercourse of business and acquaintance could be garnished with its forms and flourishes which had lost all meaning, and thus by degrees real friendship came to be superseded by that spectral shadow of "friendship" which holds by no means the least place among the various evil spirits brooding over the proscriptions and civil wars of this age.

Women.

An equally characteristic feature in the brilliant decay of this period was the emancipation of women. In an economic point of view the women had long since made themselves independent (ii. 408); in the present epoch we even meet with solicitors acting specially for women, who officiously lend their aid to solitary rich ladies in the management of their property and their lawsuits, make an impression on them by their knowledge of business and law, and thereby procure for themselves ampler perquisites and legacies than other loungers on the exchange. But it was not merely from the economic guardianship of father or husband that women felt themselves emancipated. Love-intrigues of all sorts were constantly in progress. The ballet-dancers (*mimæ*) were quite a match for those of the present day in the variety of their pursuits and the skill with which they followed them out; their primadonnas, the Cytherises and the like, pollute even the pages of history. But their as it were licensed trade was very materially injured by the free art of the ladies of aristocratic circles. Liaisons in the first houses had become so frequent, that only a scandal altogether exceptional could make them the subject of special talk; a judicial interference seemed now almost ridiculous. An unparalleled scandal, such as Publius Clodius produced in 61. 693 at the women's festival in the house of the Pontifex Maximus, although a thousand times worse than the occurrences which fifty years before had led to a series of capital sentences (iii. 436), passed almost without investigation and wholly without punishment. The watering-place season—in April, when political business was suspended and the world of quality congregated in Baïæ and Puteoli—derived its chief charm from the relations licit and illicit which, along with music and song and elegant breakfasts on board or on shore, enlivened the gondola voyages. There the ladies held absolute sway; but they were by no means content with this domain which rightfully belonged to them; they also acted as politicians, appeared in party conferences,

and took part with their money and their intrigues in the wild coterie-proceedings of the time. Any one who beheld these female statesmen performing on the stage of Scipio and Cato and saw at their side the young fop—as with smooth chin, delicate voice, and mincing gait, with head-dress and neckerchiefs, frilled robe and women's sandals he copied the loose courtesan—might well have a horror of the unnatural world, in which the sexes seemed as though they wished to change parts. What ideas as to divorce prevailed in the circles of the aristocracy may be discerned in the conduct of their best and most moral hero Marcus Cato, who did not hesitate to separate from his wife at the request of a friend desirous to marry her, and as little scrupled on the death of this friend to marry the same wife a second time. Celibacy and childlessness became more and more common, especially among the upper classes. While among these marriage had for long been regarded as a burden which people took upon them at the best in the public interest (ii. 435 ; iii. 419), we now encounter even in Cato and those who shared Cato's sentiments the maxim to which Polybius a century before traced the decay of Hellas (iii. 44), that it is the duty of a citizen to keep great wealth together and therefore not to beget too many children. Where were the times, when the designation “children-begetter” (*proletarius*) had been a term of honour for the Roman ?

In consequence of such a social condition the Latin stock in Italy underwent an alarming diminution, and its fair provinces were overspread partly by parasitic immigrants, partly by sheer desolation. A considerable portion of the population of Italy flocked to foreign lands. Already the aggregate amount of talent and of working power, which the supply of Italian magistrates and Italian garrisons for the whole domain of the Mediterranean demanded, transcended the resources of the peninsula, especially as the elements thus sent abroad were in great part lost for ever to the nation. For the more that the Roman community grew into an empire embracing many nations, the more the governing aristocracy lost the habit of looking on Italy as their exclusive home ; while of the men levied or enlisted for service a considerable portion perished in the many wars, especially in the bloody civil war, and another portion became wholly estranged from their native country by the long period of service which sometimes lasted for a generation.

Depopulation of Italy.

In like manner with the public service speculation kept a portion of the landholders and almost the whole body of merchants all their lives or at any rate for a long time out of the country, and the demoralising itinerant habits of the latter in particular estranged them altogether from civic existence in the mother country and from the various restraints of family life. As a compensation for these Italy obtained on the one hand the proletariat of slaves and freedmen, on the other hand the craftsmen and traders flocking thither from Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt, who flourished chiefly in the capital and still more in the seaport towns of Ostia, Puteoli, and Brundisium (iii. 425). In the largest and most important part of Italy, however, there was not even such a substitution of impure elements for pure; but the population was visibly on the decline. Especially was this true of the pastoral districts such as Apulia, the chosen land of cattle-breeding, which is called by contemporaries the most deserted part of Italy, and of the region around Rome, where the Campagna was annually becoming more desolate under the constant reciprocal action of the retrograde agriculture and the increasing malaria. Labici, Gabii, Boville, once cheerful little country towns, were so decayed, that it was difficult to find representatives of them for the ceremony of the Latin festival. Tusculum, although still one of the most eminent communities of Latium, consisted almost solely of some families of rank who lived in the capital but retained their native Tusculan franchise, and was far inferior in the number of burgesses entitled to vote even to small communities in the interior of Italy. The stock of men capable of arms in this district, on which Rome's ability to defend herself had once mainly depended, had so totally vanished, that people read with astonishment and perhaps with horror the accounts of the annals—sounding fabulous in comparison with things as they stood—respecting the Aequian and Volscian wars. Matters were not so bad everywhere, especially in the other portions of Central Italy and in Campania; nevertheless, as Varro complains, “the once populous cities of Italy” in general “stood desolate.”

Italy under
the oligarchy.

It is a dreadful picture—this picture of Italy under the rule of the oligarchy. There was nothing to bridge over or soften the fatal contrast between the world of the beggars and the world of the rich. The more clearly and painfully

this contrast was felt on both sides—the giddier the height to which riches rose, the deeper the abyss of poverty yawned—the more frequently, amidst that changeful world of speculation and playing at hazard, were individuals tossed from the bottom to the top and again from the top to the bottom. The wider the chasm by which the two worlds were externally divided, the more completely they coincided in the like annihilation of family life—which is yet the germ and core of all nationality—in the like laziness and luxury, the like unsubstantial economy, the like unmanly dependence, the like corruption differing only in its scale, the like demoralisation of criminals, the like longing to begin the war with property. Riches and misery in close league drove the Italians out of Italy, and filled the peninsula partly with swarms of slaves, partly with awful silence. It is a terrible picture, but not one peculiar to Italy; wherever the government of capitalists in a slave-state has fully developed itself, it has desolated God's fair world in the same way. As rivers glisten in different colours, but a common sewer everywhere looks like itself, so the Italy of the Ciceronian epoch resembles substantially the Hellas of Polybius and still more decidedly the Carthage of Hannibal's time, where in exactly similar fashion the all-powerful rule of capital ruined the middle class, raised trade and estate-farming to the highest prosperity, and ultimately led to a—hypocritically whitewashed—moral and political corruption of the nation. All the arrant sins that capital has been guilty of against nation and civilisation in the modern world, remain as far inferior to the abominations of the ancient capitalist-states as the free man, be he ever so poor, remains superior to the slave; and not until the dragon-seed of North America ripens, will the world have again similar fruits to reap.

These evils, under which the national economy of Italy lay prostrate, were in their deepest essence irremediable, and so much of them as still admitted of remedy depended essentially for its amendment on the people and on time; for the wisest government is as little able as the most skilful physician to give freshness to the corrupt juices of the organism, or to do more in the case of the deeper-rooted evils than to prevent those accidents which obstruct the remedial power of nature in its working. The peaceful energy of the new rule even of itself furnished such a preventive, for by its means some of

Reforms of
Cæsar.

the worst excrescences were done away, such as the artificial pampering of the proletariat, the impunity of crimes, the purchase of offices, and various others. But the government could do something more than simply abstain from harm. Cæsar was not one of those over-wise people who refuse to embank the sea, because forsooth no dike can defy some sudden influx of the tide. It is better, if a nation and its economy follow spontaneously the path prescribed by nature ; but, seeing that they had got out of this path, Cæsar applied all his energies to bring back by special intervention the nation to its home and family life, and to reform the national economy by law and decree. With a view to check the continued absence of the Italians from Italy and to induce the world of quality and the merchants to establish their homes in their native land, not only was the term of service for the soldiers shortened, but men of senatorial rank were altogether prohibited from taking up their abode out of Italy except when on public business, while the other Italians of marriageable age (from the twentieth to the fortieth year) were enjoined not to be absent from Italy for more than three consecutive years. In the same spirit Cæsar had already in his first consulship on founding the colony of Capua kept specially in view fathers who had several children (P. 200) ; and now as Imperator he proposed extraordinary rewards for the fathers of numerous families, while he at the same time as supreme judge of the nation treated divorce and adultery with a rigour according to Roman ideas unparalleled. Nor did he even think it beneath his dignity to issue a detailed law as to luxury—which, among other points, cut down extravagance in building at least in one of its most irrational forms, that of sepulchral monuments ; restricted the use of purple robes and pearls to certain times, ages, and classes, and totally prohibited it in grown-up men ; fixed a maximum for the expenditure of the table ; and directly forbade a number of luxurious dishes. Such ordinances doubtless were not new ; but it was a new thing, that the “master of morals” seriously insisted on their observance, superintended the provision-markets by means of paid overseers, and ordered that the tables of men of rank should be examined by his officers and the forbidden dishes on them should be confiscated. It is true that by such theoretical and practical instructions in moderation as the new monarchical police gave to the fashionable world hardly more could be accom-

Measures
against
absentees
from Italy.

Measures
for the ele-
vation of
the family.

Laws re-
specting
luxury.

plished than the compelling luxury to retire somewhat more into concealment; but, if hypocrisy is the homage which vice pays to virtue, under the circumstances of the times even a semblance of propriety enforced by police measures was a step towards improvement not to be despised. The measures of Cæsar for the better regulation of Italian monetary and agricultural relations were of a graver character and promised greater results. The first question here related to temporary enactments respecting the scarcity of money and the debt-crisis generally. The law called forth by the outcry as to locked-up capital—that no one should have on hand more than 60,000 sesterces (£600) in gold and silver cash—was probably only issued to allay the indignation of the blind public against the usurers; the form of publication, which proceeded on the fiction that this was merely the renewed enforcing of an earlier law that had fallen into oblivion, shows that Cæsar was ashamed of this enactment, and it can hardly have passed into actual application. A far more serious question was the treatment of the pending claims for debt, the complete remission of which was vehemently demanded from Cæsar by the party which called itself by his name. We have already mentioned, that he did not yield to this demand (P. 459); but two important concessions were made to the debtors, and that as early as 705. First, the interest in arrear was struck off;* and that which was paid was deducted from the capital. Secondly, the creditor was compelled to accept the moveable and immoveable property of the debtor in lieu of payment at the estimated value which his effects had before the civil war and the general depreciation which it had occasioned. The latter enactment was not unreasonable; if the creditor was to be looked on *de facto* as the owner of the property of his debtor to the amount of the sum due to him, it was doubtless proper that he should bear his share in the general depreciation of the property. On the other hand the cancelling of the payments of interest made or outstanding—which practically amounted to this, that the creditors lost, besides the interest itself, on an average 25 per cent. of what they were entitled to claim as capital at the time of the issuing of the law—was

The debt
crisis.

49.

* This is not stated by our authorities, but it necessarily follows from the permission to deduct the interest paid by cash or assignation (*si quid usuræ nomine numeratum aut perscriptum fuisset*; Sueton. *Cæs.* 42), as paid contrary to law, from the capital.

342.

in fact nothing else than a partial concession of that canceling of creditor's claims springing out of loans for which the democrats had clamoured so vehemently ; and, however bad may have been the conduct of the usurers, it is not possible thereby to justify the universal and retrospective abolition of all claims for interest without distinction. In order at least to understand it, we must recollect how the democratic party stood towards the question of interest. The legal prohibition against taking interest, which the old plebeian opposition had extorted in 412 (i. 311), had no doubt been practically disregarded by the nobility which controlled the civil procedure by means of the prætorship, but had still remained since that period formally valid ; and the democrats of the seventh century, who regarded themselves throughout as the continuers of that old agitation as to privilege and social position (P. 173), had maintained the illegality of payments of interest at any time, and even already practically enforced that principle, at least temporarily, in the confusion of the Marian period (iii. 258). It is not credible that Cæsar shared the crude views of his party on the interest question ; the fact, that in his account of the matter of liquidation he mentions the enactment as to the surrender of the property of the debtor in lieu of payment but is silent as to the cancelling of the interest, is perhaps a tacit self-reproach. But he was, like every party leader, dependent on his party and could not directly repudiate the traditional maxims of the democracy in the question of interest ; the more especially when he had to decide this question, not as the all-powerful conqueror of Pharsalus, but even before his departure for Epirus. But, while he permitted perhaps rather than originated this violation of legal order and of property, it is certainly his merit that that monstrous demand for the annulling of all claims arising from loans was rejected ; and it may perhaps be looked on as a saving of his honour, that the debtors were far more indignant at the—according to their view extremely unsatisfactory—concession given to them than the injured creditors, and made under Cælius and Dolabella those foolish and (as already mentioned) speedily frustrated attempts to extort by riot and civil war what Cæsar refused to them.

New
ordinance
as to bank-
ruptcy.

But Cæsar did not confine himself to helping the debtor at the moment ; he did what as legislator he could, permanently to keep down the fearful omnipotence of capital.

First of all the great legal maxim was proclaimed, that freedom is not a possession commensurable with property, but an eternal right of man, of which the state is entitled judicially to deprive the criminal alone, not the debtor. It was Cæsar, who, perhaps stimulated in this case also by the more humane Egyptian and Greek legislation, especially that of Solon,* introduced this principle—diametrically opposed to the maxims of the earlier ordinances as to debt—into the common law, where it has since retained its place undisputed. According to Roman law the debtor unable to pay became the slave of his creditor (i. 163). The Poetelian law no doubt had allowed a debtor, who had become unable to pay through temporary embarrassments, not through genuine insolvency, to save his personal freedom by the cession of his property (i. 311); nevertheless for the really insolvent that principle of law, though doubtless modified in secondary points, had been in substance retained unaltered for five hundred years; a direct recourse to the debtor's estate only occurred exceptionally, when the debtor had died or had forfeited his burgess-rights or could not be found. It was Cæsar who first gave an insolvent the right—on which our modern bankruptcy regulations are based—of formally ceding his estate to his creditors, whether it might suffice to satisfy them or not, so as to save at all events his personal freedom although with diminished honorary and political rights, and to begin a new financial existence, in which he could only be sued on account of claims proceeding from the earlier period and not protected in the liquidation, if he could pay them without renewed financial ruin. While thus the great democrat had the imperishable honour of emancipating personal freedom in principle from capital, he attempted moreover to impose a police limit on the excessive power of capital by usury-laws. He did not affect to disown the democratic antipathy to stipulations for interest. For Italian money-dealing there was fixed a maximum amount of the loans at interest to be allowed in the case of the individual capitalist, which appears to have been proportioned to the Italian landed estate belonging to each and perhaps amounted to half its value.

* The Egyptian royal laws (Diodorus i. 79) and likewise the legislation of Solon (Plutarch *Sol.* 13, 15) forbade bonds in which the loss of the personal liberty of the debtor was made the penalty of non-payment; and at least the latter imposed on the debtor in the event of bankruptcy no more than the cession of his whole assets.

Transgressions of this enactment were, after the fashion of the procedure prescribed in the republican usury laws, treated as criminal offences and sent before a special jury-commission. If these regulations were successfully carried into effect, every Italian man of business would be compelled to become at the same time an Italian landholder, and the class of capitalists subsisting merely on their interest would disappear wholly from Italy. Indirectly too the no less injurious category of insolvent landowners who practically managed their estates merely for their creditors was by this means materially curtailed, inasmuch as the creditors, if they desired to continue their lending business, were compelled to buy for themselves. From this very fact besides it is plain, that Cæsar wished by no means simply to renew that naive prohibition of interest by the old popular party, but on the contrary to allow the taking of interest within certain limits. It is very probable however that he did not confine himself to that injunction—which applied merely to Italy—of a maximum amount of sums to be lent, but also, especially with respect to the provinces, prescribed maximum rates for interest itself. The enactments—that it was illegal to take higher interest than 1 per cent. per month, or to take interest on arrears of interest, or in fine to make a judicial claim for arrears of interest to a greater amount than a sum equal to the capital—were, probably also after the Græco-Egyptian model,* first introduced in the Roman empire by Lucius Lucullus for Asia Minor and retained there by his better successors; soon afterwards they were transferred to other provinces by edicts of the governors, and ultimately at least part of them was provided with the force of law in all provinces by a decree of the Roman senate of 704. The fact that these Lucullan enactments afterwards appear in all their compass as imperial law and so became the basis of the Roman and indeed of modern legislation as to interest, may perhaps be traceable to an ordinance of Cæsar.

50. Elevation of
agriculture. Hand in hand with these efforts to guard against the ascendancy of capital went the endeavours to bring back agriculture to the path which was most advantageous for the commonwealth. For this purpose the improvement of

* At least the latter rule occurs in the old Egyptian royal laws (Diodorus i. 79). On the other hand the Solonian legislation knows no restrictions on interest, but on the contrary expressly allows interest to be fixed of any amount at pleasure.

the administration of justice and of police was very essential. Hitherto nobody in Italy had been sure of his life and of his moveable or immoveable property; Roman condottieri for instance, at the intervals when their gangs were not helping to manage the politics of the capital, applied themselves to robbery in the forests of Etruria or rounded off the country estates of their paymasters by fresh acquisitions; but this sort of club-law was now at an end; and in particular the agricultural population of all classes must have felt the beneficial effects of the change. The plans of Cæsar for great works also, which were not at all limited to the capital, were intended to tell in this respect; the construction, for instance, of a convenient high road from Rome through the passes of the Apennines to the Adriatic was designed to stimulate the internal traffic of Italy, and the lowering the level of the Fucine lake to benefit the Marsian farmers. But Cæsar also sought by more direct measures to influence the state of Italian husbandry. The Italian graziers were required to take at least a third of their herdsmen from freeborn adults, whereby brigandage was checked and at the same time a source of gain was opened to the free proletariat. In the agrarian question Cæsar who already in his first consulship had been in a position to regulate it (P. 200), more judicious than Tiberius Gracchus, did not seek to restore the farmer-system at any price, even at that of a revolution—concealed under juristic clauses—directed against property; by him on the contrary, as by every other genuine statesman, the security of that which is property or is at any rate regarded by the public as property was esteemed as the first and most inviolable of all political maxims, and it was only within the limits assigned by this maxim that he sought to accomplish the elevation of the Italian small holdings, which appeared to him as a vital question for the nation. Even as it was, there was much still left for him in this respect to do. Every private right, whether it was called property or designated as heritable possession, whether traceable to Gracchus or to Sulla, was unconditionally respected by him. On the other hand Cæsar, after he had in his strictly economical fashion—which tolerated no waste and no negligence even on a small scale—instituted a general revision of the Italian titles to property by the revived commission of twenty (P. 202), destined the whole actual domain land of Italy (including a considerable

Distribu-
tion of land,

portion of the lands that were in the hands of spiritual guilds but legally belonged to the state) for distribution in the Gracchan fashion, so far, of course, as it was fitted for agriculture; the Apulian summer and the Samnite winter pastures belonging to the state continued to be domain; and it was at least the design of the Imperator, if these domains should not suffice, to procure the further land requisite by the purchase of Italian estates from the public funds. In the selection of the new farmers provision was naturally made first of all for the veteran soldiers, and as far as possible the burden, which the levy imposed on the mother country, was converted into a benefit by the fact that Cæsar gave the proletarian, who was levied from it as a recruit, back to it as a farmer; it is remarkable also that the desolate Latin communities, such as Veii and Capena, seem to have been especially provided with new colonists. The regulation of Cæsar that the new owners should not be entitled to alienate the lands received by them till after twenty years, was a happy medium between the full bestowal of the right of alienation, which would have brought the larger portion of the distributed land speedily back into the hands of the great capitalists, and the permanent restrictions on free trade in land which Tiberius Gracchus (iii. 90, 96, 134) and Sulla (iii. 357, iv. 88) had enacted, both equally in vain.

Elevation
of the
municipal
system.

49, 45.

Lastly while the government thus energetically applied itself to remove the diseased, and to strengthen the sound, elements of the Italian national life, the newly-regulated municipal system—which had but recently developed itself out of the crisis of the Social war in and alongside of the state-economy (iii. 375)—was intended to communicate to the new absolute monarchy the communal life which was compatible with it, and to impart to the sluggish circulation of the noblest elements of public life once more a quickened action. The leading principles in the two municipal ordinances issued in 705 for Cisalpine Gaul and in 709 for Italy,* the latter of which remained the fundamental law for all succeeding times, are apparently, first, the strict purifying of the urban corporations from all immoral elements, while yet no trace of political police occurs; secondly, the utmost restriction of centralisation and the utmost freedom of movement in the communities, to which there was even now

* Of both laws considerable fragments still exist.

reserved the election of magistrates and a limited civil and criminal jurisdiction. The general police enactments, such as the restrictions on the right of association (P. 503), came, it is true, into operation also here.

Such were the ordinances, by which Cæsar attempted to reform the Italian national economy. It is easy both to show their insufficiency, seeing that they allowed a multitude of evils still to exist, and to prove that they operated in various respects injuriously by imposing restrictions, some of which were very severely felt, on freedom of trade. It is still easier to show that the evils of the Italian national economy generally were incurable. But in spite of this the practical statesman will admire the work as well as the master-workman. It was no small achievement, that in circumstances where a man like Sulla, despairing of remedy, had contented himself with a mere formal reorganisation, the evil was seized in its proper seat and grappled with there; and we may well conclude that Cæsar with his reforms came as near to the measure of what was possible as it was given to a statesman and a Roman to come. He could not and did not expect from them the regeneration of Italy; but he sought on the contrary to attain this in a very different way, for the right apprehension of which it is necessary first of all to review the condition of the provinces as Cæsar found them.

The provinces, which Cæsar found in existence, were Provinces. fourteen in number: seven European—the Further and the Hither Spain, Transalpine Gaul, Italian Gaul with Illyricum, Macedonia with Greece, Sicily, Sardinia with Corsica; five Asiatic—Asia, Bithynia and Pontus, Cilicia with Cyprus, Syria, Crete; and two African—Cyrene and Africa. To these Cæsar added three new ones by the erection of the two new governorships of Lugdunese Gaul and Belgia (P. 283) and by constituting Illyria a separate province.*

In the administration of these provinces oligarchic misrule Provincia. reached a point which, notwithstanding various noteworthy administra- performances in this line, no second government has ever tion of the oligarchy.

* As according to Cæsar's ordinance annually sixteen prætors and two proconsuls divided the governorships among them, and the latter remained two years in office (P. 480), we might conclude that he intended to bring the number of provinces in all up to twenty. Certainty is however the less attainable as to this, seeing that Cæsar perhaps designedly instituted fewer offices than candidatures.

attained at least in the West, and which according to our ideas it seems no longer possible to surpass. Certainly the responsibility for this rests not on the Romans alone. Almost everywhere before their day the Greek, Phœnician, or Asiatic rule had already driven out of the nations the higher spirit and the sense of right and of liberty belonging to better times. It was doubtless hard, that every accused provincial was bound when asked to appear personally in Rome to answer for himself; that the Roman governor interfered at pleasure in the administration of justice and the management of the dependent communities, pronounced capital sentences; and cancelled transactions of the municipal council; and that in case of war he treated the militia as he chose and often infamously, as *e. g.* when Cotta at the siege of the Pontic Heraclea assigned to the militia all the posts of danger, to save his Italians, and on the siege not going according to his wish ordered the heads of his engineers to be laid at his feet. It was doubtless hard, that no rule of morality or of penal justice was longer binding on the Roman administrators and their train, and that violent outrages, rapes, and murders with or without form of law were of daily occurrence in the provinces. But these things were at least nothing new; almost everywhere men had long been accustomed to be treated like slaves, and it signified little in the long run whether a Carthaginian overseer, a Syrian satrap, or a Roman proconsul acted as the local tyrant. Their material well-being, almost the only thing for which the provincials still cared, was far less disturbed by those occurrences, which although numerous in proportion to the many tyrants yet affected merely isolated individuals, than by the financial exactions pressing heavily on all, which had never previously been prosecuted with such energy. The Romans now gave fearful proof of their old mastery of finance in this field. We have already endeavoured to describe the Roman system of provincial oppression in its modest and rational foundations as well as in its growth and corruption (iii. 395—401); as a matter of course, the latter went on increasing. The ordinary taxes became far more oppressive from the inequality of their distribution and from the preposterous system of levying them than from their high amount. As to the burden of quartering troops, Roman statesmen themselves expressed the opinion that a town suffered nearly to the same extent

when a Roman army took up winter quarters in it as when an enemy took it by storm. While the taxation in its original character had been an indemnification for the burden of military defence undertaken by Rome, and the community paying tribute had thus a right to remain exempt from ordinary service, garrison-service was now—as is attested *e. g.* in the case of Sardinia—for the most part imposed on the provincials, and even in the ordinary armies, besides other duties, the whole heavy burden of the cavalry-service was devolved on them. The extraordinary contributions demanded—such as, the deliveries of grain for little or no compensation to benefit the proletariat of the capital; the frequent and costly naval armaments and coast-defences in order to check piracy; the task of supplying works of art, wild beasts, or other demands of the insane Roman luxury in the theatre and the chase; the military requisitions in case of war—were just as frequent as they were oppressive and incalculable. A single instance may show how far things were carried. During the three years' administration of Sicily by Gaius Verres the number of farmers in Leontini fell from 84 to 32, in Motya from 187 to 86, in Herbita from 252 to 120, in Agryium from 250 to 80; so that in four of the most fertile districts of Sicily 59 per cent. of the landholders preferred to let their fields lie fallow than to cultivate them under this régime. And these landholders were, as their small number itself shows and as is expressly stated, not at all small farmers, but respectable planters and in great part Roman burgesses!

In the client states the forms of taxation were somewhat different, but the burdens themselves were if possible still worse, since in addition to the exactions of the Romans there came those of the native courts. In Cappadocia and Egypt the farmer as well as the king was bankrupt; the former was unable to satisfy the tax-collector, the latter was unable to satisfy his Roman creditor. Add to these the exactions, properly so called, not merely of the governor himself, but also of his "friends," each of whom fancied that he had as it were a draft on the governor and a title accordingly to return from the province a made man. The Roman oligarchy in this respect exactly resembled a gang of robbers, and followed out the plundering of the provincials in a professional and business-like manner; the able members of the gang set to work not too nicely, for they had in

fact to share the spoil with the advocates and the jurymen, and the more they stole, they did so the more securely. The notion of honour in theft too was already developed; the big robber looked down on the little, and the latter on the mere thief, with contempt; any one who had been once for a wonder condemned boasted of the high figure of the sums which he was proved to have exacted. Such was the behaviour in the provinces of the successors of those men who had been accustomed to bring home nothing from their administration but the thanks of the subjects and the approbation of their fellow-citizens.

The Roman
capitalists
in the
provinces.

But still worse, if possible, and still less subject to any control was the havoc committed by the Italian men of business among the unhappy provincials. The most lucrative portions of the landed property and the whole commercial and monetary business in the provinces were concentrated in their hands. The estates in the transmarine regions, which belonged to Italian grandees, were exposed to all the misery of management by stewards, and never saw their owner; excepting possibly the hunting-parks, which occur as early as this time in Transalpine Gaul with an area amounting to nearly twenty square miles. Usury flourished as it had never flourished before. The small landowners in Illyricum, Asia, and Egypt managed their estates even in Varro's time in great part practically as the debtor-slaves of their Roman or non-Roman creditors, just as the plebeians in former days for their patrician lords. Cases occurred of capital being lent even to urban communities at four per cent. per month. It was no unusual thing for an energetic and influential man of business to get either the title of envoy* given to him by the senate or that of officer by the governor, and, if possible, to have men put at his service for the better prosecution of his affairs; a case is narrated on credible authority, where one of these honourable martial bankers on account of a claim against the town of Salamis in Cyprus kept its municipal council blockaded in the town-house, until five of the members had died of hunger.

To these two modes of oppression, each of which by itself was intolerable and which were always becoming better arranged to work into each other's hands, were added the general calamities, for which the Roman government was

* This is the so-called "free embassy" (*libera legatio*), namely an embassy without any proper public errand.

also in great part, at least indirectly, responsible. In the various wars a large amount of capital was dragged away from the country and a larger amount destroyed sometimes by the barbarians, sometimes by the Roman armies. Owing to the worthlessness of the Roman land and maritime police brigands and pirates swarmed everywhere. In Sardinia and the interior of Asia Minor brigandage was endemic; in Africa and Further Spain it became necessary to fortify all buildings constructed outside of the city enclosures with walls and towers. The fearful evil of piracy has been already described in another connection (P. 39). The panaceas of the prohibitive system, with which the Roman governor was wont to interpose when scarcity of money or dearth occurred, as under such circumstances they could not fail to do—the prohibition of the export of gold or grain from the province—did not mend the matter. The communal affairs were almost everywhere embarrassed, in addition to the general distress, by local disorders and frauds of the public officials.

Robberies
and damage
by war.

Where such grievances afflicted communities and individuals not temporarily but for generations with an inevitable, steady, and yearly-increasing oppression, the best regulated public and private economy could not but succumb to them, and the most unspeakable misery could not but extend over all the nations from the Tagus to the Euphrates. "All the communities," it is said in a treatise published as early as 684, "are ruined;" the same truth is specially attested as regards Spain and Narbonese Gaul, the very provinces which, comparatively speaking, were still in the most tolerable economic position. In Asia Minor even towns like Samos and Halicarnassus stood almost empty; legal slavery seemed here a haven of rest compared with the torments to which the free provincial succumbed, and even the patient Asiatic had become, according to the descriptions of Roman statesmen themselves, weary of life. Any one who desires to fathom the depths to which man can sink in the criminal infliction, and in the no less criminal endurance, of all conceivable injustice, may gather together from the criminal records of this period the wrongs which Roman grandes could perpetrate and Greeks, Syrians, and Phœnicians could suffer. Even the statesmen of Rome herself publicly and frankly conceded that the Roman name was unutterably odious through all Greece and Asia; and, when the burgesses of the Pontic Heraclea on one occasion put to death

The condi-
tion of the
provinces
generally.

the whole of the Roman tax-collectors, the only matter for regret was that such things did not occur oftener.

Cæsar and
the pro-
vinces.

The
Cæsarian
magistrates.

The Optimates scoffed at the new master who went in person to inspect his "farms" one after the other; in reality the condition of the several provinces demanded all the earnestness and all the wisdom of one of those rare men, who redeem the name of king from being regarded by the nations as merely a conspicuous example of human insufficiency. The wounds inflicted had to be healed by time; Cæsar took care that they might be so healed, and that there should be no fresh inflictions. The system of administration was thoroughly remodelled. The Sullan proconsuls and prætors had been in their provinces essentially sovereign and practically subject to no control; those of Cæsar were the well-disciplined servants of a stern master, who from the very unity and life-tenure of his power sustained a more natural and more tolerable relation to the subjects than those numerous, annually changing, petty tyrants. The governorships were no doubt still distributed among the annually retiring two consuls and sixteen prætors, but, as the Imperator directly nominated eight of the latter and the distribution of the provinces among the competitors depended solely on him (P. 480), they were in reality bestowed by the Imperator. The functions also of the governors were practically restricted. The superintendence of the administration of justice and the administrative control of the communities remained in their hands; but their command was paralysed by the new supreme command in Rome and its adjutants associated with the governor (P. 489), and the raising of the taxes was probably even now committed in the provinces substantially to imperial officials (P. 479), so that the governor was thenceforward surrounded with an auxiliary staff which was absolutely dependent on the Imperator in virtue either of the laws of the military hierarchy or of the still stricter laws of domestic discipline. While hitherto the proconsul and his quæstor had appeared as if they were members of a gang of robbers despatched to levy contributions, the magistrates of Cæsar were present to protect the weak against the strong; and, instead of the previous worse than useless control of the equestrian or senatorian tribunals, they had to answer for themselves at the bar of a just and unrelenting monarch. The law as to exactions, the enactments of which Cæsar had already in his first consulate made more stringent, was

applied by him against the chief commandants in the provinces with an inexorable severity going even beyond its letter; and the tax-officers, if indeed they ventured to indulge in an injustice, atoned for it to their master, as slaves and freedmen according to the cruel domestic law of that time were wont to atone. The extraordinary public burdens were reduced to the right proportion and the actual necessity; the ordinary burdens were materially lessened. We have already mentioned the comprehensive regulation of taxation (P. 494); the extension of the exemptions from tribute, the general lowering of the direct taxes, the limitation of the system of *decumæ* to Africa and Sardinia, the complete setting aside of middle men in the collection of the direct taxes, were most beneficial reforms for the provincials. That Cæsar after the example of one of his greatest democratic predecessors, Sertorius (P. 21), wished to free the subjects from the burden of quartering troops and to insist on the soldiers erecting for themselves permanent encampments resembling towns, cannot indeed be proved; but he was, at least after he had exchanged the part of pretender for that of king, not the man to abandon the subject to the soldier; and it was in keeping with his spirit, when the heirs of his policy created such military camps and then converted them into towns which formed rallying-points for Italian civilisation amidst the barbarian frontier districts.

It was a task far more difficult than the checking of official irregularities, to deliver the provincials from the oppressive ascendancy of Roman capital. Its power could not be directly broken without applying means which were still more dangerous than the evil; the government could for the time being abolish only isolated abuses—as when Cæsar for instance prohibited the employment of the title of state-envoy for financial purposes—and meet manifest acts of violence and palpable usury by a sharp application of the general penal laws and of the laws as to usury, which extended also to the provinces (P. 526); but a more radical cure of the evil was only to be expected from the reviving prosperity of the provincials under a better administration. Temporary enactments, to relieve the insolvency of particular provinces, had been issued on several occasions in recent times. Cæsar himself had in 694 when governor of Further Spain assigned to the creditors two-thirds of the income of their debtors in order to pay them-

Regulation
of burdens.

Influence
on the
capitalist
system.

selves from that source. Lucius Lucullus likewise when governor of Asia Minor had directly cancelled a portion of the arrears of interest which had swelled beyond measure, and had for the remaining portion assigned to the creditors a fourth part of the produce of the lands of their debtors, as well as a suitable proportion of the profits accruing to them from house-rents or slave-labour. We are not expressly told, that Cæsar after the civil war instituted similar general liquidations of debt in the provinces; yet, from what has just been remarked and from what was done in the case of Italy (P. 524), it can hardly be doubted that Cæsar likewise directed his efforts towards this object, or at least that it formed part of his plan.

While thus the Emperor, as far as lay within human power, relieved the provincials from the oppressions of the magistrates and capitalists of Rome, it might at the same time be with certainty expected from the government to which he imparted fresh vigour that it would scare off the wild border-peoples and disperse the freebooters by land and sea, as the rising sun chases away the mist. However the old wounds might still smart, with Cæsar there appeared for the sorely tortured subjects the dawn of a more tolerable epoch, the first intelligent and humane government that had appeared for centuries, and a policy of peace which rested not on cowardice but on strength. Well might the subjects in particular mourn along with the best Romans by the bier of the great liberator.

The beginnings
of the
Helleno-
Italic
state.

But this abolition of existing abuses was not the main matter in Cæsar's provincial reform. In the Roman republic, according to the view of the aristocracy and democracy alike, the provinces had been nothing but—what they were frequently called—country-estates of the Roman people, and they were employed and worked out as such. This view had now passed away. The provinces as such were gradually to disappear, in order to prepare for the renovated Helleno-Italic nation a new and more spacious home, of whose several component parts no one existed merely for the sake of another, but all for each and each for all; the new existence in the renovated home, the fresher, broader, grander national life, was of itself to overbear the sorrows and wrongs of the nation for which there was no help in the old Italy. These ideas, as is well known, were not new. The emigration from Italy to

the provinces that had been regularly going on for centuries had long since, though unconsciously on the part of the emigrants themselves, paved the way for such an extension of Italy. The first who in a systematic way guided the Italians to settle beyond the bounds of Italy was Gaius Gracchus, the creator of the Roman democratic monarchy, the author of the Transalpine conquests, the founder of the colonies of Carthage and Narbo. Then the second statesman of genius produced by the Roman democracy, Quintus Sertorius, began to introduce the barbarous Occidentals to Latin civilization; he gave to the Spanish youth of rank the Roman dress, and urged them to speak Latin and to acquire the higher Italian culture at the training institution founded by him in Osca. When Cæsar entered on the government, a large Italian population—though, in great part, lacking stability and concentration—already existed in all the provinces and client-states. To say nothing of the formally Italian towns in Spain and southern Gaul, we need only recall the numerous troops of burgesses raised by Sertorius and Pompeius in Spain, by Cæsar in Gaul, by Juba in Numidia, by the constitutional party in Africa, Macedonia, Greece, Asia Minor and Crete; the Latin lyre—ill-tuned doubtless—on which the town-poets of Corduba as early as the Sertorian war sang the praises of the Roman generals; and the translations of Greek poetry valued on account of their very elegance of language, which the earliest extra-Italian poet of note, the Transalpine Publius Terentius Varro of the Aude, published shortly after Cæsar's death.

On the other hand the interpenetration of the Latin and Hellenic character was, we might say, as old as Rome. On occasion of the union of Italy the conquering Latin nation had assimilated to itself all the other conquered nationalities, excepting only the Greek, which was received just as it stood without any attempt at external amalgamation. Wherever the Roman legionary went, the Greek schoolmaster, no less a conqueror in his own way, followed; at an early date we find famous teachers of the Greek language settled on the Guadalquivir, and Greek was as well taught as Latin in the institute at Osca. The higher Roman culture itself was in fact nothing else than the proclamation of the great gospel of Hellenic manners and art in the Italian idiom; against the modest pretension of the civilizing conquerors to proclaim it first of all in their own language

to the barbarians of the West the Hellenic at least could not loudly protest. Already the Greek everywhere—and, most decidedly, just where the national feeling was purest and strongest, on the frontiers threatened by barbaric denationalisation, *e. g.*, in Massilia, on the north coast of the Black Sea, and on the Euphrates and Tigris—descried the protector and avenger of Hellenism in Rome; and in fact the foundation of towns by Pompeius in the far East resumed after an interruption of centuries the beneficent work of Alexander.

The idea of an Italo-Hellenic empire with two languages and a single nationality was not new—otherwise it would have been nothing but a blunder; but the development of it from floating projects to a firmly-grasped conception, from scattered initial efforts to the laying of a secure and concentrated foundation, was the work of the third and greatest of the democratic statesmen of Rome.

The ruling
nations.

The Jews.

The first and most essential condition for the political and national levelling of the empire was the preservation and extension of the two nations destined to joint dominion, along with the absorption as rapidly as possible of the barbarian races, or those termed barbarian, existing by their side. In a certain sense we might no doubt name along with Romans and Greeks a third nationality, which vied with them in ubiquity in the world of that day, and was destined to play no insignificant part in the new state of Cæsar. We speak of the Jews. This remarkable people, yielding and yet tenacious, was in the ancient as in the modern world everywhere and nowhere at home, and everywhere and nowhere powerful. The successors of David and Solomon were of hardly more significance for the Jews of that age than Jerusalem for those of the present day; the nation found doubtless for its religious and intellectual unity a visible rallying-point in the petty kingdom of Jerusalem, but the nation itself consisted not merely of the subjects of the Hasmonæans, but of the innumerable bodies of Jews scattered through the whole Parthian and the whole Roman empire. Within the cities of Alexandria especially and of Cyrene the Jews formed special communities administratively and even locally distinct, not unlike the "Jews' quarters" of our towns, but with a freer position and superintended by a "master of the people" as superior judge and administrator. How numerous even in

Rome the Jewish population was already before Cæsar's time, and how closely at the same time the Jews even then kept together as fellow-countrymen, is shown by the remark of an author of this period, that it was dangerous for a governor to offend the Jews in his province, because he might then certainly reckon on being hissed after his return by the populace of the capital. Even at this time the predominant business of the Jews was trade; the Jewish trader moved everywhere with the conquering Roman merchant then, in the same way as he afterwards accompanied the Genoese and the Venetian, and capital flowed in on all hands to the Jewish, by the side of the Roman, merchants. At this period too we encounter the peculiar antipathy of the Occidentals towards this so thoroughly Oriental race and their foreign opinions and customs. This Judaism, although not the most pleasing feature in the nowhere pleasing picture of the mixture of nations which then prevailed, was nevertheless a historical element developing itself in the natural course of things, which the statesman could neither ignore nor combat, and which Cæsar on the contrary, just like his predecessor Alexander, with correct discernment of the circumstances fostered as far as possible. While Alexander, by laying the foundation of Alexandrian Judaism, did not much less for the nation than its own David by building the temple of Jerusalem, Cæsar also advanced the interests of the Jews in Alexandria and in Rome by special favours and privileges, and protected in particular their peculiar worship against the Roman as well as against the Greek local priests. The two great men of course did not contemplate placing the Jewish nationality on an equal footing with the Hellenic or Italo-Hellenic. But the Jew who has not like the Occidental received the Pandora's gift of political organisation, and stands substantially in a relation of indifference to the state; who moreover is as reluctant to give up the essence of his national idiosyncrasy, as he is ready to clothe it with any nationality at pleasure and to adapt himself up to a certain degree to foreign habits—the Jew was for this very reason as it were made for a state, which was to be built on the ruins of a hundred living polities and to be endowed with a somewhat abstract and, from the outset, weakened nationality. In the ancient world also Judaism was an effective leaven of cosmopolitanism and of national decomposition, and to that extent a specially privileged member in the Cæsarian state,

the polity of which was really nothing but a citizenship of the world, and the nationality of which was really nothing but humanity.

Hellenism. But the Latin and Hellenic nationalities continued to be exclusively the positive elements of the new citizenship. The distinctively Italian state of the republic was thus at an end; but the rumour that Cæsar was ruining Italy and Rome on purpose to transfer the centre of the empire to the Greek East and to make Ilion or Alexandria its capital, was nothing but a piece of talk—very easy to be accounted for, but also very silly—of the angry nobility. On the contrary in Cæsar's organisations the Latin nationality always retained the ascendancy; as is indicated in the very fact that he issued all his enactments in Latin, although those destined for the Greek-speaking countries were at the same time issued in Greek. In general he arranged the relations of the two great nations in his monarchy just as his republican predecessors had arranged them in the united Italy; the Hellenic nationality was protected where it existed, the Italian was extended as far as circumstances permitted, and the inheritance of the races to be absorbed was destined for it. This was necessary, because an entire equalising of the Greek and Latin elements in the state would in all probability have in a very short time occasioned that catastrophe which Byzantinism brought about several centuries later; for the Greek element was superior to the Roman not merely in all intellectual aspects, but also in the measure of its predominance, and it had within Italy itself in the hosts of Hellenes and half-Hellenes who migrated compulsorily or voluntarily to Italy an endless number of apostles apparently insignificant, but whose influence could not be estimated too highly. To mention only the most conspicuous phenomenon in this respect, the rule of Greek lackeys over the Roman monarchs is as old as the monarchy. The first in the equally long and repulsive list of these personages is the confidential servant of Pompeius, Theophanes of Mytilene, who by his power over his weak master contributed probably more than any one else to the outbreak of the war between Pompeius and Cæsar. Not wholly without reason he was after his death treated with divine honours by his countrymen; he commenced, forsooth, the *valet de chambre* government of the imperial period, which in a certain measure was just a dominion of the Hellenes over the Romans. The govern-

ment had accordingly every reason not to encourage by its direct action the extension of Hellenism at least in the West; but the Greek element, wherever it existed, was preserved and protected. However political crises might suggest to the Emperor the demolition of the strong pillars of Hellenism in the West and in Egypt, Massilia and Alexandria were neither destroyed nor denationalised. If Sicily was not simply relieved of the presence of the *decumæ*, but had its communities invested with Latin rights, which was probably meant to be followed in due time by full equalisation with Italy, Cæsar's design beyond doubt was not to Latinise Sicily, but to attach that glorious island—which nature has destined not so much to be an adjoining land to Italy, as to be the finest of its provinces—to the association of the Italian communities, under retention of its Hellenic nationality, just like Neapolis and Rhegium.

On the other hand the Roman element was promoted by the government through colonisation and Latinising with all vigour and at the most various points of the kingdom. The principle, which originated no doubt from a bad combination of formal law and brute force, but was inevitably necessary in order to deal freely with the nations destined to destruction—that all the soil in the provinces not ceded by special act of the government to communities or private persons was the property of the state, and the holder of it for the time being had merely an heritable possession on sufferance and revocable at any time—was retained by Cæsar and raised by him from a democratic party-theory to a fundamental principle of monarchical law. Gaul, of course, fell to be primarily dealt with in the extension of Roman nationality. Cisalpine Gaul obtained throughout—what a great part of the inhabitants had long enjoyed—political equalisation with the leading country, by the admission of the Transpadane communities into the Roman burgess-union, which had for long been assumed by the democracy as accomplished (P. 4, 312) and was now (705) finally accomplished by Cæsar. Practically this province had already completely Latinised itself during the forty years which had elapsed since the bestowal of Latin rights. The exclusives might ridicule the broad and gurgling accent of the Celtic Latin, and miss “an undefined something of the grace of the capital” in the Insubrian or Venetian, who as Cæsar's legionary had con-

Latinising.

Cisalpine
Gaul.

49.

The province of Narbo.

quered for himself with his sword a place in the Roman Forum and even in the Roman senate. Nevertheless Cisalpine Gaul with its dense chiefly agricultural population was even before Cæsar's time practically an Italian country, and remained for centuries the true asylum of Italian manners and Italian culture; indeed the teachers of Latin literature found nowhere else out of the capital so much encouragement and approbation. While Cisalpine Gaul was thus substantially merged in Italy, the place which it had hitherto occupied was taken by the old Transalpine province, which had been converted by Cæsar's conquests from a frontier into an inland province, and which by its vicinity as well as by its climate was fitted beyond all other regions to become in due course of time likewise an Italian land. Thither principally, according to the old aim of the transmarine settlements of the Roman democracy, was the stream of Italian emigration directed. There the ancient colony of Narbo was reinforced by new settlers, and four new burgess-colonies were instituted at Baeterræ (Beziers) not far from Narbo, at Arelate (Arles) and Arausio (Orange) on the Rhone, and at the new seaport Forum Julii (Fréjus); while the names assigned to them at the same time preserved the memory of the brave legions which had annexed northern Gaul to the empire.* The townships not furnished with colonists appear, at least for the most part, to have been led on towards Romanisation in the same way as Transpadane Gaul in former times (iii. 248) by the bestowal of Latin rights; in particular Nemausus (Nîmes) as the chief place of the territory taken from the Massiliots in consequence of their revolt against Cæsar (P. 390) was converted from a Massiliot village into a Latin urban community, and endowed with a considerable territory and even with the

* Narbo was called the colony of the Decimani, Baeterræ of the Septimani, Forum Julii of the Octavani, Arelate (and besides this the Latin colony of Ruscino) of the Sextani, Arausio of the Secundani. The ninth legion is wanting, because it had disgraced its number by the mutiny of Placentia (P. 403). That the colonists of these colonies belonged to the legions from which they took their names is not stated and is not credible; the veterans themselves were, at least the great majority of them, settled in Italy (P. 491). Cicero's complaint, that Cæsar "had confiscated whole provinces and districts at a blow" (*De Off.* ii. 7, 27; comp. *Philipp.* xiii. 15, 31, 32) relates beyond doubt, as its close connection with the censure of the triumph over the Massiliots proves, to the confiscations of land made on account of these colonies in the Narbonese province and primarily to the losses of territory imposed on Massilia.

right of coinage.* While Cisalpine Gaul thus advanced from the preparatory stage to full equality with Italy, the Narbonese province advanced at the same time into that preparatory stage; just as previously in Cisalpine Gaul, the most considerable communities there had the full franchise, the rest Latin rights.

In the other non-Greek and non-Latin regions of the empire, which were still more remote from the influence of Italy and the process of assimilation, Cæsar confined himself to the establishment of several centres for Italian civilisation, such as Narbo had hitherto been in Gaul, in order by their means to pave the way for a future complete equalisation. Such preliminary foundations can be pointed out in all the provinces of the empire, with the exception of the poorest and least important of all, Sardinia. How Cæsar proceeded in Northern Gaul, we have already set forth (P. 284); the Latin language obtained there general official recognition, though not yet employed for all branches of public intercourse, and the colony of Noviodunum (Nyon) arose on the Leman lake as the most northerly town with an Italian constitution.

In Spain, which was probably at that time the most densely peopled country of the Roman empire, Cæsarian colonists, so far as we see, were settled only in the important Helleno-Iberian seaport town of Emporiæ by the side of the old population. On the other hand the ancient and wealthy mercantile city of Gades, whose municipal system Cæsar even when prætor had remodelled suitably to the times, now obtained from the Emperor the full rights of the Italian *municipia* (705) and became—what Tusculum had been in Italy (i. 356)—the first extra-Italian community not founded by Rome which was admitted into the Roman burgess-union. Some years afterwards (709) similar rights were

Northern
Gaul.

Spain

49.

45.

* We are not expressly informed from whom the Latin rights of the non-colonised townships of this region and especially of Nemausus proceeded. But as Cæsar himself (*B. C.* i. 35) virtually states that Nemausus up to 705 was a Massiliot village; as according to Livy's account (*Dio*, xli, 25; *Flor.* ii. 13; *Oros.* vi. 15) this very portion of territory was taken from the Massiliots by Cæsar; and lastly as even on pre-Augustan coins and then in Strabo the town appears as a community of Latin rights, Cæsar alone can have been the author of this bestowal of Latinity. As to Ruscino (Roussillon near Perpignan) and other communities in Narbonese Gaul which early attained a Latin constitution, we can only conjecture that they received it contemporarily with Nemausus.

49.

conferred also on some other Spanish communities, and Latin rights probably on still more.

Carthage.

In Africa the project, which Gaius Gracchus had not been allowed to bring to an issue, was now carried out, and on the spot where the city of the hereditary foes of Rome had stood, 3,000 Italian colonists and a great number of the tenants on lease and sufferance resident in the Carthaginian territory were settled; and the new "Venus-colony," the Roman Carthage, thrived with amazing rapidity under the singularly favourable circumstances of the locality. Utica, hitherto the capital and first commercial town in the province, had already been in some measure compensated beforehand, apparently by the bestowal of Latin rights, for the revival of its superior rival. In the Numidian territory newly annexed to the empire the important Cirta and the other communities assigned to the Roman *condottiere* Publius Sittius for himself and his troops (P. 447) obtained the rights of Roman military colonies. The stately provincial towns indeed, which the insane fury of Juba and of the desperate remnant of the constitutional party had converted into ruins, did not revive so rapidly as they had been reduced to ashes, and many a ruinous site recalled long afterwards this fatal period; but the two new Julian colonies, Carthage and Cirta, became and continued to be the centres of Africano-Roman civilisation.

Corinth.

In the desolate land of Greece, Cæsar, besides other plans such as the institution of a Roman colony in Buthrotum (opposite Corfu), busied himself above all with the restoration of Corinth. Not only was a considerable burgess-colony conducted thither, but a plan was projected for cutting through the isthmus, so as to avoid the dangerous circumnavigation of the Peloponnesus and to make the whole traffic between Italy and Asia pass through the

The East.

Corintho-Saronic gulf. Lastly even in the remote Hellenic East the monarch called into existence Italian settlements; on the Black Sea, for instance, at Heraclea and Sinope, which towns the Italian colonists shared, as in the case of Emporiæ, with the old inhabitants; on the Syrian coast, in the important port of Berytus, which like Sinope obtained an Italian constitution; and even in Egypt, where a Roman station was established on the lighthouse-island commanding the harbour of Alexandria.

Through these ordinances the Italian municipal freedom

was carried into the provinces in a manner far more comprehensive than had been previously the case. The communities of full burgesses—that is, all the towns of the Cisalpine province and the burgess-colonies and burgess-*municipia* scattered in Transalpine Gaul and elsewhere—were on an equal footing with the Italian, in so far as they administered their own affairs, and even exercised a somewhat limited jurisdiction; while on the other hand the more important processes came before the Roman authority competent to deal with them—as a rule, the governor of the province.* The formally autonomous Latin and the other emancipated communities—including now those of Narbonese Gaul, all those of Sicily, so far as they were not burgess-communities, and a considerable number also in the other provinces—had not merely free administration, but probably unlimited jurisdiction; so that the governor was only entitled to interfere there by virtue of his—certainly very arbitrary—administrative control. No doubt even earlier there had been communities of full burgesses within the provinces of governors, such as Aquileia, Ravenna, Narbo, and whole governors' provinces, such as Cisalpine Gaul, had consisted of communities with Italian constitution; but it was, if not in law, at least in a political point of view a singularly important innovation, that there was now a province which as well as Italy was peopled solely by Roman burgesses,† and that others promised to become such. With this disappeared the first great practical distinction that separated Italy from the provinces; and the

Extension
of the
Italian
municipal
constitution
to the pro-
vinces.

Italy and
the pro-
vinces
reduced to
one level.

* That no community of full burgesses had more than limited jurisdiction, is certain. But the fact, which is distinctly apparent from the Cæsarian municipal ordinance for Cisalpine Gaul, is a surprising one—that the processes lying beyond municipal competency from this province went not before its governor, but before the Roman prætor; for in other cases the governor is in his province quite as much representative of the prætor who administers justice between burgesses as of the prætor who administers justice between burgesses and non-burgesses, and is thoroughly competent to determine all processes. Beyond doubt this is a remnant of the arrangement before Sulla under which in the whole continental territory as far as the Alps the urban magistrates alone were competent, and thus all the processes there, where they exceeded municipal competency, necessarily came before the prætors in Rome. In Narbo again, Gades, Carthage, Corinth, the processes in such a case went certainly to the governor concerned; as indeed even from practical considerations the carrying of a suit to Rome could not well be thought of.

† It is difficult to see why the bestowal of the Roman franchise on a province collectively and the continuance of the provincial administration for it should be usually conceived as contrasts excluding each other. Besides, Cisalpine

second—that ordinarily no troops were stationed in Italy, while they were stationed in the provinces—was likewise in the course of disappearing; troops were now stationed only where there was a frontier to be defended, and the commandants of the provinces in which this was not the case, such as Narbo and Sicily, were officers only in name. The formal contrast between Italy and the provinces, which had at all times depended on other distinctions (ii. 67), continued certainly still to subsist—Italy being the sphere of the civil jurisdiction and of the consuls and prætors, while the provinces were districts under the jurisdiction of martial law and subject to proconsuls and proprætors; but the procedure according to civil and according to martial law had for long been practically coincident, and the different titles of the magistrates signified little after the one Imperator was over all.

In all these various municipal foundations and ordinances—which are traceable at least in plan, if not perhaps all in execution, to Cæsar—a definite system is apparent. Italy was converted from the mistress of the subject peoples into the mother of the renovated Italo-Hellenic nation. The Cisalpine province completely equalised with the mother-country was a promise and a guarantee that, in the monarchy of Cæsar just as in the healthier times of the republic, every Latinised district might expect to be placed on an equal footing by the side of its elder sisters and of the mother herself. On the threshold of full national and political equalization with Italy stood the adjoining lands, the Greek Sicily and the south of Gaul, which was rapidly becoming Latinised. In a more remote stage of preparation stood the other provinces of the empire, in which, just as hitherto in southern Gaul Narbo had been a Roman colony, the great maritime cities—Emporiæ, Gades, Carthage, Corinth, Heraclea in Pontus, Sinope, Berytus, Alexandria—now became Italian or Helleno-Italian communities, the centres of an Italian civilisation even in the Greek East, the fundamental pillars of the future national and political equalisation of the empire. The rule of the urban community of Rome over the shores of the Mediterranean was at an end; in its

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49. Gaul notoriously obtained the *civitas* at latest in 705, while it remained a province as long as Cæsar lived and was only united with Italy after his death (Dio. xlviii. 12); the governors also can be pointed out down to 711. The very fact that the Cæsarian ordinance never designates the country as Italy, but as Cisalpine Gaul, ought to have led to the right view.
- 43.

stead came the new Mediterranean state, and its first act was to atone for the two greatest outrages which that urban community had perpetrated on civilisation. While the destruction of the two greatest marts of commerce in the Roman dominions marked the turning point at which the protectorate of the Roman community degenerated into political tyrannising over, and financial exaction from, the subject lands, the prompt and brilliant restoration of Carthage and Corinth marked the foundation of the new great commonwealth which was to train up all the regions on the Mediterranean to national and political equality, to union in a genuine state. Well might Cæsar bestow on the city of Corinth in addition to its far-famed ancient name the new one of "Honour to Julius" (LAVS JULI).

Organisa-
tion of
the new
empire.

While thus the new united empire was furnished with a national character, which doubtless necessarily lacked individuality and was rather an inanimate product of art than a fresh growth of nature, it further had need of unity in those institutions which express the general life of nations—in constitution and administration, in religion and jurisprudence, in money, measures, and weights; as to which, of course, local diversities of the most varied character were quite compatible with essential union. In all these departments we can only speak of the initial steps, for the thorough formation of the monarchy of Cæsar into an unity was the work of the future, and all that he did was to lay the foundation for the building of centuries. But of the lines, which the great man drew in these departments, several can still be recognised; and, it is more pleasing to follow him here, than in the task of reconstruction from the ruins of the nationalities.

As to constitution and administration we have already noticed elsewhere the most important elements of the new unity—the transition of the sovereignty from the municipal council of Rome to the sole master of the Mediterranean monarchy; the conversion of that municipal council into a supreme imperial council representing Italy and the provinces; above all the transference—now commenced—of the Roman, and generally of the Italian, municipal organization to the provincial communities. This latter course—the bestowal of Latin, and thereafter of Roman, rights on the communities ripe for full admission to the united state—gradually of itself brought about uniform communal arrangements. In one respect alone this process could not

Census of
the empire.

be waited for. The new empire needed immediately an institution which should place before the government at a glance the principal bases of administration—the proportions of population and property in the different communities—in other words, an improved census. First the census of Italy was reformed. Hitherto, strange to say, it had been always held exclusively in the capital, to the annoyance of the burgesses and to the injury of business. According to Cæsar's ordinance* in future, when a census took place in the Roman community, there were to be simultaneously registered by the highest authority in each Italian community the name of every municipal burgess and that of his father or manumitter, his district, his age, and his property; and these lists were to be furnished to the Roman censor early enough to enable him to complete in proper time the general list of Roman burgesses and of Roman property. That it was Cæsar's intention to introduce similar institutions also in the provinces is attested partly by the measurement and survey of the whole empire ordered by Cæsar, partly by the nature of the arrangement itself; for it in fact furnished the general instrument appropriate for procuring as well in the Italian as in the non-Italian communities of the state the information requisite for the central administration. Evidently here too it was Cæsar's intention to revert to the traditions of the earlier republican times, and to reintroduce the census of the empire, which the earlier republic had effected—essentially in the same way as Cæsar effected the Italian—by analogous extension of the institution of the urban censorship with its set terms and other essential rules to all the subject communities of Italy and Sicily (i. 439, ii. 68). This had been one of the first institutions which the torpid aristocracy allowed to drop and in this way deprived the supreme governing authority of any general view of the resources in men and taxation at its disposal, and consequently of all possibility of an effective control (ii. 340). The indications still extant, and the very connection of things, show irrefragably that Cæsar made preparations to renew the general census that had been obsolete for centuries.

Religion
of the
empire.

We need scarcely say that in religion and in jurisprudence no thorough levelling could be thought of; yet with all

* That this was a change introduced by Cæsar, and not possibly an enactment already made in consequence of the Social War, should never have been doubted (Cic. *Verr. act.* i. 18, 54 and elsewhere).

toleration towards local faiths and municipal statutes the new state needed a common worship consonant to the Italo-Hellenic nationality and a general code of law superior to the municipal statutes. It needed them; for *de facto* both were already in existence. In the field of religion men had for centuries been busied in fusing together the Italian and Hellenic worships partly by external adoption, partly by internal adjustment of their respective conceptions of the gods; and, owing to the pliant formless character of the Italian gods, there had been no great difficulty in resolving Jupiter into Zeus, Venus into Aphrodite, and so every essential idea of the Latin faith into its Hellenic counterpart. The Italo-Hellenic religion stood forth in its outlines ready-made; how much in this very department men were conscious of having gone beyond the specifically Roman point of view and advanced towards an Italo-Hellenic quasi-nationality, is shown by the distinction made in the already mentioned theology of Varro between the "common" gods, that is, those acknowledged by Romans and Greeks, and the special gods of the Roman community.

So far as concerns the field of criminal and police law, where the government more directly interferes and the necessities of the case are substantially met by a judicious legislation, there was no difficulty in attaining, in the way of legislative action, that degree of material uniformity which certainly was in this department needful for the unity of the empire. In the civil law again, where the initiative belongs to commercial intercourse and merely the formal shape to the legislator, the code for the united empire, which the legislator certainly could not have created, had been already long since developed naturally by commercial intercourse itself. The Roman urban law was still indeed legally based on the embodiment of the Latin national law contained in the Twelve Tables. Later laws had doubtless introduced various improvements of detail suited to the times, among which the most important was probably the abolition of the old inconvenient mode of commencing a process through standing forms of declaration by the parties (i. 163) and the substitution of an instruction to the single jurymen drawn up in writing by the presiding magistrate (*formula*): but in the main the popular legislation had only piled upon that venerable foundation an endless chaos of special laws long since in great part antiquated and forgotten, which can only

Law of the
empire.

The new
urban law
or the
edict.

be compared to the English statutes at large. The attempts to impart to them scientific shape and system had certainly rendered the tortuous paths of the old civil law accessible and thrown light upon them (iii. 474); but no Roman Blackstone could remedy the fundamental defect, that an urban code composed four hundred years ago with its equally diffuse and confused supplements was now to serve as the law of a great state. Commercial intercourse provided for itself a more thorough remedy. The lively commerce between Romans and non-Romans had long ago developed in Rome an international private law (*jus gentium*; i. 166), that is to say, a body of maxims especially relating to commercial matters, according to which Roman judges pronounced judgment, when a cause could not be decided either according to their own or any other national code and they were compelled—setting aside the peculiarities of Roman, Hellenic, Phœnician and other law—to revert to the common perceptions of right underlying all commercial dealings. The formation of the newer law proceeded on this basis. In the first place as a standard for the legal dealings of Roman burgesses with each other, it *de facto* substituted for the old urban law, which had become practically useless, a new code based in substance on a compromise between the national law of the Twelve Tables and the international law or so-called law of nations. The former was essentially adhered to, though of course with modifications suited to the times, in the law of marriage, family, and inheritance; whereas in all regulations which concerned dealings with property, and consequently in reference to ownership and contracts, the international law was the standard; in these matters indeed various important arrangements were borrowed even from local provincial law, such as the legislation as to usury (P. 526), and the institution of *hypotheca*. Through whom, when, and how this comprehensive innovation came into existence, whether at once or gradually, whether through one or several authors, are questions to which we cannot furnish a satisfactory answer. We know only that this reform, as was natural, proceeded in the first instance from the urban court; that it was first embodied in the instructions annually issued by the *prætor urbanus*, when entering on office, for the guidance of the parties in reference to the most important maxims of law to be observed in the judicial year then beginning (*edictum annuum* or

perpetuum prætoris urbani); and that, although various preparatory steps towards it may have been taken in earlier times, it certainly only attained its completion in this epoch. The new code was theoretic and abstract, inasmuch as the Roman view of law had therein divested itself of such of its national peculiarities as it had become aware of; but it was at the same time practical and positive, inasmuch as it by no means faded away into the dim twilight of general equity or even into the pure nothingness of the so-called law of nature, but was applied by definite functionaries for definite concrete cases according to fixed rules, and was not merely capable of, but had already essentially received a statutory embodiment in the urban edict. This code moreover corresponded in matter to the wants of the time, in so far as it furnished the more convenient forms required by the increase of commerce for legal procedure, for acquisition of property, and for conclusion of contracts. Lastly, it had already in the main become subsidiary law throughout the compass of the Roman empire, inasmuch as—while the manifold local statutes were retained for those legal relations which were not directly commercial, as well as for local transactions between members of the same legal district—dealings relating to property between subjects of the empire belonging to different legal districts were regulated throughout after the model of the urban edict, though not applicable *de jure* to these cases, both in Italy and in the provinces. The law of the urban edict had thus essentially the same position in that age which the Roman law has occupied in our political development: this also is, so far as such opposites can be combined, at once abstract and positive; this also recommended itself by its (compared with the earlier legal code) flexible forms of intercourse, and took its place by the side of the local statutes as universal auxiliary law. But the Roman legal development had an essential advantage over ours in this, that the denationalised legislation appeared, not as with us prematurely and by artificial birth, but at the right time and agreeably to nature.

Such was the state of the law as Cæsar found it. When he projected the plan for a new code, it is not difficult to divine his intentions. This code could only comprehend the law of Roman burgesses, and could be a general code for the empire merely so far as a code of the ruling nation suitable to the times could not but of itself become general sub-

Cæsar's
project of
codifica-
tion.

67. subsidiary law throughout the compass of the empire. In criminal law, if the plan embraced this at all, there was needed only a revision and adjustment of the Sullan ordinances. In civil law, for a state whose nationality was strictly humanity, the necessary and only possible formal shape was to invest that urban edict, which had already spontaneously grown out of lawful commerce, with the security and precision of statute-law. The first step towards this had been taken by the Cornelian law of 687, when it enjoined the judge to keep to the maxims set forth at the beginning of his magistracy and not arbitrarily to administer other law (P. 158)—a regulation, which may well be compared with the law of the Twelve Tables, and which became almost as significant for the fixing of the later urban law as that collection for the fixing of the earlier. But although after the Cornelian decree of the people the edict was no longer subordinate to the judge, but the judge was by law subject to the edict; and though the new code had practically dispossessed the old urban law in judicial usage as in legal instruction—every urban judge was still free at his entrance on office absolutely and arbitrarily to alter the edict, and the law of the Twelve Tables with its additions still always outweighed formally the urban edict, so that in each individual case of collision the antiquated rule had to be set aside by arbitrary interference of the magistrate and therefore, strictly speaking, by violation of formal law. The subsidiary application of the urban edict in the court of the *prætor peregrinus* at Rome and in the different provincial judicatures was entirely subject to the arbitrary pleasure of the individual presiding magistrate. It was evidently necessary to set aside definitively the old urban law, so far as it had not been transferred to the newer, and in the case of the latter to set suitable limits to its arbitrary alteration by each individual urban judge, possibly also to regulate its subsidiary application by the side of the local statutes. This was Cæsar's design, when he projected the plan for his code; for it could not have been otherwise. The plan was not executed; and thus that troublesome state of transition in Roman jurisprudence was perpetuated till this necessary reform was accomplished six centuries afterwards and then but imperfectly by one of the successors of Cæsar, the emperor Justinian.

Lastly, in money, measures, and weights the substantial

equalisation of the Latin and Hellenic systems had long been in progress. It was very ancient so far as concerned the definitions of weight and the measures of capacity and of length indispensable for trade and commerce (i. 215), and in the monetary system little more recent than the introduction of the silver coinage (ii. 381). But these older equations were not sufficient, because in the Hellenic world itself the most varied metrical and monetary systems subsisted side by side; it was necessary, and formed part doubtless of Cæsar's plan, now to introduce everywhere in the new united empire, so far as this had not been done already, Roman money, Roman measures, and Roman weights in such a manner that they alone should be reckoned by in official intercourse, and that the non-Roman systems should be restricted to local currency or placed in a—once for all regulated—ratio to the Roman. The action of Cæsar, however, can only be pointed out in two of the most important of these departments, the monetary system and the calendar.

The Roman monetary system was based on the two precious metals circulating side by side and in a fixed relation to each other, gold being given and taken according to weight,* silver in the form of coin; but practically in consequence of the extensive transmarine intercourse the gold far preponderated over the silver. Whether the acceptance of Roman silver money was not even at an earlier period obligatory throughout the empire, is uncertain; at any rate uncoined gold essentially supplied the place of imperial money throughout the Roman territory, the more so as the Romans had prohibited the coining of gold in all the provinces and client-states, and the denarius had, in addition to Italy, *de jure* or *de facto* naturalised itself in Cisalpine Gaul, in Sicily, in Spain and various other places, especially in the West (iii. 415). But the imperial coinage begins with Cæsar. Exactly like Alexander, he marked the foundation of the new monarchy embracing the civilised world by the fact that the only metal forming an universal medium obtained the first place in the coinage. The greatness of the scale on

Gold coin
as imperial
currency.

* The gold pieces, which Sulla (iii. 412) and contemporarily Pompeius caused to be struck, both in small quantity, do not invalidate this proposition; for they probably came to be taken solely by weight just like the golden Philippei which were in circulation even down to Cæsar's time. They are certainly remarkable, because they anticipate the Cæsarian imperial gold just as Sulla's regency anticipated the new monarchy.

which the new Cæsarian gold piece (20s. 7d. according to the present value of the metal) was immediately coined, is shown by the fact that in a single treasure buried seven years after Cæsar's death there were found 80,000 of these pieces. It is true that financial speculations may have exercised a collateral influence in this respect.* As to the silver money, the exclusive rule of the Roman denarius in all the West, for which the foundation had previously been laid, was finally established by Cæsar, when he definitively closed the only Occidental mint that still competed in silver currency with the Roman, that of Massilia. The coining of silver or copper small money was still permitted to a number of Occidental communities; three-quarter *denarii* were struck by some Latin communities of southern Gaul, half *denarii* by several cantons in northern Gaul, copper small coins in various instances even after Cæsar's time by communes of the West; but this small money was throughout coined after the Roman standard, and its acceptance moreover was probably obligatory only in local dealings. Cæsar does not seem any more than the earlier government to have contemplated the regulation with a view to unity of the monetary system of the East, where great masses of coarse silver money—much of which too easily admitted of being debased or worn away—and to some extent even, as in Egypt, a copper coinage akin to our paper money were in circulation, and the Syrian commercial cities would have felt very severely the want of their previous national coinage corresponding to the Mesopotamian currency. We find here subsequently the arrangement, that the denarius has everywhere legal currency and is the only medium of official reckoning,† while the local coins have legal currency within their limited range but according to a tariff unfavourable for them as compared with the denarius.‡ This was probably not introduced all at

* It appears to wit, that in earlier times the claims of the state-creditors payable in silver could not be paid against their will in gold according to its legal ratio to silver; whereas it admits of no doubt, that from Cæsar's time the gold piece had to be taken without opposition for 100 silver sesterces. This was just at that time the more important, as in consequence of the great quantities of gold put into circulation by Cæsar it stood for a time in the currency of trade 25 per cent. below the legal ratio.

† There is probably no inscription of the Imperial period, which specifies sums of money otherwise than in Roman coin.

‡ Thus the Attic *drachma*, although sensibly heavier than the *denarius*, was yet reckoned equal to it; the *tetradrachmon* of Antioch, weighing on an average 15 grammes of silver, was made equal to 3 Roman *denarii*, which

once, and in part perhaps may have preceded Cæsar; but it was at any rate the essential complement of the Cæsarian arrangement as to the imperial coinage, whose new gold piece found its immediate model in the almost equally heavy coin of Alexander and was doubtless calculated especially for circulation in the East.

Of a kindred nature was the reform of the calendar. The republican calendar, which strangely enough was still the old decemviral calendar—an imperfect adoption of the *octaeteris* that preceded Meton (i. 488)—had by a combination of wretched mathematics and wretched administration come to anticipate the true time by 67 whole days, so that *e. g.* the festival of Flora was celebrated on the 11th July instead of the 28th April. Cæsar finally removed this evil, and with the help of the Greek mathematician Sosigenes introduced the Italian farmer's year regulated according to the Egyptian calendar of Eudoxus, as well as a rational system of intercalation, into religious and official use; while at the same time the beginning of the year on the 1st March of the old calendar was abolished, and the date of the 1st January—fixed at first as the term for changing the supreme magistrates and in consequence of this long since predominant in civil life—was assumed as the calendar-period for commencing the year. Both changes came into effect on the 1st January 709 of the city, 45 B.C., and along with them the use of the Julian calendar so named after its author, which long after the fall of the monarchy of Cæsar remained the regulative standard of the civilised world and in the main is so still. By way of explanation there was added in a detailed edict a star-calendar derived from the Egyptian astronomical observations and transferred—not indeed very skilfully—to Italy, which fixed the rising and setting of the stars named according to days of the calendar.* In this domain

Reform of
the ca-
lendar.

only weigh about 12 grammes; the *cistophorus* of Asia Minor was according to the value of silver above 3, according to the legal tariff = $2\frac{1}{2}$ *denarii*; the Rhodian half *drachma* according to the value of silver = $\frac{3}{4}$, according to the legal tariff = $\frac{2}{3}$ of a *denarius*, and so on.

* The identity of this edict drawn up perhaps by Marcus Flavius (Macrob. *Sat.* i. 14, 2) and the alleged treatise of Cæsar *De Stellis*, is shown by the joke of Cicero (Plutarch, *Cæs.* 59) that now the Lyre rises according to edict.

Moreover it was known even before Cæsar, that the solar year of 365 days 6 hours, which was the basis of the Egyptian calendar, and which he made the basis of his, was somewhat too long. The most exact calculation of the tropical year which the ancient world was acquainted with, that of Hipparchus, put it at 365 d. 5 h. 52' 12"; the true length is 365 d. 5 h. 48' 48".

also the Roman and Greek worlds were thus placed on a par.

Cæsar and
his works.

Such were the foundations of the Mediterranean monarchy of Cæsar. For the second time in Rome the social question had reached a crisis, at which the antagonisms not only appeared to be, but actually were, in the form of their exhibition, insoluble and, in their expression, irreconcilable. On the first occasion Rome had been saved by the fact that Italy was merged in Rome and Rome in Italy, and in the new enlarged and altered home those old antagonisms were not reconciled, but fell into abeyance. Now Rome was once more saved by the fact that the countries of the Mediterranean were merged in it or became prepared for merging; the war between the Italian poor and rich, which in the old Italy could only end with the destruction of the nation, had no longer a battlefield or a meaning in the Italy of three continents. The Latin colonies closed the gap which threatened to swallow up the Roman community in the fifth century; the deeper chasm of the seventh century was filled by the Transalpine and transmarine colonisations of Gaius Gracchus and Cæsar. For Rome alone history not merely performed miracles, but also repeated its miracles, and twice cured the internal crisis, which in the state itself was incurable, by regenerating the state. There was doubtless much corruption in this regeneration; as the union of Italy was accomplished over the ruins of the Samnite and Etruscan nations, so the Mediterranean monarchy built itself on the ruins of countless states and tribes once living and vigorous; but it was a corruption out of which sprang a fresh growth, part of which remains green at the present day. What was pulled down for the sake of the new building, was only the secondary nationalities which had long since been marked out for destruction by the levelling hand of civilisation. Cæsar, wherever he came forward as a destroyer, only carried out the pronounced verdict of historical development; but he protected the germs of culture, where and as he found them, in his own land as well as among the sister nation of the Hellenes. He saved and renewed the Roman element; and not only did he spare the Greek element, but with the same self-relying genius with which he accomplished the renewed foundation of Rome he undertook also the regeneration of the Hellenes, and resumed the interrupted work of the great Alexander, whose image, we may well believe, never was absent from Cæsar's soul. He solved these two great tasks not merely side by side, but the

one by means of the other. The two great essentials of humanity—general and individual development, or state and culture—once in embryo united in those old Græco-Italians feeding their flocks in primeval simplicity far from the coasts and islands of the Mediterranean, had become dissevered when these were parted into Italians and Hellenes, and had thenceforth remained apart for many centuries. Now the descendant of the Trojan prince and the Latin king's daughter created out of a state without distinctive culture and a cosmopolitan civilisation a new whole, in which state and culture again met together at the acme of human existence in the rich fulness of blessed maturity and worthily filled the sphere appropriate to such an union.

The outlines have thus been set forth, which Cæsar drew for this work, according to which he laboured himself, and according to which posterity—for many centuries confined to the paths which this great man marked out—endeavoured to prosecute the work, if not with the intellect and energy, yet on the whole in accordance with the intentions, of the illustrious master. Little was finished; much was merely begun. Whether the plan was complete, those who venture to vie in thought with such a man may decide; we observe no material defects in what lies before us—every single stone of the building enough to make a man immortal, and yet all combining to form one harmonious whole. Cæsar ruled as king of Rome for five years and a half, not half as long as Alexander; in the intervals of seven great campaigns, which allowed him to stay not more than fifteen months altogether* in the capital of his empire, he regulated the destinies of the world for the present and the future, from the establishment of the boundary-line between civilisation and barbarism down to the removal of the rain-pools in the streets of the capital, and yet retained time and composure enough attentively to follow the prize-pieces in the theatre and to confer the chaplet on the victor with improvised verses. The rapidity and precision with which the plan was executed prove that it had been long meditated thoroughly and all its parts settled in detail; but, even thus, they remain not much less wonderful than the plan itself. The outlines were laid down and thereby the new state was defined for all coming time; the

* Cæsar stayed in Rome in April and Dec. 705, on each occasion for a few days; from Sept. to Dec. 707; some four months in the autumn of the year of fifteen months 708, and from Oct. 709 to March 710.

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47.

46. 45. 44.

boundless future alone could complete the structure. So far Cæsar might say, that his object was attained ; and this was probably the meaning of the words which were sometimes heard to fall from him—that he had lived long enough. But precisely because the building was an endless one, the master as long as he lived restlessly added stone to stone, with always the same dexterity and always the same elasticity busy at his work, without ever overturning or altering, just as if there were for him merely a to-day and no to-morrow. Thus he worked and created as never any mortal did before or after him ; and as a worker and creator he still, after well nigh two thousand years, lives in the memory of the nations—the first, and the unique, Emperor Cæsar.

CHAPTER XII.

RELIGION, CULTURE, LITERATURE, AND ART.

IN the development of religion and philosophy no new State-element appeared during this epoch. The Romano-religion. Hellenic state-religion and the Stoic state-philosophy inseparably combined with it were not merely a convenient instrument for every government—oligarchy, democracy, or monarchy—but altogether indispensable, because it was just as impossible to construct the state wholly without religious elements as to discover any new state-religion adapted to form a substitute for the old. So the besom of revolution swept doubtless at times very roughly through the cobwebs of the augural bird-lore (P. 296); nevertheless the rotten machine creaking at every joint survived the earthquake which swallowed up the republic itself, and preserved its insipidity and its arrogance without diminution for transference to the new monarchy. As a matter of course, it fell more and more into disfavour with all those who manifested freedom of judgment. Towards the state-religion indeed public opinion maintained an attitude essentially indifferent; it was on all sides recognised as an institution of political convenience, and no one specially troubled himself about it with the exception of political and antiquarian literati. But towards its philosophical sister there gradually sprang up among the unprejudiced public that hostility, which the empty and yet perfidious hypocrisy of set phrases never fails in the long run to awaken. That a presentiment of its own worthlessness began to dawn on the Stoa itself, is shown by its attempt artificially to infuse into itself some fresh spirit in the way of syncretism. Antiochus of Ascalon (flourishing about

79. 675), who professed to have amalgamated the Stoic and Platonic-Aristotelian systems into one organic unity, in reality so far succeeded that his misshapen doctrine became the fashionable philosophy of the conservatives of his time and was conscientiously studied by the genteel dilettanti and literati of Rome. Every one who displayed intellectual vigour, opposed the Stoa or ignored it. It was principally antipathy towards the boastful and tiresome Roman Pharisees, coupled doubtless with the increasing disposition to take refuge from practical life in indolent apathy or empty irony, that occasioned during this epoch the extension of the system of Epicurus to a larger circle and the naturalization of the Cynic philosophy of Diogenes in Rome. However stale and poor in thought the former might be, a philosophy, which did not seek the way to wisdom through an alteration of traditional terms but contented itself with those in existence, and throughout recognised only the perceptions of sense as true, was always better than the terminological jingle and the hollow conceptions of the Stoic wisdom; and the Cynic philosophy was of all the philosophical systems of the times in so far by much the best, as its system was confined to the having no system at all and sneering at all systems and all systematisers. In both fields war was waged against the Stoa with zeal and success; for serious men, the Epicurean Lucretius preached with the full accents of heartfelt conviction and of holy zeal against the Stoical faith in the Gods and Providence and the Stoical doctrine of the immortality of the soul; for the great public ready to laugh, the Cynic Varro hit the mark still more sharply with the flying darts of his extensively-read satires. While thus the ablest men of the older generation made war on the Stoa, the younger generation again, such as Catullus, stood in no inward relation to it at all, and passed a far sharper censure on it by completely ignoring it.

The Ori-
ental re-
ligions.

But, if in the present instance a faith no longer believed was maintained out of political convenience, they amply made up for this in other respects. Unbelief and superstition, different hues of the same historical phenomenon, went in the Roman world of that day hand in hand, and there was no lack of individuals who in themselves combined both—who denied the gods with Epicurus, and yet prayed and sacrificed before every shrine. Of course only the gods that came from the East were still in vogue, and, as the men continued to

flock from the Greek lands to Italy, so the gods of the East migrated in ever-increasing numbers to the West. The importance of the Phrygian cultus at that time in Rome is shown both by the polemical tone of the older men such as Varro and Lucretius, and by the poetical glorification of it in the fashionable Catullus, which concludes with the characteristic request that the goddess may deign to turn the heads of others only and not that of the poet himself. A fresh addition was the Persian worship, which is said to have first reached the Occidentals through the medium of the pirates who met on the Mediterranean from the East and from the West: the oldest seat of this cultus in the West is stated to have been Mount Olympus in Lycia. That in the adoption of Oriental worships in the West such higher speculative and moral elements as they contained were generally allowed to drop, is strikingly evinced by the fact that Ahuramazda, the supreme god of the pure doctrine of Zarathustra, remained virtually unknown in the West, and adoration there was especially directed to that god who had occupied the first place in the old Persian national religion and had been transferred by Zarathustra to the second—the sun-god Mithra. But the brighter and gentler celestial forms of the Persian religion did not so rapidly gain a footing in Rome as the wearisome mystical swarm of the grotesque divinities of Egypt—Isis the mother of nature with her whole train, the constantly dying and constantly reviving Osiris, the gloomy Sarapis, the taciturn and grave Harpocrates, the dog-headed Anubis. In the year when Clodius emancipated the clubs and conventicles (696) and doubtless in consequence of this very emancipation of the populace, that swarm even prepared to make its entry into the old stronghold of the Roman Jupiter in the Capitol, and it was with difficulty that the invasion was prevented and the inevitable temples were banished at least to the suburbs of Rome. No worship was equally popular among the lower orders of the population in the capital: when the senate ordered the temples of Isis constructed within the ring-wall to be pulled down, no labourer ventured to lay the first hand on them and the consul Lucius Paullus was himself obliged to apply the first stroke of the axe (704); a wager might be laid, that the more lax any woman was, the more piously she worshipped Isis. That the casting of lots, the interpretation of dreams, and similar liberal arts supported their professors,

Worship of Mithra.

Worship of Isis.

58.

50.

was a matter of course. The casting of horoscopes was already a scientific pursuit; Lucius Tarutius of Firmum, a respectable and in his own way learned man, a friend of Varro and Cicero, with all gravity cast the nativity of kings Romulus and Numa and of the city of Rome itself, and for the edification of the credulous on either side confirmed by means of his Chaldean and Egyptian wisdom the accounts of the Roman annals.

The new
Pythagore-
anism.

Nigidius
Figulus.

58. 45.

But by far the most remarkable phenomenon in this domain was the first attempt to reconcile crude faith with speculative thought, the first appearance of those tendencies, which we are accustomed to describe as Neo-Platonic, in the Roman world. Their oldest apostle there was Publius Nigidius Figulus, a Roman of rank belonging to the strictest section of the aristocracy, who filled the prætorship in 696 and died in 709 as a political exile beyond the bounds of Italy. With astonishing copiousness of learning and still more astonishing strength of faith he created out of the most dissimilar elements a philosophico-religious structure, the singular outline of which he probably developed still more in his oral discourses than in his theological and physical writings. In philosophy, seeking deliverance from the skeletons of the current systems and abstractions, he recurred to the neglected fountain of the pre-Socratic philosophy, to whose ancient sages thought had still presented itself with sensuous vividness. The researches of physical science—which, suitably treated, afford even now so excellent a handle for mystic delusion and pious sleight of hand, and in antiquity with its more defective insight into physical laws lent themselves still more easily to such objects—played in this case, as may readily be conceived, a considerable part. His theology was based essentially on that strange medley, in which Greeks of a kindred spirit had intermingled Orphic and other very old or very new indigenous wisdom with Persian, Chaldean, and Egyptian secret doctrines, and with which Figulus incorporated the quasi-results of the Tuscan investigations into nothing and of the indigenous lore touching the flight of birds, so as to produce further harmonious confusion. The whole system obtained its consecration—political, religious, and national—from the name of Pythagoras, the ultra-conservative statesman whose supreme principle was “to promote order and to check disorder,” the miracle-worker and necromancer, the primeval

sage who was a native of Italy, who was interwoven even with the legendary history of Rome, and whose statue was to be seen in the Roman Forum. As birth and death are kindred with each other, so—it seemed—Pythagoras was to stand not merely by the cradle of the republic as friend of the wise Numa and colleague of the sagacious mother Egeria, but also by its grave as the last protector of the sacred birdlore. But the new system was not merely marvellous, it also worked marvels; Nigidius announced to the father of the subsequent emperor Augustus, on the very day when the latter was born, the future greatness of his son; nay the prophets conjured up spirits for the credulous, and, what was of more moment, they pointed out to them the places where their lost money lay. The new-and-old wisdom, such as it was, made a profound impression on its contemporaries; men of the highest rank, of the greatest learning, of the most solid ability, belonging to very different parties—the consul of 700 Appius Claudius, the learned Marcus Varro, the brave officer Publius Vatinius—took part in the citation of spirits, and it even appears that a police interference was necessary against the proceedings of these societies. These last attempts to save the Roman theology, like the similar efforts of Cato in the field of politics, produce at once a comical and a melancholy impression; we may smile at the creed and its propagators, but still it is a grave matter when able men begin to addict themselves to absurdity.

54.

The training of youth followed, as may naturally be supposed, the course of bilingual humane culture chalked out in the previous epoch, and the general culture also of the Roman world conformed more and more to the forms established for that purpose by the Greeks. Even the bodily exercises advanced from ball-playing, running, and fencing to the more artistically developed Greek gymnastic contests; though there were not yet any public institutions for gymnastics, in the principal country-houses the *palæstra* was already to be found by the side of the bath-rooms. The manner in which the cycle of general culture had changed in the Roman world during the course of a century, is shown by a comparison of the encyclopædia of Cato (ii. 468) with the similar treatise of Varro “concerning the school-sciences.” As constituent elements of non-professional culture, there appear in Cato the art of oratory, the sciences of agriculture, of law, of war, and of medicine; in Varro—according to pro-

Training of
youth.

Sciences of
general
culture at
this period.

bable conjecture—grammar, logic or dialectics, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music, medicine, and architecture. Consequently in the course of the seventh century the sciences of war, jurisprudence, and agriculture had been converted from general into professional studies. On the other hand in Varro the Hellenic education appears already in all its completeness: by the side of the course of grammar, rhetoric, and philosophy, which had been introduced at an earlier period into Italy, we now find the course which had so long remained distinctively Hellenic, of geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music.* That astronomy more especially, which in the nomenclature of the stars gratified the thoughtless erudite dilettantism of the age and in its relations to astrology ministered to the prevailing religious delusions, was regularly and zealously studied by the youth in Italy, can be proved also otherwise; the astronomical didactic poems of Aratus, among all the works of Alexandrian literature, found earliest admittance into the instruction of Roman youth. To this Hellenic course there was added the study of medicine retained from the older Roman education, and lastly that of architecture so indispensable to the Roman of rank at this period, who instead of cultivating the ground built houses and villas.

Greek instruction.

Alexandrinism.

In comparison with the previous epoch the Greek as well as the Latin training improved in extent and in scholastic strictness quite as much as it declined in purity and in refinement. The increasing eagerness after the knowledge of Greek gave to instruction of itself an erudite character. To explain Homer or Euripides was after all no great art; teachers and scholars found their account better in handling the Alexandrian poems, which, besides, were in their spirit far more congenial to the Roman world of that day than the genuine Greek national poetry, and which, if they were not quite so venerable as the *Iliad*, possessed at any rate an age sufficiently respectable to pass as classics with schoolmasters. The erotic poems of Euphron, the "Causes" of Callimachus and his *Ibis*, the comically obscure *Alexandra* of Lycophron contained in rich abundance rare vocables (*glossæ*) suitable for being extracted and interpreted, sentences labo-

* These form, as is well known, the so-called seven liberal arts, which, with this distinction between the three species of discipline earlier naturalised in Italy and the four subsequently received, maintained their position throughout the middle ages.

riously involved and difficult of analysis, prolix digressions full of mystic combinations of antiquated myths—in fact, a store of cumbersome erudition of all sorts. Education required exercises more and more difficult; these productions, in great part model efforts of schoolmasters, were excellently adapted to be lessons for model scholars. Thus the Alexandrian poems took a permanent place in Italian scholastic instruction, especially as trial-themes, and certainly promoted knowledge, although at the expense of taste and of discretion. The same unhealthy appetite for culture moreover impelled the Roman youths to derive their Hellenism as much as possible from the fountainhead. The courses of the Greek masters in Rome sufficed only for initiation; every one who wished to be able to converse heard lectures on Greek philosophy at Athens, and on Greek rhetoric at Rhodes, and made a literary and artistic tour through Asia Minor, where the old art-treasures of the Hellenes were still in great measure to be found on the spot, and the cultivation of the fine arts had been continued, although somewhat mechanically; whereas the more distant Alexandria, specially celebrated as the seat of the exact sciences, was far more rarely the point whither young men desirous of culture directed their travels.

The progress of Latin instruction was similar to the Greek. This in part resulted from the mere reflex influence of the Greek, from which it in fact essentially borrowed its methods and its stimulants. Moreover, the state of politics, the impulse to ascend the orator's platform in the Forum which the democratic agitation communicated to a daily enlarging circle, contributed not a little to the diffusion and increase of oratorical exercises; "wherever one casts his eyes," says Cicero, "every place is full of rhetoricians." Besides, the writings of the sixth century, the further they receded into the past, began to be more decidedly regarded as classical texts of the golden time of Latin literature, and thereby gave a greater preponderance to the instruction which was essentially concentrated upon them. Lastly, the immigration and spreading of barbarian elements from many quarters and the incipient Latinising of extensive Celtic and Spanish districts, naturally gave to Latin grammar and Latin instruction a higher importance than they could have had, so long as Latin alone spoke Latin; the teacher of Latin literature had from the outset a different position in Comum and

Narbo than he had in Præneste and Ardea. Yet the aggregate result was a falling off rather than an improvement of culture. The ruin of the Italian country towns, the extensive intrusion of foreign elements, the political, economic, and moral deterioration of the nation, above all, the distracting civil wars inflicted more injury on the language than all the schoolmasters of the world could repair. The closer contact with the Hellenic culture of the present, the more decided influence of the loquacious Athenian wisdom and of the rhetoric of Rhodes and Asia Minor, supplied to the Roman youth just the very elements that were most pernicious in Hellenism. The propagandist mission which Latium undertook among the Celts, Iberians, and Libyans—proud as the task was—could not but have the like consequences for the Latin language as the Hellenising of the East had had for the Hellenic. The fact that the Roman public of this period applauded the well-arranged and rhythmically balanced periods of the orator, and any offence in language or metre cost the actor dear, doubtless shows that the insight into the mother tongue which was the reflection of scholastic training was becoming the common possession of a daily widening circle. But at the same time contemporaries capable of judging complain that the Hellenic culture in Italy about 690 was at a far lower level than it had been a generation before; that opportunities of hearing pure and good Latin were but rare, and these chiefly from the mouth of elderly cultivated ladies; that the tradition of genuine culture, the good old Latin mother wit, the Lucilian polish, the cultivated circle of readers of the Scipionic age, were gradually disappearing. The circumstance that the term *urbanitas*, and the idea of a polished national culture which it expressed, arose during this period, proves, not that it was in the ascendant, but that it was on the wane, and that people were keenly alive to the absence of this *urbanitas* in the language and the habits of the Latinised barbarians or barbarised Latins. Where we still meet with the urbane tone of conversation, as in Varro's Satires and Cicero's Letters, it is an echo of the old fashion which was not yet so obsolete in Reate and Arpinum as in Rome.

64.

Germes of
state-train-
ing-schools.

Thus the previous culture of youth remained substantially unchanged, except that—not so much from its own deterioration as from the general decline of the nation—it was productive of less good and more evil than in the preceding

epoch. Cæsar initiated a revolution also in this department. While the Roman senate had first combated and then at the most had simply tolerated culture, the government of the new Italo-Hellenic empire, whose essential character in fact was *humanitas*, could not but adopt measures to stimulate it after the Hellenic fashion. If Cæsar conferred the Roman franchise on all teachers of the liberal sciences and all the physicians of the capital, we may discover in this step a paving of the way in some degree for those institutions in which subsequently the higher bilingual culture of the youth of the empire was provided for on the part of the state, and which form the most significant expression of the new state of *humanitas*; and if Cæsar had further resolved on the establishment of a public Greek and Latin library in the capital and had already nominated the most learned Roman of the age, Marcus Varro, as principal librarian, this implied unmistakeably the design of opening up the cosmopolitan monarchy to cosmopolitan literature.

The development of the language during this period turned on the distinction between the classical Latin of cultivated society and the vulgar language of common life. The former itself was a product of the distinctively Italian culture; even in the Scipionic circle "pure Latin" had become the cue, and the mother tongue was spoken, no longer in entire *naïveté*, but in conscious contradistinction to the language of the great multitude. This epoch opens with a remarkable reaction against the classicism which had hitherto exclusively prevailed in the higher language of conversation and accordingly also in literature—a reaction which had inwardly and outwardly a close connection with the reaction of a similar kind in Greece. Just about this time the rhetor and romance-writer Hegesias of Magnesia and the numerous rhetors and literati of Asia Minor who attached themselves to him began to rebel against the orthodox Atticism. They demanded full currency for the language of life, without distinction, whether the word or the phrase originated in Attica or in Caria and Phrygia; they themselves spoke and wrote not for the taste of learned cliques, but for that of the great public. There could be no reasonable dispute as to the principle; but certainly the result could not be better than was the public of Asia Minor of that day, which had totally lost the taste for chasteness and purity of production, and longed only after the showy and brilliant. To say nothing of the spurious

Language.

The vulgarism of Asia Minor.

species of art that sprung out of this tendency—especially the romance and the history assuming the form of romance—the style of these Asiatics was, as may readily be conceived, abrupt and without modulation and finish, minced and effeminate, full of tinsel and bombast, thoroughly vulgar and affected; “any one who knows Hegesias,” says Cicero, “knows what silliness is.”

Roman vul- Yet this new style found its way also into the Latin world.
garism.

Hortensius,
114-50.

When the Hellenic fashionable rhetoric, after having at the close of the previous epoch obtruded into the Latin instruction of youth (iii. 443), took at the beginning of the present period the final step and mounted the Roman rostra in the person of Quintus Hortensius (640—704) the most celebrated pleader of the Sullan age, it adhered closely even in the Latin idiom to the bad Greek taste of the time; and the Roman public, no longer having the pure and chaste culture of the Scipionic age, naturally applauded with zeal the innovator who knew how to give to vulgarism the semblance of an artistic performance. This was of great importance. As in Greece the battles of language were always waged at first in the schools of the rhetoricians, so in Rome the forensic oration to a certain extent even more than literature set the standard of style, and accordingly there was combined, as it were of right, with the leadership of the bar the prerogative of giving the tone to the fashionable mode of speaking and writing. The Asiatic vulgarism of Hortensius thus dislodged classicism from the Roman platform and partly also from literature. But the fashion soon changed once more in Greece and in Rome. In the former it was the Rhodian school of rhetoricians, which, without reverting to all the chaste severity of the Attic style, attempted to strike out a middle course between it and the modern fashion; if the Rhodian masters were not too particular as to the internal correctness of their thinking and speaking, they at least insisted on purity of language and style, on the careful selection of words and phrases, and the thorough modulation of sentences.

Reaction.

The Rhodian school.

Ciceronian-
ism.
106-43.

In Italy it was Marcus Tullius Cicero (648—711) who, after having in his early youth gone along with the Hortensian manner, was brought by hearing the Rhodian masters and by his own more matured taste to better paths, and thenceforth addicted himself to strict purity of language and the thorough periodic arrangement and modulation of

his discourse. The models of language, which in this respect he followed, he found especially in those circles of the higher Roman society which had suffered but little or not at all from vulgarism ; and, as was already said, there were still such, although they were beginning to disappear. The earlier Latin and the good Greek literature, however considerable was the influence of the latter more especially on the rhythm of his oratory, were in this matter only of secondary moment : this purifying of the language was by no means a reaction of the language of books against that of conversation, but a reaction of the language of the really cultivated against the jargon of spurious and partial culture. Cæsar, in the department of language also the greatest master of his time, expressed the fundamental idea of Roman classicism, when he enjoined that in speech and writing every foreign word should be avoided, as rocks are avoided by the mariner ; the poetical and the obsolete word of the older literature was rejected as well as the rustic phrase or that borrowed from the language of common life, and more especially the Greek words and phrases which, as the letters of this period show, had to a very great extent found their way into conversational language. Nevertheless this scholastic and artificial classicism of the Ciceronian period stood to the Scipionic as repentance to innocence, or the French of the classicists under Napoleon to the model French of Molière and Boileau ; while the former classicism had sprung out of the full freshness of life, the latter as it were caught just in right time the last breath of a race perishing beyond recovery. Such as it was, it rapidly diffused itself. With the leadership of the bar the dictatorship of language and taste passed from Hortensius to Cicero, and the varied and copious authorship of the latter gave to this classicism—what it had hitherto lacked—extensive prose texts. Thus Cicero became the creator of the modern classical Latin prose, and Roman classicism attached itself throughout and altogether to Cicero as a stylist ; it was to the stylist Cicero, not to the author, still less to the statesman, that the extravagant panegyrics—yet not made up wholly of verbiage—applied, with which the most gifted representatives of classicism, such as Cæsar and Catullus, loaded him.

They soon went further. . What Cicero did in prose, was The new carried out in poetry towards the end of the epoch by the Roman new Roman school of poets, which modelled itself on the poetry.

Greek fashionable poetry, and in which the man of most considerable talent was Catullus. Here too the higher language of conversation dislodged the archaic reminiscences which hitherto to a large extent prevailed in this domain, and as Latin prose submitted to the Attic rhythm, so Latin poetry submitted gradually to the strict or rather painful metrical laws of the Alexandrines; *e.g.* from the time of Catullus, it is no longer allowable at once to begin a verse and to close a sentence begun in the verse preceding with a monosyllabic word or a dissyllabic one not specially weighty. At length science stepped in, fixed the law of language, and developed its rule, which was no longer determined by experience, but asserted the claim to determine experience. The endings of declension, which hitherto had in part been variable, were now to be once for all fixed; *e.g.* of the genitive and dative forms hitherto current side by side in the so-called fourth declension (*senatûs* and *senatus*, *senatûi* and *senatu*) Cæsar recognised exclusively as valid the contracted forms (*us* and *u*). In orthography various changes were made, to bring the written more fully into correspondence with the spoken language; thus the *u* in the middle of words like *maximus* was replaced after Cæsar's precedent by *i*; and of the two letters which had become superfluous, *k* and *g*, the removal of the first was effected, and that of the second was at least proposed. The language was, if not yet stereotyped, in the course of becoming so; it was not yet indeed passively dominated by the rule, but it had already become conscious of its influence. That this action in the department of Latin grammar derived generally its spirit and method from the Greek, and not only so, but that the Latin language was also directly rectified in accordance with Greek precedent, is shown, for example, by the treatment of the final *s*, which till towards the close of this epoch had received at pleasure sometimes the value of a consonant, sometimes that of a vowel, but was treated by the new-fashioned poets throughout, as in Greek, as a consonantal termination. This regulation of language is the proper domain of Roman classicism; in the most various ways, and for that very reason all the more significantly, the rule is inculcated and the offence against it rebuked by the coryphæi of classicism, by Cicero, by Cæsar, even in the poems of Catullus; whereas the older generation expresses itself with natural keenness of feeling respecting the revolution

Grammatical science.

which had affected the field of language as remorselessly as the field of politics.* But while the new classicism—that is to say, the standard Latin governed by rule and as far as possible placed on a parity with the standard Greek—which arose out of a conscious reaction against the vulgarism intruding into higher society and even into literature, acquired literary fixity and systematic shape, the latter by no means evacuated the field. Not only do we find it naïvely employed in the works of secondary personages who have drifted into the ranks of authors merely by accident, as in the account of Cæsar's second Spanish war, but we shall meet it also with an impress more or less distinct in literature proper, in the mime, in the semi-romance, in the æsthetic writings of Varro; and it is a significant circumstance, that it maintains itself precisely in the most national departments of literature, and that truly conservative men, like Varro, take it into protection. Classicism was based on the death of the Italian language as monarchy on the decline of the Italian nation; it was completely consistent that the men, in whom the republic was still living, should continue to accord its rights to the living language, and for the sake of its comparative vitality and nationality should tolerate its æsthetic defects. Thus then the linguistic opinions and tendencies of this epoch are everywhere divergent; by the side of the old-fashioned poetry of Lucretius appears the thoroughly modern poetry of Catullus, by the side of Cicero's well-modulated period stands the sentence of Varro intentionally disdaining all subdivision. The field of language likewise mirrors the distraction of the age.

In the literature of this period we are first of all struck by the outward increase, as compared with the former epoch, of literary effort in Rome. It was long since the literary activity of the Greeks flourished no more in the free atmosphere of civic independence, but only in the scientific institutions of the larger cities and especially of the courts. Left to depend on the favour and protection of the great, and dislodged from the former seats of the Muses† by the extinc-

* Thus Varro (*De R. R.* i. 2) says: *ab aeditimo, ut dicere didicimus a patribus nostris; ut corrigimur ab recentibus urbanis, ab aedituo.*

† The dedication of the poetical description of the earth which passes under the name of Scymnus is remarkable in reference to those relations. After the poet has declared his purpose of preparing in the favourite Menandrian measure a sketch of geography intelligible for scholars and easy to be learned by heart,

133. 96. tion of the dynasties of Pergamus (621), Cyrene (658),
75. 64. Bithynia (679), and Syria (690) and by the waning splendour of the court of the Lagidæ—moreover, since the death of Alexander the Great, necessarily cosmopolitan and at least quite as much strangers among the Egyptians and Syrians as among the Latins—the Hellenic literati began more and more to turn their eyes towards Rome. Among the host of Greek attendants with which the Roman of quality at this time surrounded himself, the philosopher, the poet, and the memoir-writer played conspicuous parts by the side of the cook, the boy-favourite, and the jester. We meet with literati of note in such positions; the Epicurean Philodemus, for instance, was installed as domestic philosopher with
58. Lucius Piso consul in 696, and occasionally edified the initiated with his clever epigrams on the coarse Epicureanism of his patron. From all sides the most notable representatives of Greek art and science migrated in daily increasing numbers to Rome, where literary gains were now more abundant than anywhere else. Among those thus mentioned as settled in Rome we find the physician Asclepiades whom king Mithradates vainly endeavoured to draw away from thence into his service; the universalist in learning, Alexander of Miletus, termed Polyhistor; the poet Parthenius from Nicæa in Bithynia; Posidonius of Apamea in Syria equally celebrated as a traveller, teacher, and author, who at a great age
51. migrated in 703 from Rhodes to Rome; and various others. A house like that of Lucius Lucullus was a seat of Hellenic culture and a rendezvous for Hellenic literati almost like the Alexandrian Museum; Roman resources and Hellenic

he dedicates—as Apollodorus dedicated his similar historical compendium to Attalus Philadelphus king of Pergamus

ἀθάνατον ἀπονέμοντα δόξαν Ἀττάλῳ
τῆς πραγματείας ἐπιγραφὴν εἰληφότι—

- 91-75. his manual to Nicomedes III. king (663?—679) of Bithynia:

ἐγὼ δ' ἀκούων, διότι τῶν νῦν βασιλέων
μόνος βασιλικὴν χρηστότητα προσφέρεις,
πεῖραν ἐπεθύμησ' αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑμαντοῦ λαβεῖν
καὶ παραγενέσθαι καὶ τί βασιλεύς ἐστ' ἰδεῖν.
διὸ τῇ προθέσει σύμβουλον ἐξελεξάμην
. . . . τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα τὸν Διδομένη . . .
οὗ δὴ σχεδὸν μάλιστα καὶ πεπεισμένος
πρὸς σὴν κατὰ λόγον ἦκα (κοινὴν γὰρ σχεδὸν
τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσιν ἀναδέδειχας) ἐστίαν.

connoisseurship had gathered in these halls of wealth and science an incomparable collection of statues and paintings of earlier and contemporary masters, as well as a library as carefully selected as it was magnificently fitted up, and every person of culture and especially every Greek was welcome there—the master of the house himself was often seen walking up and down the beautiful colonnade in philological or philosophical conversation with one of his learned guests. No doubt these Greeks brought along with their rich treasures of culture their preposterousness and servility to Italy; one of these learned wanderers for instance, the author of the “Art of Flattery,” Aristodemus of Nysa (about 700) recommended himself to his masters by demonstrating that Homer was a native of Rome! In the same measure as the pursuits of the Greek literati prospered in Rome, literary activity and literary interest increased among the Romans themselves. Even Greek composition, which the stricter taste of the Scipionic age had totally set aside, now revived. The Greek language was now universally current, and a Greek treatise found a quite different public from a Latin one; therefore Romans of rank, such as Lucius Lucullus, Marcus Cicero, Titus Atticus, Quintus Scævola (tribune of the people in 700), like the kings of Armenia and Mauretania, published occasionally Greek prose and even Greek verses. Such Greek authorship however by native Romans remained a secondary matter and almost an amusement; the literary as well as the political parties of Italy all coincided in adhering to their Italian nationality, only more or less pervaded by Hellenism. Nor could there be any complaint at least as to want of activity in the field of Latin authorship. There was a flood of books and pamphlets of all sorts, and above all of poems, in Rome. Poets swarmed there, as they did only in Tarsus or Alexandria; poetical publications had become the standing juvenile sin of livelier natures, and even then the writer was reckoned fortunate whose youthful poems compassionate oblivion withdrew from criticism. Any one who understood the art, wrote without difficulty at a sitting his five hundred hexameters, in which no schoolmaster found anything to censure but no reader discovered anything to praise. The female world also took a lively part in these literary pursuits; the ladies did not confine themselves to dancing and music, but by their spirit and wit ruled conversa-

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Extent of
the literary
pursuits of
the Romans.

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tion and talked excellently on Greek and Latin literature; and, when poetry laid siege to a maiden's heart, the fortress not unfrequently capitulated likewise in graceful verses. Rhythms became more and more the fashionable plaything of the big children of both sexes; poetical epistles, joint poetical exercises and competitions among good friends, were of common occurrence, and towards the end of this epoch institutions were already opened in the capital, at which unfledged Latin poets might learn verse-making for money. In consequence of the large consumption of books the machinery for the manufacture of copies was substantially perfected, and publication was effected with comparative rapidity and cheapness; bookselling became a respectable and lucrative trade, and the bookseller's shop a usual meeting-place of men of culture. Reading had become a fashion, nay a mania; at table, where coarser pastimes had not already intruded, reading was regularly introduced, and any one who meditated a journey seldom forgot to pack up a travelling library. The superior officer was seen in the camp tent with the obscene Greek romance, the statesman in the senate with the philosophical treatise, in his hands. Matters accordingly stood in the Roman state as they have stood and will stand in every state where the citizens read "from the threshold to the closet." The Parthian vizier was not far wrong, when he pointed out to the citizens of Seleucia the romances found in the camp of Crassus and asked them whether they still regarded the readers of such books as formidable opponents.

The classicalists and the moderns.

The literary tendency of this age was varied and could not be otherwise, for the age itself was divided between the old and the new modes. The same tendencies which came into conflict on the field of politics, the national-Italian tendency of the conservatives, the Hellenic-Italian or, if the term be preferred, cosmopolitan tendency of the new monarchy, fought their battles also on the field of literature. The former attached itself to the older Latin literature, which in the theatre, in the school, and in erudite research assumed more and more the character of classical. With less taste and stronger party tendencies than the Scipionic epoch showed, Ennius, Pacuvius, and especially Plautus were now exalted to the skies. The leaves of the Sibyl rose in price, the fewer they became; the relatively greater nationality and relatively greater productiveness of the poets of the

sixth century were never more vividly felt than in this epoch of finished *Épigonism*, which in literature as decidedly as in politics looked up to the century of the Hannibalic warriors as to the golden age that had now unhappily passed away beyond recall. No doubt there was in this admiration of the old classics no small portion of the same hollowness and hypocrisy which are characteristic of the conservatism of this age in general; and here too there was no want of trimmers. Cicero for instance, although in prose one of the chief representatives of the modern tendency, revered nevertheless the older national poetry nearly with the same antiquarian respect which he paid to the aristocratic constitution and the augural discipline; "patriotism requires," we find him saying, "that we should rather read a notoriously wretched translation of Sophocles than the original." While thus the modern literary tendency cognate to the democratic monarchy numbered secret adherents enough even among the orthodox admirers of Ennius, there were not wanting already bolder judges, who treated the native literature as disrespectfully as the senatorial politics. Not only did they resume the strict criticism of the Scipionic epoch and give weight to Terence only in order to condemn Ennius and still more the *Emnianists*, but the younger and bolder men went much farther and ventured already—though only as yet in heretical revolt against literary orthodoxy—to call Plautus a rude jester and Lucilius a bad verse-smith. This modern tendency attached itself not to the native authorship, but rather to the more recent Greek literature or the so-called *Alexandrinism*.

We cannot avoid saying at least so much respecting this remarkable aftergrowth of Hellenic language and art as is requisite for the understanding of the Roman literature of this and the later epochs. The Alexandrian literature was based on the decline of the pure Hellenic idiom, which from the time of Alexander the Great was superseded in daily life by an inferior jargon deriving its origin from the contact of the Macedonian dialect with various Greek and barbarian tribes; or, to speak more accurately, the Alexandrian literature sprang out of the ruin of the Hellenic nation generally, which had to perish, and did perish, in its national individuality in order to establish the universal monarchy of Alexander and the empire of Hellenism. Had Alexander's universal empire continued to subsist, the former national and popular literature would have been succeeded by a cos-

The Greek
Alexan-
drinism.

mopolitan literature Hellenic merely in name, essentially denationalised and called into life in a certain measure by royal patronage, but at all events ruling the world; but, as the state of Alexander was unhinged by his death, the germs of the literature corresponding to it rapidly perished. Nevertheless the Greek nation with all that it had possessed—with its nationality, its language, its art—belonged to the past. It was only in a comparatively narrow circle not of men of culture—for such, strictly speaking, no longer existed—but of men of erudition that the Greek literature was still cherished even when dead; that the rich inheritance which it had left was inventoried with melancholy pleasure or arid refinement of research; and that the living sense of sympathy or the dead erudition was elevated into a semblance of productiveness. This posthumous productiveness constitutes the so-called Alexandrinism. It is essentially similar to that literature of scholars, which, keeping aloof from the living Romanic nationalities and their vulgar idioms, grew up during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries among a cosmopolitan circle of erudite philologists—as an artificial after-growth of the departed antiquity; the contrast between the classical and the vulgar Greek of the period of the Diadochi is doubtless less strongly marked, but is not properly speaking different from that between the Latin of Manutius and the Italian of Macchiavelli.

The Roman
Alexan-
drinism.

Italy had hitherto been in the main disinclined towards Alexandrinism. Its season of comparative brilliance was the period shortly before and after the first Punic war; yet Nævius, Ennius, Pacuvius and generally the whole body of the national Roman authors down to Varro and Lucretius in all branches of poetical production, not excepting even the didactic poem, attached themselves, not to their Greek contemporaries or very recent predecessors, but without exception to Homer, Euripides, Menander and the other masters of the living and national Greek literature. Roman literature was never fresh and national; but, as long as there was a Roman people, its authors instinctively sought for living and national models, and copied, if not always to the best purpose or the best authors, at least such as were original. The Greek literature which sprang up after Alexander found its first Roman imitators—for the slight attempts of the Marian age (iii. 463) can scarcely be taken into account—among the contemporaries of Cicero and Cæsar; and now the

Roman Alexandrinism spread with singular rapidity. In part this arose from external causes. The increased contact with the Greeks, especially the frequent journeys of the Romans into the Hellenic provinces and the assemblage of Greek literati in Rome, naturally procured a public even among the Italians for the Greek literature of the day, for the epic and elegiac poetry, epigrams, and Milesian tales current at that time in Greece. Moreover, as we have already stated (P. 565), the Alexandrian poetry had its established place in the instruction of the Italian youth; and thus reacted on Latin literature all the more, since the latter continued to be essentially dependent at all times on the Hellenistic school-training. We find in this respect even a direct connection of the new Roman with the new Greek literature; the already mentioned Parthenius, one of the better known Alexandrian elegists, opened, apparently about 700, a school for literature and poetry in Rome, and the excerpts are still extant in which he supplied one of his noble pupils with materials for Latin elegies of an erotic and mythological nature according to the well known Alexandrian receipt. But it was by no means simply such accidental occasions which called into existence the Roman Alexandrinism; it was on the contrary a product—perhaps not pleasing, but thoroughly inevitable—of the political and national development of Rome. On the one hand, as Hellas resolved itself into Hellenism, so now Latium resolved itself into Romanism; the national development of Italy became overgrown and was merged in Cæsar's Mediterranean empire, just as the Hellenic development in the Eastern empire of Alexander. On the other hand, as the new empire rested on the fact that the mighty streams of Greek and Latin nationality, after having flowed in parallel channels for many centuries, now at length coalesced, the Italian literature had not merely as hitherto to seek its groundwork generally in the Greek, but had also to put itself on a level with the Greek literature of the present, or in other words with Alexandrinism. With the scholastic Latin, with the closed number of classics, with the exclusive circle of classic-reading *urbani*, the national Latin literature was dead and at an end; there arose instead of it a thoroughly degenerate, artificially fostered, imperial literature, which did not rest on any definite nationality, but proclaimed in two languages the universal gospel of humanity, and was dependent in point of spirit throughout and con-

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sciously on the old Hellenic, in point of language partly on this, partly on the old Roman popular, literature. This was no improvement. The Mediterranean monarchy of Cæsar was doubtless a grand and, what is more, a necessary creation; but it had been called into life by an arbitrary superior will, and therefore there was nothing to be found in it of the fresh popular life, of the overflowing national vigour, which are characteristic of younger, more limited, and more natural commonwealths, and which the Italian state of the sixth century had still been able to exhibit. The ruin of the Italian nationality, accomplished in the creation of Cæsar, nipped the promise of literature. Every one who has any sense of the close affinity between art and nationality will always turn back from Cicero and Horace to Cato and Lucretius; and nothing but the schoolmaster's view of history and of literature—which has acquired, it is true, in this department the sanction of prescription—could have called the epoch of art beginning with the new monarchy pre-eminently the golden age. But while the Romano-Hellenic Alexandrinism of the age of Cæsar and Augustus must be deemed inferior to the older, however imperfect, national literature, it is on the other hand as decidedly superior to the Alexandrinism of the age of the Diadochi as Cæsar's enduring structure to the ephemeral creation of Alexander. We shall have afterwards to show that the Augustan literature, compared with the kindred literature of the period of the Diadochi, was far less a literature of philologers and far more an imperial literature than the latter, and therefore had a far more permanent and far more general influence in the upper circles of society than the Greek Alexandrinism.

Dramatic
literature,
Tragedy
and comedy
disappear.

Nowhere was the prospect more lamentable than in dramatic literature. Tragedy and comedy had already before the present epoch become inwardly extinct in the Roman national literature. New pieces were no longer performed. That the public still in the Sullan age expected to see such, appears from the reproductions—belonging to this epoch—of Plautine comedies with the titles and names of the persons altered, with reference to which the managers well added that it was better to see a good old piece than a bad new one. From this it was no great step to that entire surrender of the stage to the dead poets, which we find in the Ciceronian age, and to which Alexandrinism made no oppo-

sition. Its productiveness in this department was worse than none. Real dramatic composition the Alexandrian literature never knew; the spurious drama alone, which was written primarily for reading and not for exhibition, could be introduced by it into Italy, and soon accordingly these dramatic iambs began to be quite as prevalent in Rome as in Alexandria, and the writing of tragedy in particular began to figure among the regular diseases of adolescence. We may form a pretty accurate idea of the quality of these productions from the fact that Quintus Cicero, in order homœopathically to beguile the weariness of winter quarters in Gaul, composed four tragedies in sixteen days.

In the "picture of life" or *Mimus* alone the last still The Mime, vigorous product of the national literature, the Atellan farce, became engrafted with the ethological offshoots of Greek comedy, which Alexandrinism cultivated with greater poetical vigour and better success than any other branch of poetry. The *mimus* originated out of the dances in character to the flute, which had long been usual, and which were performed sometimes on other occasions, *e.g.* for the entertainment of the guests during dinner, but more especially in the pit of the theatre during the intervals between the acts. It was not difficult to form out of these dances—in which the aid of speech had doubtless long since been occasionally employed—by means of the introduction of a more organised plot and a regular dialogue little comedies, which were yet essentially distinguished from the earlier comedy and even from the farce by the facts, that the dance and the lasciviousness inseparable from such dancing continued in this case to play a chief part, and that the *mimus*, as belonging properly not to the boards but to the pit, threw aside all ideal scenic effects, such as masks for the face and theatrical buskins, and—what was specially important—admitted of the female characters being represented by women. This new *mimus*, which first seems to have come on the stage of the capital about 672, soon swallowed up the national harlequinade, with which it indeed in the most essential respects coincided, and was employed as the usual interlude and especially as afterpiece along with the other dramatic performances.* The plot was of course still more

* Cicero testifies that the *minius* in his time had taken the place of the Atellana (*Ad Fam.* ix. 16); with this accords the fact, that the *mini* and *minæ* first appear about the Sullan epoch (*Ad Her.* i. 14, 24; ii. 13, 19;

indifferent, loose, and absurd than in the harlequinade; if it was only sufficiently chequered, so that the beggar suddenly became a Cræsus and so forth, they did not remonstrate with the poet who instead of untying the knot cut it to pieces. The subjects were chiefly of an amorous nature, mostly of the licentious sort; for example, poet and public without exception took part against the husband, and poetical justice consisted in the derision of good morals. The artistic charm depended wholly, as in the *Atellana*, on the portraiture of the manners of common and low life; in which rural pictures are laid aside for those of the life and doings of the capital, and the sweet rabble of Rome—just as in the similar Greek pieces the rabble of Alexandria—is summoned to applaud its own likeness. Many subjects are taken from the life of tradesmen; there appear the—here also inevitable—"Fuller," then the "Ropemaker," the "Dyer," the "Saltman," the "Female Weavers," the "Rascal;" other pieces give sketches of character, as the "Forgetful," the "Braggart," the "Man of 100,000 sesterces;"* or pictures of other lands, the "Etruscan Woman," the "Gauls," the "Cretan," "Alexandria;" or descriptions of popular festivals, as "the Compitalia," "the Saturnalia," "Anna Perenna," "the Hot Baths;" or parodies of mythology, as "the Voyage to the Underworld," "the Arvernian Lake." Apt nicknames and short commonplaces which were easily retained and applied were welcome; but every piece of nonsense was of itself privileged; in this preposterous world Bacchus is applied to for water and the fountain-nymph for wine. Isolated examples even of the political allusions for-

212-211 *Atta Fr.* 1 *Ribbeck*; *Plin. H. N.* vii. 48, 158; *Plutarch Sull.* 2, 36). The designation *minus*, however, is sometimes inaccurately applied to the comedian generally. Thus the *minus* who appeared at the festival of Apollo in 542-543 (*Festus* under *salva res est*; comp. *Cicero De Orat.* ii. 59, 242) was evidently nothing but an actor of the *palliata*, for there was at this period no room in the development of the Roman theatre for real mimes in the later sense.

With the *minimus* of the classical Greek period—prose dialogues, in which *genre* pictures, particularly of a rural kind, were presented—the Roman *minimus* had no especial relation.

* With the possession of this sum, which constituted the qualification for the first voting-class and subjected the inheritance to the Voconian law, the boundary line was crossed which separated inferior (*tenuiores*) from respectable people. Therefore the poor client of Catullus (xxiii. 26) beseeches the gods to help him to this fortune.

merly so strictly prohibited in the Roman theatre are found in these mimes.* As regards metrical form, these poets gave themselves, as they tell us, "but moderate trouble with the versification;" the language abounded, even in the pieces prepared for publication, with vulgar expressions and low figures. The mime was, it is plain, in substance nothing but the former farce; with this exception, that the character-masks and the standing scenery of Atella as well as the rustic impress are dropped, and in their room the life of the capital in its boundless liberty and licence is brought on the stage. Most pieces of this sort were doubtless of a very fugitive nature and made no pretension to a place in literature; but the mimes of Laberius, full of pungent delineation of character and in point of language and metre exhibiting the hand of a master, maintained their ground in it; and even the historian must regret that we are no longer permitted to compare the drama of the republican death-struggle in Rome with its great Attic counterpart.

With the worthlessness of dramatic literature the increase of scenic spectacles and of scenic pomp went hand in hand. Dramatic representations obtained their regular place in the public life not only of the capital but also of the country towns; the former also now at length acquired by means of Pompeius a permanent theatre (699; see P. 301), and the Campanian custom of stretching canvas over the theatre for the protection of the actors and spectators during the performance, which in ancient times always took place in the open air, now likewise found admission to Rome (676). As at that time in Greece it was not the—more than pale—Pleiad of the Alexandrian dramatists, but the classic drama, above all the tragedies of Euripides, which amidst the amplest development of scenic resources kept the stage, so in Rome at the time of Cicero the tragedies of Ennius, Pacuvius, and Accius, and the comedies of Plautus were those chiefly produced. While the latter had been in the previous period supplanted by the more tasteful but in point of comic vigour

* In the "Descensus ad Inferos" of Laberius all sorts of people come forward, who have seen wonders and signs; to one there appeared a husband with two wives, whereupon a neighbour is of opinion that that is still worse than the vision, recently seen by a soothsayer in a dream, of six ædiles. Cæsar forsooth desired—according to the talk of the time—to introduce polygamy in Rome (Suetonius *Cæs.* 82) and he nominated in reality six ædiles instead of four. One sees from this that Laberius understood how to exercise the fool's privilege and Cæsar how to permit the fool's freedom.

far inferior Terence, Roscius and Varro, or in other words dramatic art and antiquarian scholarship, co-operated to procure for him a resurrection similar to that which Shakespeare experienced at the hands of Garrick and Johnson; but even Plautus had to suffer from the degenerate susceptibility and the impatient haste of an audience spoilt by the short and slovenly farces, so that the managers found themselves compelled to excuse the length of the Plautine comedies and even perhaps to make omissions and alterations. The more limited the stock of plays, the more the activity of the managing and executive staff as well as the interest of the public was directed to the scenic representation of the pieces. There was hardly any more lucrative trade in Rome than that of the actor and the dancing-girl of the first rank. The princely estate of the tragic actor Æsopus has been already mentioned (P. 511); his still more celebrated contemporary Roscius (iii. 459) estimated his annual income at 600,000 sesterces (£6,000)* and the dancer Diouysia estimated hers at 200,000 sesterces (£2000). At the same time immense sums were expended on decorations and costume; now and then trains of six hundred mules in harness crossed the stage, and the Trojan theatrical army was employed to present to the public a tableau of the nations vanquished by Pompeius in Asia. The music which accompanied the delivery of the inserted choruses likewise obtained a greater and more independent importance; as the wind sways the waves, says Varro, so the skilful flute-player sways the minds of the listeners with every modulation of melody. It accustomed itself to the use of quicker time, and thereby compelled the player to more lively action. Musical and dramatic connoisseurship was developed; the *habitué* recognised every tune by the first note, and knew the texts by heart; every fault in the music or recitation was severely censured by the audience. The state of the Roman stage in the time of Cicero vividly reminds us of the modern French theatre. As the Roman mime corresponds to the loose tableaux of the pieces of the day, nothing being too good and nothing too bad for either the one or the other, so we find in both the same traditionally classic tragedy and comedy, which the man of culture is in duty bound to admire or at least to applaud.

* He obtained from the state for every day on which he acted 1000 *denarii* (£40) and besides this the pay for his company. In later years he declined the honorarium for himself.

The multitude is satisfied, when it meets its own reflection in the farce, and admires the decorative pomp and receives the general impression of an ideal world in the drama; the man of higher culture concerns himself at the theatre not with the piece, but only with its artistic representation. Moreover the Roman histrionic art oscillated in its different spheres, just like the French, between the cottage and the drawing-room. It was nothing unusual for the Roman dancing-girls to throw off at the finale the upper robe and to give a dance in undress for the benefit of the public; but on the other hand in the eyes of the Roman Talma the supreme law of his art was, not the truth of nature, but symmetry.

In recitative poetry metrical annals after the model of those of Ennius seem not to have been wanting; but they were perhaps sufficiently criticised by that graceful vow of his mistress of which Catullus sings—that the worst of the bad heroic poems should be presented as a sacrifice to holy Venus, if she would only bring back her lover from his vile political poetry to her arms. Indeed in the whole field of recitative poetry at this epoch the older national-Roman tendency is represented only by a single work of note, which, however, is altogether one of the most important poetical products of Roman literature. It is the didactic poem of Titus Lucretius Carus (655—699) “Concerning the Nature of Things,” whose author, belonging to the best circles of Roman society, but taking no part in public life whether from weakness of health or from disinclination, died in the prime of manhood shortly before the outbreak of the civil war. As a poet he attached himself decidedly to Ennius and thereby to the classical Greek literature. Indignantly he turns away from the “hollow Hellenism” of his time, and professes himself with his whole soul and heart to be the scholar of the “chaste Greeks,” as indeed even the sacred earnestness of Thucydides has found no unworthy echo in one of the best-known sections of this Roman poem. As Ennius draws his wisdom from Epicharmus and Euhemerus, so Lucretius borrows the form of his representation from Empedocles, “the most glorious treasure of the richly endowed Sicilian isle;” and, as to the matter, gathers “all the golden words together from the rolls of Epicurus,” “who outshines other wise men as the sun obscures the stars.” Like Ennius, Lucretius disdains

Metrical
Annals.Lucretius.
99-55.

the mythological lore with which poetry was overloaded by Alexandrinism, and requires nothing from his reader but a knowledge of the legends generally current.* In spite of the modern purism which rejected foreign words from poetry, Lucretius prefers to use, as Ennius had done, a significant Greek word in place of a feeble and obscure Latin one. The old Roman alliteration, the want of mutual adjustment between the divisions of the verse and those of the sentence, and generally the older modes of expression and composition, are still frequently found in Lucretius' rhythms, and although he handles the verse more melodiously than Ennius, his hexameters move not, as those of the modern poetical school, with a lively grace like the rippling brook, but with a stately slowness like the stream of liquid gold. Philosophically and practically also Lucretius leans throughout on Ennius, the only indigenous poet whom his poem celebrates. The confession of faith of the singer of Rudia (ii. 451)—

*Ego deum genus esse semper dixi et dicam cœlitum,
Sed eos non curare opinor, quid agat humanum genus—*

describes completely the religious standpoint of Lucretius, and not unjustly for that reason he himself terms his poem as it were the continuation of Ennius;

*Ennius ut noster cecinit, qui primus amœno
Detulit ex Helicone perenni fronde coronam,
Per gentis Italas hominum quæ clara clueret.*

Once more—and for the last time—the poem of Lucretius is resonant with the whole poetic pride and the whole poetic earnestness of the sixth century, in which, amidst the images of the formidable Carthaginian and the glorious Scipiad, the imagination of the poet is more at home than in his own degenerate age.† To him too his own song “gracefully welling out of the abundance of feeling” sounds, as compared with the common poems, “like the brief song of the swan compared with the cry of the crane;”—with him

* Such an individual apparent exception as Panchaea the land of incense (ii. 417) is to be explained from the circumstance that this had passed from the romance of the Travels of Euhemerus already perhaps into the poetry of Ennius, at any rate into the poems of Lucius Manlius (iii. 464; Plin. *H. N.* x. 2, 4) and thence was well known to the public for which Lucretius wrote.

† This naively appears in the descriptions of war, in which the tempests that destroy armies, and the hosts of elephants that trample down those who are on their own side—pictures, that is, from the Punic wars—appear as if they belonged to the immediate present. Comp. ii. 41; v. 1226, 1303, 1339.

too the heart swells, listening to the melodies of its own invention, with the hope of illustrious honours—just as Ennius forbids the men, to whom he “gave from the depth of the heart a foretaste of fiery song,” to mourn at his, the immortal singer’s, tomb.

It is a remarkable fatality, that this man of extraordinary talents, far superior in originality of poetic endowments to most if not to all his contemporaries, fell upon an age in which he felt himself strange and forlorn, and in consequence of this made the most singular mistake in the selection of a subject. The system of Epicurus, which converts the universe into a great vortex of atoms and undertakes to explain the origin and end of the world as well as all the problems of nature and of life in a purely mechanical way, was doubtless somewhat less silly than the conversion of myths into history which was attempted by Euhemerus and after him by Ennius; but it was not an ingenious or a fresh system, and the task of poetically unfolding this mechanical view of the world was of such a nature that never probably did poet expend life and art on a more ungrateful theme. The philosophic reader censures in the Lucretian poem the omission of the finer points of the system, the superficiality especially with which controversies are presented, the defective division, the frequent repetitions, with quite as good reason as the poetical reader frets at the mathematics put into rhythm which makes a great portion of the poem absolutely unreadable. In spite of these incredible defects, before which every man of mediocre talent must inevitably have succumbed, this poet might justly boast of having carried off from the poetic wilderness a new chaplet such as the muses had not yet bestowed on any; and it was by no means merely the occasional similitudes, and the other inserted descriptions of mighty natural phenomena and yet mightier passions, which acquired for the poet this chaplet. The genius which marks the view of life as well as the poetry of Lucretius depends on his unbelief, which came forward and was entitled to come forward with the full victorious power of truth, and therefore with the full vigour of poetry, in opposition to the prevailing faith of hypocrisy or of superstition.

*Humana ante oculos fæde cum vita jaceret
In terris oppressa gravi sub religione,
Quæ caput a cæli regionibus ostendebat*

*Horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans,
 Primum Gravius homo mortalis tendere contra
 Est oculos ausus primusque obsistere contra.
 Ergo vivida vis animi pervicit, et extra
 Processit longe flammanti: mœnia mundi
 Atque omne immensum peragravit mente animoque.*

The poet accordingly was zealous to overthrow the gods, as Brutus had overthrown the kings, and "to release nature from her rigorous lords." But it was not against the long ago collapsed throne of Jovis that these flaming words were hurled; just like Ennius, Lucretius fights practically above all things against the wild foreign faiths and superstitions of the multitude, the worship of the Great Mother for instance and the childish lightning-lore of the Etruscans. Horror and antipathy towards that terrible world in general, in which and for which the poet wrote, suggested his poem. It was composed in that hopeless time when the rule of the oligarchy had been overthrown and that of Cæsar had not yet been established, in the sultry years during which the outbreak of the civil war was awaited with long and painful suspense. If we seem to perceive in its unequal and restless utterance that the poet daily expected to see the wild tumult of revolution break forth over himself and his work, we must not with reference to his view of men and things forget amidst what men, and in prospect of what things, that view had its origin. In Hellas at the epoch of Alexander the Great it was a current saying, and one profoundly felt by all the best men, that the best thing of all was not to be born, and the next best to die. Of all views of the world possible to a tender and poetically organised mind in the kindred Cæsarian age this was the noblest and the most ennobling, that it is a benefit for men to be released from a belief in the immortality of the soul and thereby from the evil dread of death and of the gods which malignantly steals over men like terror creeping over children in a dark room; that, as the sleep of the night is more refreshing than the trouble of the day, so death, eternal repose from all hope and fear, is better than life, as indeed the gods of the poet themselves are nothing, and have nothing, but an eternal blessed rest; that the pains of hell torment man, not after life, but during its course in the wild and unruly passions of his throbbing heart; that the task of man is to attune his soul to equanimity, to esteem the purple no higher than the warm dress worn at

home, rather to remain in the ranks of those that obey than to press into the confused crowd of candidates for the office of ruler, rather to lie on the grass beside the brook than to take part under the golden ceiling of the rich in emptying his countless dishes. This philosophico-practical tendency is the true ideal essence of the Lucretian poem and is only overlaid, not choked, by all the dreariness of its physical demonstrations. Essentially on this rests its comparative wisdom and truth. The man who with a reverence for his great predecessors and a vehement zeal, to which this century elsewhere knew no parallel, preached such doctrine and embellished it with the charm of art, may be termed at once a good burgess and a great poet. The didactic poem concerning the Nature of Things, however much it may challenge censure, has remained one of the brilliant stars in the poorly illuminated expanse of Roman literature; and with reason the greatest of German philologists chose the task of making the Lucretian poem once more readable as his last and most masterly work.

Lucretius, although his poetical vigour as well as his art was admired by his cultivated contemporaries, yet remained—of late growth as he was—a master without scholars. In the Hellenic fashionable poetry on the other hand there was no lack at least of scholars, who exerted themselves to emulate the Alexandrian masters. With true tact the more gifted of the Alexandrian poets avoided larger works and the pure forms of poetry—the drama, the epos, the lyric; the most pleasing and successful performances consisted with them, just as with the new Latin poets, in “short-winded” tasks, and especially in such as belonged to the domains bordering on the pure forms of art, more especially to the wide field intervening between narrative and song. Multifarious didactic poems were written. Small half heroic, half erotic epics were great favourites, and especially an erudite sort of love-elegy peculiar to this autumnal summer of Greek poetry and characteristic of the philological source whence it sprang, in which the poet more or less arbitrarily interwove the description of his own feelings, chiefly amatory, with epic shreds from the cycle of Greek legend. Festal lays were diligently and ingeniously manufactured; in general, owing to the want of spontaneous poetical feeling, the occasional poem preponderated and especially the epigram, of which the Alexandrians produced excellent specimens. The poverty

The Hellenic fashionable poetry.

of materials and the want of freshness in language and rhythm, which inevitably cleave to every literature not national, men sought as much as possible to conceal under odd themes, far-fetched phrases, rare words and artificial versification, and generally under the whole apparatus of philological and antiquarian erudition and technical dexterity.

54. Such was the gospel which was preached to the Roman boys of this period, and they came in crowds to hear and to practice it; already (about 700) the love poems of Euphorion and similar Alexandrian poetry formed the ordinary reading and the ordinary pieces for declamation of the cultivated youth.* The literary revolution took place; but it yielded in the first instance with rare exceptions only premature or unripe fruits. The number of the "new-fashioned poets" was legion, but poetry was rare and Apollo was compelled, as always when so many throng towards Parnassus, to make very short work. The long poems never were worth anything, the short ones seldom. Even in this literary age the poetry of the day had become a public nuisance; it sometimes happened that one's friend would send home to him by way of mockery as a festal present a pile of trashy verses fresh from the bookseller's shop, whose value was at once betrayed by the elegant binding and the smooth paper. A real public, in the sense in which national literature has a public, was wanting to the Roman Alexandrians as well as to the Hellenic; it was thoroughly the poetry of a clique or rather cliques, whose members clung closely together, abused intruders, read and criticised among themselves the new poems, sometimes also in quite the Alexandrian fashion celebrated the successful productions in fresh verses, and variously sought to secure for themselves by clique-praises a spurious and ephemeral renown. A notable teacher of Latin literature, himself poetically active in this new direction, Valerius Cato appears to have exercised a sort of scholastic patronage over the most distinguished men of this circle and to have pronounced final decision on the relative value of the poems. As compared with their Greek models these Roman

* "No doubt," says Cicero (*Tusc.* iii. 19, 45) in reference to Ennius, "the glorious poet is despised by our reciters of Euphorion." "I have safely arrived," he writes to Atticus (vii. 2 *init.*), "as a most favourable north wind blew for us across from Epirus. This spondaic line you can if you like sell to one of the new-fashioned poets as your own" (*ita belle nobis flavit ab Epiro lenissimus Onchesmites. Hunc σπονδαῖόν τ' εἶς si cui voles τῶν νεωτέρων pro tuo vendito*).

poets evince throughout a want of freedom, sometimes a schoolboy dependence; most of their products must have been simply the austere fruits of a school poetry still occupied in learning and by no means yet dismissed as mature. Inasmuch as in language and in measure they adhered to the Greek patterns far more closely than ever the national Latin poetry had done, a greater correctness and consistency in language and metre were certainly attained; but it was at the expense of the flexibility and fulness of the national idiom. As respects the subject-matter, under the influence partly of effeminate models, partly of an immoral age, amatory themes acquired a surprising preponderance little conducive to poetry; but the favourite metrical compendia of the Greeks were also in various cases translated, such as the astronomical treatise of Aratus by Cicero, and, either at the end of this or more probably at the commencement of the following period, the geographical manual of Eratosthenes by Publius Varro of the Aude and the physico-medicinal manual of Nicander by Æmilius Macer. It is neither to be wondered at nor regretted that of this countless host of poets but few names have been preserved to us; and even these are mostly mentioned merely as curiosities or as once upon a time great; such as the orator Quintus Hortensius with his "five hundred thousand lines" of tiresome obscenity, and the somewhat more frequently mentioned Lævius, whose *Erotopœgnia* attracted a certain interest only by their complicated measures and affected phraseology. Even the small epic of Smyrna by Gaius Helvius Cinna (+ 710?) much as it was praised by the clique, bears both in its subject—the incestuous love of a daughter for her father—and in the nine years' toil bestowed on it the worst characteristics of the time.

Those poets alone of this school constitute an original and pleasing exception, who knew how to combine with its neatness and its versatility of form the national elements of worth still existing in the republican life, especially in that of the country towns. To say nothing here of Laberius and Varro, this description applies especially to the three poets already mentioned above (P. 319) of the republican opposition, Marcus Furius Bibaculus (652–691), Gaius Licinius Calvus (672–706) and Quintus Valerius Catullus (667–c. 700). Of the two former whose writings have perished, we can indeed only conjecture this; respecting the poems of Catullus we

44.

102–63.

82–48.

87–54.

Catullus.

can still form a judgment. He too depends in subject and form on the Alexandrians. We find in his collection translations of pieces of Callimachus, and these not altogether the very good, but the very difficult. Among the original pieces, we meet with elaborately-turned fashionable poems, such as the over-artificial Galliambics in praise of the Phrygian Mother; and even the poem, otherwise so beautiful, of the marriage of Thetis has been artistically spoiled by the truly Alexandrian insertion of the complaint of Ariadne in the principal poem. But by the side of these school-pieces we meet with the melodious lament of the genuine elegy, the festal poem in the full pomp of individual and almost dramatic execution, above all, the freshest miniature-painting of cultivated social life, the pleasant and very unreserved amatory adventures of which half the charm consists in prattling and poetising about the mysteries of love, the delightful life of youth with full cups and empty purses, the pleasures of travel and of poetry, the Roman and still more frequently the Veronese anecdote of the town, and the humorous jest amidst the familiar circle of friends. But not only does Apollo touch the lyre of the poet, he wields also the bow; the winged dart of sarcasm spares neither the tedious verse-maker nor the provincial who corrupts the language, but it hits none more frequently and more sharply than the potentates by whom the liberty of the people is endangered. The short-lined and merry metres, often enlivened by a graceful refrain, are of finished art and yet free from the repulsive smoothness of the manufactory. These poems lead us alternately to the valleys of the Nile and the Po; but the poet is incomparably more at home in the latter. His poems are based on Alexandrian art doubtless but at the same time on the distinctive feelings of a burgess and a burgess in fact of a rural town, on the contrast of Verona with Rome, on the contrast of the homely municipal with the high-born lords of the senate who usually maltreat their humble friends—as that contrast was probably felt more vividly than anywhere else in Catullus' home, the flourishing and comparatively vigorous Cisalpine Gaul. The most beautiful of his poems reflect the sweet pictures of the Lago di Garda, and hardly could any man of the capital have written a poem like the deeply pathetic one on his brother's death, or the excellent genuinely homely festal hymn for the marriage of Manlius and Aurunculeia. Catullus,

although dependent on the Alexandrian masters and in the midst of the fashionable and clique poetry of that age, was yet not merely a good scholar among many mediocre and bad ones, but himself as much superior to his masters as the burgess of a free Italian community was superior to the cosmopolitan Hellenic man of letters. Eminent creative vigour indeed and high poetic intentions we may not look for in him; he is a richly gifted and graceful but not a great poet, and his poems are, as he himself calls them, nothing but "pleasantries and trifles." Yet when we find not merely his contemporaries electrified by these fugitive songs, but the art-critics of the Augustan age also characterising him along with Lucretius as the most important poet of this epoch, his contemporaries as well as their successors were completely right. The Latin nation has produced no second poet in whom the artistic substance and the artistic form appear in so symmetrical perfection as in Catullus; and in this sense the collection of the poems of Catullus is certainly the most perfect which Latin poetry as a whole can show.

Lastly, poetry in a prose form begins in this epoch. The law of genuine, *naïve* as well as conscious, art which had hitherto remained unchangeable—that the poetical subject-matter and the metrical setting should go together—gave way before the intermixture and disturbance of all kinds and forms of art, which is one of the most significant features of this period. As to romances indeed nothing further is to be noticed, than that the most famous historian of this epoch Sisenna did not esteem himself too good to translate into Latin the much-read Milesian tales of Aristides—licentious fashionable novels of the most stupid sort. A more original and pleasing phenomenon in the debateable border-land between poetry and prose, was the æsthetic writings of Varro, who was not merely the most important representative of Latin philologico-historical research, but one of the most fertile and most interesting authors in belles lettres. Descended from a plebeian *gens* which had its home in the Sabine land but had belonged for the last two hundred years to the Roman senate, strictly reared in antique discipline and decorum,* and already at the beginning of this epoch a

Poems in prose.

Romances.

Varro's æsthetic writings.

* "For me when a boy," he somewhere says, "there sufficed a single rough coat and a single under-garment, shoes without stockings, a horse without a saddle; I had no daily warm bath, and but seldom a river-bath." On account of his personal valour he obtained in the piratic war, where he commanded a division of the fleet, the naval crown.

- 116-27. man of maturity, Marcus Terentius Varro of Reate (638—727) belonged in politics, as a matter of course, to the constitutional party, and bore an honourable and energetic part in its doings and sufferings. He supported it, partly in literature—as when he combated the first coalition, the “three-headed monster,” in pamphlets; partly in more serious warfare, where we found him in the army of Pompeius as commandant of Further Spain (P. 382). When the cause of the republic was lost, Varro was destined by his conqueror to be librarian of the library which was to be formed in the capital. The troubles of the following period drew the old man once more into their vortex, and it was not till seventeen years after Cæsar’s death, in the eighty-ninth year of his well-occupied life, that death called him away. The æsthetic writings, which have made him a name, were brief essays, some in simple prose and of graver contents, others humorous sketches the prose groundwork of which was inlaid with various poetical effusions. The former were the “philosophico-historical dissertations” (*Logistorici*), the latter the Menippean Satires. In neither case did he follow Latin models, and the *Satura* of Varro in particular was by no means based on that of Lucilius. In fact the Roman *Satura* in general was not properly a fixed species of art, but only indicated negatively the fact that the “multifarious poem” was not to be included under any of the recognised forms of art; and accordingly the *Satura*-poetry assumed in the hands of every gifted poet a different and peculiar character. It was rather in the pre-Alexandrian Greek poetry that Varro found the models for his more severe as well as for his lighter æsthetic works; for the graver dissertations, in the dialogues of Heraclides of Heraclea on the Black Sea (+ about 450), for the satires, in the writings of Menippus of Gadara in Syria (flourishing about 475). The choice was significant. Heraclides, stimulated as an author by Plato’s philosophic dialogues, had amidst the brilliance of their form totally lost sight of the scientific contents and made the poetico-fabulistic dress the main matter; he was an agreeable and largely-read author, but far from a philosopher. Menippus was quite as little a philosopher, but the most genuine literary representative of that philosophy whose wisdom consisted in denying philosophy and ridiculing philosophers, the cynical wisdom of Diogenes; a comic teacher of serious wisdom, he proved by examples and merry sayings that except an
- Varro’s models.
- 300.
- 280.

upright life everything is vain in earth and heaven, and nothing more vain than the disputes of so-called sages. These were the true models for Varro, a man full of old Roman indignation at the pitiful times and full of old Roman humour, by no means destitute withal of plastic talent, but as to everything which had the appearance not of palpable fact, but of idea or even of system, utterly stupid, and perhaps the most unphilosophical among the unphilosophical Romans.* But Varro was no slavish pupil. The impulse and in general the form he derived from Heraclides and Menippus; but his was a nature too individual and too decidedly Roman, not to keep his imitative creations essentially independent and national. For his grave dissertations, in which a moral maxim or other subject of general interest is handled, he disdained in his framework to approximate to the Milesian tales, as Heraclides had done, and so to serve up to the reader even childish little stories like those of Abaris and of the maiden reawakened to life after being seven days dead. But seldom he borrowed the dress from the nobler myths of the Greeks, as in the essay "Orestes or concerning Madness;" history ordinarily afforded him a worthier frame for his subjects, more especially the contemporary history of his country, so that these essays became, as they were called, *laudationes* of esteemed Romans, above all of the Coryphæi of the constitutional party. Thus the dissertation "concerning Peace" was at the same time a memorial of Metellus Pius, the last in the brilliant series of successful generals of the senate; that "concerning the Worship of the Gods," was at the same time destined to preserve the memory of the highly-respected Optimate and Pontifex Gaius Curio; the essay "on Fate" was connected with Marius, that "on the Writing of History" with Sisenna the first historian of this epoch, that "on the Beginnings of the Roman Stage" with the princely giver of scenic spectacles Scaurus, that "on Numbers" with the highly-polished Roman banker Atticus. The two philosophico-

Varro's
philoso-
phico-his-
torical
essays.

* There is hardly anything more childish than Varro's scheme of all the philosophies, which in the first place summarily declares all systems that do not propose the happiness of man as their ultimate aim to be non-existent, and then reckons the number of philosophies conceivable under this supposition as two hundred and eighty-eight. The able man was unfortunately too much a scholar to confess that he neither could nor would be a philosopher, and accordingly as such throughout life he performed a blind dance—not altogether becoming—between the Stoa, Pythagoreanism, and Diogenism.

historical essays "Laelius or concerning Friendship," "Cato or concerning Old Age," which Cicero wrote probably after the model of those of Varro, may give us some approximate idea of Varro's half didactic, half narrative, treatment of these subjects.

Varro's
Menippean
satires.

The Menippean satire was handled by Varro with equal originality of form and contents; the bold mixture of prose and verse is foreign to the Greek original, and the whole intellectual contents are pervaded by Roman idiosyncrasy—one might say, by a savour of the Sabine soil. These satires like the essays already noticed handle some moral or other theme adapted to the larger public, as is shown by the several titles—*Columnæ Herculis*, *περὶ Δόξης*; *Ἐδρεν ἢ Λοπῆς τὸ Πῶμα*, *περὶ Γεγαμηκότων*; *Est Modus Matulæ*, *περὶ Μέθης*; "*Παριάρα*, *περὶ Ἑγκωμίων*." The plastic dress, which in this case might not be wanting, is of course but seldom borrowed from the history of his native country, as in the satire *Serranus*, *περὶ Ἀρχαυρεσιῶν*. The dog-world of Diogenes on the other hand plays, as might be expected, a great part; we meet with the *Κυνίττωρ*, the *Κυνορρήτωρ*, the *Ἰπποκύων*, the *Ἰδρυκύων*, the *Κυνοῖδιδασκαλικόν* and others of a like kind. Mythology is also laid under contribution for comic purposes; we find a *Prometheus Liber*, an *Ajax Stramenticius*, a *Hercules Socraticus*, a *Sesquialixes* who had spent not merely ten but fifteen years in wanderings. The outline of the dramatic or romantic framework is still discoverable from the fragments in some pieces, such as the *Prometheus Liber*, the *Sexagessis*, the *Manius*; it appears that Varro frequently, perhaps regularly, narrated the tale as his own experience; e.g. in the *Manius* the *dramatis personæ* go to Varro and discourse to him "because he was known to them as a bookmaker." As to the poetical value of this dress we are no longer allowed to form any certain judgment; we still in our fragments meet with several very charming sketches full of wit and liveliness—thus in the "*Prometheus Liber*," the hero after the loosing of his chains opens a manufactory of men, in which Goldshoe the rich (*Chrysosandalos*) bespeaks for himself a maiden, of milk and finest wax, such as the Milesian bees gather from various flowers, a maiden without bones and sinews, without skin or hair, pure and polished, slim, smooth, tender, charming. The life-breath of this poetry is polemics—not so much the political warfare of party, such as Lucilius and

Catullus practised, but the general moral antagonism of the stern elderly man to the unbridled and perverse youth, of the scholar living in the midst of his classics to the loose and slovenly, or at any rate in point of tendency reprobate, modern poetry,* of the good burgess of the ancient type to the new Rome in which the Forum, to use Varro's language, was a pigsty and Numa, if he turned his eyes towards his city, would see no longer a trace of his wise regulations. Varro did in the constitutional struggle what seemed to him the duty of a citizen; but his heart was not in such partizan agitation—"why," he complains on one occasion, "do ye call me from my pure life into the filth of your senate-house?" He belonged to the good old time, when the talk savoured of onions and garlic, but the heart was sound. His warfare against the hereditary foes of the genuine Roman spirit, the Greek philosophers, was only a single aspect of this old-fashioned opposition to the spirit of the new times; but it resulted both from the nature of the Cynical philosophy and from the temperament of Varro, that the Menippean lash was very specially plied round the ears of the philosophers and put them accordingly into proportional alarm—it was not without palpitation that the philosophic scribes of the time transmitted to the "severe man" their newly issued treatises. Philosophising is verily no art. With the tenth part of the trouble with which a master rears his slave to be a professional baker, he trains himself to be a philosopher; no doubt, when the baker and the philosopher both come under the hammer, the artist of pastry goes off a hundred times dearer than the philosopher. Singular people, these philosophers! One enjoins that corpses be buried in honey—it is a fortunate circumstance

* On one occasion he writes, "*Quintiporis Clodii foria ac poemata ejus gargaridians dices; O fortuna. O fors fortuna!*" And elsewhere, "*Cum Quintipor Clodius tot comœdias sine ulla fecerit Musa, ego unum libellum non 'edolem,' ut ait Ennius?*" This not otherwise known Clodius must have been in all probability a wretched imitator of Terence, as those words sarcastically laid at his door "*O fortuna, O fors fortuna!*" are found occurring in a Terentian comedy.

The following description of himself by a poet in Varro's *Ὀνος Δύρας*,

*Pacui discipulus dicor, porro is fuit Enni,
Ennius Musarum; Pompilius clueor*

might aptly parody the introduction of Lucretius (P. 584), to whom Varro as a declared enemy of the Epicurean system cannot have been well disposed, and whom he never quotes.

that his desire is not complied with, otherwise where would any honey-wine be left? Another thinks that men grow out of the earth like cresses. A third has invented a world-borer (*Κοσμοτορύννη*) by which the earth will some day be destroyed.

*Postremo, nemo ægrotus quicquam somniat
Tam infandum, quod non aliquis dicat philosophus.*

It is ludicrous to observe how a Long-beard—by which is meant an etymologizing Stoic—cautiously weighs every word in goldsmith's scales; but there is nothing that surpasses the genuine philosophers' quarrel—a Stoic boxing-match far excels any encounter of athletes. In the satire *Marcopolis*, *περὶ ἀρχῆς*, when Marcus created for himself a Cloud-Cuckoo-Home after his own heart, matters fared, just as in the Attic comedy, well with the peasant, but ill with the philosopher; the *Celer-δὲ-ἐνὸς-λήμματος-λόγος*, son of Antipater the Stoic, beats in the skull of his opponent—evidently the philosophic *Dilemma*—with the mattock. With this morally polemic tendency and this talent for embodying it in caustic and picturesque expression, which, as the dress of dialogue given to the books on Husbandry written in his eightieth year shows, never left him down to extreme old age, Varro most happily combined an incomparable knowledge of the national manners and language, which is embodied in the philological writings of his old age after the manner of a commonplace-book, but displays itself in his Satires in all its direct fulness and freshness. Varro was in the best and fullest sense of the term a local antiquarian, who from the personal observation of many years knew his nation in its former idiosyncrasy and seclusion as well as in its modern state of transition and dispersion, and had supplemented and deepened his direct knowledge of the national manners and national language by the most comprehensive investigation of historical and literary archives. His partial deficiency in rational judgment and learning—in our sense of the words—was compensated for by his clear intuition and the poetry which lived within him. He sought neither after antiquarian notices nor after rare antiquated or poetical words;* but he was himself an

* He himself once aptly says, that he had no special fondness for antiquated words, but frequently used them, and that he was very fond of poetical words, but did not use them.

old and old-fashioned man and almost a rustic, the classics of his nation were his favourite and long-familiar companions; how could it fail that many details of the manners of his forefathers whom he loved above all and especially knew should be narrated in his writings, and that his discourse should abound with proverbial Greek and Latin phrases, with good old words preserved in the Sabine conversational language, with reminiscences of Ennius, Lucilius, and above all of Plautus? We should not judge as to the prose style of these æsthetic writings of Varro's earlier period by the standard of his work on Language written in his old age and probably published in an unfinished state, in which certainly the clauses of the sentence are arranged on the thread of the relative like thrushes on a string; but we have already observed that Varro rejected on principle the effort after a chaste style and Attic periods (P. 571), and his æsthetic essays, while destitute of the mean bombast and the spurious tinsel of vulgarism, were yet written after an unclassic and even slovenly fashion in sentences rather directly joined on to each other than regularly subdivided. The poetical pieces inserted on the other hand show not merely that their author knew how to mould the most varied measures with as much mastery as any of the fashionable poets, but that he had a right to include himself among those to whom a god has granted the gift of "banishing cares from the heart by song and sacred poesy."* The sketches of Varro no more created

* The following description is taken from the *Marcipor* ("Slave of Marcus").

*Repente noctis circiter meridiem
Cum pictus aer fervidis late ignibus
Cæli choream astricen ostenderet,
Nubes aquali, frigido velo leves
Cæli cavernas aureas subducerant,
Aquam vomentes inferam mortalibus.
Ventique frigido se ab axe eruperant,
Phrenetici septentrionum filii,
Secum ferentes tegulas, ramos, syrus.
At nos caduci, naufragi, ut ciconiæ
Quarum bipennis fulminis plumas vapor
Perussit, alte moesti in terram cecidimus.*

In the *Ἀνθρωποποιία* we find the lines:

*Non fit thesauris, non auro pectus' solutum;
Non demunt animis curas ac religiones
Persarum montes, non atria diviti' Crassi.*

a school than the didactic poem of Lucretius; to the more general causes which prevented this there falls to be added their thoroughly individual stamp, which was inseparable from the greater age, from the rusticity, and even from the peculiar learning of their author. But the grace and humour of the Menippean satires above all, which seem to have been in number and importance far superior to Varro's graver works, captivated his contemporaries as well as those in after times who had any relish for originality and national spirit; and even we, who are no longer permitted to read them, may still from the fragments preserved discern in some measure that the writer "knew how to laugh and how to jest in moderation." And as the last breath of the good spirit of the old burgess-times ere it departed, as the latest fresh growth which the national Latin poetry put forth, the Satires of Varro deserved that the poet in his poetical testament should commend these his Menippean children to every one "who had at heart the prosperity of Rome and of Latium;" and they accordingly retain an honourable place in the literature as in the history of the Italian people.*

But the poet was successful also in a lighter vein. In the *Est Modus Matulae* there stood the following elegant commendation of wine:—

*Vino nihil jucundius quisquam bibit.
Hoc ægritudinem ad medendam invenerunt,
Hoc hilaritatis dulce seminarium,
Hoc continet coagulum convivia.*

And in the *Κοσμοπολίην* the wanderer returning home thus concludes his address to the sailors:—

*Detis habenas animæ leni,
Dum nos ventus flamine sudo
Suavem ad patriam perducit.*

* The sketches of Varro have so uncommon historical and even poetical significance and are yet, in consequence of the fragmentary shape in which information regarding them has reached us, known to so few and so irksome to study, that we may be allowed to give in this place a résumé of some of them with the few restorations indispensable for making them readable.

The satire *Manius* (Early Up!) describes the management of a rural household. "Manius summons his people to rise with the sun and in person conducts them to the scene of their labours. The youths make their own bed, which labour renders soft to them, and supply themselves with waterpot and lamp. Their drink is the clear fresh spring, their fare bread, and onions as a relish. Everything prospers in house and field. The house is no work of art; but an architect might learn symmetry from it. Care is taken of the field, that it shall not be left disorderly and waste, or go to ruin through slovenliness

The critical writing of history, after the manner in which the Attic authors wrote the national history in their classic period and in which Polybius wrote the history of the world, was never properly developed in Rome. Even in the field most adapted for it,—the representation of contemporary and of

Historical
composi-
tion.

and neglect; in return the grateful Ceres wards off damage from the produce, that the high-piled sheaves may gladden the heart of the husbandman. Here hospitality still holds good; every one who has but imbibed mother's milk is welcome. The bread-pantry and wine-vat and the store of sausages on the rafters, lock and key are at the service of the traveller, and piles of food are set before him; contented sits the sated guest, looking neither before nor behind, dozing by the hearth in the kitchen. The warmest double-wool sheep-skin is spread as a couch for him. Here people still as good burgesses obey the righteous law, which neither out of envy injures the innocent nor out of favour pardons the guilty. Here they speak no evil against their neighbours. Here they trespass not with their feet on the sacred hearth, but honour the gods with devotion and with sacrifices, throw to the familiar spirit his little bit of flesh into his appointed little dish, and when the master of the household dies, accompany the bier with the same prayer with which those of his father and of his grandfather were borne forth."

In another satire there appears a "Teacher of the Old" (Γερωντοδιδάσκαλος), of whom the degenerate age seems to stand more urgently in need than of the teacher of youth, and he explains how "once everything in Rome was chaste and pious," and now all things are so entirely changed. "Do my eyes deceive me, or do I see slaves in arms against their masters?—Formerly every one who did not present himself for the levy, was sold on the part of the state into slavery abroad; now the censor who allows cowardice and everything to pass is called (by the aristocracy ii. 322, iii. 370, iv. 96, 325) a great citizen, and earns praise because he does not seek to make himself a name by annoying his fellow-citizens.—Formerly the Roman husbandman had his beard shaven once every week; now the rural slave cannot have it fine enough.—Formerly one saw on the estates a corn-granary, which held ten harvests, spacious cellars for the wine-vats and corresponding wine-presses; now the master keeps flocks of peacocks and causes his doors to be inlaid with African cypress-wood.—Formerly the matron turned the spindle with the hand and kept at the same time the pot on the hearth in her eye, that the pottage might not be singed; now," it is said in another satire, "the daughter begs her father for a pound of precious stones, and the wife her husband for a bushel of pearls.—Formerly a newly-married husband was silent and bashful; now the wife surrenders herself to the first coachman that comes.—Formerly the blessing of children was woman's pride; now if her husband desires for himself children, she replies: Knowest thou not what Ennius says?

*Ter sub armis malim vitam cernere
Quam semel modo parere.*—

Formerly the wife was quite content, when the husband once or twice in the year gave her a trip in the uncushioned waggon;" now, he could add (comp. Cicero *Pro. Mil.* 21, 55), the wife sulks if her husband goes to his country

Sisenna.

78.

recently past events,—there was nothing, on the whole, but more or less inadequate attempts; in the epoch especially from Sulla to Cæsar the not very important contributions, which the previous epoch had to show in this field—the labours of Antipater and Asellius—were barely even equalled. The only work of note belonging to this field, which arose in the present epoch, was the history of the Social and Civil Wars by Lucius Cornelius Sisenna (prætor in 676). Those who had read it testify that it far excelled in liveliness and readableness the old dry chronicles, but was written withal in a style thoroughly impure and even degenerating into puerility; as indeed the few remaining fragments exhibit a paltry

57.

estate without her, and the travelling lady is attended to the villa by the fashionable host of Greek menials and the choir.—In a treatise of a graver kind, “Catus or the Training of Children,” Varro not only instructs the friend who had asked him for advice on that point, regarding the gods who were according to old usage to be sacrificed to for the children’s welfare, but, referring to the more judicious mode of rearing children of the Persians and to his own strictly spent youth, he warns against over-feeding and over-sleeping, against sweet bread and fine fare—the whelps, the old man thinks, are now fed more judiciously than the children—and likewise against the enchantresses’ charms and blessings, which in cases of sickness so often take the place of consulting the physician. He advises to keep the girls at embroidery, that they may afterwards understand how to judge properly of embroidered and textile work, and not to allow them to put off the child’s dress too early; he warns against carrying boys to the gladiatorial games, in which the heart is early hardened and cruelty learned. In the “Man of Sixty Years” Varro appears as a Roman Epimenides who had fallen asleep when a boy of ten and awoke again after half a century. He is astonished to find instead of his smooth-shorn boy’s head an old bald pate with an ugly snout and savage bristles like a hedgehog; but he is still more astonished at the change in Rome. Lucrine oysters, formerly a wedding dish, are now every-day fare; for which, accordingly, the bankrupt glutton silently prepares the incendiary torch. While formerly the father disposed of his boy, now the disposal is transferred to the latter; he disposes, forsooth, of his father by poison. The comitium had become an exchange, the criminal trial a mine of gold for the jurymen. No law is any longer obeyed save only this one, that nothing is given for nothing. All virtues have vanished; in their stead the awakened man is saluted by the impiety, pertidy, lewdness of the new denizens. “Alas for thee, Marcus, with such a sleep and such an awakening!” The sketch resembles the Catilinarian epoch, shortly after which (about 697) the old man must have written it, and there lay a truth in the bitter turn at the close; where Marcus, properly reprovèd for his unseasonable accusations and antiquarian reminiscences is—with a mock application of a primitive Roman custom—dragged as an useless old man to the bridge and thrown into the Tiber. There was certainly no longer room for such men in Rome.

painting in detail of the horrible,* and a number of words newly coined or derived from the language of conversation. When it is added that the author's model and, so to speak, the only Greek historian familiar to him was Clitarchus, the author of a biography of Alexander the Great oscillating between history and fiction in the manner of the semi-romance which bears the name of Curtius, we shall not hesitate to recognise in Sisenna's celebrated historical work, not a product of genuine historical criticism and art, but the first Roman essay in that hybrid mixture of history and romance so much a favourite with the Greeks, which desires to make the groundwork of facts life-like and interesting by means of fictitious details and thereby makes it insipid and untrue; and it will no longer excite surprise that we meet with the same Sisenna as translator of Greek fashionable romances (P. 591).

That the prospect should be still more lamentable in the field of the general annals of the city and even of the world, ^{Annals of the city.} is implied in the nature of the case. The increasing activity of antiquarian research induced the expectation that the current narrative would be rectified from documents and other trustworthy sources; but this hope was not fulfilled. The more and the deeper men investigated, the more clearly it became apparent what a task it was to write a critical history of Rome. The difficulties even, which opposed themselves to investigation and narration, were immense; but the most dangerous obstacles were not those of a literary kind. The conventional early history of Rome, as it had now been narrated and believed for at least ten generations (i. 476), was most intimately mixed up with the civil life of the nation; and yet in every thorough and honest inquiry not only had details to be modified here and there, but the whole building had to be overturned as much as the Franconian primitive history of king Pharamund or the British of king Arthur. An inquirer of conservative views, such as was Varro for instance, could have no wish to put his hand to such a work; and if a daring freethinker had undertaken it, a death-cry would have been raised by all good citizens against this worst of all revolutionaries, who was preparing

* "The innocent," so ran a speech, "thou draggest forth, trembling in every limb, and on the high margin of the river's bank in the dawn of the morning" [thou causest them to be slaughtered]. Several such phrases, that might be inserted without difficulty in a commonplace novel, occur.

to deprive the constitutional party even of their past. Thus philological and antiquarian research deterred from the writing of history rather than conduced towards it. Varro and the more sagacious men in general evidently gave up the task of annals as hopeless; at the most they arranged, as did Titus Pomponius Atticus, the lists of magistrates and *gentes* in unpretending tabular shape—a work by which the synchronistic Græco-Roman chronology was finally brought into the shape in which it was conventionally fixed for posterity. But the manufacture of city-chronicles of course did not suspend its activity; it continued to supply its contributions both in prose and verse to the great library written by *ennui* for *ennui*, while the makers of the books, in part already freedmen, did not trouble themselves at all about research properly so called. Such of these writings as are noticed—not one of them is preserved—seem to have been not only of a wholly secondary character, but in great part even pervaded by interested falsification. It is true that the chronicle of Quintus Claudius Quadrigarius (about 676 ?) was written in an old-fashioned but good style, and studied at least a commendable brevity in the representation of the fabulous period. Gaius Licinius Macer (+ as late prætor in 688), father of the poet Calvus (P. 589) and a zealous democrat, laid claim more than any other chronicler to documentary research and criticism, but his *libri lintei* and other matters peculiar to him are in the highest degree suspicious, and an interpolation of the whole annals for purposes of a democratic character—an interpolation of a very extensive kind, and which has passed over in part to the later annalists—is probably traceable to him. Lastly, Valerius Antias excelled all his predecessors in prolixity as well as in puerile storytelling. The falsification of numbers was here systematically carried out down even to contemporary history, and the primitive history of Rome was elaborated once more from one form of insipidity to another; for instance the narrative of the way in which the wise Numa according to the instructions of the nymph Egeria caught the gods Faunus and Picus with wine, and the beautiful conversation thereupon held by the same Numa with the god Jupiter, cannot be too urgently recommended to all worshippers of the so-called legendary history of Rome in order that, if possible, they may believe these things—of course, in substance. It would have been a marvel if the Greek novel-writers of this period

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66.

Valerius
Antias.

had allowed such materials, made as if for their use, to escape them. In fact there were not wanting Greek literati, who worked up the Roman history into romances; such a composition, for instance, was the Five Books "Concerning Rome" of the Alexander Polyhistor already mentioned among the Greek literati living in Rome (P. 572), a preposterous mixture of vapid historical tradition and trivial, principally erotic, fiction. He, it may be conjectured, took the first steps towards filling up the five hundred years, which were wanting to bring the destruction of Troy and the origin of Rome into the chronological connection required by the fables on either side, with one of those lists of kings without achievements which were unhappily familiar to the Egyptian and Greek chroniclers; for, to all appearance, it was he that launched into the world the kings Aventinus and Tiberinus and the Alban *gens* of the Silvii, whom the following times accordingly did not neglect to furnish in detail with name, period of reigning, and, for the sake of greater definiteness, also a portrait.

Thus from various sides the historical romance of the Greeks finds its way into Roman historiography; and it is more than probable that not the least portion of what we are accustomed now-a-days to call tradition of the Roman primitive times proceeds from sources of the stamp of Amadis of Gaul and the chivalrous romances of Fouqué—an edifying consideration, which may be commended to those who have a relish for the humour of history and who know how to appreciate the comical aspect of the piety still cherished in certain circles of the nineteenth century for king Numa. A novelty in the Roman literature of this period is the appearance of universal history or, to speak more correctly, of Roman and Greek history conjoined, alongside of the native annals. Cornelius Nepos (*c.* 650—*c.* 725) first supplied an universal chronicle (published before 700) and a general collection of biographies—arranged according to certain categories—of Romans and Greeks distinguished in politics or literature or of men at any rate who exercised influence on the Roman or Greek history. These works are of a kindred nature with the universal histories which the Greeks had for a considerable time been composing; and these very Greek world-chronicles, such as that of Kastor son-in-law of the Galatian king Deiotarus, concluded in 698, now began to include in their range the Roman history which previously they had neglected. These works certainly

Universal
history.

Nepos.

100–30.

54.

56.

attempted, just like Polybius, to substitute the history of the Mediterranean world for the more local one; but that which in Polybius was the result of a grand and clear conception and deep historical feeling was in these chronicles rather the product of the practical exigencies of school and self-instruction. These general chronicles, treatises for scholastic instruction or manuals for reference, and the whole literature therewith connected which subsequently became very copious in the Latin language also, can hardly be reckoned as belonging to artistic historical composition; and Nepos himself in particular was a mere compiler distinguished neither by spirit nor even by symmetrical plan.

The historiography of this period is certainly remarkable and in a high degree characteristic, but it is as far from pleasing as the age itself. The interpenetration of Greek and Latin literature is in no field so clearly apparent as in that of history; here the respective literatures become earliest equalised in matter and form, and the conception of Helleno-Italic history as an unity, in which Polybius was so far in advance of his age, was now learned by Greek and Roman boys at school. But while the Mediterranean state had found a historian before it had become conscious of its own existence, now, when that consciousness had been attained, there did not arise either among the Greeks or among the Romans any man who was able to give to it adequate expression. "There is no such thing," says Cicero, "as Roman historical composition;" and, so far as we can judge, this is no more than the simple truth. The man of research turns away from writing history, the writer of history turns away from research; historical literature oscillates between the school-book and the romance. All the species of pure art—epos, drama, lyric poetry, history—are worthless in this worthless world; but in no species is the intellectual decay of the Ciceronian age reflected with so terrible a clearness as in its historiography.

The minor historical literature of this period displays on the other hand, amidst many insignificant and forgotten productions, one treatise of the first rank—the *Memoirs of Cæsar*, or rather the *Military Report* of the democratic general to the people from whom he had received his commission. The most finished section, and that which alone was published by the author himself, describing the Celtic campaigns down to 702, is evidently designed to justify as

Literature
subsidiary
to history.

Cæsar's
Report.

well as possible before the public the formally unconstitutional enterprise of Cæsar in conquering a great country and constantly increasing his army for that object without instructions from the competent authority ; it was written and given forth in 703, when the storm broke out against Cæsar in Rome and he was summoned to dismiss his army and answer for his conduct.* The author of this vindication writes, as he himself says, entirely as an officer and carefully avoids extending his military report to the hazardous departments of political organisation and administration. His incidental and partisan treatise cast in the form of a military report is itself a piece of history like the bulletins of Napoleon, but it is not, and was not intended to be, an historical work in the true sense of the word ; the objective form which the narrative assumes is that of the magistrate, not that of the historian. But in this modest character the work is masterly and finished, more than any other in all Roman literature. The narrative is always terse and never scanty, always simple and never careless, always of transparent vividness and never strained or affected. The language is completely pure from archaisms and from vulgarisms—the type of the modern *urbanitas*. In the Books concerning the Civil War we seem to feel that the author had desired to avoid war and could not avoid it, and perhaps also that in Cæsar's soul, as in every other, the period of hope was purer and fresher than that of fulfilment ;

51.

* That the treatise on the Gallic war was published all at once, has been long conjectured ; the distinct proof that it was so, is furnished by the mention of the equalisation of the Boii and the Hædui already in the first book (c. 28) whereas the Boii still appear in the seventh (c. 10) as tributary subjects of the Hædui, and evidently only obtained equal rights with their former masters on account of their conduct and that of the Hædui in the war against Vercingetorix. On the other hand any one who attentively follows the history of the time will find in the expression as to the Milanian crisis (vii. 6) a proof that the treatise was published before the outbreak of the civil war ; not because Pompeius is there praised, but because Cæsar there approves the exceptional laws of 702 (P. 325). This he might and could not but do, so long as he sought to bring about a peaceful accommodation with Pompeius (P. 348), but not after the rupture ; when he reversed the condemnations that took place on the basis of those laws injurious for him (P. 458). Accordingly the publication of this treatise has been quite rightly placed in 703.

52.

The tendency of the work we discern most distinctly in the constant, often—most decidedly, doubtless, in the case of the Aquitanian expedition iii. 11—not successful, justification of every single act of war as a defensive measure which the state of things had rendered inevitable. That the adversaries of Cæsar censured his attacks on the Celts and Germans above all as unprovoked, is well known (Sueton. *Cæs.* 24).

51.

but over the treatise on the Gallic war there is diffused a bright serenity, a simple charm, which are no less unique in literature than Cæsar is in history.

Correspondence. Of a kindred nature were the letters interchanged between the statesmen and literati of this period, which were carefully collected and published in the following epoch; such as the correspondence of Cæsar himself, of Cicero, Calvus and others. They can still less be included among strictly literary performances; but this literature of correspondence was a rich store-house for historical as for all other research, and the most faithful mirror of an epoch in which so much of the worth of past times and so much spirit, cleverness, and talent were evaporated and dissipated in trifling.

A journalist literature in the modern sense was never formed in Rome; literary warfare continued to be confined to the writing of pamphlets and, along with this, to the custom generally diffused at that time of annotating the notices destined for the public in places of resort with the pencil or the pen. On the other hand subordinate persons were employed to note down the events of the day and news of the city for the absent men of quality; and Cæsar as early as his first consulship took fitting measures for the immediate publication of an extract of the transactions of the senate. From the private journals of those Roman penny-a-liners and these official current reports there arose a sort of news-sheet for the capital (*acta diurna*), in which the résumé of the business discussed before the people and in the senate, and births, deaths, and such like were recorded. This became a not unimportant source for history, but remained without proper political as without literary significance.

Speeches. To subsidiary historical literature belongs of right also the composition of orations. The speech, whether written down or not, is in its nature ephemeral and does not belong to literature; but it may, like the report and the letter, and indeed still more readily than these, come to be included, through the significance of the moment and the power of the mind from which it springs, among the permanent treasures of the national literature. Thus in Rome the notes of orations of a political tenor delivered before the burgesses or the jurymen had for long played a great part in public life; and not only so, but the speeches of Gaius Gracchus in particular were justly reckoned among the classical Roman

writings. But in this epoch a singular change occurred on all hands. The composition of political speeches was on the decline like political speaking itself. The political speech in Rome, as generally in the ancient polities, reached its culminating point in the discussions before the burgesses; there the orator was not fettered, as in the senate, by corporate considerations and burdensome forms, nor, as in the judicial addresses, by the interests—in themselves foreign to politics—of the accusation and defence; there alone his heart swelled proudly before the whole great and mighty Roman people hanging on his lips. But all this was now gone. Not as though there was any lack of orators or of the publishing of speeches delivered before the burgesses; on the contrary political authorship only now waxed copious, and it began to become a standing complaint at table that the host incommoded his guests by reading before them his latest orations. Publius Clodius had his speeches to the people issued as pamphlets, just like Gaius Gracchus; but two men may do the same thing without producing the same effect. The more important leaders even of the opposition, especially Cæsar himself, did not often address the burgesses, and no longer published the speeches which they delivered; indeed they partly sought for their political fugitive writings another form than the traditional one of *contiones*, in which respect more especially the writings praising and censuring Cato (P. 462) are remarkable. This is easily explained. Gaius Gracchus had addressed the burgesses; now men addressed the populace; and as the audience, so was the speech. No wonder that the reputable political author shunned a dress which implied that he had directed his words to the crowd assembled in the Forum. While the composition of orations thus declined from its former literary and political value in the same way as all branches of literature which were the natural growth of the national life, there began at the same a singular, non-political, literature of pleadings. Hitherto the Romans had known nothing of the idea that the address of an advocate as such was destined not only for the judges and the parties, but also for the literary edification of contemporaries and posterity; no advocate had written down and published his pleadings, unless they were possibly at the same time political orations and in so far were fitted to be circulated as party writings, and this had not occurred very frequently. Even Quintus

Decline of
political
oratory.

Rise of a
literature of
pleadings.

- 114—50. Hortensius (640—704) the most celebrated Roman advocate in the first years of this period, published but few speeches and these apparently only such as were wholly or half political. It was his successor in the leadership of the Roman bar, Marcus Tullius Cicero (648—711) who was from the outset quite as much author as forensic orator; he published his pleadings regularly, even when they were not at all or but remotely connected with politics. This was a token, not of progress, but of an unnatural and degenerate state of things. In Athens also the appearance of non-political pleadings among the forms of literature was a sign of debility; and it was doubly so in Rome, which did not like Athens by a sort of necessity produce this malformation through an exaggerated pursuit of rhetoric, but borrowed it from abroad arbitrarily and in antagonism to the better traditions of the nation. Yet this new species of literature came rapidly into vogue, partly because it had various points of contact and coincidence with the earlier authorship of political orations, partly because the unpoetic, dogmatical, rhetorising temperament of the Romans offered a favourable soil for the new seed, as indeed at the present day the speeches of advocates and even a sort of literature of law-proceedings are of some moment in Italy. Thus oratorical authorship emancipated from politics was naturalised in the Roman literary world by Cicero. We have already had occasion several times to mention this many-sided man. As a statesman without insight, opinion, or purpose, he figured successively as democrat, as aristocrat, and as a tool of the monarchs, and was never more than a short-sighted egotist. Where he presented the semblance of action, the questions to which his action applied had, as a rule, just reached their solution; thus he came forward in the trial of Verres against the senatorial *judicia* when they were already set aside; thus he was silent at the discussion on the Gabinian, and acted as a champion of the Manilian, law; thus he thundered against Catilina when his departure was already settled, and so forth. He was valiant in opposition to sham attacks, and he knocked down many walls of pasteboard with a loud din: no serious matter was ever, either in good or evil, decided by him, and the execution of the Catilinarians in particular was far more due to his acquiescence than to his instigation. In a literary point of view we have already noticed that he was the creator of the modern Latin prose (P. 569); his importance
- Cicero.
106—43.

rests on his mastery of style, and it is only as a stylist that he shows confidence in himself. In the character of an author, on the other hand, he stands quite as low as in that of a statesman. He essayed the most varied tasks, sang the great deeds of Marius and his own petty achievements in endless hexameters, beat Demosthenes off the field with his speeches, and Plato with his philosophic dialogues; and time alone was wanting for him to vanquish also Thucydides. He was in fact so thoroughly a dabbler, that it was pretty much a matter of indifference to what work he applied his hand. By nature a journalist in the worst sense of that term—abounding, as he himself says, in words, poor beyond all conception in ideas—there was no department in which he could not with the help of a few books have rapidly got up by translation or compilation a readable essay. His correspondence mirrors most faithfully his character. People are in the habit of calling it interesting and clever; and it is so, as long as it reflects the urban or villa life of the world of quality; but where the writer is thrown on his own resources, as in exile, in Cilicia, and after the battle of Pharsalus, it is stale and empty as was ever the soul of a feuilletonist banished from his familiar circles. It is scarcely needful to add that such a statesman and such a *littérateur* could not, as a man, exhibit aught else than a thinly varnished superficiality and heartlessness. Must we still describe the orator? The great author is also a great man; and in the great orator more especially conviction or passion flows forth with a clearer and more impetuous stream from the depths of the breast than in the scantily-gifted many who merely count and are nothing. Cicero had no conviction and no passion; he was nothing but an advocate, and not a good one. He understood how to set forth his narrative of the case with piquancy of anecdote, to excite, if not the feeling, at any rate the sentimentality of his hearers, and to enliven the dry business of legal pleading by clevernesses or witticisms mostly of a personal sort; his better orations, though they are far from coming up to the free gracefulness and the sure point of the most excellent compositions of this sort, for instance the *Memoirs of Beaumarchais*, yet form easy and agreeable reading. But while the very advantages just indicated will appear to the serious judge as advantages of very dubious value, the absolute want of political discernment in the orations on constitutional questions and of juristic deduction

in the forensic addresses, the egotism forgetful of its duty and constantly losing sight of the cause while thinking of the advocate, the dreadful barrenness of thought in the Ciceronian orations must revolt every reader of feeling and judgment. If there is anything wonderful in the case, it is in truth not the orations, but the admiration which they excited. As to Cicero every unbiassed person will soon make up his mind; Ciceronianism is a problem, which in fact cannot be properly solved, but can only be resolved into that greater mystery of human nature—language and the effect of language on the mind. Inasmuch as the noble Latin language, just before it perished as a national idiom, was once more as it were comprehensively seized by that dexterous stylist and deposited in his copious writings, something of the power which language exercises, and of the piety which it awakens, was transferred to the unworthy vessel. The Romans possessed no great Latin prose-writer; for Cæsar was like Napoleon only incidentally an author. Was it to be wondered at that, in the absence of such an one, they should at least honour the genius of the language in the great stylist? and that, like Cicero himself, Cicero's readers also should accustom themselves to ask not what, but how he had written? Custom and the schoolmaster then completed what the power of language had begun. Cicero's contemporaries however were, as may readily be conceived, far less involved in this strange idolatry than many of their successors. The Ciceronian manner ruled no doubt throughout a generation the Roman advocate-world, just as the far worse manner of Hortensius had done; but the most considerable men, such as Cæsar, kept themselves always aloof from it, and among the younger generation there arose in all men of fresh and living talent the most decided opposition to that hybrid and feeble rhetoric. They found Cicero's language deficient in precision and chasteness, his jests deficient in liveliness, his arrangement deficient in clearness and articulate division, and above all his whole eloquence wanting in the fire which makes the orator. Instead of the Rhodian eclectics men began to recur to the genuine Attic orators, especially to Lysias and Demosthenes, and sought to naturalise a more vigorous and masculine eloquence in Rome. Representatives of this tendency were, the solemn but stiff Marcus Junius Brutus (669—712); the two political partisans Marcus Cælius Rufus (672—706; P. 459) and

Opposition
to Cicero-
nianism.

Calvus and
his asso-
ciates.

85-42.

82-48.

Gaius Scribonius Curio (+ 705; P. 354—393)—both as 49.
 orators full of spirit and life; Calvus well known also as a poet
 (672—706), the literary Coryphæus of this younger group 82—18.
 of orators; and the earnest and conscientious Gaius Asinius
 Pollio (678—757). Undeniably there was more taste and 76—4. A.D.
 more spirit in this younger oratorical literature than in the
 Hortensian and Ciceronian put together; but we are not able
 to judge how far, amidst the storms of the revolution which
 rapidly swept away the whole of this richly gifted group with
 the single exception of Pollio, those better germs attained
 development. The time allotted to them was but too brief.
 The new monarchy began by making war on freedom of
 speech, and soon wholly suppressed the political oration
 (P. 325). Thenceforth the subordinate species of the pure
 advocate-pleading was doubtless still retained in literature;
 but the higher art and literature of oratory, which
 thoroughly depend on political life, perished with the latter
 of necessity and for ever.

Lastly there sprang up in the æsthetic literature of this
 period the artistic treatment of subjects of professional The artifi-
 science in the form of the stylistic dialogue, which had been cial dialogue
 applied to
 very extensively in use among the Greeks and had been the pro-
 fessional
 sciences.
 already employed also in isolated cases among the Romans Cicero's
 dialogues.
 (iii. 471). Cicero especially made various attempts at pre-
 senting rhetorical and philosophical subjects in this form and
 making the professional manual a suitable book for reading.
 His chief writings are the *De Oratore* (written in 699), to 55.
 which the history of Roman eloquence (the dialogue *Brutus*
 written in 708) and other minor rhetorical essays were 46.
 added by way of supplement; and the treatise *De Republicâ*
 (written in 700), with which the treatise *De Legibus* (written 54.
 in 702 ?) after the model of Plato is brought into connection. 52 ?
 They are no great works of art, but undoubtedly they are
 the works in which the excellencies of the author are most,
 and his faults least, conspicuous. The rhetorical writings
 are far from coming up to the didactic chasteness of form
 and precision of thought of the Rhetoric dedicated to Heren-
 nius, but they contain instead a store of practical forensic
 experience and forensic anecdotes of all sorts easily and
 tastefully set forth, and in fact solve the problem of combin-
 ing didactic instruction with amusement. The treatise *De*
Republicâ carries out, in a singular mongrel compound
 of history and philosophy, the fundamental thought that the

existing constitution of Rome is substantially the ideal state-organisation sought for by philosophers; an idea indeed just as unphilosophical as unhistorical, and besides not even peculiar to the author, but which, as may readily be conceived, became and remained popular. The scientific groundwork of these rhetorical and political writings of Cicero belongs of course entirely to the Greeks, and many of the details also, such as the grand concluding effect in the treatise *De Republicâ*, the Dream of Scipio, are evidently borrowed from them; yet they possess comparative originality, inasmuch as the elaboration shows throughout Roman local colouring, and the proud consciousness of political life, which the Roman was certainly entitled to feel as compared with the Greeks, makes the author even confront his Greek instructors with a certain independence. The form of Cicero's dialogue is doubtless neither the genuine interrogative dialectics of the best Greek artificial dialogue nor the genuine conversational tone of Diderot or Lessing; but the great groups of advocates gathering around Crassus and Antonius and of the older and younger statesmen of the Scipionic circle furnish a lively and effective framework, fitting channels for the introduction of historical references and anecdotes, and convenient resting-points for the scientific discussion. The style is quite as elaborate and polished as in the best-written orations, and so far more pleasing than these, since the author does not often in this field make a vain attempt at pathos. While these rhetorical and political writings of Cicero with a philosophic colouring are not devoid of merit, the compiler on the other hand completely failed, when in the involuntary leisure of the last years of his life (709—710) he applied himself to philosophy proper, and with equal peevishness and precipitation composed in a couple of months a philosophical library. The receipt was very simple. In rude imitation of the popular writings of Aristotle, in which the form of dialogue was employed chiefly for the setting forth and criticising of the different older systems, Cicero stitched together the Epicurean, Stoic, and Syncrétist writings handling the same problem, as they came or were given to his hand, into a so-called dialogue. And all that he did on his own part was, to supply an introduction prefixed to the new book from the ample collection of prefaces for future works which he had beside him; to impart a certain popular character, inasmuch as he interwove Roman examples and references and sometimes

digressed to subjects irrelevant but more familiar to the writer and the reader, such as the treatment of the deportment of the orator in the *De Officiis*; and to exhibit that sort of bungling, which a man of letters, who has not attained to philosophic thinking or even to philosophic knowledge and who works rapidly and boldly, shows in the reproduction of dialectic trains of thought. In this way no doubt a multitude of thick tomes might very quickly come into existence—"They are copies," wrote the author himself to a friend who wondered at his fertility; "they give me little trouble, for I supply only the words and these I have in abundance." Against this nothing further could be said; but any one who seeks classical productions in works so written can only be advised to study in literary matters a becoming silence.

Of the sciences only a single one manifested vigorous life, that of Latin philology. The scheme of linguistic and antiquarian research within the domain of the Latin race, planned by Silo, was carried out by his disciple Varro especially on the grandest scale. There appeared comprehensive elaborations of the whole stores of the language, more especially the extensive grammatical commentaries of Figulus and the great work of Varro *De Lingua Latina*; monographs on grammar and the history of the language, such as Varro's writings on the usage of the Latin language, on synonyms, on the age of the letters, on the origin of the Latin tongue; scholia on the older literature, especially on Plautus; works of literary history, biographies of poets, investigations into the earlier drama, into the scenic division of the comedies of Plautus, and into their genuineness. Latin archæology, which embraced the whole older history and the ritual law apart from practical jurisprudence, was comprehended in Varro's "Antiquities of Things Human and Divine," which was and for all times remained the fundamental treatise on the subject (published between 687 and 709). The first portion, "Of Things Human," described the primeval age of Rome, the divisions of city and country, the science of the years, months, and days, lastly, the public transactions at home and in war; in the second half, "Of Things Divine," the state-theology, the nature and significance of the colleges of experts, of the holy places, of the religious festivals, of sacrificial and votive gifts, and lastly of the gods themselves were summarily untold. Moreover, besides a number of monographs—*e. g.* on the descent of the Roman people, on

Profes-
sional
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Latin phi-
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Varro.

the Roman *gentes* descended from Troy, on the tribes—there was added, as a larger and more independent supplement, the treatise “Of the Life of the Roman People”—a remarkable attempt at a history of Roman manners, which sketched a picture of the state of domestic life, finance, and culture in the regal, the early republican, the Hannibalic, and the most recent period. These labours of Varro were based on an empiric knowledge of the Roman world and its adjacent Hellenic domain more various and greater in its kind than any other Roman either before or after him possessed—a knowledge to which living observation and the study of literature alike contributed. The eulogy of his contemporaries was well deserved, that Varro had enabled his countrymen—strangers in their own world—to know their position in their native land, and had taught the Romans who and where they were. But criticism and system will be sought for in vain. His Greek information seems to have come from somewhat confused sources, and there are traces that even in the Roman field the writer was not free from the influence of the historical romance of his time. The matter is doubtless inserted in a convenient and symmetrical framework, but not classified or treated methodically; and with all his efforts to bring tradition and personal observation into harmony, the scientific labours of Varro are not to be acquitted of a certain implicit faith in tradition or of an unpractical scholasticism.* The connection with Greek philology consists in the imitation of its defects more than of its excellencies; for instance, the basing of etymologies on mere similarity of sound both in Varro himself and in the other philologists of this epoch runs into pure guesswork and often into downright absurdity.† In its empiric confidence and copiousness as well as in its empiric inadequacy and want of

* A remarkable example is the general exposition regarding cattle in the treatise on Husbandry (ii. 1) with the nine times nine subdivisions of the doctrine of cattle-rearing, with the “incredible but true” fact that the mares at Olisipo (Lisbon) become pregnant by the wind, and generally with its singular mixture of philosophical, historical, and agricultural notices.

† Thus Varro derives *facere* from *facies*, because he who makes anything gives to it an appearance, *volpes*, the fox, after *Stilo* from *volare pedibus* as the flying-footed; Gaius Trebatius, a philological jurist of this age, derives *sacellum* from *sacra cella*, *Figulus frater* from *ferre alter* and so forth. This practice, which appears not merely in isolated instances but as a main element of the philological literature of this age, presents a very great resemblance to the mode in which till recently comparative philology was prosecuted, before insight into the organism of language put a stop in its case to the occupation of the empirics.

method the Varronian vividly reminds us of the English national philology, and just like the latter, finds its centre in the study of the older drama. We have already observed that the monarchical literature developed the rules of language in contradistinction to this linguistic empiricism (P. 570). It is in a high degree significant that there stands at the head of the modern grammarians no less a man than Cæsar himself, who in his treatise on Analogy (given forth between 696 and 704) first undertook to bring free language under the power of law. 58. 50.

Alongside of this extraordinary stir in the field of philology the small amount of activity in the other sciences is surprising. What appeared of importance in philosophy—such as Lucretius' representation of the Epicurean system in the poetical child-dress of the pre-Socratic philosophy, and the better writings of Cicero—produced its effect and found its audience not through its philosophic contents, but in spite of these solely through its æsthetic form; the numerous translations of Epicurean writings and the Pythagorean works, such as Varro's great treatise on the Elements of Numbers and the still more copious one of Figulus concerning the Gods, had beyond doubt neither scientific nor formal value. The other professional sciences.

Even the professional sciences were but feebly cultivated. Varro's Books on Husbandry written in the form of dialogue are no doubt more methodical than those of his predecessors Cato and Saserna—on which accordingly he drops many a side glance of censure—but have on the whole proceeded more from the study than, like those earlier works, from living experience. Of the juristic labours of Varro and of Servius Sulpicius Rufus (consul in 703) hardly aught more can be said, than that they contributed to the dialectic and philosophical embellishment of Roman jurisprudence. And there is nothing further here to be mentioned, except perhaps the three books of Gaius Matrius on cooking, pickling, and making preserves—so far as we know, the earliest Roman cookery-book, and, as the work of a man of rank, certainly a phenomenon deserving of notice. That mathematics and physics were stimulated by the increased Hellenistic and utilitarian tendencies of the monarchy, is apparent from their growing importance in the instruction of youth (P. 564) and from various practical applications; under which, besides the reform of the calendar (P. 555), may perhaps be included 51.

the appearance of wall-maps at this period, the technical improvements in shipbuilding and in musical instruments, designs and buildings like the aviary specified by Varro, the bridge of piles over the Rhine executed by the engineers of Cæsar, and even two semicircular stages of boards arranged for being pushed together and employed first separately as two theatres and then jointly as an amphitheatre. The public exhibition of foreign natural curiosities at the popular festivals was not unusual; and the descriptions of remarkable animals, which Cæsar has embodied in the reports of his campaigns, show that, had an Aristotle appeared, he would have again found his patron-prince. But such literary performances as are mentioned in this department are essentially associated with Neopythagoreanism, such as the comparison of Greek and Barbarian, *i. e.* Egyptian, celestial observations by Figulus, and his writings concerning animals, winds, and generative organs. After Greek physical research generally had swerved from the Aristotelian effort to find amidst the several facts their law, and had more and more passed into an empiric and mostly uncritical observation of the external and surprising in nature, natural science when coming forward as a mystical philosophy of nature, instead of enlightening and stimulating, could only still more stupefy and paralyze; and in presence of such a method it was better to rest satisfied with the platitude which Cicero delivers as Socratic wisdom, that the investigation of nature either seeks after things which nobody can know, or after such things as nobody needs to know.

Art.

Architec-
ture.

If, in fine, we cast a glance at art, we discover here the same unpleasant phenomena which pervade the whole mental life of this period. Building on the part of the state was virtually brought to a total stand amidst the scarcity of money that marked the last age of the republic. We have already spoken of the luxury in building of the Roman grandees; the architects learned in consequence of this to be lavish of marble—the coloured sorts such as the yellow Numidian (*Giallo antico*) and others came into vogue at this time, and the marble-quarries of Luna (*Carrara*) were now employed for the first time—and began to inlay the floors of the rooms with mosaic work, to panel the walls with slabs of marble, or to paint the compartments in imitation of marble—the first steps towards the subsequent fresco painting. But art was no gainer by this lavish magnificence.

In the arts of design connoisseurship and collecting were always on the increase. It was a mere affectation of Catonian simplicity, when an advocate spoke before the jurymen of the works of art "of a certain Praxiteles;" every one travelled and inspected, and the trade of the art-ciceroni, or, as they were then called, the *exegetæ*, was none of the worst. Ancient works of art were formally hunted after—statues and pictures less, it is true, than, in accordance with the rude character of Roman luxury, artistically wrought furniture and ornaments of all sorts for the room and the table. As early as that age the old Greek tombs of Capua and Corinth were ransacked for the sake of the bronze and earthenware vessels which had been placed in the tomb along with the dead. For a small statuette of bronze 40,000 sesterces (£400) were paid, and 200,000 (£2000) for a pair of costly carpets; a well wrought bronze cooking machine came to cost more than an estate. In this barbaric hunting after art the rich amateur was, as might be expected, frequently cheated by his informants; but the economic ruin of Asia Minor in particular so exceedingly rich in artistic products brought many really ancient and rare ornaments and works of art into the market, and from Athens, Syracuse, Cyzicus, Pergamus, Chios, Samos, and other ancient seats of art, everything that was for sale and very much that was not migrated to the palaces and villas of the Roman grandees. We have already mentioned what treasures of art were to be found within the house of Lucullus, who indeed was accused, perhaps not unjustly, of having gratified his interest in the fine arts at the expense of his duties as a general. The amateurs of art crowded thither as they crowd at present to the Villa Borghese, and complained even then of such treasures being confined to the palaces and country houses of the grandees, where they could be seen only with difficulty and after special permission from the possessor. The public buildings on the other hand were far from filled in like proportion with famous works of Greek masters, and in many cases there still stood in the temples of the capital nothing but the old images of the gods carved in wood. As to the exercise of art there is virtually nothing to report; there is hardly mentioned by name from this period any Roman sculptor or painter except a certain Arellius, whose pictures rapidly went off not on account of their artistic value, but because the cunning reprobate furnished in the pictures of the

Arts of
design.

goddesses faithful portraits of his mistresses for the time being.

Dancing
and music.

The importance of music and dancing increased in public as in domestic life. We have already set forth how theatrical music and the dancing-piece attained to an independent standing in the development of the stage at this period (P. 582); we may add that now in Rome itself representations were very frequently given by Greek musicians, dancers, and declaimers on the public stage—such as were usual in Asia Minor and generally in the whole Hellenic and Hellenising world.* To these fell to be added the musicians and dancing-girls, who exhibited their arts to order at table and elsewhere, and the special choirs of stringed and wind instruments and singers which were no longer rare in noble

* Such "Greek entertainments" were very frequent not merely in the Greek cities of Italy, especially in Naples (Cic. *pro Arch.* 5, 10; Plut. *Brut.* 21), but even now also in Rome (iii. 423; Cic. *Ad Fam.* vii. 1, 3; *Ad Att.* xvi. 5, 1; Sueton. *Cæs.* 39; Plut. *Brut.* 21.) When the well-known epitaph of Licinia Eucharis fourteen years of age, which probably belongs to the end of this period, makes this "girl well instructed and taught in all arts by the Muses themselves" shine as a dancer in the private exhibitions of noble houses and appear first in public on the Greek stage (*modo nobilitum ludos decoravi choro, et Græca in scena prima populo apparui*), this doubtless can only mean that she was the first girl that appeared on the public Greek stage in Rome; as generally indeed it was not till this epoch that women began to come forward publicly in Rome (P. 579). These "Greek entertainments" in Rome seem not to have been properly scenic, but rather to have belonged to the category of composite exhibitions—primarily musical and declamatory—such as were not of rare occurrence in subsequent times also in Greece (Welcker, *Griech. Trag.* S. 1277). This view is supported by the prominence of flute-playing in Polybius (xxx. 13) and of dancing in the account of Suetonius regarding the armed dances from Asia Minor performed at Cæsar's games and in the epitaph of Eucharis; the description also of the *citharædus* (*Ad Her.* iv. 47, 60; comp. Vitruv. v. 5, 7) must have been derived from such "Greek entertainments." The combination of these representations in Rome with Greek athletic combats is significant (Polyb. *l. c.*; Liv. xxxix. 22). Dramatic recitations were by no means excluded from these mixed entertainments, since among the players whom Lucius Anicius caused to appear in 587 in Rome tragedians are expressly mentioned; there was however no exhibition of plays in the strict sense, but either whole dramas or perhaps still more frequently pieces taken from them were declaimed or sung to the flute by single artists. This must accordingly have been done also in Rome; but to all appearance for the Roman public the main matter in these Greek games was the music and dancing, and the text probably had little more significance for them than the texts of the Italian opera for the Londoners and Parisians of the present day. Those composite entertainments with their confused medley were far better suited for the Roman public and especially for exhibitions in private houses than proper scenic performances in the Greek language; the view that the latter also took place in Rome cannot be refuted, but can as little be proved.

houses. But that even the world of quality itself played and sang with diligence, is shown by the very adoption of music into the cycle of the generally recognised subjects of instruction (P. 564); as to dancing, it was, to say nothing of women, made matter of reproach even against consulars that they exhibited themselves in dancing performances amidst a small circle.

Towards the end of this period, however, there appears with the commencement of the monarchy the beginning of a better time also in art. We have already mentioned the mighty stimulus which building in the capital received, and building throughout the empire was destined to receive, through Cæsar. Even in the cutting of the dies of the coins there appears about 700 a remarkable change; the stamping hitherto for the most part rude and negligent is thenceforward managed with more delicacy and care.

Incipient
influence of
the mo-
narchy.

54.

We have reached the end of the Roman republic. We have seen it rule for five hundred years in Italy and in the countries on the Mediterranean; we have seen it brought to run in politics and morals, religion and literature, not through outward violence but through inward decay, and thereby making room for the new monarchy of Cæsar. There was in the world, as Cæsar found it, much of the noble heritage of past centuries and an infinite abundance of pomp and glory, but little spirit, still less taste, and least of all true delight in life. It was indeed an old world; and even the richly-gifted patriotism of Cæsar could not make it young again. The dawn does not return till after the night has fully set in and run its course. But yet with him there came to the sorely harassed peoples on the Mediterranean a tolerable evening after the sultry noon; and when at length after a long historical night a new day dawned once more for the peoples, and fresh nations in free self-movement commenced their race towards new and higher goals, there were found among them not a few, in which the seed sown by Cæsar had sprung up, and which were and are indebted to him for their national individuality.

Conclusion.

THE END.